Does changing the reference frame affect infant categorization of the spatial relation BETWEEN?

Past research has shown that variation in the target objects depicting a given spatial relation disrupts the formation of a category representation for that relation. In the current research, we asked whether changing the orientation of the referent frame depicting the spatial relation would also disrupt the formation of a category representation for that relation. Experiments 1 to 3 provided evidence that 6- and 7-month-olds formed a category representation for BETWEEN when a diamond shape was depicted in different locations between two vertical or horizontal reference bars during familiarization and in a novel location between the same orientation of bars during test. By contrast, in Experiment 4, same-age infants did not form a category representation for BETWEEN when the diamond shape was depicted between two vertical (or horizontal) bars during familiarization and between two horizontal (or vertical) bars during test. Moreover, in Experiment 5, 9- and 10-month-olds did form a category representation for BETWEEN when the orientation of the referent bars depicting the relation changed from familiarization to test. The findings suggest that the formation of category representations for spatial relations by infants is affected by changes to either target (figure) or referent (ground).     

The cradle of categorization: Is the basic level basic?

A common assumption in the developmental literature is that the earliest kind of conceptual categories to be formed are basic-level categories. A corollary assumption is that superordinate categories are formed after, and out of, previously acquired basic-level categories. Two experiments using an object-manipulation task explored these assumptions by studying response to a variety of categories in children aged from 12 to 20 months. The first experiment examined responses to basic-level categories (dogs vs. cars),superordinate categories (animals vs. vehicles), and contextual categories (kitchen things vs. bathroom things). At all ages tested, the children performed best on the basic-level categories but, even at 12 months of age, some children were responsive to the superordinate and contextual categories. By 20 months of age, approximately half of the children showed such sensitivity. The second experiment showed that 16- and 20-month-olds differentiated basic-level categories only when the categorical contrasts were taken from different superordinate classes (e.g., dogs vs. cars) and not when the categories were drawn from the same superordinate class (e.g., dogs vs. horses). The data suggest that basic-levels categories are not the first kind of conceptual categories to be formed. Instead, it appears that children may form more global categories, with basic-level differentiation occurring later.     

The cause of stuttering: What''s the question?

There is a consensus among speech-language pathologists that the cause of stuttering is unknown. This lack of understanding is not due to the lack of research effort, but it may be due to asking an unanswerable question. We may already know the causes of many of those behaviors that make up the general concept, stuttering, if we would ask more specific questions.     

The picture superiority effect in categorization: visual or semantic?

Two experiments are reported whose aim was to replicate and generalize the results presented by Snodgrass and McCullough (1986) on the effect of visual similarity in the categorization process. For pictures, Snodgrass and McCullough's results were replicated because Ss took longer to discriminate elements from 2 categories when they were visually similar than when they were visually dissimilar. However, unlike Snodgrass and McCullough, an analogous increase was also observed for word stimuli. The pattern of results obtained here can be explained most parsimoniously with reference to the effect of semantic similarity, or semantic and visual relatedness, rather than to visual similarity alone.     

Can language do the driving? The effect of linguistic input on infants' categorization of support spatial relations

Two experiments explored the effect of linguistic input on 18-month-olds' ability to form an abstract categorical representation of support. Infants were habituated to 4 support events (i.e., one object placed on another) and were tested with a novel support and a novel containment event. Infants formed an abstract category of support (i.e., looked significantly longer at the novel than familiar relation) when hearing the word "on" during habituation but not when viewing the events in silence (Experiment 1) or when hearing general phrases or a novel word (Experiment 2). Results indicate that a familiar word can facilitate infants' formation of an abstract spatial category, leading them to form a category that they do not form in the absence of the word.     

