Philosophy,mathematics, science and computation

Attempts to lay a foundation for the sciences based on modern mathematics are questioned. In particular, it is not clear that computer science should be based on set-theoretic mathematics. Set-theoretic mathematics has difficulties with its own foundations, making it reasonable to explore alternative foundations for the sciences. The role of computation within an alternative framework may prove to be of great potential in establishing a direction for the new field of computer science.Whitehead's theory of reality is re-examined as a foundation for the sciences. His theory does not simply attempt to add formal rigor to the sciences, but instead relies on the methods of the biological and social sciences to construct his world-view. Whitehead's theory is a rich source of notions that are intended to explain every element of experience. It is a product of Whitehead's earlier attempt to provide a mathematical foundation for the physical sciences and is still consistent with modern physics.A computer simulation language is, in fact, a theory of reality; one that is often based on extremely simplistic notions. Simulation languages have evolved from the various programming languages and not from the development of their underlying world-view. The use of an established theory of reality, such as Whitehead's, as the basis of a simulation language is proposed as a way of extending the usefulness of computer simulation as an experimental tool for the theory.The simulation language is a first step in this direction. Based on Whitehead's notion of concrescence and a formalization in the typed -calculus, provides a notation and method for the construction and simulation of real-world phenomena. Both philosophy and computer science stand to benefit from such an attempt. Whitehead's theory gains a testing tool, while computer science gains a significantly more advanced simulation language. In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to the finality of statement is an exhibition of folly. A. N. Whitehead,Process and Reality.     

On human self-domestication, psychiatry, and eugenics

The hypothesis that anatomically modern homo sapiens could have undergone changes akin to those observed in domesticated animals has been contemplated in the biological sciences for at least 150 years. The idea had already plagued philosophers such as Rousseau, who considered the civilisation of man as going against human nature, and eventually "sparked over" to the medical sciences in the late 19^th and early 20^th century. At that time, human "self-domestication" appealed to psychiatry, because it served as a causal explanation for the alleged degeneration of the "erbgut" (genetic material) of entire populations and the presumed increase of mental disorders.     

A space for measuring mind and brain: interdisciplinarity and digital tools in the development of brain mapping and functional imaging, 1980-1990

Brain mapping is said to have opened up the possibility of a new collaboration between the sciences of mind and the sciences of the brain, potentially leading to a new kind of scientist, sometimes called "cognitive neuroscientist." This article traces the recent history of brain mapping and analyzes the processes that have led to a new "close working relationship" between the sciences of mind and brain. A key part of the working relationship is shown to be constituted through the development of the Talairach system, a digital space in which to measure structure and function. The development of meaningful brain mapping data involves the creation of measurement spaces that allow interdisciplinary collaboration and is not the result solely of theoretical developments or of the application of a technology.     

Upon Further Reflection: View from the Other Side of “Windows on the 21st Century”

Three points discussed in Glenn (1993) are reviewed in the context of current events: the discipline of behavior analysis as a cultural system, the importance of that discipline in the training and regulation of behavior analytic practitioners, and Association for Behavior Analysis International (ABAI) as a cultural subsystem that links to all the other parts and therefore links the other parts to one another. Noting similarities between behavior analysis and biology, I consider the growth of biological sciences as a model for behavior analysis. Of particular importance for biology has been the role of basic biological sciences in the practice of medicine and the resulting feedback loops that have developed among its basic sciences, applied sciences, and medical practice. I suggest that behavior analysis explicitly follow this model and that ABAI has a critical role to play in leading the field to developing the feedback loops that have integrated the biological sciences and medicine.     

A Problem in Schutz's Theory of the Historical Sciences with an Illustration from the Women's Liberation Movement

In the first part of this essay it is contended that Schutz's project is best called the philosophical theory of the cultural sciences; in the last parts it is shown that he offers satisfactory rudiments of a theory of the historical sciences except where the differentia specifica of those sciences is concerned. The central part is devoted to women's liberation as a case of contemporary history in relation to which Schutz's thought about the historical sciences needs correction.     

