Does perceived ability to deceive = ability to deceive? Predictive validity of the perceived ability to deceive (PATD) scale

This research investigated whether the perceived ability to deceive (PATD) scale predicts ability to deceive in a vocational testing context. Using a quasi-experimental design, participants (N = 85 student and community members) completed the PATD scale and a personality measure under standard instructions before being asked to fake the personality measure as if they were applying for a job in the police force. Based on extant research, successful faking was operationalised as elevated scores on conscientiousness and extraversion and reduced scores on neuroticism. Analysis via independent t-test did not support the hypothesis that PATD predicts faking success. Future research should consider the relationship between PATD and intention to fake, as well as extend examination of PATD to other deception-related contexts.     

The role of fluid and emotional intelligence in malingering

The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of fluid (gf), social (SI) and emotional intelligence (EI) in faking the Beck Depression Inventory (2nd ed., BDI‐II). Twenty‐two students and 26 non‐students completed Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), a social insight test, the Schutte et al. self‐report EI scale, and the BDI‐II under honest and faking instructions. Results were consistent with a new model of successful faking, in which a participant's original response must be manipulated into a strategic response, which must match diagnostic criteria. As hypothesised, the BDI‐II could be faked, and gf was not related to faking ability. Counter to expectations, however, SI and EI were not related to faking ability. A second study explored why EI failed to facilitate faking. Forty‐nine students and 50 non‐students completed the EI measure, the Marlowe‐Crown Scale and the Levenson et al. Psychopathy Scale. As hypothesised, EI was negatively correlated with psychopathy, but EI showed no relationship with socially desirable responding. It was concluded that in the first experiment, high‐EI people did fake effectively, but high‐psychopathy people (who had low EI) were also faking effectively, resulting in a distribution that showed no advantage to high EI individuals.     

Instructed faking of the HEXACO reduces facet reliability and involves more Gc than Gf

Research on the role of intelligence in the capacity to fake personality tests tends to use the Big Five and g-factor models of personality and intelligence. The current study (N = 185 university students) examines instructed faking on the HEXACO and separately considers the role of fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc). Results demonstrate that: (a) participants can fake the HEXACO domains and facets to about the same extent as the Big Five; (b) faking has little effect on domain reliability but reduces facet reliability; and (c) faking involves Gc to a much greater degree than Gf. Results are discussed in terms of practical applications of facet scores, and process models of faking.     

Individual Differences in the Ability to Fake on Personality Measures

This study provides a partial test of the model of faking proposed by McFarland and Ryan (2000) McFarland, L. A. and Ryan, A. M. 2000. Variance in faking across noncognitive measures.. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(5): 812–821. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] by examining the degree to which self-monitoring, knowledge of the constructs being measured, job familiarity, and openness to ideas account for variance in ability to fake on a personality measure. Undergraduates (N = 342) completed a modified version of the NEO Personality Inventory–Revised under both honest and faking instructions. In addition, some participants were asked to “fake good” and others were asked to fake toward the requirements of a specific job (i.e., accountant). Consistent with prior research, the fake good manipulation was found to increase scores on 8 of the 9 personality variables. In contrast, the fake accountant manipulation resulted in a personality profile consistent with a priori hypotheses in which some personality scores were significantly increased whereas others were significantly decreased. Results also revealed that the individual difference variables explained a significant portion of the variance in the ability to fake and that the two faking conditions produced different relations with these individual difference variables. As hypothesized, the participants' openness to ideas was a significant predictor of the ability to fake like an accountant (β = .22) but not the ability to fake good. In contrast, the participants' knowledge of the constructs being measured was a significant predictor of the ability to fake good (β = .18) but not the ability to fake like an accountant. We conclude by elaborating on the importance of using a hypothesis testing approach in the assessment of the relations between personality variables and job performance.     

