A questionable questionnaire: a rejoinder to Marks

In a recent article Marks argues that two previous articles in this journal in 1986 and 1988, questioning the construct validity of the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, should be dismissed due to methodological flaws and overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In this response to Marks, the methodologies of the two studies in question are clarified and defended. Research and other evidence supporting the two Chara studies are presented. It is concluded that the construct validity of the imagery questionnaire has not been established and that further investigations of the questionnaire, and particularly its rating scale, are warranted.     

Random controls: A rejoinder

Furedy, Poulos, and Schiffman (1975) have made a conclusion in direct contradiction to available data in skin conductance conditioning which show clearly that a stimulus designated to be random was, in fact, random with respect to an unconditioned stimulus. It was also pointed out that the overlap criterion does illustrate the weakness of the Toronto studies; that the random stimulus in the Prokasy, Williams, Kumpfer, and Lee (1973) paper was not excitatory; and that controlled studies for at least a decade have shown the first-interval response to be associative.     

Comments on cyberbullying article: A rejoinder

In this article, I discuss many of the points raised in the thoughtful comments by Hinduja and Patchin (2012, this issue), Menesini (2012, this issue), and Smith (2012, this issue) on my original article “Cyberbullying: An overrated phenomenon” (Olweus, 2012, this issue). After having seriously considered the arguments of my commentators, I still think there is strong empirical evidence for my original position—supported by one or more but not all of my commentators—that cyberbullying is a basically low-frequent phenomenon and that there has not occurred a marked increase in the prevalence rates of cyberbullying over the past five or six years. With regard to the possible negative effects of cyberbullying, over and above the effects of traditional bullying, I note with appreciation that this issue has received some attention in the recent research literature but I also make a call for more systematic consideration of potential confounders in such studies. A good deal of the discussion in the comments and the current article concerned the issue of whether cyberbullying should be regarded as a form of bullying on a par with traditional forms of bullying or if it is distinct enough to be considered a partly separate phenomenon or dimension. I conclude by arguing that in order for research on cyberbullying to proceed in a systematic and fruitful way, it is necessary to place it in proper context (along with traditional bullying) and to communicate a somewhat more realistic picture of its prevalence and nature.     

A Refutation of Skeptical Theism

Skeptical theists argue that no seemingly unjustified evil (SUE) could ever lower the probability of God's existence at all. Why? Because God might have justifying reasons for allowing such evils (JuffREs) that are undetectable. However, skeptical theists are unclear regarding whether or not God's existence is relevant to the existence of JuffREs, and whether or not God's existence is relevant to their detectability. But I will argue that, no matter how the skeptical theist answers these questions, it is undeniable that the skeptical theist is wrong; SUEs lower the probability of God's existence. To establish this, I will consider the four scenarios regarding the relevance of God's existence to the existence and detectability of JuffREs, and show that in each—after we establish our initial probabilities, and then update them given the evidence of a SUE—the probability of God's existence drops.     

A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non‐theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons.