The Easy Approach to Ontology

This paper defends the view that ontological questions (properly understood) are easy—too easy, in fact, to be subjects of substantive and distinctively philosophical debates. They are easy, roughly, in the sense that they may be resolved straightforwardly—generally by a combination of conceptual and empirical enquiries. After briefly outlining the view and some of its virtues, I turn to examine two central lines of objection. The first is that this ‘easy’ approach is itself committed to substantive ontological views, including an implausibly permissive ontology. The second is that it, like neo-Fregean views, relies on transformation rules that are questionable on both logical and ontological grounds. Ultimately, I will argue, the easy view is not easily assailed by either of these routes, and so remains (thus far) a tenable and attractive approach.

New Directions in Metaphysics and Ontology

A personal view is presented of how metaphysics and ontology stand at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the light of developments during the twentieth. It is argued that realist metaphysics, with serious ontology at its heart, has a promising future, provided that its adherents devote some time and effort to countering the influences of both its critics and its false friends.

Ontology relativized: Reply to Moulines

Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers.     

Cognitive externalism meets bounded rationality

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does not fit his version of CE. We then propose and defend a version of CE—“scaffolded cognition”—that is not committed to constitutive claims about the mind, but still differs from mainstream internalism. Finally, we analyze BR from our own CE perspective, thereby clarifying its vague appeals to the environment, and argue that cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.     

The role of analogy in ontology alignment: A study on LISA

Ontologies are explicit specifications of concepts and their relationships. In the context of a semantic web of independently developed ontologies, overcoming interoperability and heterogeneity issues is of considerable importance. Many semantic web applications, such as matching of instances in social networks, reasoning over combined knowledge bases, and knowledge sharing among services, rely on ontology alignment. While existing research in this area has developed a wide range of different heuristics, in this paper we propose to look towards cognitive science, specifically analogical reasoning, to support ontology alignment. We investigate the question whether ontology alignment is rooted in the same cognitive process as analogical reasoning. We apply the LISA system, a cognitively-based model of human analogical reasoning, to ontology alignment and present a comprehensive experimental study to determine its performance on ontology alignment problems.     

Cognitive Evaluation of Machine Learning Agents

Advances in applying statistical Machine Learning (ML) led to several claims of human-level or near-human performance in tasks such as image classification & speech recognition. Such claims are unscientific primarily for two reasons, (1) They incorrectly enforce the notion that task-specific performance can be treated as manifestation of General Intelligence and (2) They are not verifiable as currently there is no set benchmark for measuring human-like cognition in a machine learning agent. Moreover, ML agent’s performance is influenced by knowledge ingested in it by its human designers. Therefore, agent’s performance may not necessarily reflect its true cognition. In this paper, we propose a framework that draws parallels from human cognition to measure machine’s cognition. Human cognitive learning is quite well studied in developmental psychology with frameworks and metrics in place to measure actual learning. To either believe or refute the claims of human-level performance of machine learning agent, we need scientific methodology to measure its cognition. Our framework formalizes incremental implementation of human-like cognitive processes in ML agents with an implicit goal to measure it. The framework offers guiding principles for measuring, (1) Task-specific machine cognition and (2) General machine cognition that spans across tasks. The framework also provides guidelines for building domain-specific task taxonomies to cognitively profile tasks. We demonstrate application of the framework with a case study where two ML agents that perform Vision and NLP tasks are cognitively evaluated.     

Existence questions

I argue that thinking of existence questions as deep questions to be resolved by a distinctively philosophical discipline of ontology is misguided. I begin by examining how to understand the truth-conditions of existence claims, by way of understanding the rules of use for ‘exists’ and for general noun terms. This yields a straightforward method for resolving existence questions by a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry. It also provides a blueprint for arguing against most common proposals for uniform substantive ‘criteria of existence’, whether they involve mind-independence, possession of causal powers, observability, etc., and thus for showing that many arguments for denying entities (numbers, ordinary objects, fictional characters, propositions…) on grounds of their failure to meet one or more of these proposed existence criteria are mistaken.

