Counterfactual thinking about controllable events

When people think about what might have been, they mentally undo controllable rather than uncontrollable events. We report the results of two experiments in which we examined this controllability effect in counterfactual thinking. The experiments show that the mutability of controllable events is influenced by the perceived appropriateness or inappropriateness of the events. The first experiment shows that people change inappropriate controllable actions more than appropriate controllable ones. The second experiment shows that people mutate inappropriate controllable events whether the outcome is exceptional or normal with respect to intrapersonal habitual norms, and whether the outcome is positive or negative. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of counterfactual thinking.     

Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act

When people think counterfactually about how a situation could have turned out differently, they mentally undo events in regular ways (e.g., they focus on actions not failures to act). Four experiments examine the recent discovery that the focus on actions in the short term switches to inactions in the long term. The experiments show that this temporal switch occurs only for particular sorts of situations. Experiment 1 showed no temporal pattern to the agency effect when 112 participants judged emotional impact and frequency of "if-only" thoughts from both short- and long-term perspectives for an investment scenario. Experiment 2 showed no temporal pattern when 190 participants considered a college choice scenario with a good outcome. Experiment 3 showed no temporal pattern when 131 participants considered an investment scenario even when the situation for the actor and nonactor was bad from the outset. Experiment 4, with 113 participants, showed a focus on actions even when the investment loss was equal for both the actor and nonactor. The implications of the results are discussed in terms of what is explicitly available in the mental representation of actions and inactions.     

The Motivational Roots of Norms for Environmentally Responsible Behavior

We assessed whether people use a magnitude-matching principle in determining causes for complex social events. We hypothesized that individuals tend to favor causal explanations that match the event in terms of size and scope. In Experiment 1, the magnitude of the consequences of events was manipulated, and participants were presented with two potential causes of modest magnitude and two potential causes of high magnitude. Analyses revealed a relative magnitude-matching effect such that participants were more likely to select high magnitude causes for large magnitude events than modest magnitude events and more likely to select modest magnitude causes for modest magnitude events than large magnitude events. Experiment 2 replicated the magnitude-matching effect with a different event and set of causes, and demonstrated that this effect could be reversed by undermining participants' beliefs in the magnitude-matching principle.     

Infants' Perception of Causal Chains

Three experiments examined infants' and adults' perception of causal sequences of events. In a causal-chain sequence, the first action causes a second action that then causes a final outcome; in a temporal-chain sequence, the first two actions are independent and the second action causes a final outcome. Infants and adults were shown the same event sequences; infants were tested using a visual habituation paradigm, whereas adults were given a questionnaire. Experiment 1 indicated that 15-month-old infants perceive the primary cause of the final outcome to be the first action in a causal chain but the second action in a temporal chain. Experiment 2 showed that adults interpret the causal sequences in a manner similar to that of 15-month-olds. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that 10-month-old infants do not yet perceive causal sequences in the same manner as 15-month-olds and adults. These results are interpreted in terms of both infants' developing knowledge of causal events and adults' attributions of causality in complex events.     

Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

节律性时间期待效应不受注意控制的影响

采用双任务范式探讨当听觉节律刺激序列以较慢速度呈现时,其诱导产生的时间期待效应是否受到同时进行的视觉工作记忆任务的影响。结果发现,无论目标刺激是呈现在听觉通道还是视觉通道,双任务和单任务条件下目标刺激出现在规律听觉刺激序列之后被试的反应时均快于目标出现在非规律听觉刺激序列之后,即节律性刺激序列诱导产生的时间期待效应不受工作记忆任务的影响。该结果表明节律性时间期待效应不受注意控制的影响。     

Inferring interventional predictions from observational learning data

Previous research has shown that people are capable of deriving correct predictions for previously unseen actions from passive observations of causal systems (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). However, these studies were limited, since learning data were presented as tabulated data only, which may have turned the task more into a reasoning rather than a learning task. In two experiments, we therefore presented learners with trial-by-trial observational learning input referring to a complex causal model consisting of four events. To test the robustness of the capacity to derive correct observational and interventional inferences, we pitted causal order against the temporal order of learning events. The results show that people are, in principle, capable of deriving correct predictions after purely observational trial-by-trial learning, even with relatively complex causal models. However, conflicting temporal information can impair performance, particularly when the inferences require taking alternative causal pathways into account.     

