Humanizing Personhood

This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends that a more focused attention on the morally relevant features of human life may indeed play a crucial role in enhancing our moral understanding.     

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide from Confucian Moral Perspectives

This essay first discusses the three major arguments in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide in contemporary Western society, viz., the arguments of mercy, preventing indignity, and individual autonomy. It then articulates both Confucian consonance and dissonance to them. The first two arguments make use of Confucian discussions on suicide whereas the last argument appeals to Confucian social-political thought. It concludes that from the Confucian moral perspectives, none of the three arguments is fully convincing.     

Animal welfare and individual characteristics: a conversation against speciesism

It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual's characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one's understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans.     

Dispositional accounts of evil personhood

It is intuitively plausible that not every evildoer is an evil person. In order to make sense of this intuition we need to construct an account of evil personhood in addition to an account of evil action. Some philosophers have offered aggregative accounts of evil personhood, but these do not fit well with common intuitions about the explanatory power of evil personhood, the possibility of moral reform, and the relationship between evil and luck. In contrast, a dispositional account of evil personhood can allow that evil is explanatory, that an evil person can become good, and that luck might prevent evil persons from doing evil or cause non-evil persons to do evil. Yet the dispositional account of evil personhood implies that some evil persons are blameless, which seems to clash with the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation. Moreover, since it is likely that a large proportion of us are disposed to perform evil actions in some environments, the dispositional account threatens to label a large proportion of people evil. In this paper I consider a range of possible modifications to the dispositional account that might bring it more closely into alignment with our intuitions about moral condemnation and the rarity of evil persons. According to the most plausible of these theories, S is an evil person if S is strongly disposed to perform evil actions when in conditions that favour S’s autonomy.     

Psychotherapy through the Group Process by Dorothy Stock Whitaker and Morton A. Lieberman

Ethics deals with right and wrong behavior. It can be used to check whether group therapists with their patients “abstain(s) from whatever is deleterious and mischievous,” an Hippocratic concern, and whether they safeguard their personhood, a Kantian requirement. Therapists' paternalism weakens the patients' moral agency and challenges their autonomy. Personal therapy lessens this tendency.

The group models Plato's and Socrates' ancient dialectic. Both see the end point, self-knowledge, as a virtue and seek it. Increased care of group members for each other is the modus operandi of treatment. This, with the therapist's clinical input, brings about patient wholeness. Reduction in the distorted treatment relationship returns autonomy to the patient. Group therapy is an ethical way to change patients psychologically. Gratuitously, they become more virtuous.     

?The person is a monad with windows?: sketch of a conceptual history of ‘person’ in Russia

The basic concepts ??person?? (Person), I/self (Ich) and ??subject?? (Subjekt) structuring the Russian discourse of personhood (Personalit?t) developed during the philosophical discussions of the 1820s?C1840s. The development occurred in the course of an intense reception of German Idealism and Romanticism. Characteristic of this process is that the modern meaning of personhood going back to the theological and natural-law interpretations of the person in Western Europe does not exist in the Russian cultural consciousness. Therefore the Russian concepts of personhood demonstrate the influence of the semantic innovations of Romanticism. Correspondingly, the semantic core of the Russian discourses on personhood is not the idea of an ??autonomous person?? but that of an ??unique individuality??. Here, personhood is not the indefeasible attribute of every man, but the mark of inimitable individuality. Accordingly, the basic distinction underlying the discourse on personhood in Russia is not the differentiation between ??person?? and ??thing?? as in the European tradition, but the distinction between ??individual?? and (anonymous) ??community??. Also, in the meaning of the concept of I/self the dominant differentiation is not that between I/self (Ich) and not-I/not-self (Nicht-Ich), but that between I and We. This discourse on personhood centring on the idea of individuality took form in Russia starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular in aesthetics, psychology, and educational theory, as well as in the philosophy of history. The comparative intercultural analysis of the history of concepts pertaining to personhood in the German-Russian cultural transfer brings to light the dialectic of European modernity in which a degree of tension is visible between the idea of personal autonomy and individuality.     

The Church in the Postcommunist World

Abstract

The collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe is evidence only of the triumph of Western‐style consumerism. The Church's influence on society, both in East and West, is very limited. This situation is the result of historical factors which may be traced back to the early Middle Ages. Historical materialism is the offspring of the medieval Western version of Christianity which, under rationalistic and moralistic pressure, transformed God into a dead authoritarian concept. A brief analysis of the terms ratio and logos is offered in illustration of the different mindsets of the Eastern and Western Churches. The metaphysical revolution which brought in the modern world was a rebellion against the Western understanding of God. Historically, Orthodoxy has lacked the confidence to advance its own view but it can contribute an understanding of the Church based on the notions of personhood and relation that offers the most fruitful way forward.     