The mother’s mental representation of her infant

Abstract

The mother’s intrapsychic mental representation of her infant begins before pregnancy and is modified during pregnancy and thereafter. Parents have conscious expectations and unconscious fantasies about their infant, which are all too often not consistent with reality. Early intervention in infant–parent disturbances is important for repair of the relationship and prevention of later pathogenic development. A clinical example of a mother’s unconscious ambivalent mental representations of her infant is presented.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

Can supporting a cause decrease donations and happiness? The cause marketing paradox

In two laboratory and one pilot field study, we demonstrate that cause marketing, whereby firms link products with a cause and share proceeds with it, reduces charitable giving by consumers, even when it is costless to the consumer to buy on CM (versus not); further, instead of increasing total contribution to the cause, it can decrease it. Consumers appear to realize that participating in cause marketing is inherently more selfish than direct charitable donation, and are less happy if they substitute cause marketing for charitable giving. Our results suggest that egoistic and empathetic altruism may have different effects on happiness.     

Compared to what? Effects of categorization on hedonic contrast

Test stimuli are rated less “good” following very good context stimuli than when presented either alone or following neutral context stimuli. This diminution in rating is calledhedonic contrast. In two experiments, the degree of hedonic contrast depended on how subjects were instructed to categorize context and test stimuli. Contrast was substantially attenuated if context and test stimuli were said to belong to different categories. The effect was demonstrated for beverages (Experiment 1) and birds (Experiment 2). Stimuli’s hedonic ratings were far less affected by other stimuli declared to belong to a different category than by stimuli declared to belong to a common category.     

The root cause of the attentional blink: First-target processing or disruption of input control?

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented shortly after the first (T1). T1-based theories ascribe this attentional blink (AB) to a T1-initiated period of inattention. Distractor-based theories ascribe it to a disruption of input control caused by post-T1 distractors. The finding that an AB occurs without intertarget distractors (Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:159-169, 2009) seemingly disconfirms distractor-based theories. The present experiments addressed different ways in which distractor-based theories might account for that finding. Intertarget events were varied in four experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Nieuwenstein, Potter, and Theeuwes??s findings. The next two experiments tested two ways (lack of visual stimulation, violation of expectation) in which the blank intertarget interval might cause an AB. Experiment 4 explored whether backward-masking of T1 can account entirely for the larger AB obtained with intervening distractors or whether distractors also disrupt input control. The results disconfirm predictions from distractor-based theories and support the claim of T1-based theories that T1 processing alone is sufficient for the AB. Simulations based on the eSTST (Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:787-807, 2009) and the B&B models (Olivers & Meeter, Psychological Research, 115, 836-863 2008) were compared. Predictions were more accurate from the T1-based theory (eSTST) than from the distractor-based theory (B&B).     

The lay distinction between primary and secondary emotions: A spontaneous categorization?

In line with the psychological essentialism perspective, Leyens et al. ( 13 2000) have hypothesized that people attribute different essences to groups and that they attribute more uniquely human characteristics to their own group than to out‐groups. Leyens et al. have focused on two types of emotions, which in Roman languages have specific labels, such as sentimientos and emociones in Spanish. A cross‐cultural study showed that sentimientos (or secondary emotions) are considered uniquely human emotions whereas emociones (or primary emotions) are perceived as nonuniquely human emotions. The present study focuses on whether this categorization into primary and secondary emotions is a spontaneous distinction that people use in their everyday lives, or whether, on the contrary, it is the result of experimental demands. The paradigm “Who says what to whom” was used to test this question. Geometrical shapes of different colours were systematically associated with different stimuli that varied in meaningfulness. In a first condition, shapes were associated with small or large items of furniture (meaningful categories) and with primary and secondary emotions. In a second condition, the items of furniture were replaced by words ending with a vowel or a consonant (meaningless categories). Subsequently, participants had to recognize which shape was associated with each stimulus. Intra‐category errors were significantly more numerous than inter‐category errors, except for the words ending with a vowel or a consonant. Stated otherwise, types of emotions were recognized like the meaningful difference between items of furniture. These results show that the distinction between primary and secondary emotions is an implicit one that people use spontaneously, and not as a result of task demands. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism and inter‐group relations.     

