不同维度的执行功能与早期心理理论的关系

采用意外地点任务、意外内容任务和三种不同类型的执行功能任务来探究执行功能与心理理论之间的关系。共60名被试,3岁和4岁被试各30名,男女各半。区分自己心理状态和他人心理状态能力与执行功能的关系主要体现在混合成分执行功能与这一能力的密切联系上;在错误信念发展的早期,执行功能与错误信念理解能力的关系主要集中在“混合成分的执行功能与对自己错误信念理解能力,工作记忆的执行功能与对他人错误信念理解能力”这两对联系上     

The influence of language on theory of mind: a training study

This study investigated the role of language in the development of theory of mind. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of the syntactic and semantic properties of sentential complements would facilitate the development of a representational theory of mind. Sixty preschoolers who failed false belief and sentential complement pretests were randomly assigned to training on false belief, sentential complements, or relative clauses (as a control group). All the children were post-tested on a set of different theory of mind tasks, sentential complements and relative clauses. The main findings were that the group trained on sentential complements not only acquired the linguistic knowledge fostered by the training, but also significantly increased their scores on a range of theory of mind tasks. In contrast, false belief training only led to improved theory of mind scores but had no influence on language. The control group, trained on relative clauses, showed no improvement on theory of mind posttests. These findings are taken as evidence that the acquisition of sentential complements contributes to the development of theory of mind in preschoolers.     

Longitudinal Relations Between Theory of Mind and Metacognition and the Impact of Language

This study investigated the longitudinal relation between children's theory of mind and their metacognitive knowledge with a special focus on the impact of language on this relation. Measures of theory-of-mind understanding and metamemory knowledge were assessed in 133 3-year-old children at 4 measurement points separated by half-year intervals. Results revealed a somewhat more pronounced effect of children's early theory of mind on the change in metamemory knowledge than vice versa. This effect was almost independent of the time period under investigation as well as of earlier language and nonverbal competencies and socioeconomic status. Early language competencies had a direct impact on theory-of-mind and metamemory development and moreover indirectly affected metamemory development through children's theory of mind. The results of the study suggest that children's abilities to metarepresent together with their early language competencies are important in the acquisition of metamemory knowledge.     

Development of theory of mind and executive control

Several recent studies have demonstrated a developmental link, in the age range of 3–5 years, between the acquisition of a ‘theory of mind’ and self control. In this review, we consider the existence of such a link in assessing five competing theoretical hypotheses that might help us to understand the nature of this developmental advance: (1) executive control depends on theory of mind; (2) theory of mind development depends on executive control; (3) the relevant theory of mind tasks require executive control; (4) both kinds of task require the same kind of embedded conditional reasoning; (5) theory of mind and executive control involve the same brain region. We briefly describe these theoretical accounts and evaluate them in the light of existing empirical evidence. At present, only account (3) can be ruled out with some confidence.     

Self‐knowledge in childhood: Relations with children's imaginary companions and understanding of mind

Relations between interior self‐knowledge and (a) imaginary companion (IC) status and (b) theory of mind (ToM) abilities were investigated in a sample (N= 80) of 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds. Interior self‐knowledge was assessed in terms of the extent to which children acknowledged that they (rather than an adult) were the authority on unobservable aspects of themselves (e.g., dreaming, thinking, hunger). Compared with children without an IC, those who possessed a parentally corroborated IC ascribed less interior self‐knowledge to an adult, with a trend for them to assign more interior self‐knowledge to themselves. Children's interior self‐knowledge judgments were not associated with their ToM performance. IC status was also unrelated to ToM performance. We consider how having an IC may provide children with opportunities to distinguish between knowledge that is inaccessible to an external observer and that which an external observer may glean without being told.     

Constructing an understanding of mind: the development of children's social understanding within social interaction

Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about their experience and beliefs (Chapman 1991; 1999). It is through such triadic interaction that children gradually construct knowledge of the world as well as knowledge of other people. We contend that the extent and nature of the social interaction children experience will influence the development of children's social understanding. Increased opportunity to engage in cooperative social interaction and exposure to talk about mental states should facilitate the development of social understanding. We review evidence suggesting that children's understanding of mind develops gradually in the context of social interaction. Therefore, we need a theory of development in this area that accords a fundamental role to social interaction, yet does not assume that children simply adopt socially available knowledge but rather that children construct an understanding of mind within social interaction.     