Cognitive inhibition in depression

Cognitive inhibition is a key mechanism in the regulation of emotion. There is emerging evidence that depression is characterized by deficits in the inhibition of mood-congruent material. These deficits could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented information thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes. Indeed, it has been suggested that deficits in cognitive inhibition lie at the heart of memory and attention biases in depression, and set the stage for ruminative responses to negative events and negative mood states. A ruminative response style results in a heightened vulnerability to experience episodes of major depression. Recent research has demonstrated that deficient inhibition of negative material is associated with heightened rumination. In this article, we review the depression literature with a focus on studies that investigate cognitive inhibition in depressed participants and in participants who report a history of major depressive episodes. In addition, we summarize neurobiological findings that indicate a strong relation between depression and deficits in inhibition and we take a closer look at the relation of inhibition, rumination and mood regulation.     

The Logical Basis of the Tractarian Ontology

This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance will be considered. The latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out.

Cross‐Cultural Differences in Categorical Memory Errors

Cultural differences occur in the use of categories to aid accurate recall of information. This study investigated whether culture also contributed to false (erroneous) memories, and extended cross‐cultural memory research to Turkish culture, which is shaped by Eastern and Western influences. Americans and Turks viewed word pairs, half of which were categorically related and half unrelated. Participants then attempted to recall the second word from the pair in response to the first word cue. Responses were coded as correct, as blanks, or as different types of errors. Americans committed more categorical errors than did Turks, and Turks mistakenly recalled more non‐categorically related list words than did Americans. These results support the idea that Americans use categories either to organize information in memory or to support retrieval strategies to a greater extent than Turks and suggest that culture shapes not only accurate recall but also erroneous distortions of memory.     

Internal Realism,Religious Pluralism and Ontology

Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability” and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.

Questioning the Link Between PTSD and Cognitive Dysfunction

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been linked with impairment in cognitive functioning, but anomalies appear to arise on several levels, masking the true nature of the relationship. On one level, there is a blurring of the emotional and physical causes of cognitive dysfunction, especially with memory problems that are similar to those due to neurological disorders. At other levels, problems are evident due to issues such as overgeneralizing from specific populations to the general population, and the use of narrow-focused neuropsychological assessment instruments that neither dissociate among precise memory components nor relate to everyday situations. In this review we highlight methodological problems and concerns, and make suggestions to establish valid links between PTSD and cognitive dysfunction.     

神经成像读心中的认知本体论疑难

认知神经科学的研究者们在使用神经成像技术进行读心时,运用到了反向推理和大脑解码两种策略。但目前相关研究中所涉及的同一认知过程或心理功能的具体内涵并不统一,反映出认知神经科学部分术语存在定义混乱的现象。这一方面使得反向推理面临相关脑区缺乏选择性的难题,另一方面也限制了大脑解码的准确率。对此最有希望的一种解决办法是建立认知本体论,可它仍然在技术、方法以及哲学三个层面上存在疑难,这削弱了利用神经成像去读取他人思想这一做法的可靠性及合理性。

     

The Role of Cognitive Control in Cocaine Dependence

While hedonic and reward-related processes are central to drug use and dependence, this article focuses on the contribution that cognitive processes may make to addiction. In particular, attention is drawn to those processes involved in exercising control over behavior as drug dependence is characterized by risky, impulsive behavior. Functional neuroimaging implicates prefrontal deficits in cocaine dependence with an emerging picture of cocaine users having attentional biases towards drug-related stimuli, poor performance in laboratory tests of inhibitory control, and compromised monitoring and evaluation of their behavior. Combined, these deficits may contribute to the continuation of use in dependent individuals and may qualify as important targets for therapeutic interventions.     

