Culture and Personal Epistemology: U.S. and Middle Eastern Students’ beliefs about Scientific Knowledge and Knowing

Middle Eastern (Omani) and Western (U.S.) students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in the sciences were compared on four dimensions of personal epistemology proposed by Hofer and Pintrich (Review of Educational Research (1997), 67, 88–140). As predicted, given their experiences with comparatively traditional political and religious institutions, Omani more so than U.S. college students were more likely to accept scientific authorities as the basis of scientific truth. Furthermore, Omani men were more accepting of authorities than were Omani women, but there was no gender difference among U.S. students. Omani more than U.S. students also believed that knowledge in the sciences was simpler and more certain, which is consistent with comparisons between U.S. and Asian students (e.g., Qian & Pan, 2002, A comparision of epistemological beliefs and learning from science text between American and Chinese high school students. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistomology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 365–385), Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum). Students in the two countries did not differ, however, in whether their beliefs were based on personal opinions versus systematic evidence. Suggestions for further research included directly assessing experiences with, and attitudes toward, authorities in academic and other areas of students’ lives.     

Development of Mentalizing Ability in Japanese Children

This longitudinal study examined the early development of mentalizing ability in 33 Japanese children, who were between 33 and 39 months old. Their mentalizing ability was assessed using the following tasks: 1) gaze-direction, 2) point-direction, 3) desire-emotion, 4) emotion-situation, and 5) divergent beliefs, at two time-points with a 6-month interval. The children’s performance improved significantly over 6 months for all tasks except divergent beliefs. Although an increasing proportion of the children achieved the criterion for the divergent beliefs task, only two thirds met this criterion at Time 2. The children’s performances did not differ from their western counterparts as reported in previous studies. The mentalizing abilities, except for the emotion-situation task measured at Time 1, correlated significantly with one another and predicted the emotion-situation task performance at Time 2. The findings on the development of mentalizing ability in Japanese children are discussed in light of cross-cultural perspectives.     

Durability of peace education effects in the shadow of conflict

Value-oriented instructional programs, such as anti-racism, may often face societal barriers. A case in point are peace education programs in conflictual contexts. Close analysis of peace education programs in regions of conflict and tension suggest that they face formidable barriers that would appear to prevent the attainment of their goals of mutual legitimization, changed attitudes and empathy. However, positive research findings suggest otherwise. A possible solution of this contradiction is the distinction between strongly held and not easily changeable attitudes and beliefs, called “convictions” (Abelson, American Psychologist 43: 267–275 1988) and more regular attitudes. Possibly, the barriers facing peace education may pertain to convictions while the positive impact of peace education may pertain to less strongly held attitudes and beliefs. The present study examined the possible differential changes in more or less central beliefs when Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian youth participated in a year long, school-based peace education program. This study also examined the durability of the program’s effects on the 956 adolescent study participants divided into program and no-program controls. Findings showed that such a peace education program can effectively influence adolescents’ more peripheral beliefs but not the core beliefs that stand in the center of the groups’ collective narratives. However, peripheral beliefs that are more easily affected can as easily change back, apparently by the context of adverse social and political forces.     

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action.     

Therapist Response to Clients’ Partner Abuse: Implications for Training and Development of Marriage and Family Therapists

This qualitative study explored ecosystemic influences on therapists’ responses to partner abuse. Research questions focus on aspects of personal and professional development of attitudes and belief systems surrounding partner abuse. In-depth interviews with seven therapy trainees indicate that family of origin experiences, clinical experiences, and therapist developmental processes affect values, beliefs, and clinical reactivity to cases involving partner abuse. Implications for therapists’ self-work, clinical training, and the process of supervision are addressed.     

The Effects of Education on Americans’ Religious Practices,Beliefs, and Affiliations

I challenge the scholarly contention that increases in education uniformly lead to declines in religious participation, belief, and affiliation. I argue that education influences strategies of action, and these strategies of action are relevant to some religious beliefs and activities but not others. Analysis of survey data shows that (1) education negatively affects exclusivist religious viewpoints and biblical literalism but not belief in God or the afterlife; (2) education positively affects religious participation, devotional activities, and emphasizing the importance of religion in daily life; (3) education positively affects switching religious affiliations, particularly to a mainline Protestant denomination, but not disaffiliation; (4) education is positively associated with questioning the role of religion in secular society but not with support for curbing the public opinions of religious leaders; and (5) the effects of education on religious beliefs and participation vary across religious traditions. Education does influence Americans’ religious beliefs and activities, but the effects of education on religion are complex.     

