Structuralist constraints and mathematical social theorizing

Several case studies and theoretical reports indicate that the structuralist concept of a constraint has a central role in the reconstruction of physical theories. It is surprising that there is, in the literature, only little theoretical discussion on the relevance of constraints for the reconstruction of social scientific theories. Almost all structuralist reconstructions of social theorizing are vacuously constrained. Consequently, constraints are methodologically irrelevant.In this paper I try to show that there really exist constraint-type assumptions in mathematical modelling in the social sciences. Methodologically constraints have exactly the same role in the context of social mathematical modelling as they have in physical theories. In typical cases of mathematical modelling in the social sciences, the related constraints work as empirical hypotheses and should be tested by statistical means.     

Structuralism as a form of scientific realism

Structural realism has recently re‐entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti‐realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered.     

Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects.     

Spacetime,Ontology, and Structural Realism

This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes.     

Modular Semantics for Theories: An Approach to Paraconsistent Reasoning

Some scientific theories are inconsistent, yet non-trivial and meaningful. How is that possible? The present paper aims to show that we can analyse the inferential use of such theories in terms of consistent compositions of the applications of universal axioms. This technique will be represented by a preferred models semantics, which allows us to accept the instances of universal axioms selectively. For such a semantics to be developed, the framework of partial structures by da Costa and French will be extended by a few elements of the Sneed formalism, also known as the structuralist approach to science.     

Incommensurability,Comparability, and Non-reductive Ontological Relations

We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between (radical) incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal.     

The Structure of Causal Sets

More often than not, recently popular structuralist interpretations of physical theories leave the central concept of a structure insufficiently precisified. The incipient causal sets approach to quantum gravity offers a paradigmatic case of a physical theory predestined to be interpreted in structuralist terms. It is shown how employing structuralism lends itself to a natural interpretation of the physical meaning of causal set theory. Conversely, the conceptually exceptionally clear case of causal sets is used as a foil to illustrate how a mathematically informed rigorous conceptualization of structure serves to identify structures in physical theories. Furthermore, a number of technical issues infesting structuralist interpretations of physical theories such as difficulties with grounding the identity of the places of highly symmetrical physical structures in their relational profile and what may resolve these difficulties can be vividly illustrated with causal sets.     

People's naive understandings of their close relationships: Attributional and personal construct perspectives

In this paper, similarities and differences between attribution theory and personal construct theory are described. In comparing these theories, account making is used as an illustrative phenomenon to show major points of similarity and divergence in possible interpretation. Attribution theory basically involves a focus on the situational determinants of thought and behavior, whereas personal construct theory involves an idiographic approach to human thought and action. Despite this fundamental difference, the two theoretical positions are similar in key ways, including original emphases on people's naive understandings. Major aspects of the construal process as articulated by George Kelly for personal construct theory and the interpretative process as posited by Fritz Heider are similar, it is concluded that scholars from both theoretical persuasions would profit from a closer examination of this interface and of how account making as a natural human reaction to stressful situations reveals interesting areas of overlap for conceptual and empirical exploration.     

Intentionality and Interpersonal Relations

The present commentary re-introduces Heider’s (1958) common-sense psychology and his treatment of intentionality, comparing and contrasting his theoretical formulations with those of Elstrup (IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 43:4, 2009). Special emphasis is made in all those aspects of Heider’s theory that are related to the perception, interpretation, prediction and control of our behavior and that of another person. Also, different social aspects of interpersonal relations are presented. Finally, some ideas regarding different approaches to the study of attributing are discussed.     

A theory of behavior interaction in dyads: A structuralist account

A theory from the behavioral and social sciences is presented from the structuralist point of view. A more comprehensive theory-net is outlined, some basic terms and core assumptions are formulated, and an expansion of the theory towards two intended applications is given. Finally, some results of a first empirical test of the theory are reported. The aim of the paper is to show that the structuralist account of scientific theories is not confined to mathematical theories from the natural sciences, but can also be applied to relatively informal constructions of the behavioral and social sciences.     

归因取向理论建构及实证

尝试用一种新的视角—— 取向研究视角, 对以往归因理论进行整合研究, 建构一种与社会情境结合更紧密, 更具概括性的归因取向理论。归因取向理论的假设建构模型包括四种归因取向维度：社会取向, 个人取向, 积极取向和消极取向。根据理论模型编制归因取向量表, 以1301名被试为研究对象, 运用探索性因素分析和验证性因素分析方法对该理论模型进行实证研究。结果证明了该理论建构的存在, 理论建构中各维度的因素负荷和拟合指数良好, 归因取向量表具有良好的信度和建构效度。检验归因取向维度和8个社会心理变量的关系, 证明了四种归因取向维度具有概括性、普遍性、稳定性和评估有效性特征。     

Incest avoidance: oedipal and preoedipal, natural and cultural

Why do most people experience a subjective aversion to the idea of incestuous sexual relations? To help answer this question, recent strands of thinking in both cultural and evolutionary anthropology are considered together with psychoanalytic theories regarding incest avoidance. Coevolutionary theories that propose ways to think about genetic and cultural inheritance as partially independent of each other, evolutionary arguments about the reproductive advantages of incest avoidance, structuralist theory arguing for a kind of incest aversion unrelated to any possible Darwinian selective advantage, and other trends in biosocial research into the origins of the incest avoidance are considered. Finally, a synthesis is proposed that seeks to expand our understanding of the oedipal and preoedipal dynamics of the aversion as these are conceptualized in psychoanalytic theory.     