Gift narration: dynamic themes of reciprocity,debt, and social relations in Theravāda Buddhist Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Scholarly studies of Buddhist gift-giving have explored the many ways in which gifts are or are not reciprocal. This topic is revisited in this article by the author drawing greater attention to the practice of narration. Instead of understanding Buddhist words about dāna as representing religious doctrines or the experience of its social practice, the author considers how Buddhists narrate dāna as a means of maintaining relationships with self and others. Examining narratives of one monastic gift-recipient, meanings of dāna and moral principles of gift-giving are shown to vary alongside shifting relations between givers and receivers. This case suggests that themes of reciprocity are most salient when narrators grapple with interpersonal threats. Offering possible interpretations of this correlation, the author argues how reciprocal forces could be external social conditions to which narratives respond as well as created ex nihilo through the practice of narration as a strategy of ordering interpersonal conflicts potentially unrelated to reciprocity.     

Moral Tuning

Can a set of musical metaphors in a treatise on ethics reveal something about the nature and source of moral autonomy? This article argues that it can. It shows how metaphorical usage of words like tone, pitch , and concord in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments can be understood as elements of an analogical model for morality. What this model tells us about morality depends on how we conceptualise music. In contrast to earlier interpretations of Smith's metaphors that have seen music as an aesthetic object, this article sees music as a practice. Understood in this way, the analogy allows us to see morality too as a practice––as moral tuning . This in turn reveals a novel answer to the intractable problem of conventionalism: moral autonomy consists in the freedom inherent in the constant need to interpret and reinterpret the strictly formal ideal of perfect propriety.     

In the World of Persons: The Personhood Debate in the Analects and Zhuangzi

This article is an examination of a debate between Confucians and Zhuangists surrounding the notion of moral personhood as understood in the early Confucian tradition. This debate takes place across texts??most importantly in the Confucian challenge of Analects 18.5-7 and the Zhuangist response of the Renjianshi chapter of the Zhuangzi. In better understanding the disagreement between these two schools, we can come to a clearer picture of the notion of personhood at stake. The Zhuangist reaction to the Confucian position on personhood helps to demonstrate that the Confucians held a conception of the person as communally constructed. Such a view, I argue, can be of great use in contemporary debates surrounding agency, moral responsibility, and moral development. After offering an outline of the Confucian position, I consider various Zhuangist objections both in the Analects and Renjianshi chapter, before considering what I take to be convincing Confucian responses to the Zhuangist objections.     

Personal wholeness and political creativity: The theology of liberation and pastoral care

The writer questions whether it is legitimate to take the institutional, ecclesiastical, and ecclesiological settings of pastoral care as a starting point for understanding it. He responds negatively since the struggle for liberation is a social, economic, and political one and mental distress reflects the individual's relation to this world. Thus the relation between the institutional church and the sociopolitical realities is ambiguous and it sometimes obscures the conflict between the rich and the poor, the powerless and the powerful, and so on. There follows an analysis of the institutional setting of pastoral care as it functions to mediate grace, provide interpretations, and give moral advice, with an attempt to discern to whom this care is offered. Several observations are made on the ways a theology of liberation might delineate the problems of pastoral care. The area must be understood politically as communal creative activity, aiming, in the midst of shared suffering, to transfigure the world.He is an acknowledged spokesman for the theology of liberation and has publishedA Theology of Human Hope andTomorrow's Child (Harper, 1972).     

Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise

We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.     

In defense of the mirror thesis

In this journal, Luke Russell defends a sophisticated dispositional account of evil personhood according to which a person is evil just in case she is strongly and highly fixedly disposed to perform evil actions in conditions that favour her autonomy. While I am generally sympathetic with this account, I argue that Russell wrongly dismisses the mirror thesis—roughly, the thesis that evil people are the mirror images of the morally best sort of persons—which I have defended elsewhere. Russell’s rejection of the mirror thesis depends upon an independently implausible account of moral sainthood, one that is implausible for reasons that Russell himself suggests in another context. Indeed, an account of moral sainthood that parallels Russell’s account of evil personhood is plausible for the same reasons that his account of evil personhood is, and that suggests that Russell himself is actually committed to the mirror thesis.     

HUMANITY AS AN OBJECT OF RESPECT: IMMANUEL KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH AND THE FOUNDATION FOR MORALITY

The article deals with Kant's understanding of personhood and autonomy. It highlights the connection of autonomy and human dignity within Kant's appreciation of morality, and indicates how his distinction between the empirical and transcendental spheres enables Kant to extend dignity even to humans who are not actually autonomous. Turning to contemporary approaches within ethics that refer to Kant but omit this transcendental framework, it defends the necessity of a trans‐empirical frame within the Kantian system and hints at consequences for bioethics. It concludes that Kant works with neither an absolutist notion of freedom in terms of solipsistic autarky, nor an empirical freedom and autonomy that begin and end at certain points of time.     