Can Blended Classroom and Distributed Learning Approaches be Used to Teach Medical Students How to Initiate Behavior Change Counseling During a Clinical Clerkship?

Medical school curricula often provide insufficient time and instruction for health behavior change counseling. We examined the feasibility of blending classroom and distributed learning experiences to teach medical students how to initiate health behavior change counseling and analyzed the impact of this approach on their attitudes, knowledge, and skills. Usage patterns and pre- to post-class attitude and knowledge changes were assessed with self-report questions among 153 third year family medicine clerkship students. Most students viewed at least 90% of the online written content and took an average of 41 min (SD = 24 min 35 s) to view all of the content. Students’ confidence in their ability to help patients change unhealthy behaviors significantly improved (p < .01). The blended learning curriculum facilitated learning of behavior change skills, encouraged interaction with course materials, and improved medical students’ self confidence for using health behavior change skills.     

On the role of beliefs in observational flavor conditioning

In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning. Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’ belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information). Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks. At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike: They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event, rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity.     

On the role of beliefs in observational flavor conditioning

In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning. Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’ belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information). Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks. At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike: They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event, rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

Change and Stability in Attitudes Toward Violence During ISAF Service

A Swedish contingent to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF; N = approx. 320) was studied before and after deployment to Afghanistan to assess if the mission and experiences on it affected attitudes toward violence. Attitudes toward war violence and penal violence were assessed across t = 1 and t = 2, as were the effects of combat exposure on change and stability in attitudes. It was hypothesized that the attitudes would remain stable across the deployment due to their importance to the soldierly identity, but that experiences of combat exposure would cause an increase in the propensity toward change. Results demonstrate that attitudes did not change between the pre- and postdeployment stages. Unexpectedly, increasing levels of combat exposure did not predict higher rates of change, but rather increased stability in attitudes toward violence. The results demonstrate that in terms of the willingness to use force, peacekeeping deployments do not have detrimental effects on soldiers.     

Sun,Wind, Rock and Metal: Attitudes toward Renewable and Non-renewable Energy Sources in the Context of Climate Change and Current Energy Debates

Current energy debates are often framed in terms of the extent to which energy sources may mitigate global climate change (GCC) and facilitate energy independence (EI). However, little is understood about whether and how attitudes towards GCC and EI influence attitudes toward energy sources. Our study included 277 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at a large, Southeastern university. As hypothesized, results from ordinal and binary logistic regression analyses revealed that the likelihood participants would support the use of solar, wind, coal or nuclear energy decreased as a function of their belief that an energy source contributed to GCC. The belief that an energy source contributed to EI increased participants’ likelihood of support. Results suggest that beliefs about GCC and EI are important to determining support for energy sources and will likely contribute to effective marketing strategies and efforts to implement more environmentally-sustainable behavior and energy policy.     

Competition, superstition and the illusion of control

The effects of reinforcement schedule and competition on generating superstitious behaviors and beliefs were examined in 72 people. Superstition was induced by having participants respond to turn on a tone under a concurrent 2—lever Variable Interval (VI) Extinction (EXT) schedule. During the session, stimulus lights would occasionally be illuminated, although they did not signal any change in contingency. Attributing importance to the inactive lever, a pattern of switching between levers, or to the illumination of the lights were considered to be superstitious beliefs. Participants were either run alone or in pairs, and manipulation of the reinforcement schedule resulted in groups which were matched in probability of reinforcement, as well as in groups which were mismatched. Reinforcement schedule (VI 30” versus VI 60”) and competitive situation did not affect degree of superstitious belief, except when people were placed in a “winning” condition. However, Superstition was associated with participants’ belief in improved future performance and with participants’ perceived skill relative to their opponents. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between superstition, the illusion of control, and self-efficacy. Differences between experimentally-induced and commonly held superstitions are also discussed.     

