制造疾病：工具理性的泛滥

工具理性的泛滥导致医疗的商品化和技术主体化,产生“制造疾病”的现象层出不穷。究其原因概括为：其一,求“效率”过程无意中“制造疾病”;其二,为追求利益最大化有意“制造疾病”,将科学简单地等同于数据,认为科学可以解释一切疾病,无视患者自愈的能力,将“正常”的生命现象视为疾病;其三,视人为物,为社会管理“制造疾病”。医者应将自己的工具理性,约束在为患者谋利的价值理性之下,弘扬医学人文去遏制制造疾病的恶行。

     

“基因编辑婴儿”事件的工具理性批判

工具理性在利用技术手段达到技术目的的过程中创造了支撑现代社会的技术和物质。但工具理性也因过度重视技术和“去情感化”、“对象化”等特征忽视人的价值意义。在众多被工具理性主义渗透、强力冲击的领域中,使用基因编辑技术对人类胚胎细胞按照既定目标进行编辑就是被工具理性控制的例子。将人类胚胎视为研究对象,崇拜唯技术论、机械思维主导、道德情感缺场,展现社会责任虚化,导致社会信任危机。把作为主体的人客体化为试验对象进行基因人为修改试验,违背法律规定,挑战伦理界限,是未能有效引导工具理性导致的技术事故。     

Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts to reconcile the tension between the self-interested account of moral behaviour and the affective capacity for morality by showing that the latter could develop from the former without violating the constraints of instrumental rationality. I argue, first, that his account is incomplete and assumes what it has to demonstrate; and, second, that this cannot be remedied with any plausibility. Finally, I argue that Gauthier covertly relies on a substantive claim about human good that is inconsistent with the instrumental conception of reason. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise

Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just shows us that since instrumental rationality involves a higher-order commitment to combine our willing an end with our taking the necessary means, it therefore cannot, on pain of regress, itself be added as a conjunct to one of the elements to be combined. This view does not support instrumentalism.     

个人主义方法的重新审视

个人主义及其方法,是近代尤其是当代具有影响的伦理思想及其方法。对于其产生与发展颇具争议：一方面,个人主义的方法原则把人从社会中剥离出来,使他成为周围事物和他自己的惟一评判,赋予他不断膨胀的权利;另一方面,它也为遭到长期压迫的人类思想提供了呼吸的空间和活动的范围,使一个人可以满怀尊严,能够亲自解决自己的幸福与命运问题。     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

Ideological Views in Emerging Adulthood: Balancing Autonomy and Community

Ideological views of 140 emerging adults (ages 20–29) were explored, using the ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. Two questions were asked as part of an interview: “When you get toward the end of your life, what would you like to be able to say about your life, looking back on it?” and “What values or beliefs do you think are the most important to pass on to the next generation?” Overall, emerging adults used Autonomy and Community in roughly equal proportions, whereas Divinity was used relatively infrequently. Use of Autonomy was negatively correlated with use of Community on both questions, but the correlations were modest, and some emerging adults were able to reconcile the two ethics. Qualitative examples are presented to illustrate the findings of the study, and the findings are discussed in the context of claims about American individualism.     

当代青年抑郁问题的社会生成逻辑

采用现代性社会理论的观点,对当代青年抑郁问题背后的社会文化动因进行了系统探讨。个体化社会中的当代青年被迫转变为自我问题的负责人,抑郁成为了个体化社会情感危机的典型表现;社会加速特征极大改变了当代青年的生活方式,优绩主义主导了当代青年的价值观;消费文化通过商品的情感化和情感的商品化,加剧了当代青年人的自我认同危机。随着社会文化因素的负面影响在心理层面的不断累积,抑郁最终成为当代青年用于应对社会风险和结构性压力的一种感觉结构。

     

大学生文化倾向性与姓名知觉反应时的关系

摘要 本文采用问卷调查和字词辨别反应时任务的方法,考察了大学生对个体姓名信息反应时与文化倾向性之间的关系。结果表明：（1）自陈式《垂直、水平个人-集体主义问卷》的集体主义维度上具有较低的区分效度,有待改善;（2）在视觉通路中,个体对自我的姓名、姓、名的加工时均具有一定的优先性,并发现个体对自我姓名的知觉模式为整体知觉;（3）姓名信息所蕴含的文化信息与文化倾向问卷中所测量的信息具有一定的相关,支持并验证了文化倾向问卷的内容效度;同时研究发现姓、名作为自我结构的标识物比姓名更佳。     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。     

个体主义—集体主义问卷编制与信效度分析

编制区分参照对象的个体主义—集体主义问卷,检验其信度和效度.在文献和实证研究基础上,构建个体主义—集体主义的理论维度,编写问卷条目.先对385名被试实施初测,进行项目分析和探索性因素分析.再对766名被试实施再测,进行结构验证和信度检验.结果发现,区分参照对象的个体主义—集体主义问卷是包含价值选择和行为理念的两维结构,由19个条目组成.该问卷构想效度和信度良好.因此,区分参照对象的个体主义—集体主义问卷可以作为测量个体主义—集体主义的有效工具.