人才甄选中的人格测验作假研究的深入与拓展

企业人才甄选情境下求职者很容易在人格测验中作假。至今有关作假的研究已包含作假的内涵、来源和识别等多个方面,也诞生了多种心理模型尝试解释作假产生的心理机制,如作假动机与作假能力交互作用理论、作假计划行为理论、作假整合模型、一般作假行为模型以及作假的VIE模型,为后续理论研究点明方向。此外,作假应用领域中新兴的网络人格测验作假受到关注,在此介绍网络与纸笔测验两种形式下,人格测验作假行为、作假意向的不同。     

Faking on self-report emotional intelligence and personality tests: Effects of faking opportunity, cognitive ability, and job type

We assessed the combined effects of cognitive ability, opportunity to fake, and trait job-relevance on faking self-report emotional intelligence and personality tests by having 150 undergraduates complete such tests honestly and then so as to appear ideal for one of three jobs: nurse practitioner, marketing manager, and computer programmer. Faking, as expected, was greater (a) in higher-g participants, (b) in those scoring lower under honest conditions (with greater opportunity to fake), and (c) on job-relevant traits. Predicted interactions accounted for additional unique variance in faking. Combining all three factors yielded a “perfect storm” standardized difference of around 2, more than double the overall .83 estimate. Implications for the study of faking are discussed.     

Correction for faking in self‐report personality tests

Faking is a common problem in testing with self‐report personality tests, especially in high‐stakes situations. A possible way to correct for it is statistical control on the basis of social desirability scales. Two such scales were developed and applied in the present paper. It was stressed that the statistical models of faking need to be adapted to different properties of the personality scales, since such scales correlate with faking to different extents. In four empirical studies of self‐report personality tests, correction for faking was investigated. One of the studies was experimental, and asked participants to fake or to be honest. In the other studies, job or school applicants were investigated. It was found that the approach to correct for effects of faking in self‐report personality tests advocated in the paper removed a large share of the effects, about 90%. It was found in one study that faking varied as a function of degree of how important the consequences of test results could be expected to be, more high‐stakes situations being associated with more faking. The latter finding is incompatible with the claim that social desirability scales measure a general personality trait. It is concluded that faking can be measured and that correction for faking, based on such measures, can be expected to remove about 90% of its effects.     

A Model of Faking Likelihood in the Employment Interview

There has been surprisingly little research on faking in the employment interview, despite the fact that professional judgment would suggest that faking might occur in the interview. Based on a review of the literature on faking in personality tests and the literature on deception, we propose a model of faking during an employment interview and develop 19 testable propositions to guide future research. We argue that faking is a function of capacity, willingness, and opportunity to fake. Structured interviews provide less opportunity for intentional distortion; however, some components of structure may actually increase faking. Finally, job candidates distort their responses in job desirable ways.     

Secondary psychopathy,but not primary psychopathy,is associated with risky decision-making in noninstitutionalized young adults

Although risky decision-making has been posited to contribute to the maladaptive behavior of individuals with psychopathic tendencies, the performance of psychopathic groups on a common task of risky decision-making, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), has been equivocal. Different aspects of psychopathy (personality traits, antisocial deviance) and/or moderating variables may help to explain these inconsistent findings. In a sample of college students (N = 129, age 18–27), we examined the relationship between primary and secondary psychopathic features and IGT performance. A measure of impulsivity was included to investigate its potential as a moderator. In a joint model including main effects and interactions between primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy and impulsivity, only secondary psychopathy was significantly related to risky IGT performance, and this effect was not moderated by the other variables. This finding supports the growing literature suggesting that secondary psychopathy is a better predictor of decision-making problems than the primary psychopathic personality traits of lack of empathy and remorselessness.     

They Don't Do It Often,But They Do It Well: Exploring the relationship between applicant mental abilities and faking

Despite its scientific and practical importance, relatively few studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between job applicant mental abilities and faking. Some studies suggest that more intelligent people fake less because they do not have to. Other studies suggest that more intelligent people fake more because they have increased capacity to fake. Based on a model of faking likelihood, we predicted that job candidates with a high level of mental abilities would be less likely to fake a biodata measure. However, for candidates who did exhibit faking on the biodata measure, we expected there would be a strong positive relationship between mental abilities and faking, because mental abilities increase their capacity to fake. We found considerable support for hypotheses on a large sample of job candidates (N=17,368), using the bogus item technique to detect faking.     