Deductive Reasoning in the Structuralist Approach

The distinction between the syntactic and the semantic approach to scientific theories emerged in formal philosophy of science. The semantic approach is commonly considered more advanced and more successful than the syntactic one, but the transition from the one approach to the other was not brought about without any loss. In essence, it is the formal analysis of atomic propositions and the analysis of deductive reasoning that dropped out of consideration in at least some of the elaborated versions of the semantic approach. In structuralist theory of science, as founded by Sneed and Stegmüller, the focus is on global propositions concerning the question of whether or not certain empirical systems satisfy a set-theoretic predicate that encodes the axioms of a scientific theory. Hence, an analysis of deductive reasoning from atomic premisses with the help of a given theory is missing. The objective of the present paper is to develop a deductive system on the basis of the structuralist framework. This system comes with a novel formulation of empirical propositions in structuralism.     

后经验主义时代的理论心理学

随着经验实证主义的衰落,心理学迎来了后经验主义时代。在后经验主义时代,人们对理论和经验观察的关系有了新的理解。理论不再是经验观察的附属物,相反,经验事实是被理论决定的。理论不是经验事实的概括和归纳,而是一种文化历史的建构。后经验主义时代的理论心理学以库恩的范式论、现象学、释义学和社会建构论作为自己的哲学基础。理论的评价标准不再是与经验事实的一致性。因为经验事实由于受到理论的污染,不再是一种客观的标准。在后经验主义条件下,理论的评价标准可建立在概念和逻辑、价值观和意识形态、修辞与叙事以及实践和应用的水平上     

Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism

Building on previous work, I continue the arguments for scientific realism in the presence of a natural level structure of science. That structure results from a cognitive antireductionism that calls for the retention of mature theories even though they have been “superseded”. The level structure is based on “scientific truth” characterized by a theory's validity domain and the confirming empirical data. Reductionism (including fundamentalism) fails cognitively because of qualitative differences in the ontology and semantics of successive theories. This cognitive failure exists in spite of the mathematical success of theory reduction. The claim for scientific realism is strongly based on theory coherence between theories on adjacent levels. Level coherence consists of mathematical relations between levels, as well as of reductive explanations. The latter refers to questions that can be posed (but not answered) on a superseded level, but which can be answered (explained) on the superseding level. In view of the pluralism generated by cognitive antireductionism, theory coherence is claimed to be so compelling that it provides strong epistemic justification for a pluralistic scientific realism.     

A Primer on Psychological Theory

This paper addresses some of the principal constituent elements in the formation of theories in the science of psychology. To that end, means of theory construction, concomitant theory functions and types, and norms of acceptance are presented. Where appropriate, efforts were made to cite particular historic or contemporary theories of human behavior as cogent exemplars.     

The Allegory of the Olive Tree: a case study for (neo) structuralist analysis

The Book of Mormon presents a fascinating opportunity to test aspects of structuralist analysis of myth and culture. This article examines some of the key issues in structuralist theory and attempts to develop some new avenues of structuralist analysis, particularly in relation to agency and transformation. Although in some sense these avenues can be seen as challenging principles of traditional structuralism, the changes suggested are more refinements than significant alterations. The article then tests these theories in relation to a series of very complex allegories in the Book of Mormon. This discussion both demonstrates the analytical power of the approach and raises some interesting ethnographic issues, particularly the presence of triadic rather than dyadic structure. In order to add a diachronic aspect to the discussion and to examine process of transformation between cultures, the article touches on the use of similar allegories in the New Testament and in Intertestamental literature.     

Semantic approaches in the philosophy of science

In this article I give an overview of some recent work in philosophy of science dedicated to analysing the scientific process in terms of (conceptual) mathematical models of theories and the various semantic relations between such models, scientific theories, and aspects of reality. In current philosophy of science, the most interesting questions centre around the ways in which writers distinguish between theories and the mathematical structures that interpret them and in which they are true, i.e. between scientific theories as linguistic systems and their non-linguistic models. In philosophy of science literature there are two main approaches to the structure of scientific theories, the statement or syntactic approach—advocated by Carnap, Hempel and Nagel—and the non-statement or semantic approach—advocated, among others, by Suppes, the structuralists, Beth, Van Fraassen, Giere, Wójcicki. In conclusion, I briefly review some of the usual realist inspired questions about the possibility and character of relations between scientific theories and reality as implied by the various approaches I discuss in the course of the article. The models of a scientific theory should indeed be adequate to the phenomena, but if the theory is ‘adequate’ to (true in) its conceptual (mathematical) models as well, we have a model-theoretic realism that addresses the possible meaning and reference of ‘theoretical entities’ without relapsing into the metaphysics typical of the usual scientific realist approaches.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.