Beauty,ugliness and the sublime

Jung and Freud had very different ideas about the nature of analysis. This paper begins by exploring how Jung's gnostic approach, with its goal of individuation, is deeply informed by Buddhist and Taoist principles. His pluralistic, relational model regards truth as subjective and co‐constructed with the patient. In contrast, Freud's secular methodology has objective truth as its goal. His classical psychoanalysis is a form of reality testing where the analyst claims to know the painful, singular, objective reality which the patient tries to evade. The theory of aesthetic development (see Piaget 1951, Baldwin 1975, Parsons 1980, Housen 1992, Harris Williams 2010) proposes that artistic appreciation is linked to human development. The paper looks at how the apperception of beauty, related to both truth and meaning, acts as an indicator and facilitator of individuation in the clinical encounter. This is illustrated by a clinical case study. Through empirical research, support is given to the argument (Bollas 1978, Meltzer 1988) that our early experience of the feminine/maternal plays a central role in developing an aesthetic capacity. The experience of the sublime in analysis is examined and portrayed as a means by which aesthetic development may be reignited and narcissistic isolation shattered.     

Selective attention to imagined facial ugliness is specific to body dysmorphic disorder

Cognitive-behavioral models postulate that biases in selective attention are key factors contributing to susceptibility to and maintenance of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD). Visual attention in particular toward the imagined defect in appearance may be a crucial element. The present study therefore examined whether individuals with BDD showed increased visual attention to flaws in their own and in unfamiliar faces. Twenty individuals with BDD, 20 individuals with social phobia, and 20 mentally healthy individuals participated in an eye-tracking experiment. Participants were instructed to gaze at the photographs of 15 pictures of themselves and several unfamiliar faces. Only patients with BDD showed heightened selective visual attention to the imagined defect in their own face, as well to corresponding regions in other, unfamiliar faces. The results support the assumption that there is a specific attentional bias in BDD.     

On "On what there is"

All sides in the recent debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor-criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense , are philosophically indeterminate.     

On phi-phenomena

The meaning of "phi" in Max Wertheimer 's 1912 article on seen movement (the publication of which marks the beginning of Gestalt psychology) and the import of the article itself were topics of a report in this Journal. The claims made in that report are questioned here, and a different interpretation of phi and the original article is offered.     

论公正

公正的基准是权利。权利在本质上是一种获得性的社会性资格。公正就是这样的原则 :以权利为本位而义务与权利相对等、对称和对应。公正作为美德就是尊重他人的权利和尊重公共规则。公正作为制度伦理首先就是以权利为本位 ,其次是普遍和平等 ,再次是公开、明确和有既定程序。     

On Doubt

Despite the prominence of doubt in philosophy since Descartes, the published philosophical literature includes no extended treatment of the nature of doubt. In this paper, I summarize the main contributions that have been made to the subject and then develop a commonsense functionalist account of doubt by specifying (a significant part of) the functional role of doubt that something is the case. After adding two further wrinkles, I show how the resulting account can be used to address the questions of how doubt is related to belief and whether suspension of judgment can be identified with (some appropriate level or levels of) doubt. Although the account is partisan, it should hold interest for those who favor other positions in the philosophy of mind, since (a) much of the account can be taken on board by those in other camps, and (b) the paper demonstrates how a sufficiently detailed account of doubt can be put to work addressing longstanding questions of interest across philosophical sub-disciplines.     

On Minorities

Abstract

In this paper I present a logical analysis of minorities and minority rights. I consider the question whether the classic social contract of a liberal democracy can be extended to include minorities without significant alteration to the accepted agreement between the individual and the state.     

On Philosophy

In this article the author holds that progress in philosophy is a vague concept. Its criteria are not universally acknowledged. All that is clear is that philosophy does not develop in a linear way. Philosophy is polydiscoursive. As for the past fifty years, the author believes three important things happened in philosophy. (1) It has been shown that consciousness exists not within one individual but spreads within a community of people; (2) philosophy has discovered autism, a result that helps us to understand a human being as neither a biological nor a social individual but a third thing—a dreaming being who is not only asocial but also tongueless, where speech and consciousness are separated; and (3) contemporary philosophy has learned to distinguish between sign and symbol. And it has been realized that the human mind is neither an instinct nor a computer but an objectified suffering, a transformed emotion.