关于数学应用题心理表征策略的新理论

本文主要阐述了数学应用题心理表征中的两种策略一直接转换策略和问题模型策略,介绍了两种策略的认知过程,并对两种策略的区分方法进行了探讨,最后总结说明了研究数学心理表征在理论和实践中的意义。     

儿童数学应用题表征水平的特点研究

本研究运用实验法对某普通小学的161名4～6年级学生进行了长方形面积任务和MPI测验,以考察学生的应用题表征水平及其对问题解决的影响.结果表明:(1)表征水平随着年级的升高而不断提高,学生在表征水平上性别差异不显著;(2)无论哪个年级.表征水平都是优等生好于中等生,中等生好于差等生;表征水平越高,学生在问题解决上的成绩越好;(3)随着题目难度的不断加大,各表征水平的学生在解题正确率上的差距也在不断拉大.也就是说,题目越难,表征水平在解题中的作用也就越明显.     

小学4～6年级儿童数学应用题表征模型的使用研究

该研究考察了小学4～6年级学生在数学应用题中理解阶段和执行阶段使用表征模型的情况,研究运用实验法对某普通小学的158名4～6年级学生进行了应用题改写任务和缩写任务.结果表明：（1）学生在理解阶段更多地选择情境条件,使用情境模型来表征问题;在执行阶段较少选择情境条件,转而使用问题模型来表征问题;（2）随着年级的升高,相对于优等生来说,其他学生在缩写任务中对情境条件的选择数量越来越少,而优等生在这方面一直都做得很好.差等生识别多余条件的能力并没有随着年级的升高而发生改变,而优等生却在不断增强.     

小学2～4年级儿童数学应用题表征策略差异的研究

本研究运用实验法和临床访谈法对某普通小学的123名2～4年级学生进行了数学应用题测验,以考察数学学优生和学差生在解决比较应用题时表征策略的差异。结果表明:(1)从2～4年级儿童解答一致和不一致应用题上看,学优生较多地使用问题模型策略对问题进行表征,学差生较多地使用直接转换策略对问题进行表征;(2)除学差女生的解题正确率低于学差男生的正确率,学差女生自我报告中直接转换策略的使用多于学差男生外,在其它方面,性别差异并不显著;(3)随着年级的升高,学优生在使用问题模型策略上越来越成熟,学差生并没有学会使用更加有效的问题模型表征策略,仍然停留在直接转换策略上,但他们在关于策略使用的认识上有所提高。     

小学2-4年级儿童数学应用题表征策略对其解决不规则问题影响的研究

本研究运用实验法和临床访谈法对某普通小学的123名2-4年级学生进行了不规则数学应用题测验,以考察数学学优生和学差生在解决这些应用题时表征策略的差异。结果表明：（1）从2-4年级儿童解答条件多余和条件不足应用题上看,学优生的成绩要好于学差生,口头报告分析显示学优生较多地使用问题模型策略对问题进行表征,而学差生较多使用直接转换策略对问题进行表征;（2）在三年级时,条件多余和条件不足应用题的解题正确率有所提高,但到四年级时,正确率却有所下降;（3）在解决条件多余和条件不足应用题中,性别差异不显著。     

算术应用题的分类结果与数学成绩关系研究

以算术应用题为材料,探讨了不同年级、不同数学成绩学生对算术应用题的分类结果及其与数学成绩的关系。结果表明:不同年级学生对算术应用题分类结果差异显著;数学成绩优生与数学成绩差生对算术应用题分类结果存在差异。     

数学成绩与代数应用题分类结果的相关研究

以初中代数应用题为材料,探讨了不同年级学生对代数应用题的分类结果与数学成绩的关系。结果表明：不同年级学生对代数应用题分类结果差异显著;数学成绩优生与数学成绩差生对代数应用题分类结果差异显著。     

关于语义加载与心理内容表征的两个问题研究

在心理内容表征的研究中存在一个极其模糊的问题,即心理表征中的语义内容是如何实现的,而从我们的个体经验可以知道,没有内容的心理表征是没有意义的,因此,探讨表征中的语义赋值机制,是当前认识论研究中的一个难点。关于这个问题笔者曾提出了语义分段累积加载模型(以下简     

词汇的语义表征及其启动效应研究现状与问题

语义启动是研究语义表征的主要范式。在过去的30年里,通过对语义启动效应的研究,词汇的语义表征理论也从符号联结发展到神经联结,其影响因素也逐步重视多方面的交互作用。究其问题,已有研究还存在很多不一致的结论,对语义内在的表征机制和学习机制缺乏深入了解,对影响语义表征的个体因素考虑不多。     

工作压力的研究现状与方向

工作压力的研究在西方已经进行了多年,并受到越来越多的注意,但在我国研究还较少。本文从工作压力的定义、对于工作压力的测量、影响工作压力产生的因素、工作压力的后果、以及应对这几个方面介绍这一领域目前的研究现状并提出作者认为这一领域现存的问题和今后的研究方向。     

