Second Thoughts About Decision Reversibility: An Empirical Overview

People generally expect that having the opportunity to reverse a decision contributes to the quality of decision‐making. However, previous research has unequivocally shown that reversible decisions actually yield lower levels of post‐choice satisfaction and higher levels of regret than irreversible decisions. Only recently, research has begun to investigate the underlying processes explaining these counterintuitive and detrimental consequences of decision reversibility. In the present paper, we will review and integrate this research and distinguish a number of important cognitive and motivational consequences of decision (ir)reversibility. With this paper, we aim to inspire future research into the discrepancy between people's wish for reversibility on the one hand and their need for irreversibility on the other.     

Unraveling the Aging Skein: Disentangling Sensory and Cognitive Predictors of Age‐related Differences in Decision Making

Age‐related differences in sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory have been identified as three significant predictors of the age‐related performance decline observed in complex cognitive tasks. Yet, the assessment of their relative predictive capacity and interrelations is still an open issue in decision making and cognitive aging research. Indeed, no previous investigation has examined the relationships of all these three predictors with decision making. In an individual‐differences study, we therefore disentangled the relative contribution of sensory functioning, processing speed, and working memory to the prediction of the age‐related decline in cognitively demanding judgment and decision‐making tasks. Structural equation modeling showed that the age‐related decline in working memory plays an important predictive role, even when controlling for sensory functioning, processing speed, and education. Implications for research on decision making and cognitive aging are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

决策理由、行动和后果对决策后悔的影响

探讨决策理由(合理与不合理)、行动(做与不做)和后果(严重与轻微)对决策后悔的影响,以2×2×2被试内设计,设置8个决策情境进行实验。结果:不合理决策的后悔体验比合理决策更高,严重的后果导致的后悔比轻微的后果更高,行动无主效应,但在后果轻微,理由不正当条件下,行动也就是“做”导致更多的后悔情绪。结论:决策理由的合理性与后果的严重性是影响决策后悔的重要因素; 只有理由不正当且后果轻微时,才存在“做效应”。     

Age-related changes in decision making: comparing informed and noninformed situations

Advantageous decision making progressively develops into early adulthood, most specifically in complex and motivationally salient decision situations in which direct feedback on gains and losses is provided (Figner & Weber, 2011). However, the factors that underlie this developmental improvement in decision making are still not well understood. The current study therefore investigates 2 potential factors, long-term memory and working memory, by assigning a large developmental sample (7-29 years of age) to a condition with either high or low demands on long-term and working memory. The first condition featured an age-adapted version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; i.e., a noninformed situation), whereas the second condition provided an external store where explicit information on gains, losses, and probabilities per choice option was presented (i.e., an informed situation). Consistent with previous developmental IGT studies, children up to age 12 did not learn to prefer advantageous options in the noninformed condition. In contrast, all age groups learned to prefer the advantageous options in the informed conditions, although a slight developmental increase in advantageous decision making remained. These results indicate that lowering dependence on long-term and working memory improves children's advantageous decision making. The results additionally suggest that other factors, like inhibitory control processes, may play an additional role in the development of advantageous decision making.     

Shooting behaviour: How working memory and negative emotionality influence police officer shoot decisions

Previous research on police officer shoot decisions has focussed on the influence of situational factors that lead to the shooting error. Focussing instead on the ‘shooter’, the present study examined whether working memory capacity and threat‐related increases in negative emotionality influenced participant shoot decisions in a simulated shooting task. Following a working memory test, 24 police officers viewed a police‐relevant threatening video while physiological indices of arousal and negative affect were obtained and then completed a computerized shoot‐don't shoot task. Results indicated that lower working memory capacity was associated with a greater likelihood of shooting unarmed targets and a failure to shoot armed targets. Moreover, an interaction effect indicated that these associations were only significant for officers who experienced heightened negative emotionality in response to the video. Results suggest that when negatively aroused via threat, limited working memory capacity increases the risk of shooting error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recognition Decisions From Visual Working Memory Are Mediated by Continuous Latent Strengths

Making recognition decisions often requires us to reference the contents of working memory, the information available for ongoing cognitive processing. As such, understanding how recognition decisions are made when based on the contents of working memory is of critical importance. In this work we examine whether recognition decisions based on the contents of visual working memory follow a continuous decision process of graded information about the correct choice or a discrete decision process reflecting only knowing and guessing. We find a clear pattern in favor of a continuous latent strength model of visual working memory–based decision making, supporting the notion that visual recognition decision processes are impacted by the degree of matching between the contents of working memory and the choices given. Relation to relevant findings and the implications for human information processing more generally are discussed.     

Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性的调节机制

在以往涉及不作为惯性的研究中,个体通常只是错失了1个先前选项.本研究旨在考察当之前错失了多个选项后,不作为惯性是否仍会出现,并深入探讨估价和后悔因素在不作为惯性产生或消失中的作用.结果发现,先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性具有调节作用:当先前只错失了1个选项时,出现了不作为惯性,当先前已错失了两个选项时,不作为惯性消失了.中介分析发现,这一调节作用可被预期后悔所中介.结果表明,预期后悔是导致个体在错失多个选项后不作为惯性消失的主要原因.     

A cognitive approach to dogmatism: An investigation into the relationship of verbal working memory and dogmatism

This study investigated the relationship of working memory to open and closed belief systems. Two hundred college students completed a working memory span test to measure verbal working memory, and Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale (1956). Regression analysis was undertaken to determine the contribution of verbal working memory to dogmatism. A negative correlation was found between dogmatism scores and working memory scores (p = .002) confirming the hypothesis that those participants who display a larger working memory capacity would show lower levels of dogmatic beliefs than participants displaying a smaller working memory capacity. Error analysis was employed to determine the significance of inhibition processes; indicating that capacity limits in verbal working memory, and not processing deficits, were primarily responsible for poor working memory scores. Dogmatism was not found to be related to gender, age, ethnicity, religious affiliation, academic major, or level of education.     

