7～11岁儿童的同伴接纳与心理理论发展的研究

本研究采用情境故事研究7～11岁儿童二级错误信念理解和特质理解能力的发展,并探讨该年龄段儿童同伴接纳与心理理论发展的相互影响机制。结果表明,7～11岁儿童的二级错误信念理解能力随年龄增长显著提高;7岁儿童关于特质因果性的理解有比较高的起点,7～9岁加速发展,之后趋缓;7～9岁儿童的同伴接纳与其二级误信念理解能力没有显著的相关;总体上看,受欢迎学生的特质理解能力显著优于被拒斥学生。     

7-11岁儿童心理状态信息理解与使用的发展特点及关系

采用失言任务和改进的说服任务考察了153名7-11岁儿童的心理理论理解和使用能力的发展状况。结果发现：儿童的失言理解能力和心理状态信息使用能力7-9岁时发展迅速,9岁后趋于稳定;两种能力的发展趋势基本一致,两者呈现中度相关;8-9岁是儿童失言理解和心理状态信息使用发展的转折点。结果表明：心理状态理解和使用的能力是儿童心理理论发展的重要组成部分,两者的发展基本同步。     

5～8岁儿童失言探测与理解的发展特点

失言探测与理解是一种融入了人际互动,需要个体体会交往双方心理感受的高级心理理论任务.本研究采用图片-故事法探讨失言情境(他人对自我、自我对他人和他人对他人 )对5～8岁儿童失言探测与理解的影响.结果发现,7～8岁儿童基本拥有了失言探测与理解能力,6、7、8岁儿童在所有情境下失言探测和理解能力同步发展,而5岁儿童在他人对自我情境下失言探测与理解的成绩显著好于自我对他人情境下的成绩,提示失言探测与理解能力在不同阶段会表现出不同的发展特点.     

7～11岁儿童失言理解及与母亲教养方式的关系

采用失言任务和改编后的教养方式问卷探讨7~11岁儿童心理理论的发展及其与母亲教养方式的相关。结果表明,在学龄期,儿童在不同层面上对失言的理解能力仍在提高,高年级时已超出单一维度。7岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"过度偏爱"显著负相关;8岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"惩罚和严厉"显著负相关。结果提示在某些年龄阶段,儿童心理理论的发展可能与母亲特定的教养方式有关。     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

3～6岁儿童“心理理论”的发展

“心理理论”是发展心理学的研究热点,在儿童获得心理理论的年龄和发展阶段问题上仍存在争议。该研究以3所城市幼儿园中的233名3-6岁儿童为被试,采用“意外转移”和“欺骗外表”两个错误信念测验任务考察儿童“心理理论”的获得年龄和发展阶段。研究得出如下结论:3岁之前儿童已理解外表与真实的区别,但还不能理解错误信念。 4岁儿童理解了欺骗外表任务中自己和他人的错误信念,5岁儿童理解了意外转移任务中的错误信念。4-5岁是儿童获得“心理理论”的关键年龄,但这会因测验任务的不同而有所差异。儿童的错误信念理解不存在显著的性别差异。     

幼儿心理理论水平及其与抑制控制发展的关系

本研究通过经典的错误信念任务首先考察了3与4岁幼儿心理理论的发展水平;然后通过抑制控制任务探讨了幼儿心理理论发展水平与抑制控制能力发展的关系。结果表明,3、4岁在完成错误信念任务时有显著的年龄差异;通过错误信念任务的幼儿在抑制冲突的得分显著地高于没有通过错误信念的幼儿;而且除了他人的错误信念,幼儿在其他错误信念上的水平与抑制冲突成绩有显著的相关。     

7～9岁儿童失言理解与执行功能的关系

为了说明学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的关系,研究采用失言理解、威斯康星卡片分类和汉诺塔任务分别考察了90名7—9岁儿童的心理理论和执行功能。结果表明,失言理解与抑制-转换能力相关显著（r=0．34,P〈0．01）,但是与计划能力相关不显著（r=0．06,P〉0．05）。在控制年龄后,失言理解与抑制-转换能力的相关仍然显著（r=0．29,P〈0．05）。研究结果说明,学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的相关模式与学龄前儿童完全一致,提示心理理论与执行功能的相关关系从学龄前延续到了学龄阶段。     

成年个体的心理理论与执行功能

为了说明成年个体心理理论与执行功能的发展及两者的关系,在匹配了智商和教育水平条件下,采用心理理论故事理解任务、失言理解任务和威斯康星卡片分类任务分别探察了30名62~77岁的老年人和30名19~25岁青年人的心理理论和执行功能。结果表明,老年人和青年人在2种心理理论任务上的得分与卡片分类任务的得分都不存在显著相关,老年人在失言任务上的得分显著低于青年人,在心理理论故事理解任务上和威斯康星卡片分类任务上,老年人的表现与青年人没有显著差异。结合已有的研究结果提示：心理理论与执行功能的相关模式在成年和学前阶段是不同的。     

儿童二级错误信念认知与二级情绪理解的发展

以来自两所幼儿园的133名儿童为被试,探讨了3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解的发展分化与联系。结果发现,6岁左右是儿童的二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解发展的关键期;4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,获得情绪解码能力;儿童的二级未知与二级错误信念认知之间,儿童的情绪解码与二级情绪理解之间,在发展上存在1~2年的差距;二级推理能力是儿童进行二级心理状态认知的关键。     

Relations between theory of mind,mental state language and social adjustment in primary school children

