Optimizing subjective measures of consciousness

Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure.Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.     

Being confident without seeing: What subjective measures of visual consciousness are about

Can observers be confident about the accuracy of a discrimination response without a visual experience of the stimulus? In a series of five experiments, observers performed a masked orientation discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, or a random-dot motion discrimination task, followed by two subjective ratings after each trial, in which participants reported either their visual experience of the stimulus or their confidence in being correct. We observed that the threshold for ratings of the perception of the stimulus was above the threshold for ratings of a decision, that decision ratings outperformed stimulus ratings in predicting trial accuracy, and that different decision-related scales were more strongly associated with other decision-related scales than with ratings of stimulus clarity. We propose a taxonomy of subjective measures of consciousness that differentiates between subjective measures relating to the percept of the stimulus and measures relating to a discrimination decision and discuss the relation to type II blindsight.     

Consciousness: mapping the theoretical landscape

What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the theories attempt to explain consciousness. We then situate each of several representative models in this landscape and indicate which aspect of consciousness they try to explain. We conclude that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness should be usefully complemented by a search for the computational correlates of consciousness.     

内隐序列学习意识的理论、测量和影响因素

内隐序列学习意识理论有二分和渐进两种观点。意识的主观和客观行为测量来源于二分理论, 其研究却产生了渐进理论; 电生理和脑成像测量则存在严重的二分偏向。影响意识的三因素--反应刺激间隔(RSI)、人格开放性和新异刺激都是意识产生的原因, 其有关研究各自支持或反对两种意识理论, 进一步探索可能孕育出新的意识理论。鉴于二分理论无法解释中间意识, 反之渐进理论无法解释意识与无意识的脑区分离, 本文提出双系统渐进理论或可统合两者, 且可能促使大脑网络技术探索意识产生机制的多样性和竞争性等新研究的产生。此外, 所有测量方式的敏感性等级尚待确定, 影响意识三因素的交互作用也值得探索。     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

Getting to the heart of it: Multi-method exploration of nonconscious prioritization processes

Understanding the determinants of consciousness is crucial for theories that see it as functionally adaptive, and for explaining how consciousness affects higher-level cognition. The invention of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a long-duration suppression technique, resulted in a proliferation of research into the process of prioritization for consciousness. We developed a new technique, repeated masked suppression (RMS), that facilitates the measurement of long suppression times, but relies on different visual principles. RMS enables a theoretical leap: It allows scientists to examine the central process of prioritization across different suppression methods. In five experiments (n = 282) we collected chronometric RMS and CFS data, finding that the previously reported face inversion effect and the face priority-dimension generalize beyond CFS. Our results validate the use of multi-method designs in the study of prioritization for consciousness. Furthermore, we show how RMS could be used online to reach diverse samples, previously beyond the reach of consciousness science.     

冲突适应独立于意识：来自行为和ERP的证据

尽管已有研究发现诸如抑制控制和任务转换等认知控制功能独立于意识, 但是对冲突适应是否需要意识的参与目前还存在激烈的争论。为了进一步探讨此问题, 本研究记录了18名被试在完成箭头偏对比掩蔽任务(meta-contrast masking task)时的行为和脑电数据。结果显示, 在有意识和无意识条件下在反应时和额中N2和中顶P3波幅上均表现出了显著的冲突适应效应。这不仅表明冲突控制独立于意识, 而且也表明先前无意识经验对人类信息加工系统的适应性调节作用。本研究对认识认知控制和意识的本质具有重要意义, 也为建构认知控制与意识关系的理论提供了启示。     

Interactively guided introspection is getting science closer to an effective consciousness meter

The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported (Sperling, 1960), and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made (Johansson et al., 2005, Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, and Carter-Thomas (2013) could resolve this dilemma. They showed that subjects can be interactively guided to become better aware of their past experience, thereby overturning the “choice blindness” results of Johansson et al. (2005). Although some more fine-tuning of the experimental protocol is needed, interactively guided introspection may well become the most reliable and exhaustive measure of consciousness.     

Discrete and continuous measures of dimensional stimulus control

In two sets of experiments, we examined dimensional stimulus control of pigeons' responses to a visual flicker-rate continuum. In the first experiment, responses to a single key were reinforced periodically during stimuli from one half of the stimulus continuum, and responses during other stimuli were extinguished. In the second experiment, two response keys were simultaneously available, with reinforcement for each response alternative associated with different halves of the stimulus continuum. Conditions of the second experiment involved either free-operant or discrete-trial stimulus presentations. Results from these experiments show that positive dimensional contrast appeared in discrimination tasks with one or two response alternatives, but only with free-operant procedures. In addition, discrimination between stimulus classes established by differential reinforcement was assessed as accurately by continuous rate measures as by discrete response choice in the two-alternative situation. The general implication of these experiments is that response rate measures, when properly applied, may reveal sources of variation within stimulus classes, such as dimensional contrast, that are not evident with discrete measures.     

Nietzsche's Pluralism about Consciousness

In this paper I argue that Nietzsche's view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness (^Sconsciousness). Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche's treatment of perceptions and sensations we should conclude that he takes each of such state types to involve a specific kind of consciousness which differs from ^Sconsciousness. I label these two additional kinds of consciousness perceptual consciousness (^Pconsciousness) and qualitative consciousness (^Qconsciousness), respectively. I conclude the paper with some remarks on how, in Nietzsche's picture, these three different kinds of consciousness might relate.     