A Comparison of the Construct Validity of Two Alternative Approaches to the Assessment of Psychopathy in the Community

This study compared the validity of 2 different self-report approaches to the assessment of psychopathy in nonforensic samples: the Psychopathy Resemblance Index (PRI), derived from a measure of normal personality functioning, and the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP), developed specifically to assess the maladaptive traits associated with psychopathy. In 2 adult samples (n ₁ = 260, n₂ = 250), the PRI and the SRP were positively correlated with each other and with measures of maladaptive personality traits related to Machiavellianism and narcissism. However, unlike the SRP, the PRI was independent of trait empathy and general psychopathology and was positively associated with trait emotional intelligence. These results suggest that the PRI captures a more adaptive variant of psychopathy than does the SRP.     

An assessment of the fakeability of self-report and implicit personality measures

Researchers are focusing on developing implicit measures of personality to address concerns related to the faking of self-report measures. The present study examined the validity and fakeability of Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures of personality self-concept in a repeated-measures design (N = 33). People’s predictions about how they represented themselves on the measures were also assessed. Results indicated that participants were able fake self-report measures when instructed to do so and that they could accurately predict how they represented themselves on these measures. Participants were also able to fake an IAT measure of Extraversion, but were unable to fake an IAT measure of Conscientiousness or predict how they represented themselves on either IAT measure.     

Unique and Interactive Associations of Callous-Unemotional Traits,Impulsivity and Grandiosity with Child and Adolescent Conduct Disorder Symptoms

The construct of psychopathy remains underrepresented in the clinical diagnosis of Conduct Disorder (CD) as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th edition (DSM-5) only addresses one out of the three dimensions of child psychopathy, Callous Unemotional (CU) traits. This study tests if and to what extent there are unique and interactive associations of CU traits, impulsivity, and grandiosity with child and adolescent CD symptoms. Data were collected from two separate community samples of children (N?=?1599; Mage?=?9.46, SD?=?1.65; 52% female) and adolescents (N?=?2719; Mage?=?16.99, SD?=?0.99; 49% female), who were followed longitudinally after a year. Hierarchical linear regression analyses were conducted, testing cross-sectional and longitudinal associations with CD symptoms, taking into account all three psychopathy dimensions. The cross-sectional findings indicate that only youth presenting a combination of all three psychopathy dimensions scored above the clinical cut-off score for CD. On the other hand, longitudinal findings provided evidence that the combination of high initial levels of CD and CU traits as well as the combination between CD, grandiosity, and impulsivity can lead to clinical levels of future CD symptoms. Findings also indicated that CU traits and impulsivity more strongly predicted adolescent than child CD symptoms, and that CU traits were more strongly associated with boys’ than girls’ CD symptoms. Findings support the inclusion of CU traits as a specifier for the diagnosis of CD, and provide evidence that other psychopathy dimensions can also help clinicians to better understand and treat youth with CD, and should be considered for future revisions of the DSM.     

Using Personality Testing for Personnel Selection: Faking and Test-Taking Inductions

This research assessed whether warning subjects that faked responses could be detected would reduce the amount of faking that might occur when using a personality test for selection of police officers. Also, personality test subscales which best differentiated honest from dissimulated responses were determined. Subjects (N=120) were randomly assigned to a straight-take (that is, respond honestly), fake good, or modified fake good group. Both fake good groups were instructed to respond to the test so as to appear favourably for the job; additionally, the modified fake good group was warned that faking could be detected and could reduce hiring chances. Multivariate analyses revealed significant differences on the Denial and Deviation subscales between the three conditions (p <0.01). The pattern of differences suggested that the threat of faking detection reduced faking. Potential application of these findings in personnel selection was discussed.     

Do Applicants Fake Their Personality Questionnaire Responses and How Successful are Their Attempts? A Case of Military Pilot Cadet Selection

This paper presents the results of three interrelated studies investigating the occurrence of response distortion on personality questionnaires within selection and the success of applicants in faking situations. In Study 1, comparison of the Big Five personality scores obtained from applicants in a military pilot cadet selection procedure with participants responding honestly, faking good, and faking an ideal candidate revealed that applicants responded more desirable than participants responding honestly but less desirable than respondents under fake instructions. The occurrence of faking within the military pilot selection process was replicated in Study 2 using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire and another comparison group. Finally, in Study 3, comparison of personality profiles obtained in selection and ‘fake job’ situations with experts' estimates indicated that participants were partially successful in faking the desirable profile.     