From Psychologism to Personhood: Honneth, Recognition, and the Making of Persons

The paper explores the philosophical anthropology and the moral grammar of recognition. It does so by examining how the formation of the self is informed by social recognition, the result of which can motivate individuals and groups to engage in struggles for recognition. To pursue this task, the discussion focuses on the insights of Honneth, who grounds his theory of recognition in the intersubjective relations between persons. The idea that recognition impacts the formation of personal identity is regarded as susceptible to the charge of reducing recognition demands into demands for satisfying psychological needs. Contrary to this worry, the central claim of the paper is that such an identity-based understanding of recognition can still be salvaged. More precisely, this can be done by conceiving of demands of recognition as demands for inclusion into personhood through which the moral dimension of recognition struggles is properly understood. This article concludes that despite its potential ambiguities, the notion of personhood and its relation to recognition remains philosophically defensible.     

Who is umuntu in Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu? Interrogating moral issues facing Ndau women in polygyny

Discussions on the African communitarian idea of personhood have generated several debates among African philosophers about how it is conceived and perceived. While scholars like Wiredu and Gyekye maintain that personhood is gender-neutral, others such as Oyowe suggest that personhood is gendered. The position that African communitarian personhood is gendered is the basis for the argument in this article. Defenders of this notion argue that the gender-neutral conception of personhood has created situations where gender issues have been glossed over, thereby perpetuating gender inequality in African communities. It is within this context that we take the argument further by interrogating the word umuntu in the popular southern African maxim on personhood, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. We ask the question: if personhood is gendered, then who is umuntu in this aphorism? In an attempt to answer this question, we advance two important claims. First, we claim that umuntu refers to a person whose interest is upheld in the community as well as those who are able to determine their own interest. Second, we also say that this concept of umuntu has perpetuated cultural practices that adversely impact women and girls in most African rural communities. Although some scholars might object to these claims, in this article we will not be addressing those objections, but rather we argue that umuntu is gendered male in the aphorism.     

安乐死是何种权利?——关于安乐死的法伦理学解读

安乐死是能为人们带来人格利益的道德权利。我们没有合理的理由对其做出限制 ,但它却很难成为一种法定的权利。主要的阻碍是立法的客观条件不具备 ,以及法律天生的对人性的忧虑。这意味着 ,安乐死作为一种应有的权利要转化为法定权利 ,尽管不是没有可能 ,但要有十分的耐心和谨慎。     

Consequentializing and Underdetermination

The paper explores a new interpretation of the consequentializing project. Three prominent interpretations are criticized for neglecting the explanatory dimension of moral theories. Instead, it is argued that consequentializing leads to a phenomenon that is structurally analogous to one in science—the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This provides important insights into the consequentializing debate, and advances our general understanding of the moral domain.     

An Ethics of Propriety: Ritual,Roles, and Dependence in Early Confucianism

This study examines the normative foundations of early Confucian ethics and suggests that rather than attempting to understand Confucian ethics in the language of ‘morality’ a more productive way would be to appreciate Confucianism as an ethics of propriety that can be articulated in terms of social roles, ritual decorum, and relational dependence. I argue that Western notions of ‘morality’ betray a thicker, more culturally loaded concept that possesses a limited utility in regard to comparative study. We can appeal to a kind of methodological charity where we not only maximize the sense of the text or subject's sayings but also privilege the categories of thought that are native to the text's or speaker's lexicon. With this in mind, we can understand Confucian ethics as an ethics of propriety that departs substantially from Western moral systems, including virtue ethics, and challenges our received views on justice, autonomy, and personal identity.     

Hume on the Problem of Other Minds

Hume is not often cited as a philosopher who posited a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. He instead seems to assume the belief in other minds in his moral philosophy without justification. However, Hume needs to explain how we experience and respond to others’ affections, and hence generate moral sentiments, given how central the latter are to his moral theory. Two recent interpretations of Hume’s solution to the Problem are the Wittgensteinian Interpretation, and the Simulation Theory Interpretation. Both focus on the concept of sympathy as a solution to the Problem, claiming that, for Hume, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. This paper critically examines these two interpretations and offers an alternative called ‘the Analogical Argument Interpretation’, which reconstructs Hume’s version of an analogical argument carried out not by our rational faculty of mind but by custom and imagination. On this interpretation, Hume does not think that sympathy generates the belief in other minds, but rather, sympathy presupposes that belief.