Competition, superstition and the illusion of control

The effects of reinforcement schedule and competition on generating superstitious behaviors and beliefs were examined in 72 people. Superstition was induced by having participants respond to turn on a tone under a concurrent 2—lever Variable Interval (VI) Extinction (EXT) schedule. During the session, stimulus lights would occasionally be illuminated, although they did not signal any change in contingency. Attributing importance to the inactive lever, a pattern of switching between levers, or to the illumination of the lights were considered to be superstitious beliefs. Participants were either run alone or in pairs, and manipulation of the reinforcement schedule resulted in groups which were matched in probability of reinforcement, as well as in groups which were mismatched. Reinforcement schedule (VI 30” versus VI 60”) and competitive situation did not affect degree of superstitious belief, except when people were placed in a “winning” condition. However, Superstition was associated with participants’ belief in improved future performance and with participants’ perceived skill relative to their opponents. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between superstition, the illusion of control, and self-efficacy. Differences between experimentally-induced and commonly held superstitions are also discussed.     

Ethical Orientations and Attitudes of Hispanic Business Students

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the attitudes and orientations of Hispanic business students regarding ethical and unethical actions as well as what rewards or punishments are considered appropriate for specific scenarios. A survey was developed using a 2 × 2 randomized experimental design to measure students’ ethical orientations and 38 items were developed to measure students’ attitudes regarding factors that can influence the decision to cheat or not to cheat. The results suggest that Hispanic business students are predominantly concerned with the ethical dimension of an act relative to the outcome of the act. Also, contrary to previous studies findings, some Hispanic business students are likely to cheat on any type of graded work based on the reason for cheating rather than the type of graded work. The paper utilizes an established framework for measuring ethical attitudes and orientations. The study offers a preliminary inductive path towards a more in depth understanding of Hispanic business students which is a rapidly growing population segment whose influence will become more widespread in the coming decades. Some of the findings are not consistent with previous research that examined student bodies as a whole. This might suggest that student ethics researchers may be missing valuable information regarding differences between student body segments that can further inform our understanding of students’ ethical views. Further, this insight may provide an avenue for a more effective approach to guiding the ethical development of students.     

Beyond attitudinal ambivalence: effects of belief homogeneity on attitude‐intention‐behaviour relations

Attitudinal ambivalence extends the traditional unidimensional conceptualization of attitude by acknowledging that people can simultaneously evaluate attitude objects as positive and negative. The present paper argues that this bidimensional view of attitudes may be extended further to take account of multidimensional influences on attitudes using measures of belief homogeneity. Study 1 (n = 155) showed that attitudes based on homogeneous belief‐sets were significantly more predictive of subsequent behaviour (β = 0.47, p<0.01) than were attitudes based on heterogeneous belief‐sets (β = 0.08, ns). Study 2 (n = 136) manipulated belief homogeneity and found that when beliefs were made heterogeneous, attitudes based on heterogeneous belief‐sets were significantly less predictive of behavioural intentions (β = 0.46, p < 0.01) than attitudes based on homogeneous belief‐sets (β = 0.84, p < 0.01). Implications for research on attitudinal ambivalence and attribute importance are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Stigmatising Implications of Presenting Schizophrenia as a Genetic Disease

This study aimed to investigate the hypothesis that belief in a genetic aetiology of schizophrenia will increase the stigma associated with the disorder. Levels of five potentially stigmatising attitudes were compared in two groups of participants who had read a vignette describing an individual who has schizophrenia. In one group the disorder was explained as being caused by ‘genetic’ factors, and in the other by ‘environmental’ factors. This study found that three of the five potentially stigmatising attitudes measured were increased when participants read a vignette with a genetic causation rather than an environmental causation. Firstly, genetic attributions increased levels of associative stigma towards close relatives (p < 0.001). Secondly, participants viewed recovery as less likely when genetic factors were implicated as causative (p < 0.001). Finally, there was also an increased perception of the character’s “dangerousness” when the condition was explained by genetic factors (p < 0.05). Contrary to previous research was the finding that perceived aetiology had no effect on participant’s desire for social distance from an affected individual. Neither did perceived aetiology influence beliefs about moral accountability. The implications of these findings suggest that genetic counsellors and other health professionals, who are providing genetic information to those affected by schizophrenia should be aware of the possibility that a genetic explanation of schizophrenia could increase potentially stigmatising attitudes towards their clients and their clients’ families. It is also possible that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia may themselves form deterministic interpretations of the genetic information they receive and subsequently be less likely to adopt behavioural advice or adhere to treatment. Counsellors and health professionals should strive to present information in a balanced manner, ensuring recipients understand the multi-factorial causes of the disease.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Evidence does not equal knowledge

Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition.     

Stakes and beliefs

The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.