A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome

In this paper we argue that there are two distinct components of a theory of mind: a social-cognitive and a social-perceptual component. Evidence for this proposal is presented from various sources, including studies of children with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder. Earlier work has demonstrated that people with Williams syndrome appear to be spared in the social-perceptual component of a theory of mind. In this paper we present evidence that they are not spared in the social-cognitive component of theory of mind. Three experiments with young children with Williams syndrome were conducted. In each experiment the children with Williams syndrome were compared to age-, IQ-, and language-matched children with Prader-Willi syndrome, and children with non-specific mental retardation. The experiments used different measures of theory of mind ability, including false belief (Experiment 1), explanation of action (Experiment 2), and recognition of emotional expressions (Experiment 3). In none of these experiments did the children with Williams syndrome evidence superior performance compared to the control groups. The results from this and other studies on Williams syndrome support the view that the social-cognitive and social-perceptual components of a theory of mind are dissociable. In Williams syndrome only the latter components, which are linked to distinct neurobiological substrates, are spared.     

Children's developing understanding of differences between their own intentional action and passive movement

Four studies examined 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' ability to judge accurately whether they acted intentionally. Children self‐initiated action to attain an outcome, or their arm was moved by the experimenter to create an outcome. In Experiment 3, children in both age groups accurately claimed they were agents of self‐guided action but not of passive movement. In contrast, in Experiments 1, 2 and 4, children in both age groups found it difficult to deny they intended to bring about the outcome, even though their movement was passive and, in some cases, the outcome was unexpected. They were consistently successful only when exclusively involved in creating one of two outcomes and asked which one they intended (Experiment 4). In sum, 3‐and 4‐year‐olds can distinguish when their movements are self‐directed and when they are passive. They are limited, however, in applying this distinction to self‐judgments concerning whether they acted intentionally. These findings are discussed with respect to linguistic and cognitive limitations that may influence the role first‐person knowledge plays in theory‐of‐mind development.     

Young children's self‐benefiting lies and their relation to executive functioning and theory of mind

It is well established that children lie in different social contexts for various purposes from the age of 2 years. Surprisingly, little is known about whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain, how self‐benefiting lies emerge, and what cognitive factors affect the emergence of self‐benefiting lies. To bridge this gap in the literature, we situated children between 2 and 4 years of age in a zero‐sum game where children must lie to their opponent if they wanted to win a desirable reward. We found that the majority of young children did not lie even when they experienced personal losses repeatedly. However, some children spontaneously lied during the game; as the game progressed, more children lied. Further, we found that children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning in terms of a combination of inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility had significant positive and unique correlations with how frequently children lied for personal gain. The present results taken together with the existing findings regarding children's lies for self‐protection and politeness purposes suggest that the act of lying begins early in life. Further, its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

Highlights

• The study investigated whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain.
• This study used a zero‐sum game to elicit children's self‐benefiting lies. Results showed the majority of young children did not lie, and it is related to children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.
• The act of lying begins early in life, and its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

     

Are belief‐based justifications associated with metalinguistic awareness? A cross‐sectional study in school‐age children

Previous research has consistently demonstrated that false‐belief (FB) understanding correlates with and predicts metalinguistic ability in preschoolers. Surprisingly, however, there is scant evidence on the question of whether this relation persists at later ages. The present cross‐sectional study sought to fill this gap by examining the association between FB understanding, belief‐based justifications and metalinguistic awareness. A sample of 150 children primary‐school children between 8 and 11 years of age were administered a test of receptive language, a second‐order theory‐of‐mind task and a comprehensive metalinguistic battery. The results of correlational and regression analyses showed that explicit metalinguistic awareness (in particular, performance in the Ambiguity and Phonemic Segmentation subtests) was significantly predicted by children's belief‐based responses to the justification question in the theory of mind task but only for children with small receptive vocabularies; in contrast, FB understanding made no independent contribution (either alone or in interaction with other measures). These findings complement and advance existing data by showing that, in school‐age children, the association between the 2 domains involves more mature, verbally explicit levels of FB understanding and metalinguistic awareness.

Highlights

• We examined the relation between metalinguistic awareness and theory‐of‐mind in primary‐school children.
• Metalinguistic awareness was associated to belief‐based justifications, but only for children with small vocabulary.
• In school‐age children the ability to provide verbal justifications plays a key role in the relation between theory‐of‐mind and metalinguistic awareness.

     

Mind over grammar: reasoning in aphasia and development

Research on propositional reasoning (involving ‘theory of mind’ understanding) in adult patients with aphasia reveals that reasoning can proceed in the absence of explicit grammatical knowledge. Conversely, evidence from studies with deaf children shows that the presence of such knowledge is not sufficient to account for reasoning. These findings are in keeping with recent research on the development of naming, categorization and imitation, indicating that children's reasoning about objects and actions is guided by inferences about others’ communicative intentions. We discuss the extent to which reasoning is supported by, and tied to, language in the form of conversational awareness and experience rather than grammar.     

A model of the synchronic self

The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one's body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one's body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentive(B) self, which underlies the sense of control over one's body; the boundary(B) self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's body; the agentive(M) self which underlies the sense of control over one's thoughts; and the boundary(M) self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's mind. I model the agentive(B) and agentive(M) selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundary(B) self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundary(M) self.     