Objective Similarity and Mental Representation

The claim that similarity plays a role in representation has been philosophically discredited. Psychologists, however, routinely analyse the success of mental representations for guiding behaviour in terms of a similarity between representation and the world. I provide a foundation for this practice by developing a philosophically responsible account of the relationship between similarity and representation in natural systems. I analyse similarity in terms of the existence of a suitable homomorphism between two structures. The key insight is that by restricting attention to only those homomorphisms induced by causal processes, we can solve two philosophical problems with a single assumption. First, causal structure provides an adequate source for the bias required to ensure the similarity relation is non-trivial; second, it provides an adequate source for the directionality required to move from similarity to representation. I defend this account against objections by Goodman and van Fraassen and demonstrate that it is indeed the account of similarity's role in representation assumed by psychological practice.     

概率与事物表征

概率表达着世界的可能性。近年来研究发现, 人们倾向于在更抽象的和更核心的水平上表征低概率事件, 而倾向于在更具体和更次要的水平上表征高概率事件。相应的, 高水平表征事物会导致人们的概率估计偏低, 而低水平表征事物会导致概率估计偏高。此外, 习得的刺激间联系也会影响人们的概率估计。未来研究应注意探讨概率影响事物表征的内在原因、概率估计的动态性与多重概率估计、以及其更深层次的内部机制等问题。     

Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

心理表征哲学及其联结主义诠释

对心理表征问题进行自然的解释是至关重要的,但这方面的研究都是建立在有关概念和命题表征的预设的基础之上的,所以有必要弄清概念表征和命题表征的哲学解释;联结主义也对心理表征问题作了解释,根据被表征的是什么以及通过什么来表征的原则,联结主义网络主要通过四种方式对概念和命题进行表征。总的来说,联结主义对概念和命题的表征与它们的哲学解释并不是一一对应的,其方法论基础是费耶阿本德的多元方法论,即"怎么都行"。     

On the Mental Representation of Conditional Sentences

Four experiments are reported which attempt to externalize subjects' mental representation of conditional sentences, using novel research methods. In Experiment 1, subjects were shown arrays of coloured shapes and asked to rate the degree to which they appeared to be true of conditional statements such as 'If the figure is green then it is a triangle'. The arrays contained different distributions of the four logically possible cases in which the antecedent or consequent is true or false: TT, TF, FT, and FF. For example, a blue triangle would be FT for the conditional quoted above. In Experiments 2 to 4, subjects were able to construct their own arrays to make conditionals either true or false with any distribution of the four cases they wished to choose. The presence and absence of negative components was varied, as was the form of the conditional, being either 'if then' as above or 'only if': 'The figure is green only if it is a triangle'. The first finding was that subjects represent conditionals in fuzzy way: conditionals that include some counter-example TF cases (Experiment 1) may be rated as true, and such cases are often included when subjects construct an array to make the rule true (Experiments 2 to 4). Other findings included a strong tendency to include psychologically irrelevant FT and FF cases in constructed arrays, presumably to show that conditional statements only apply some of the time. A tendency to construct cases in line with the 'matching bias' reported on analogous tasks in the literature was found, but only in Experiment 4, where the number of symbols available to construct each case was controlled. The findings are discussed in relation to the major contemporary theories of conditional reasoning based upon inference rules and mental models, neither of which can account for all the results.     

物体位置与空间关系的心理表征

外界环境中物体位置与空间关系在记忆中如何表征,一直是空间认知研究领域探讨和争论的热点问题。该文从空间表征的参照框架、朝向特异性、组织结构和存储内容四个方面,系统回顾了近年来对空间表征形成机制与内在特征的理论探讨。在此基础上,进一步讨论了当前空间表征研究中存在的生态效度问题,以及以后将虚拟环境技术引入到空间认知研究中的发展趋势     

Recent Scholarship on Hume's Theory of Mental Representation

In a recent paper, Karl Schafer argues that Hume's theory of mental representation has two distinct components, unified by their shared feature of having accuracy conditions. As Schafer sees it, simple and complex ideas represent the intrinsic imagistic features of their objects whereas abstract ideas represent the relations or structures in which multiple objects stand. This distinction, however, is untenable for at least two related reasons. Firstly, complex ideas represent the relations or structures in which the impressions that are the objects of their simple components stand. Secondly, abstract ideas are themselves instances of complex ideas. I draw two important conclusions from these facts. Firstly, contra Schafer and Garrett (to whom Schafer responds), the Copy Principle, properly emended, constitutes the entirety of Hume's theory of mental representation. Secondly, whereas paradigm examples of complex ideas, e.g. ideas of spatial and temporal complexes, are structured by relations of contiguity, abstract ideas are those complex ideas instead structured by relations of resemblance. As such, they represent their objects not as spatially or temporally contiguous but rather as resembling.     

A 15-Year Review of Trends in Representation of Female Subjects in Islamic Bioethics Research

Journal of Religion and Health - Gender representation in Islamic bioethics research in the twenty-first century has not been studied. To study temporal trends in representation of female subjects...