Intentional response distortion on personality tests: using eye-tracking to understand response processes when faking

Intentional response distortion or faking among job applicants completing measures such as personality and integrity tests is a concern in personnel selection. The present study aimed to investigate whether eye-tracking technology can improve our understanding of the response process when faking. In an experimental within-participants design, a Big Five personality test and an integrity measure were administered to 129 university students in 2 conditions: a respond honestly and a faking good instruction. Item responses, response latencies, and eye movements were measured. Results demonstrated that all personality dimensions were fakeable. In support of the theoretical position that faking involves a less cognitively demanding process than responding honestly, we found that response times were on average 0.25 s slower and participants had less eye fixations in the fake good condition. However, in the fake good condition, participants had more fixations on the 2 extreme response options of the 5-point answering scale, and they fixated on these more directly after having read the question. These findings support the idea that faking leads to semantic rather than self-referenced item interpretations. Eye-tracking was demonstrated to be potentially useful in detecting faking behavior, improving detecting rates over and beyond response extremity and latency metrics.     

Do people fake on personality inventories? A verbal protocol analysis

Research has focused heavily on whether individuals can fake on personality inventories. Research is less clear on whether individuals actually do fake on personality inventories. Verbal protocol analysis was used to trace the motivational processes for 12 participants as they completed a personality inventory in an applicant context. Exploratory analyses suggested that individuals do fake on personality inventories; that individuals can be classed into one of three faking classes (honest responders, slight fakers, and extreme fakers); and that honest fakers take less time to complete and make less corrections to their personality inventories than faking responders. Study implications, limitations, and future research will be discussed.

Throwing more light on the dark side of psychopathy: An extension of previous findings for the revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory

Despite previous studies of psychopathy and the motivational systems of the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) of personality, few have examined psychopathy in light of the revised RST model. In a large sample (N = 779) of young adults, we expand on Hughes, Moore, Morris, and Corr’s (2012) preliminary findings relating primary/secondary psychopathy to revised RST’s three systems: Flight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS), Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), and Behavioral Approach System (BAS). Converging results between Hughes et al. and the current study emphasize three major findings: (1) primary psychopathy is negatively related to the BIS as well as the FFFS; (2) primary psychopathy is positively related to goal-driven behavior of the BAS; and, (3) secondary psychopathy is positively related to impulsivity reflected in the BAS. The FFFS was incrementally predictive of primary but not secondary psychopathy. No evidence for a BAS × BIS interaction in psychopathy was found. Results are discussed in terms of future research directions.     

Effects of the testing situation on item responding: cause for concern

The effects of faking on personality test scores have been studied previously by comparing (a) experimental groups instructed to fake or answer honestly, (b) subgroups created from a single sample of applicants or nonapplicants by using impression management scores, and (c) job applicants and nonapplicants. In this investigation, the latter 2 methods were used to study the effects of faking on the functioning of the items and scales of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. A variety of item response theory methods were used to detect differential item/test functioning, interpreted as evidence of faking. The presence of differential item/test functioning across testing situations suggests that faking adversely affects the construct validity of personality scales and that it is problematic to study faking by comparing groups defined by impression management scores.     

Cross‐Cultural Differences in Applicant Faking on Personality Tests: A 43‐Nation Study

In a globalised world, more and more organisations have to select from pools of applicants from different cultures, often by using personality tests. If applicants from different cultures were to differ in the amount of faking on personality tests, this could threaten their validity: Applicants who engage in faking will have an advantage, and will put those who do not fake at a disadvantage. This is the first study to systematically examine and explain cross‐cultural differences in actual faking behavior. In N = 3,678 employees from 43 countries, a scenario‐based repeated measures design (faking vs. honest condition) was applied. Results showed that faking differed significantly across countries, and that it was systematically related to countries’ cultural characteristics (e.g. GLOBE's uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, humane orientation, and in‐group collectivism), but in an unexpected way. The study discusses these findings and their implications for research and practitioners.