Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocents is Not a Universal Moral Certainty

In this paper, I argue that the certainty about the wrongness of killing must not be considered as a universal, but as a local one. Initially, I show that there exist communities in which the wrongness of killing innocents is not a moral certainty and that this kind of case cannot be justified by arguing that such people are psychopaths. Lastly, I argue that universal certainties do not admit of exceptions: thus, the fact that some exceptional cases affect the certainty that killing innocents is wrong, leads me to conclude that it is a local certainty.     

Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocent,Non-threatening People is a Universal Moral Certainty

In a recent article in this journal, José María Ariso makes the argument that the killing of innocent, non-threatening people is not a universal moral certainty. To make this case, he gives two examples where the certainty is seemingly not present: the pisa-suave child soldiers in the Colombian civil war and the often-discussed case of Nazi Germany. This paper is an attempt to respond to these criticisms. I will respond to each charge in turn and argue that they do not pose a problem to the idea that the wrongness of killing innocent, non-threatening people is a universal moral certainty.     

Epicurus,Death, and the Wrongness of Killing

This article questions the assumption, held by several philosophers, that the Epicurean argument for death's being “nothing to us” must be fallacious since its acceptance would undermine the principle that killing is (in general) wrong. Two possible strategies are considered, which the Epicurean-sympathizer might deploy in order to show that the non-badness of death (for the person who dies) is compatible with killing's being wrong. One of these is unsuccessful; the other is more promising. It involves arguing that the wrongness of killing is a “basic moral certainty” and hence requires no underpinning by the judgement that death is bad. Problems for this proposal, and possible responses to those problems, are considered. Though the strategy is not decisive, it is deemed to be one that the Epicurean could plausibly adopt.     

When and Why Mimicry is Facilitated and Attenuated

Although people tend to mimic others automatically, mimicry is facilitated or attenuated depending on the specific context. In the current paper, the authors discuss when mimicry is facilitated and attenuated depending on characteristics of situations, targets, and observers. On the basis of the review, the authors propose a new model – the Associated Reactions to Actions in Context model (ARAC) – to explain why and when mimicry is facilitated and attenuated. ARAC proposes that when people observe an action, reaction‐to‐action neurons fire. Which reaction is elicited depends on the (learned or innate) association with an action in that context. Thus, when mimicry is rewarding in a specific context, this response is facilitated. When mimicry is damaging, this response is attenuated, and another reaction may be facilitated instead. The authors discuss the added value of the ARAC model compared to other models explaining the elicitation of behavioral reactions.     

Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is Not the Keeper of the Common Good

Christian ethicists often assume that the state is the agency whose purpose it is to protect and promote the common good. This conclusion is based on a series of assumptions of fact: that the state is natural and primordial, that society gives rise to the state and not vice‐versa, and that the state is one limited part of society. In this essay I examine the origins of the state and the state‐society relationship according to those who study the historical record, and argue that the above assumptions of fact are untenable in the face of the evidence. The essay concludes by registering a theological challenge to the state's sometimes overreaching claims to be the keeper of the common good and the repository of sacred values that demands sacrifice on its behalf. In the face of these tendencies, one of the church's urgent tasks is to demystify the nation‐state and to treat it like the telephone company—i.e., as a provider of goods and services that contribute to a certain limited order.     

Exploring the When and Why of Schadenfreude

We summarize the empirical work on schadenfreude , or pleasure felt at someone else's misfortune. Although schadenfreude is a socially undesirable emotion, research reveals at least three conditions in which it commonly arises. One condition is when observers gain from the misfortune. We discuss research showing that gains in ingroup outcomes based on the failures of rival outgroups can create schadenfreude , especially for those highly identified with their ingroups. A second condition is when another's misfortune is deserved. We focus on research showing that the misfortunes of hypocrites are perceived as highly deserved and therefore create schadenfreude in observers. A third condition is when a misfortune befalls an envied person. We summarize studies showing that the core ingredients of envy prime the envying person for schadenfreude when the envied person suffers.     

从"杀盗非杀人"看逻辑与价值的混淆

"杀盗非杀人"是墨辩的一个自相矛盾的诡辩命题,墨者之所以提出这个命题,论者之所以倾心辩护,是由于逻辑与价值的混淆.本文对这个命题进行了逻辑分析和价值分析,通过追究墨者提出这个命题的用意和后果,发现了墨辩停留在逻辑萌芽状态而未能发展为逻辑学的症结所在,就是:逻辑屈从价值,价值牺牲逻辑.     

Why Fat is a Feminist Issue

The proposition that fat is a feminist issue is almost an axiom within the feminist literature. And yet, different feminist scholars see fat as a feminist issue for radically different reasons. An analysis of mainly U.S. research suggests that for some, fat is a symptom of underlying distress and compulsive eating as a coping mechanism for this gendered anguish. For others, higher rates of “obesity” among poor women and women of color is a scandalous form of environmental injustice necessitating policy interventions to combat obesity in these populations. Others have argued that fat is a feminist issue because the fear of being or becoming fat tyrannizes average-size and relatively thin women, limiting their quality of life and often leading to eating disorders. In contrast, Fikkan and Rothblum (2011) argue that fat is a feminist issue because fat women are subjugated to bias, discrimination and abuse precisely because they are fat women. Unlike other approaches, they put actual fat women at the heart of their analysis, comparing their experience to that of both thin women and to fat men. They rightly signal the importance of examining how the social experiences of fat people vary by sex, social class, race/ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among other factors. While emphasizing the importance of their perspective, this article advocates that this line of feminist analysis be pushed even further.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorize these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.     

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorise these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.