Cue interaction and judgments of causality: Contributions of causal and associative processes

In four experiments, the predictions made by causal model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model were tested by using a cue interaction paradigm that measures the relative response to a given event based on the influence or salience of an alternative event. Experiments 1 and 2 uncorrelated two variables that have typically been confounded in the literature (causal order and the number of cues and outcomes) and demonstrated that overall contingency judgments are influenced by the causal structure of the events. Experiment 3 showed that trial-by-trial prediction responses, a second measure of causal assessment, were not influenced by the causal structure of the described events. Experiment 4 revealed that participants became less sensitive to the influence of the causal structure in both their ratings and their predictions as trials progressed. Thus, two experiments provided evidence for high-level (causal reasoning) processes, and two experiments provided evidence for low-level (associative) processes. We argue that both factors influence causal assessment, depending on what is being asked about the events and participants' experience with those events.     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

The influence of aging on preferences for sequences of mixed affective events

Research on preferences among sequences of mixed affective events has mostly used young adults as participants. Given differences due to aging in people's ability to regulate emotion, one could expect differences due to aging in preferences for different sequences. Study 1 demonstrated age‐related differences in how older adults (age 65 and older) versus young adults (age 18–25) choose to order mixed affective events that will occur over time. The tendency to choose sequences in which the final event is positive was greater among older adults versus young adults. And, more so than young adults, older adults preferred that the positive and negative events in a sequence be separated in time by a neutral event. Studies 2–3 investigated age‐related differences in overall retrospective evaluations of presented sequences of mixed affective events. In contrast to young adults, older adults' retrospective evaluations were not affected by: (1) whether the final trend of the sequence improved monotonically; (2) whether the last event in the sequence was positive; or (3) the temporal proximity of positive and negative events in the sequence. Results of Study 3 suggest that these age‐related differences are due to differences in older (vs. young) adults' ability to regulate emotion. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phase Correction Following a Perturbation in Sensorimotor Synchronization Depends on Sensory Information

In models of sensorimotor synchronization, it is generally assumed that phase correction occurs in response to information about sensorimotor asynchrony or relative phase. Without such feedback, a phase perturbation in the motor activity should not be followed by phase correction. Alternatively, internally generated temporal expectations could provide a basis for phase correction in the absence of feedback. To test those hypotheses, the author conducted an experiment in which participants (N = 8) tapped their finger in synchrony with isochronous auditory sequences containing a single shifted event onset, after which there could be a gap of up to 3 missing events. Participants were instructed to not react to the shifted event and to continue tapping regularly during any gap. The shifted event caused an involuntary phase shift of the following tap. The shift was corrected if the sequence continued, but during a gap, the shift persisted without correction. Those results confirm that sensory feedback is necessary for phase correction to occur.     

Cross-cultural differences in mental representations of time: evidence from an implicit nonlinguistic task

Across cultures people construct spatial representations of time. However, the particular spatial layouts created to represent time may differ across cultures. This paper examines whether people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. In Experiment 1, we asked Hebrew and English speakers to arrange pictures depicting temporal sequences of natural events, and to point to the hypothesized location of events relative to a reference point. In both tasks, English speakers (who read left to right) arranged temporal sequences to progress from left to right, whereas Hebrew speakers (who read right to left) arranged them from right to left, replicating previous work. In Experiments 2 and 3, we asked the participants to make rapid temporal order judgments about pairs of pictures presented one after the other (i.e., to decide whether the second picture showed a conceptually earlier or later time-point of an event than the first picture). Participants made responses using two adjacent keyboard keys. English speakers were faster to make "earlier" judgments when the "earlier" response needed to be made with the left response key than with the right response key. Hebrew speakers showed exactly the reverse pattern. Asking participants to use a space-time mapping inconsistent with the one suggested by writing direction in their language created interference, suggesting that participants were automatically creating writing-direction consistent spatial representations in the course of their normal temporal reasoning. It appears that people automatically access culturally specific spatial representations when making temporal judgments even in nonlinguistic tasks.     