Objective age of acquisition for 223 Italian words: Norms and effects on picture naming speed

The present study provides a set of objective age of acquisition (AoA) norms for 223 Italian words that may be useful for conducting cross-linguistic studies or experiments on Italian language processing. The data were collected by presenting children from the ages of 2 to 11 with a normed picture set (Lotto, Dell’Acqua, & Job, 2001). Following the study of Morrison, Chappell, and Ellis (1997), we report two measures of objective AoA. Both measures strongly correlated with each other, and they also showed a good correlation with the rated AoA provided by adult participants. Furthermore, we assessed the relationship between the AoA measures and other variables used in psycholinguistic experiments. Regression analyses showed that familiarity, typicality, and word frequency were significant predictors of AoA. AoA, but not word frequency, was found to determine naming latencies. Finally, we present a path model in which AoA is a mediator in predicting speed in picture naming. The norms and the picture set can also be downloaded from http://dpss.psy.unipd.it/files/strumenti.php and from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Consciousness and information integration

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.

     

Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness

There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it’s becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.     

Dreams: an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science.     

The effect of masked pictures on the interpretation of ambiguous pictures

Two experiments investigated whether the initial organization of ambiguous pictures presented supraliminally could be influenced by the presentation of semantically related pictures that had been pattern masked to prevent conscious representation. Twenty-two pictures were presented tachistoscopically in a counterbalanced sequence, each alternating with the supraliminal presentation of its ambiguous counterpart. The results supported the hypothesis that pictures precluded from consciousness by pattern masking could nevertheless influence the interpretation of ambiguous pictures. Although the possibility of structural priming could not be completely ruled out in these experiments, there is evidence to suggest that semantic priming is a component. The research potential of semantic priming is also discussed.     

Know thyself: Metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness

Subjective measures of awareness rest on the assumption that conscious knowledge is knowledge that participants know they possess. Post-Decision Wagering (PDW), recently proposed as a new measure of awareness, requires participants to place a high or a low wager on their decisions. Whereas advantageous wagering indicates awareness of the knowledge on which the decisions are based, cases in which participants fail to optimize their wagers suggest performance without awareness. Here, we hypothesize that wagering and other subjective measures of awareness reflect metacognitive capacities subtended by self-developed metarepresentations that inform an agent about its own internal states. To support this idea, we present three simulations in which neural networks learn to wager on their own responses. The simulations illustrate essential properties that are required for such metarepresentations to influence PDW as a measure of awareness. Results demonstrate a good fit to human data. We discuss the implications of this modeling work for our understanding of consciousness and its measures.     

Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem

The assumption that implicit measures assess associations that are not accessible to consciousness abounds in current social cognition research. In the present report, we question this assumption, focusing on the construct of implicit self-esteem as a case in point. Although researchers often argue that implicitly measured self-esteem is unconscious, we provide evidence that it is not, and that discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are the result of reporting tendencies. Study 1 demonstrated that individuals for whom explicitly measured self-esteem is relatively high and implicitly measured self-esteem is relatively low admit to overpresenting themselves. In Study 2, implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem were related when subjects were urged to avoid over- or underpresenting themselves when responding to the explicit measures. We discuss the critical distinction between awareness of one's attitudes and awareness of their influence.     

Perceptual retouch theory derived modeling of interactions in the processing of successive visual objects for consciousness: Two-stage synchronization of neuronal oscillators

We introduce a new version of the perceptual retouch model. This model was used for explaining properties of temporal interaction of successive objects in reaching conscious representation. The new model incorporates two interactive binding operations – binding features for objects and binding the bound feature-objects with a large scale oscillatory system that corresponds to perceptual consciousness. Here, the typical result of masking experiments – second object advantage in conscious perception – is achieved by applying the effects of a common synchronizing oscillator with a delay. This delayed modulation of each of the feature-binding first-order oscillators that represent emerging and decaying neural activities of each of the objects guarantees that the oscillating synchrony of the feature-neurons of the following object is higher than the synchrony of the feature-neurons of the first presented object. Thus we model the fact that the following object dominates the preceding object in conscious perception. We also show the capacity of the model to simulate illusory misbinding of features from different objects. The third qualitative effect, the relative release of the first object from backward masking is achieved by priming the non-specific oscillatory modulation ahead in time.     

Philosophy as a kind of courage

It is possible to reveal and to examine the collective and social fields of consciousness experimentally. An account is given of planned experiments based on quantitative calculations, which indicate that the effects of individual and collective fields of consciousness on matter may elicit directly observable physical results. Moreover, it is shown that collective coherent consciousness fields may enhance the physical effects of consciousness at a significant rate. The predicted results have a significance in our picture of our consciousness, in self‐assertion and dynamising of consciousness, the expansion of collective fields of consciousness, and thus the raising of the level of consciousness for humanity.     

A beautiful day in the neighborhood: What factors determine the generation effect for simple multiplication problems?

In four experiments, we examined the generation effect for the free recall of simple multiplication answers. Large-product-size problems showed a consistent generation-effect advantage over small-product-size problems, except when each answer was generated twice, via two different sets of operands (Experiment 2). Also, measures of problem-solution time and strategy use accounted for the large-product-size advantage. Across experiments, however, small-product-size problems (but not large-product-size problems) showed considerable variation in the size of their generation effect. We discovered that solving small-product-size problems via direct memory retrieval increased the episodic recall probability of other problems that were near neighbors to the generated answer, and we attribute this result to a spreading activation mechanism in semantic memory. A measure of neighbor activations, combined with RT to solve each problem, accounted for 51% of the observed generation-effect variance.