《代际互动——未成年人道德建设的代际维度》出版

<正>中南林业科技大学廖小平教授的《代际互动——未成年人道德建设的代际维度》于2009年9月由人民出版社出版。该书针对未成年人道德建设研究普遍缺乏学理性、忽视社会转型的影响和成年人因素等不足,试图从学理上把当今中国未成年人道德建设放在社会转型时期由成年人与未成年人所构成的代际     

论未成年人习惯养成的道德价值与心智历程

习惯与道德之间有着天然联系。“从规范行为习惯做起 ,培养良好道德品质和文明行为”是未成年人思想道德建设的有效路径。习惯养成能有效规避未成年人思想道德建设中可能存在的道德风险 ,形成思想道德建设中的辐射效应。从“三思而行”到“不虑而行”是未成年人良好习惯养成必经的心智历程。     

代际互动与未成年人道德建设——评《代际互动——未成年人道德建设的代际维度》

深入研究未成年人道德建设的规律、机制,寻找未成年人道德建设的新视角、新途径,是当前我国公民道德建设中的一个重要和急迫的问题.应该说,我国对于未成年人道德建设的理论研究和实践探索还是取得了许多有价值的成果的,但实际效果并不令人满意.造成这种局面的原因多样而复杂.     

养成训练:未成年公民品德塑造的新路径

重灌输轻养成、重理论教育轻行为训练是青少年道德建设成效不高的重要原因,而养成训练则被证明是未成年公民道德素质生成的有效路径.这是由品德生成的客观规律、未成年人身心发展的特点以及体验教育、实践育人的任务决定的.要切实提高道德行为习惯养成的实际效果,德目指标应易记易循,行为准则须明确具体;活动方案设计应贴紧未成年人实际,训练活动要注重可操作性,强化情感体验环节,抓好"小处"、"小事",注意训练活动的持续性和家校(园)之间的良性互动,不断巩固养成成果.实践证明,从基本道德行为习惯养成训练入手正是促进未成年人道德建设取得实效的关键所在.     

新时期高校德育与高雅音乐契合互动模式探析

高校德育的目的是培养“审美的人”,注重培养社会主义崇高的思想品德,树立高尚的道德水平,促进新时期高校道德教育的全面发展。艺术审美观可以提升大学生道德价值观,高校大学生审美的品位、愿望和观念与其思想境界、道德观念和政治追求的紧密联系,高校德育同高雅音乐实现的目标上是一致的。新时期,要注重发挥家庭、学校、社会三个主体作用,实现高雅音乐的审美与高校德育的契合互动。     

论大学德育生活化模式

传统的大学德育模式主要是给予性德育模式和选择性德育模式两种。给予性德育模式是极端功能主义,据此,人的道德是被给定的,道德仅仅由程序产生,具有唯一的合法性。选择性德育模式在激发人的创造性与主动精神方面具有进步性,但仍然是一种极端存在哲学,据此,人自己形成其道德。大学德育生活化模式认为,道德既是被给定的,同时又是自我设定的。德育是一个“理解”和“建构”过程。德育生活化模式要求在德育思想、内容与手段等三个方面进行变革。     

儿童道德认识的结构与发展规律

道德认识是道德品质形成过程中的第一个环节,是道德行为的基础。探索儿童道德认识的结构与发展规律,在儿童德育中有极其重要的理论与实践意义。儿童道德认识的发展,包括一整套逐步形成的结构,它是通过主体与外部世界之间的不断互动而     

二次否定:市场经济条件下社会主义道德建设的“路径”选择

以《公民道德建设实施纲要》为指导,循着经济发展与道德建设的互动逻辑,揭示市场经济条件下我国社会主义道德“双重否定”式的“路径”选择:第一重否定是市场经济之物化的主体精神对计划经济之抽象集体主义的否定;第二重否定是通过社会主义制度与市场经济的结合来否定后者利己拜物的自发倾向,并在新的基础上实现主体精神与社会本位主义的有机统一,使集体主义道德摆脱抽象性,从天国重返人间。     

首届中国未成年人思想道德建设论坛《宣言》

2008年11月8日至9日,由中央文明办未成年人思想道德建设工作组和中国伦理学会主办、徐州市承办的首届中国未成年人思想道德建设论坛在江苏省徐州市召开.中央有关部门领导同志、来自全国各地的从事未成年人思想道德建设研究的专家学者和实际工作者汇聚一堂,围绕"做一个有道德的人:未成年人思想品德养成的理论与实践"这一主题进行了广泛深入的探讨,交流了当前深化未成年人思想道德建设的新思路、新举措,取得了广泛的共识.     

加强和改进未成年人思想道德建设的指导思想、基本原则和主要任务

当前和今后一个时期,加强和改进未成年人思想道德建设的指导思想是:坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导,深入贯彻十六大精神,全面落实《爱国主义教育实施纲要》、《公民道德建设实施纲要》,紧密结合全面建设小康社会的实际,针对未成年人身心成长的特点,积极探索新世纪新阶段未成年人思想道德建设的规律,坚持以人为本,教育和引导未成年人树立中国特色社会主义的理想信念和正确的世界观、人生观、价值观,养成高尚的思想品质和良好的道德情操,努力培育有理想、有道德、有文化、有纪律的,德、智、体、美…     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.