The non-specificity of theory of mind deficits: Evidence from children with communicative disabilities

The aim of the present paper was to investigate the performance on theory of mind tasks of four different clinical groups: children with deficits in attention, motor control and perception (DAMP), children with autism, children with Asperger syndrome, and non-vocal cerebral-palsied children. The children with DAMP performed on the same level as the comparison group on the first and second order theory of mind task. The children with autism and Asperger syndrome performed somewhat lower than the children with DAMP and the comparison group. However, in respect of the specifcity issue, only 6 out of 14 of the non-vocal participants successfully solved the first order theory of mind task, while 13 out of 14 children in a comparison group did. The children were matched for chronological age and IQ. The findings suggest that deficits in theory of mind are not specific to the autistic continuum, but can be found in other groups with communicative disabilities, implying that linguistic and communicative skills are important precursors in the development of theory of mind. The study also shows that severe dysfunction in attention, motor control, and perception is not associated with any theory of mind difficulties.     

幼儿心理理论与社会行为发展关系的初步研究

研究短期跟踪57名新进入幼儿园的幼儿,测查他们心理理论(theory of mind)和社会行为的发展水平.结果表明,幼儿心理理论的发展差异确实与他们的社会行为发展存在某种密切关系,但其与社会行为发展的不同方面似乎存在不同的关系模式.对这些不同的关系模式,文中分别从幼儿的心理状态认识、执行性控制能力发展和个性倾向等方面进行了探讨.     

Theories of mind in infancy

This paper reviews and evaluates various theories of the origins of theory of mind in infancy. In what a theory of mind consists is first considered. It is argued that any theory of mind has two important features. Firstly, a theory of mind recognizes, at least, the existence of psychological relations between agents and objects, including some relations which involve “action at a distance”. Secondly, in a theory of mind, self and other are equivalent in that both can act equally as agents of psychological relations. Any theory of the development of theory of mind must explicate how it is possible to acquire an understanding of these two features. With this requirement in mind, four main types of recent theories are considered — modularity theories, Piagetian theories, matching theories, and intersubjectivity theories. While no decision is made amongst these theories, suggestions for further improvement in theorizing on this topic are presented.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

Is Silence Really Golden? The Role of Spiritual Voice in Folk Pedagogy and Folk Psychology

Most recently, considerable attention has been focused on the social construction of knowledge and an internalist, first‐person perspective on learning. Included in this paradigm shift is a particular ‘hybrid’ of both psychology and educational theory often referred to as ‘theory of mind’ (ToM research) or folk psychology. This article outlines models of teaching, learning, and mind in the hopes that such an advance in understanding children's minds will lead to an improved pedagogy. To address the issues of emotion and ‘spiritual voice’ that may constrain learning in the classroom and self‐development, Belenky et al.’sfive epistemological perspectives or ‘Women's Ways of Knowing’ (New York, Basic Books, 1986) are couched within the framework of Olson and Burner's [Folk Psychology and Folk Pedagogy, in: D. Olson & N. Torrance (Eds) Handbook of Education and Human Development: New Models of Learning, Teaching and Schooling, pp. 9‐27 (Oxford, Blackwell)] four models of mind, teaching and learning. At issue is the dialogical relation between folk psychology and folk pedagogy and its contingency on both culture and context.     

What would Batman do? Self‐distancing improves executive function in young children

This experimental research assessed the influence of graded levels of self‐distancing – psychological distancing from one's egocentric perspective – on executive function (EF) in young children. Three‐ (n = 48) and 5‐year‐old (n = 48) children were randomly assigned to one of four manipulations of distance from the self (from proximal to distal: self‐immersed, control, third person, and exemplar) on a comprehensive measure of EF. Performance increased as a function of self‐distancing across age groups. Follow‐up analyses indicated that 5‐year‐olds were driving this effect. They showed significant improvements in EF with increased distance from the self, outperforming controls both when taking a third person perspective on the self and when taking the perspective of an exemplar other (e.g., Batman) through role play. Three‐year‐olds, however, did not show increased EF performance as a function of greater distance from the self. Preliminary results suggest that developments in theory of mind might contribute to these age‐related differences in efficacy. These findings speak to the importance of psychological distancing in the expression of conscious control over thought and action from a young age and suggest a promising new avenue for early EF intervention.     

幼儿气质、教师期望和同伴接纳对自我控制的影响

通过对684名3-5岁幼儿进行同伴提名和问卷测量,考察气质、教师期望和同伴接纳对自我控制的影响,结果发现：（1）气质、教师期望和同伴接纳各维度不同程度地预测幼儿自我控制。（2）气质、同伴接纳、教师期望交互作用于自我控制,其中同伴接纳是有调节的中介变量,其既是气质反应性、专注性和教师对幼儿日常习惯期望影响自我控制的部分中介变量,又同时受到气质情绪性的调节。（3）社会抑制性与教师对幼儿人际互动的期望交互作用于自我控制。