The Effect of Anxiety on the Cognitive Functioning in Non-clinical Schizotypal Individuals

Schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) is characterized by eccentric behavior and perceptual distortions that closely resemble the patterns observed in those with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia and related personality disorders (i.e., SPD) are associated with deficits in sustained attention, slower than normal reaction times, and manifestations of working memory deficits and erratic cognitive tasks. The present study used the schizotypal personality scale (STA) to compare cognitive abilities of self-reported low schizotypic tendency subjects with high schizotypic tendency subjects. The group scores on the STA differed significantly. Those with high STA scores also tended to have higher state and trait anxiety scores based on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). The groups did not significantly differ on any of the demographic variables tested, including age, education, self-rated health status, and medication. Along with an executive function test, two computerized tasks tested subjects on reaction time and memory. Even when covariates (i.e., state, trait anxiety scores) were analyzed, there were no significant differences between the groups and tasks, although the gathered data showed trends in the expected direction.     

The Effect of Anxiety on the Cognitive Functioning in Non-clinical Schizotypal Individuals

Schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) is characterized by eccentric behavior and perceptual distortions that closely resemble the patterns observed in those with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia and related personality disorders (i.e., SPD) are associated with deficits in sustained attention, slower than normal reaction times, and manifestations of working memory deficits and erratic cognitive tasks. The present study used the schizotypal personality scale (STA) to compare cognitive abilities of self-reported low schizotypic tendency subjects with high schizotypic tendency subjects. The group scores on the STA differed significantly. Those with high STA scores also tended to have higher state and trait anxiety scores based on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). The groups did not significantly differ on any of the demographic variables tested, including age, education, self-rated health status, and medication. Along with an executive function test, two computerized tasks tested subjects on reaction time and memory. Even when covariates (i.e., state, trait anxiety scores) were analyzed, there were no significant differences between the groups and tasks, although the gathered data showed trends in the expected direction.     

Infinity in Ontology and Mind

Two fundamental categories of any ontology are the category of objects and the category of universals. We discuss the question whether either of these categories can be infinite or not. In the category of objects, the subcategory of physical objects is examined within the context of different cosmological theories regarding the different kinds of fundamental objects in the universe. Abstract objects are discussed in terms of sets and the intensional objects of conceptual realism. The category of universals is discussed in terms of the three major theories of universals: nominalism, realism, and conceptualism. The finitude of mind pertains only to conceptualism. We consider the question of whether or not this finitude precludes impredicative concept formation. An explication of potential infinity, especially as applied to concepts and expressions, is given. We also briefly discuss a logic of plural objects, or groups of single objects (individuals), which is based on Bertrand Russell’s (1903, The principles of mathematics, 2nd edn. (1938). Norton & Co, NY) notion of a class as many. The universal class as many does not exist in this logic if there are two or more single objects; but the issue is undecided if there is just one individual. We note that adding plural objects (groups) to an ontology with a countable infinity of individuals (single objects) does not generate an uncountable infinity of classes as many.

No Time, No Wholes: A Temporal and Causal-Oriented Approach to the Ontology of Wholes

What distinguishes a whole from an arbitrary sum of elements? I suggest a temporal and causal oriented approach. I defend two connected claims. The former is that existence is, by every means, coextensive with being the cause of a causal process. The latter is that a whole is the cause of a causal process with a joint effect. Thus, a whole is something that takes place in time. The approach endorses an unambiguous version of Restricted Composition that suits most commonsensical intuitions about wholes.     

Developing/development cyborgs

The paper takes as its starting point Donna Haraway’s suggestion, “The actors are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere”. It discusses first the understanding of the cyborg promoted by Haraway as illustrating an ontological non-humanist disposition, rather than a periodizing claim. The second part of the paper examines some instances of low-tech cyborg identities, which have emerged in developing countries (elsewhere) as a consequence of development initiatives. The paper argues that the quite literal attempts to develop cyborgs in such countries gives rise to developments not foreseen or controllable by the development industries. If cyborg identities are developing and minds and bodies shaped in the frictions between culture, technology, economy, and development projects and activities then what are the implications for cognitive studies. In the final part of the paper this question is considered and it is suggested that cognitive studies would do well to expand their analytical foci to take into account cyborg bodies and minds found “elsewhere”.