Varieties of (Scientific) Creativity: A Hierarchical Model of Domain-Specific Disposition, Development, and Achievement

ABSTRACT— Prior research supports the inference that scientific disciplines can be ordered into a hierarchy ranging from the "hard" natural sciences to the "soft" social sciences. This ordering corresponds with such objective criteria as disciplinary consensus, knowledge obsolescence rate, anticipation frequency, theories-to-laws ratio, lecture disfluency, and age at recognition. It is then argued that this hierarchy can be extrapolated to encompass the humanities and arts and interpolated within specific domains to accommodate contrasts in subdomains (e.g., revolutionary versus normal science). This expanded and more finely differentiated hierarchy is then shown to have a partial psychological basis in terms of dispositional traits (e.g., psychopathology) and developmental experiences (e.g., family background). This demonstration then leads to three hypotheses about how a creator's domain-specific impact depends on his or her disposition and development: the domain-progressive, domain-typical, and domain-regressive creator hypotheses. Studies published thus far lend the most support to the domain-regressive creator hypothesis. In particular, major contributors to a domain are more likely to have dispositional traits and developmental experiences most similar to those that prevail in a domain lower in the disciplinary hierarchy. However, some complications to this generalization suggest the need for more research on the proposed hierarchical model.     

从丘浚的科学观看儒学与科学的可容性

丘浚是我国古代自觉提倡并积极探讨自然科学的儒家学者。他将儒学的研究对象分为“性理之学”(相当于“哲学”)与“物理之学”(相当于“科学”)两个部分 ,并对当时儒者重“性理之学”而轻“物理之学”的现象提出了批评。他不仅揭示了研究“物理之学”的必要性 ,而且还提出了研究“物理之学”的方法与要求。丘浚对研究“物理之学”的积极提倡 ,使我们看到了儒学与科学之间可容性的一面。     

The evolution of beasts and babies: recapitulation, instinct, and the early discourse on child development

The field of "child study" emerged at the end of the nineteenth century with the purpose of disclosing children's "nature" for the benefit of parents, educators, psychologists, and other interested groups. Borrowed from the biological sciences, narratives of biological recapitulation were common in the discourses about child development during this period. Such theories often measured children against "savages," but they also suggested that the study of childhood offered clues into the evolutionary relationships between humans and animals. By emphasizing the relevance of children's "instincts," observers of child development explained child behavior as the tissue that linked humans and animals.     

Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences

We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.     

Behavioral Laws in Histories of Psychology: Psychological Science,Metascience, and the Psychology of Science

Histories of psychology frequently include statements that explicitly or implicitly express behavioral laws. Usually these "meta-historical generalizations" provide "covering laws" for explanatory accounts, contextual frames, or paradoxical con- trasts. These abstract propositions come from many sources, vary immensely in scientfic validity, and are found in several psychological publications besides histories, including book reviews, obituaries, journal articles, monographs, and trade books. Not only could the authors of these nomothetic claims make better use of empirical results in the metasciences, but these assertions themselves offer an inventory of valuable hypotheses that should inspire future research in the behavioral sciences and especially in the psychology of science.     

Fostering integrity in research: Definitions, current knowledge, and future directions

Over the last 25 years, a small but growing body of research on research behavior has slowly provided a more complete and critical understanding of research practices, particularly in the biomedical and behavioral sciences. The results of this research suggest that some earlier assumptions about irresponsible conduct are not reliable, leading to the conclusion that there is a need to change the way we think about and regulate research behavior. This paper begins with suggestions for more precise definitions of the terms "responsible conduct of research," "research ethics," and "research integrity." It then summarizes the findings presented in some of the more important studies of research behavior, looking first at levels of occurrence and then impact. Based on this summary, the paper concludes with general observations about priorities and recommendations for steps to improve the effectiveness of efforts to respond to misconduct and foster higher standards for integrity in research.     

Theology and Science within a Lakatosian Program

The writings of Ian Barbour and Arthur Peacocke can be construed as initial contributions to a Lakatosian research program on the relation between theology and science, the core theory of which is the thesis that theology belongs at the top of a nonreducible hierarchy of sciences. The positive heuristic of this program involves showing that theology and the sciences have enough in common epistemologically to be so related and arguing for nonreducibility. The author in this essay "rationally reconstructs" some of her philosophical work as a contribution to these tasks.     

