Introductory remarks by the issue editors: The multiple dimensions of the parent–baby story

Abstract

In their introductory remarks, the guest editors, themselves presenters at the conference “Parent–Infant Disturbance: Theory and Therapy,” introduce the philosophy and methodology underlying this interdisciplinary psychoanalytic conference and outline the multiple dimensions of the issue at hand, as they are addressed by the individual contributions to this volume. The paper concludes with a remembrance of and dedication to the victims of the Paris terrorist attack of November 13, 2015.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

The role and importance of interpretation in the talking cure

Starting with an exploration of how the concept of interpretation in analytical treatment has evolved, the author goes on to discuss the role and importance of interpretation in the changes that psychoanalysis brings about. Although interpretation is looked upon as the key element in psychoanalytic activity, the fact that it is subsumed within the transference raises questions as to its influence in the analytical domain. After discussing the foundations of interpretation with respect to the theory of psychoanalytic treatment and examining Strachey’s views on this, the author defines the conditions and constraints surrounding interpretation and preparatory interventions in order to outline the essential nature of the interpretative process as seen against the wider background of the analyst’s activity as manifested through speech. This leads to a discussion of the relative influence of insight and suggestion in bringing about therapeutic change. The author draws the conclusion that interpretation works as a metaphor in lifting repression.     

Fromm’s understanding of the Buddhist philosophical theory and psychoanalysis: From the phenomenal ego to the authentic being1

Abstract

Erich Fromm was one of the first psychoanalytic thinkers who was genuinely interested in Asian philosophies. In the first part of this article, I will show Fromm’s imago of Buddhism as a radical, nontheistic, and ethical philosophy “without God.” I will argue that Fromm made an important difference between the phenomenal ego and being that proves crucial for his understanding of psychoanalysis and his critique of modern society. I will also explore Fromm’s synthesis of Buddhist philosophy and psychoanalysis, and show the similarities and differences between them.     

质量还是价格?折衷产品缺货情境下的消费者选择

基于情境效应和决策冲突理论, 通过三个实验探讨折衷产品选项的不可得如何影响消费者对余下可得产品的偏好。研究结果表明, 折衷商品不可得对余下商品的吸引力呈现非对称性的影响。以质量和价格产品属性的购买情境为例, 中等价格中等质量商品的不可得将显著提升低价格商品的吸引力(实验1), 其原因在于折衷方案不可得显著提高了消费者的决策冲突, 高水平的决策冲突导致决策者偏好具有确定性优势的选项, 规避优势存在模糊性的选项。随着质量属性模糊性的降低(提供专家评价, 实验2; 消费者专业知识较强, 实验3)或提高(质量存在波动范围, 实验2), 折衷商品不可得效应相应减弱或加强。     

Case History, Case Story: An Enquiry Into the Hermeneutics of C. G. Jung

The case histories written by C. G. Jung, from his 1902 Doctoral Dissertation to his 1950 case of Miss X, are evaluated as pieces of evidence in support of his theories. Evidence is shown to rely for its validity on an 'evidential context' which has altered over time. Jung's case histories change over the course of his writings and become more like stories. The reason for this difference is his move from an interpretative schema based on the natural sciences when a psychiatrist, through that of psychoanalysis, to one based on the human sciences, and in particular to one based on hermeneutics - the study of interpretation and meaning - when he developed his theory of analytical psychology. Jung moves from a form of hermeneutics based on what constitutes a 'valid' interpretation to one that concentrates on meaning and understanding. In writing his later case histories like stories, Jung is using them as merely part of the wider cultural context of evidence required by analytical psychology rather than as privileged pieces of evidence in themselves.     

Is Philosophy All About the Meaning of Life?

This article defends a conception of philosophy popular outside the discipline but unpopular within it: that philosophy is unified by a concern with the meaning of life. First, it argues against exceptionalist theses according to which philosophy is unique among academic disciplines in not being united by a distinctive subject matter. It then presents a positive account, showing that the issue of the meaning of life is uniquely able to reveal unity between the practical and theoretical concerns of philosophy, while meeting a range of desiderata for a typical specification of subject matter. After showing how recent analytic work on “the meaning of life” has conflated the traditional question with issues of social meaningfulness, it offers an explanation of why the traditional question has become marginalised in philosophy. The reasons are not good, however, so it concludes that philosophy should embrace its popular image.     

Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.     

From Psychoanalysis to a Post-Foulkesian Group Analysis

This paper explores the relationship between individual psychoanalytic theory and that of Foulkesian group analytic theory. It traces some of the philosophical and metaphysical assumptions behind orthodox psychoanalytic theory, and discusses its implications for group analytic theory. The paper then describes some aspects of a post-Foulkesian group analytic theory which challenge these assumptions and argues for the socio-political to be given a constitutive role in the construction of the psyche.     

Wild Analysis in Politics

This commentary provides a critical discussion of Crouse and Stalker's (2007) attempt to psychoanalyze right‐wing authoritarian beliefs. The psychological inventory used by Crouse and Stalker for this purpose, The Right‐Wing Authoritarian Scale (Altemeyer, 1998), has dubious validity characteristics, and the conclusions reached by Crouse and Stalker regarding the origins and characteristics of right‐wing political beliefs and attitudes may be more reflective of the authors' political prejudices than of a serious psychoanalytic study of different personality structures. In the present article, the author demonstrates not only the flaws associated with the measuring instrument used, but also the left‐wing biases in the Crouse and Stalker analysis. Unfortunately, these prejudices against individuals with conservative political beliefs may be extensively present in the psychology and psychoanalytic communities and serve neither an appropriate clinical nor scientific purpose.