The present study investigated the concurrent relations between theory of mind (ToM), mental state language (MSL) and social adjustment (assessed in terms of emotional instability, prosocial behaviour and aggressiveness) in a sample of 150 children between 8 and 11 years of age. The results showed no correlation between the performance on false belief tasks and the frequency of MSL in a narrative task. False belief understanding was unrelated with all measures of social adjustment, whereas the children’s use of MSL was negatively correlated with emotional instability and aggressiveness, above and beyond the influence of receptive language ability. These findings suggest that having a ToM ability is different from spontaneously using it during non-interactive narrative tasks, and that the two ToM measures are differently related to social competence in primary school children.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Aging of theory of mind: The influence of educational level and cognitive processing

Previous studies of theory of mind (ToM) in old age have provided mixed results. We predicted that educational level and cognitive processing are two factors influencing the pattern of the aging of ToM. To test this hypothesis, a younger group who received higher education (mean age 20.46 years), an older group with an education level equal to that of the young group (mean age 76.29 years), and an older group with less education (mean age 73.52 years) were recruited. ToM tasks included the following tests: the second‐order false‐belief task, the faux‐pas task, the eyes test, and tests of fundamental aspects of cognitive function that included two background tests (memory span and processing speed) and three subcomponents of executive function (inhibition, updating, and shifting). We found that the younger group and the older group with equally high education outperformed the older group with less education in false‐belief and faux‐pas tasks. However, there was no significant difference between the two former groups. The three groups of participants performed equivalently in the eyes test as well as in control tasks (false‐belief control question, faux‐pas control question, faux‐pas control story, and Eyes Test control task). The younger group outperformed the other two groups in the cognitive processing tasks. Mediation analyses showed that difficulties in inhibition, memory span, and processing speed mediated the age differences in false‐belief reasoning. Also, the variables of inhibition, updating, memory span, and processing speed mediated age‐related variance in faux‐pas. Discussion focused on the links between ToM aging, educational level, and cognitive processing.     

From fancy to reason: Scaling deaf and hearing children's understanding of theory of mind and pretence

We examined deaf and hearing children's progression of steps in theory of mind (ToM) development including their understanding of social pretending. Ninety‐three children (33 deaf; 60 hearing) aged 3–13 years were tested on a set of six closely matched ToM tasks. Results showed that deaf children were delayed substantially behind hearing children in understanding pretending, false belief (FB) and other ToM concepts, in line with their delayed uptake of social pretend (SP) play. By using a scaling methodology, we confirmed previous evidence of a consistent five‐step developmental progression for both groups. Moreover, by including social pretence understanding, both deaf and hearing children's ToM sequences were shown to extend reliably to six sequential developmental steps. Finally and focally, even though both groups' sequences were six steps long, the placement of pretence relative to other ToM milestones varied with hearing status. Deaf children understood social pretending at an earlier step in the ToM sequence than hearing children, albeit at a later chronological age. Theoretically, the findings are relevant to questions about how universal developmental progressions come together along with culturally distinctive inputs and biological factors (such as hearing loss) to set the pace for ToM development.     

Investigating the relationship between trait and ability emotional intelligence and theory of mind

Theoretical links between emotional knowledge and theory of mind (ToM) have previously been proposed. This study investigates this relationship using measures of both ability and trait emotional intelligence (EI). Our sample comprised 194 children, divided into two age groups (5–7 years and 8–10 years). Children participated in measures of false belief understanding, advanced tests of ToM, ability EI and trait EI, and a standardized language assessment. For both age groups, we found that only ability EI was related to false belief understanding. Furthermore, regression analyses revealed that the understanding and managing branches of ability EI predicted unique variance in false belief understanding once controlling for age, language, and the other ability EI branches. Trait EI failed to display any association with false belief understanding. Ability and trait EI were associated with more advanced ToM tasks undertaken only by the older sample. These results offer support for previous research that has found a relationship between emotion perception and labelling and ToM. They also provide new knowledge: (1) higher order emotional knowledge, measured by ability EI, is associated with advanced ToM; and (2) emotional self efficacy, as measured by trait EI, is also important in advanced ToM. Furthermore, they provide the first account of associations between standardized EI measures and ToM.     

Mental playmates: Siblings,executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child‐aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance‐reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child‐aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child‐aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child‐aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child‐aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both ToM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.     

从假装到心理表征理论:假装认识训练的影响

研究探究假装情境及假装认识对幼儿心理理论(Theory of mind)发展的影响。实验一考察60名3~4岁幼儿在假装情境下的信念认识任务中的表现,发现幼儿对假装的早期认识的出现要早于对信念的认识的出现,假装情境对幼儿的信念认识没有直接促进作用。实验二对42名在信念认识任务上表现不佳的幼儿进行假装认识训练,结果发现假装认识训练促进了幼儿的信念认识,促进效应须经历一段时间才显现。研究支持假装认识在心理理论发展中具有重要作用的假设,但潜在作用机制仍有待进一步探究。     

Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: clues to developmental primacy

There has been much theoretical discussion of a functional link between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) in autism. This study sought to establish the relationship between ToM and EF in young children with autism (M = 5 years, 6 months) and to examine issues of developmental primacy. Thirty children with autism and 40 typically developing children, matched on age and ability, were assessed on a battery of tasks measuring ToM (1st- and 2nd-order false belief) and components of EF (planning, set shifting, inhibition). A significant correlation emerged between ToM and EF variables in the autism group, independent of age and ability, while ToM and higher order planning ability remained significantly related in the comparison group. Examination of the pattern of ToM-EF impairments in the autism group revealed dissociations in 1 direction only: impaired ToM with intact EF. These findings support the view that EF may be 1 important factor in the advancement of ToM understanding in autism. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.