The relational versus collective “We” and intergroup allocation: The role of nested group categorization

Intergroup research has focused primarily, if not solely, on how an intergroup comparative context primes social categorization. The current research examines how individual differences, in terms of distinct forms of social self (the relational versus collective self), differentially drive social categorization and zero-sum resource allocation across groups nested within a superordinate group. Results show that the relational self exhibited more ingroup-biased allocations than the collective self; superordinate categorization mediated this relationship. Moreover, the relational self showed more ingroup-biased allocations under the condition of intergroup competition than cooperation; whereas the collective self showed equally unbiased allocations under the conditions of intergroup competition and cooperation. Our research suggests that competition worsens nested group relations for the relational self, but not for the collective self.     

What makes a categorization task difficult?

To understand why some categorization tasks are more difficult than others, we consider five factors that may affect human performance--namely, covariance complexity, optimal accuracy level with and without internal noise, orientation of the optimal categorization rule, and class separability. We argue that covariance complexity, an information-theoretic measure of complexity, is an excellent predictor of task difficulty. We present an experiment that consists of five conditions using a simulated medical decision-making task In the task human observers view hundreds of hypothetical patient profiles and classify each profile into Disease Category A or B. Each profile is a continuous-valued, three-dimensional stimulus consisting of three vertical bars, where each bar height represents the result of a medical test. Across the five conditions, covariance complexity was systematically manipulated. Results indicate that variation in performance is largely a function of covariance complexity and partly a function of internal noise. The remaining three factors do not explain performance results. We present a challenge to categorization theorists to design models that account for human performance as predicted by covariance complexity.     

Supervised versus unsupervised categorization: two sides of the same coin?

Supervised and unsupervised categorization have been studied in separate research traditions. A handful of studies have attempted to explore a possible convergence between the two. The present research builds on these studies, by comparing the unsupervised categorization results of Pothos et al. ( 2011 ; Pothos et al., 2008 ) with the results from two procedures of supervised categorization. In two experiments, we tested 375 participants with nine different stimulus sets and examined the relation between ease of learning of a classification, memory for a classification, and spontaneous preference for a classification. After taking into account the role of the number of category labels (clusters) in supervised learning, we found the three variables to be closely associated with each other. Our results provide encouragement for researchers seeking unified theoretical explanations for supervised and unsupervised categorization, but raise a range of challenging theoretical questions.     

Do infant rats cry?

In the current revival of interest in the emotional and mental lives of animals, many investigators have focused attention on mammalian infants that emit distress vocalizations when separated from the home environment. Perhaps the most intensively studied distress vocalization is the ultrasonic vocalization of infant rats. Since its discovery, this vocalization has been interpreted both as a communicatory signal for the elicitation of maternal retrieval and as the manifestation of emotional distress. In contrast, the authors examined the cardiovascular causes and consequences of the vocalization, and on the basis of this work, they hypothesized that the vocalization is the acoustic by-product of the abdominal compression reaction (ACR), a maneuver that results in increased venous return to the heart. Therefore, the vocalization may be analogous to a sneeze, serving a physiological function while incidentally producing sound.     

A rule-based categorization deficit in Alzheimer's disease?

This study examined the categorization processes that Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients use during assessments of semantic memory. Rule-based categorization involves the careful, analytic processing of strict criteria to determine category membership, particularly for items from graded categories with ambiguous category membership; similarity-based categorization requires an overall comparison of a test stimulus with a prototype or remembered exemplar of the category and is relatively effective for the rapid categorization of items with unambiguous category membership. To assess these processes in AD, patients were asked to decide the category membership of test stimuli for categories with poorly defined or fuzzy boundaries (e.g., VEGETABLE) and for categories with well-defined boundaries (e.g., FEMALE) and then to judge the representativeness of the test stimulus for its chosen category. A subgroup of AD patients demonstrated a typical pattern of impaired semantic memory compared to healthy control subjects; that is, difficulty deciding the category membership of test items from fuzzy categories. Among these patients, we found no deficit in category membership decisions about items taken from well-defined categories. We also found that AD patients and healthy controls do not differ in their representativeness judgments of items within a correctly judged category. These findings are most consistent with the hypothesis that rule-based categorization difficulty limits semantic memory in AD.