The feigenbaum scenario in a unified science of life and mind

In exploring the possibilities for creating a model of the creative cosmos, it is important to seek mathematical models that can express the common relationships unifying the sciences of matter, life and mind. Current candidates for such all embracing mathematical models come from the burgeoning fields of non‐linear dynamics that are described under varying labels as Chaos Theory, Self‐Organization Theory and Adaptive Complexity Theory. In this paper we will limit ourselves to only one mathematical model called, “The Feigenbaum Scenario.” A major virtue of The Feigenbaum Scenario is that it is relatively easy to understand by non‐mathematicians and it has led to new depths of profound understanding in a wide variety of the physical and biological sciences. Everything from purely mechanical systems, fluid dynamics and the weather to the patterns of biological growth in nature and the dynamics of heart, hormone and brain rhythms have been found to exhibit aspects of the Feigenbaum scenario. We explore the possibility that the Feigenbaum scenario can be extended to experiences of mind, sensation, perception and human behavior as well. We conclude that a major function of consciousness may be to transform the non‐linear, irrational, unconscious and difficult to predict dynamics of unconscious nature into the more linear, rational and predictable psycho‐dynamics that make human experience and social life possible.     

Indeterminacy in the social sciences

It is maintained that a principle of indeterminacy exists in the social sciences which bears some resemblance to the Heisenberg principle in the realm of physics. In the social sciences, however, the principle is grounded not on physical interference, but on the capacity of human beings to alter their behavior on the basis of changing conceptions of their social condition, and so the contention of writers like Nagel ‘that no distinct principle of explanation is involved’ must be rejected. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the causes of social indeterminacy, which suggests that the phenomenon is ineradicable.     

Reasoning in the social sciences

In 1981, A. C. Crombie identified six styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition that constitute our ways of reasoning in the natural sciences. In this paper, I try to show that these styles constitute reasoning in the social sciences as well, and that, as a result, the differences between reasoning about the physical world and about human beings are not so different as some interpretevists have supposed.     

The ethics of social science research

ABSTRACT Ethical thinking about social science research is dominated by a biomedical model whose salient features are the assumption that only potential harms to subjects of research are relevant in the ethical evaluation of that research, and in the emphasis on securing informed consent in order to establish ethical probity. A number of counter-examples are considered to the assumption, a number of defences against these counter-examples are examined, and an alternative model is proposed for the ethical evaluation of social science research: a model which can cope with the systemic harms (harms other than those to participants as participants) which have been identified. This model is based on John Rawls's idea of original position reasoning and treats social science research as an institutional feature of the basic structure of society.     

Understanding in the social sciences and history

Understanding in its widest sense is the aim of all rational knowledge. A distinction can be made between interpretation (leading to the understanding of meanings) and explanation (leading to the understanding of facts). The view that in the social sciences facts and meanings are the same is criticized. In respect of the specific understanding of human and social facts empathetic and rational understanding are distinguished and some of the difficulties pointed out inherent in both, in particular with regard to testability. On the other hand, it is found that a purely behaviouristic approach, although possible, would not be completely satisfactory, so that in spite of all difficulties the social sciences (history included) cannot do without specific understanding, as a heuristic device as well as an aim.