Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is Not the Keeper of the Common Good

Christian ethicists often assume that the state is the agency whose purpose it is to protect and promote the common good. This conclusion is based on a series of assumptions of fact: that the state is natural and primordial, that society gives rise to the state and not vice‐versa, and that the state is one limited part of society. In this essay I examine the origins of the state and the state‐society relationship according to those who study the historical record, and argue that the above assumptions of fact are untenable in the face of the evidence. The essay concludes by registering a theological challenge to the state's sometimes overreaching claims to be the keeper of the common good and the repository of sacred values that demands sacrifice on its behalf. In the face of these tendencies, one of the church's urgent tasks is to demystify the nation‐state and to treat it like the telephone company—i.e., as a provider of goods and services that contribute to a certain limited order.     

Exploring the When and Why of Schadenfreude

We summarize the empirical work on schadenfreude , or pleasure felt at someone else's misfortune. Although schadenfreude is a socially undesirable emotion, research reveals at least three conditions in which it commonly arises. One condition is when observers gain from the misfortune. We discuss research showing that gains in ingroup outcomes based on the failures of rival outgroups can create schadenfreude , especially for those highly identified with their ingroups. A second condition is when another's misfortune is deserved. We focus on research showing that the misfortunes of hypocrites are perceived as highly deserved and therefore create schadenfreude in observers. A third condition is when a misfortune befalls an envied person. We summarize studies showing that the core ingredients of envy prime the envying person for schadenfreude when the envied person suffers.     

从"杀盗非杀人"看逻辑与价值的混淆

"杀盗非杀人"是墨辩的一个自相矛盾的诡辩命题,墨者之所以提出这个命题,论者之所以倾心辩护,是由于逻辑与价值的混淆.本文对这个命题进行了逻辑分析和价值分析,通过追究墨者提出这个命题的用意和后果,发现了墨辩停留在逻辑萌芽状态而未能发展为逻辑学的症结所在,就是:逻辑屈从价值,价值牺牲逻辑.     

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.     

Why Fat is a Feminist Issue

The proposition that fat is a feminist issue is almost an axiom within the feminist literature. And yet, different feminist scholars see fat as a feminist issue for radically different reasons. An analysis of mainly U.S. research suggests that for some, fat is a symptom of underlying distress and compulsive eating as a coping mechanism for this gendered anguish. For others, higher rates of “obesity” among poor women and women of color is a scandalous form of environmental injustice necessitating policy interventions to combat obesity in these populations. Others have argued that fat is a feminist issue because the fear of being or becoming fat tyrannizes average-size and relatively thin women, limiting their quality of life and often leading to eating disorders. In contrast, Fikkan and Rothblum (2011) argue that fat is a feminist issue because fat women are subjugated to bias, discrimination and abuse precisely because they are fat women. Unlike other approaches, they put actual fat women at the heart of their analysis, comparing their experience to that of both thin women and to fat men. They rightly signal the importance of examining how the social experiences of fat people vary by sex, social class, race/ethnicity, and sexual orientation, among other factors. While emphasizing the importance of their perspective, this article advocates that this line of feminist analysis be pushed even further.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorize these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.     

When the smile is a cue to familiarity

The question discussed in the two following experiments concerns the effect of facial expressions on face recognition. Famous and unknown faces with neutral or smiling expression were presented for different inspection durations (15 ms vs 1000 ms). Subjects had to categorise these faces as famous or unknown (Experiment 1), or estimate their degree of familiarity on a rating scale (Experiment 2). Results showed that the smile increased ratings of familiarity for unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and for famous faces (Experiment 2). These data are discussed in the framework of current face-recognition models and are interpreted in terms of social value of the smile. It is proposed that the smiling bias found here acts at the level of the decision process.     

From the Victim's Point of View

In this keynote speech to the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities in October, 1999, Hilfiker suggests that the underlying goal of teaching ethics should be to develop in those who care for others an empathy with the outsider. Unless care givers cannot see the world from the victim's point of view, they will have a difficult time developing an ethical framework in which to work. In this paper, Hilfiker tells the story of how he came to find the victim's point of view through his own experiences as a physician and through the work of Dorothee Sölle, René Girard, and John Rawls.     

Why Frankenstein is a Stigma Among Scientists

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818) is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises.     

Why the Practice of Medicine is Not a Phronetic Activity

This essay argues that the practice of medicine is not a phronetic activity in the original Aristotelian sense of that term. Jonsen and Toulmin are two philosophers who have conflated the techne of medicine with phronesis. This conflation ignores Aristotle's crucial distinction between techne and phronesis and his use of the medical analogy. It is argued that medical reasoning is similar to phronesis but does not exemplify it. Phronesis will not save the life of medical ethics. The concept could be utilized as a moral prosthetic.