Temporal information and children's and adults' causal inferences

Three experiments examined whether children and adults would use temporal information as a cue to the causal structure of a three-variable system, and also whether their judgements about the effects of interventions on the system would be affected by the temporal properties of the event sequence. Participants were shown a system in which two events B and C occurred either simultaneously (synchronous condition) or in a temporal sequence (sequential condition) following an initial event A. The causal judgements of adults and 6–7-year-olds differed between the conditions, but this was not the case for 4-year-olds' judgements. However, unlike those of adults, 6–7-year-olds' intervention judgements were not affected by condition, and causal and intervention judgements were not reliably consistent in this age group. The findings support the claim that temporal information provides an important cue to causal structure, at least in older children. However, they raise important issues about the relationship between causal and intervention judgements.     

Scripts or scraps: reconsidering the development of sequential understanding

A growing literature attests to temporally ordered recall of events by children under 2 years of age. Other data suggest a developmental sequence wherein the ability to reproduce unfamiliar and/or arbitrarily ordered events, and familiar events in other than canonical order develops well after the first ordered productions of events. Early ordering is thus argued to be dependent upon familiarity, rather than upon general temporal principles. This suggestion was investigated by using elicited imitation to assess 21-month-olds' recall of familiar-canonical, familiar-reversed, novel-causal, and novel-arbitrary event sequences. Subjects reproduced canonical and both types of novel sequences in modeled order. On reversed sequences they vacillated between reproducing the events as modeled and "correcting" them to canonical order. The results suggest that temporal organization is not imposed upon an existing unordered event representation, but rather, is an integral aspect of the representation from its initial construction. It is suggested that young children's difficulty with reversed sequences may be attributed to a reluctance to reorganize existing representations, rather than to the absence of applicable temporal principles.     

公众时间回溯式记忆的特点

采用事后回溯设计,考察了大学生公众时间回溯式记忆的特点。研究选取1995到2001年之间发生可辨别的新闻事件14项,要求被试对新闻事件的时序、时点和时距进行回忆。结果表明：（1）公众事件回溯式时点记忆的正确率随时间的远近发生变化,较远的时间回忆正确率低,而较近的时间回忆正确率较高,存在近因效应。（2）公众事件的回溯式时距估计受真实时距的影响,短时距容易被高估,长时距容易被低估。（3）公众事件的回溯式时序回忆存在近因效应和首因效应,被试对发生较远的事件总是倾向于估计得更远,对发生较近的事件也倾向于估计得较近。而对两者中间的事件的顺序估计较为混乱。（4）本实验研究的公众事件回溯式时间记忆符合时间的重构理论和分段综合模型。     

Perception of randomness and predicting uncertain events

Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run minority events, called the long-run contrarian strategy; a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run majority events, called the short-run momentum strategy; and a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run minority events, called the short-run contrarian strategy. When the character of events remains unknown, the most common strategy is the short-run momentum strategy. With the increase of a perceived randomness of the situation, people tend more often to use the short-run contrarian strategy. People differ in their general beliefs about the continuation or reversal of a trend in various natural and social processes. Trend believers, when facing sequences of binary events commonly perceived as random, tend to use momentum strategies, whereas those who believe in the trend's reversal tend to use contrarian strategies.     

心理距离与建构水平的双向作用关系

心理距离概念源于时间建构理论,以自我为中心,参照点是此时此地自己的直接经验,并沿不同维度向外扩展,形成通常所认为的时间、空间、社会距离和假设性四个维度。本文述评了心理距离与建构水平的双向作用关系及其产生原因,即远心理距离使人采用核心、去背景化特征表征事物,近心理距离使人采用外围、背景化特征表征事物;反之,高水平建构使人感知到远心理距离,低水平建构使人感知到近心理距离。未来研究应关注非自我参照点的客观距离与建构水平的关系,以及心理距离与建构水平关系的心理物理学研究等。