Agency,Chance, and the Scientific Status of Psychology

Psychologists generally reject the reductionist, physicalist, “nothing but” stance of the natural sciences. At the same time they consider their discipline a science and wonder why it does not enjoy the status (and funding) of the natural sciences. Ferguson American Psychologist, 70, 527-542 (2015), Lilienfeld American Psychologist, 67, 111-129 (2012), and Schwartz et al. American Psychologist, 71, 52-70 (2016) are among those who adopt a soft naturalism of nonreductive physicalism which declares, or implies, that when it comes to humans, there is more than what the natural sciences can unravel. They envision psychology as scientific in the epistemological sense of generating reproducible results, but reject the reductive ontology of science which currently points to the undeterminable chance of quantum theory as the closest physics has come to the beginnings and what might loosely be called the foundation of the universe (e.g., Bridgman Harper's, 158, 443-451 1929; Eddington 1948). The case made here is that any science, including a psychological one, must be based on a naturalist ontology. This implies restricting the term science to disciplines which not only meet epistemological criteria like reproducibility, but which also adopt—on the ontological level—the parsimonious assumption that at present it makes sense to think that “there is nothing but time and chance” (e.g., Cox and Forshaw 2011; Crease and Goldhaber 2014; Rorty 1989). From this perspective, psychology emerges as two distinct disciplines, one a natural science, the other a human science in the broad sense of science as scientia.     

Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis

While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory “goes beyond the individual” but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. This paper reviews a sampling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency.     

Knowing without knowing: implicit cognition and the minds of infants and animals / Saber sin saber: la cognición implícita y las mentes de niños pequeños y animales

The main aim of this paper is to highlight the need to address the conceptual problem of ‘implicit knowledge’ or ‘implicit cognition’ — a notion especially important in the study of the nonverbal minds of animals and infants. We review some uses of the term ‘implicit’ in psychology and allied disciplines, and conclude that conceptual clarification of this notion is not only lacking, but largely avoided and reduced to a methodological problem. We propose that this elusive notion is central in the study not only of animal and infant minds, but also the human adult mind. Some promising approaches in developmental and evolutionary psychology towards innovative conceptualization of implicit knowledge remain conceptually underdeveloped and in need of reconsideration and re-elaboration. We conclude by suggesting that the challenge of implicit cognition and nonverbal minds will only be solved through a concerted interdisciplinary approach between psychology and other disciplines.     

Why Social Science is Biological Science

The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species.     

What is the Crisis of Western Sciences?

This article is an attempt to formulate a clear definition of the concept of crisis of Western sciences introduced by Husserl in his last work. The attempt will be based on a reading of the Krisis, which will stress its underlying continuity with Husserl’s life-long concerns about the theoretical insufficiency of positive sciences, and downplay the novelty of the idea of crisis itself within Husserl’s work. After insisting on the fact that, according to Husserl, only an account of the shortcomings of the scientificity of Western sciences can justify the claim that they are undergoing a crisis, it will be argued that the common definition of the crisis of the sciences as the loss of their significance for life rests on a misunderstanding. The crisis of Western sciences will be characterized, instead, as the repercussion of the crisis of the scientificity of philosophy (and, specifically, of metaphysics) on the scientificity of positive sciences. The loss of significance of scientific knowledge for our existence will in turn appear as a further, inevitable consequence of the uprooting of the sciences from the soil of a universal philosophy culminating in metaphysics, and thus, as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with the crisis of Western sciences, but not identical to it.     

Thought translation, tennis and Turing tests in the vegetative state

Brain damage can cause massive changes in consciousness levels. From a clinical and ethical point of view it is desirable to assess the level of residual consciousness in unresponsive patients. However, no direct measure of consciousness exists, so we run into the philosophical problem of other minds. Neurologists often make implicit use of a Turing test-like procedure in an attempt to gain access to damaged minds, by monitoring and interpreting neurobehavioral responses. New brain imaging techniques are now being developed that permit communication with unresponsive patients, using their brain signals as carriers of messages relating to their mental states.     

Possibilities, Intentions and Threats: Dual Use in the Life Sciences Reconsidered

Due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of a few weeks later, the concept of dual use has spread widely in the life sciences during the past decade. This article is aimed at a clarification of the dual use concept and its scope of application for the life sciences. Such a clarification would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers seeking to ensure security while avoiding undesirable interventions of government in the conduct of science. The article starts with an overview of the main developments in life sciences in relation to dual use. This is illustrated by discussions on synthetic biology and dual use. The findings lead to a reconsideration of the dual use concept. An area in need of further attention is to what extent threats and intentions should have impact on the definition of dual use. Possible threats are analyzed against the background of the phenomenon of securitization of health care and life sciences: considering these sectors of society in security terms. Some caveats that should be taken into account in a dual use policy are described. An acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept could help researchers, universities, companies and policy makers. Such a definition should build upon, but go beyond, the view developed in the influential Fink-report, which concentrates on the so-called ??experiments of concern??, e.g. experiments that enhance the virulence of pathogens (National Research Council of the National Academies 2004) It will be argued that??in addition to these more technical aspects??a definition of dual use should include the aspect of threats and intentions.