Misremembrance of options past: source monitoring and choice

This study reveals that when remembering past decisions, people engage in choice-supportive memory distortion. When asked to make memory attributions of options' features, participants made source-monitoring errors that supported their decisions. They tended to attribute, both correctly and incorrectly, more positive features to the option they had selected than to its competitor. In addition, they sometimes attributed, both correctly and incorrectly, more negative features to the nonselected option. This pattern of distortion may be beneficial to people's general well-being, reducing regret for options not taken. At the same time, it is problematic for memory accuracy, for accountability, and for learning from past experience.     

The influence of episodic memory decline on value-based choice

Recent studies suggest the involvement of episodic memory in value-based decisions as a source of information about subjective values of choice options. We therefore tested the link between age-related memory decline and inconsistencies in value-based decisions in 30 cognitively healthy older adults. Within the pre-registered experiment, the inconsistencies were measured in two ways: i) the consistency between stated preferences and revealed choices; ii) the amount of intransitivities in choice triplets, revealed in a forced paired choice task including all possible pairings of 20 food products. Although no significant association of memory functions to number of intransitive triplets was observed, participants with lower memory scores were more likely to choose the item for which they stated a lower preference. The results suggest a higher noise in the underlying preference signal in participants with lower memory. We discuss the results in the context of the unique needs of elderly consumers.     

Risk Taking in Decision Making for Others Versus the Self1

In two studies, we examined people's level of risk taking when making monetary decisions for other people rather than for themselves. Experiment 1 examined the role of regret in these situations; results show that regret concerns led to increased risk avoidance both when participants made decisions for other people as well as when making decisions for themselves. Experiment 2 tested whether skill tasks would lead to greater risk avoidance when the decision was for another person versus for oneself. This hypothesis was not supported, although men were more risk seeking than were women in both situations. Taken together, these studies suggest that many of the findings from risk research on individual decision making regarding financial situations generalize to decision making for others.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Think different: the merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making

The role of unconscious and conscious thought in decision making was investigated in 5 experiments. Because of the low processing capacity of consciousness, conscious thought was hypothesized to be maladaptive when making complex decisions. Conversely, unconscious thought was expected to be highly effective. In Experiments 1-3, participants were presented with a complex decision problem in which they had to choose between various alternatives, each with multiple attributes. Some participants had to make a decision immediately after being presented with the options. In the conscious thought condition, participants could think about the decision for a few minutes. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for a few minutes and then indicated their decision. Throughout the experiments, unconscious thinkers made the best decisions. Additional evidence obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 suggests that unconscious thought leads to clearer, more polarized, and more integrated representations in memory.     

When experienced regret refuses to fade: Regrets of action and attempting to forget open life regrets

The emotional experience of regret often persists rather then fading over time. The present experiment with 101 student participants investigated whether recollecting life regrets of action, construing life regrets as psychologically open, or attempting to forget versus remember regret-related thoughts interfered with the fading of affect over a two-week interval. Results showed that regrets of action failed to show a fading affect pattern. In addition, disappointment failed to fade for regrets of inaction construed as open. Experienced regret failed to fade for regrets construed as open followed by attempts to forget regret-related thoughts. Intrusive and avoidant thoughts co-occurred with the latter disruptions in fading affect. Discussion concerns the causal relationship of memory and fading affect, and the different processes underlying fading of affect for discrete emotions.     

Regret Regulation: Disentangling Self‐Reproach From Learning

This article begins with several testable propositions inspired by Zeelenberg and Pieters (this issue). I argue that a critical skill for decision makers is to decouple the aspect of regret that leads to self‐reproach from that aspect that can be used to learn from the outcome and improve future decision making. Results of an illustrative study are presented and discussed. Two other useful strategies are to match the decision effort to the decision's importance and to break big decisions into smaller ones. I close with a call for research examining regret as a self‐control mechanism.     

To do or not to do: desirability and consistency mediate judgements of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.     

Working memory capacity and individual differences in the making of reinstatement and elaborative inferences

This study investigated the role of working memory capacity on the making of reinstatement and causal elaborative inferences during the reading of natural texts. In order to determine participants' working memory capacity, they were asked to take the reading span task before they took part in the study. Those participants that were identified as high or low working memory capacity readers were asked to perform a lexical decision task in two conditions: pre-inference and inference. In the pre-inference condition, target words representing reinstatement or causal elaborative inferences were presented immediately before the sentences that were predicted to prompt them. In the inference condition, the target words were presented immediately after the sentences that were predicted to prompt the inferences. Results indicated that, for the high working memory capacity readers, lexical decision times were faster at the inference compared to the pre-inference locations for both types of inferences. In the case of low working capacity readers, lexical decision times were faster at the inference compared to the pre-inference locations only for reinstatement inferences. These findings suggest that working memory capacity plays a role in the making of causal inferences during the comprehension of natural texts.     

Regret aversion and decision process quality: Effects of regret salience on decision process carefulness

A considerable amount of past research has examined the effects of regret aversion on which options decision makers choose. However, past research has largely neglected to address the effect of regret aversion on the decision process. We conducted five experiments to examine the effect of making regret salient on decision process quality. We predicted that increased regret aversion would lead to more careful decision processing. The results consistently supported this prediction across the different decision situations, incentive structures, regret salience manipulations, and dependent variables used. In all experiments making regret salient led decision makers to take significantly longer to reach a decision. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 4 it also led participants to collect significantly more information before making a choice. Implications and future directions are discussed.