共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Barry Hartley Slater 《Synthese》2008,163(2):187-198
Prawitz proved a theorem, formalising ‘harmony’ in Natural Deduction systems, which showed that, corresponding to any deduction
there is one to the same effect but in which no formula occurrence is both the consequence of an application of an introduction
rule and major premise of an application of the related elimination rule. As Gentzen ordered the rules, certain rules in Classical
Logic had to be excepted, but if we see the appropriate rules instead as rules for Contradiction, then we can extend the theorem to the classical case. Properly arranged there is a thoroughgoing ‘harmony’, in the classical
rules. Indeed, as we shall see, they are, all together, far more ‘harmonious’ in the general sense than has been commonly
observed. As this paper will show, the appearance of disharmony has only arisen because of the illogical way in which natural
deduction rules for Classical Logic have been presented. 相似文献
2.
This paper deals with two issues in the field of reasoning by analogy in the law. The one issue is whether there exists such
a thing as analogous rule application, or whether there is only the ‘normal’ application of a broadened rule. It is argued
that if rules, as the entities made by a legislator, are distinguished from generalised solutions for cases, the idea of analogous
application of rules makes sense. It is also shown how the so-called ‘reason-based model of rule application’, in contrast
to the traditional modus ponens or subsumption model, makes it easy to give a logical account of analogous rule application.
The other issue is how to argue logically about whether two cases are sufficiently similar to adopt the outcome of the one
case for the other case. Section 3 provides a general logical model to establish this. The model is based on the comparison
of the reasons for and against a particular solution in the two cases. 相似文献
3.
Patrick Hutchings 《Sophia》2009,48(4):479-489
‘Good’ is nothing specific but is transcendentally or generally applied over specific, and specified, ‘categories’. These
‘categories’ may be seen—at least for the purposes of this note—as under Platonic Forms. The rule that instances under a category
or form need a Form to be under is valid. It may be tautological: but this is OK for rules. Not being specific, however, ‘good’
neither needs nor can have a specifying Form. So, on these grounds, the Form of the Good is otious. Any rule of the kind,
‘Everything needs a Form, so good needs a Form of the Good’ is mistaken, in that good is not a kind, but a transcendental. To give a Form to the transcendental
‘good’ is a mistake: it is a Rylian category mistake. And the Form of the Good either does no work, or works unprofitably
in any but an aesthetic sense. 相似文献
4.
Leon Horsten 《Synthese》2005,146(1-2):111-127
Two simple generalized conversational implicatures are investigated :(1) the quantitative scalar implicature associated with
‘or’, and (2) the ‘not-and’-implicature, which is the dual to (1). It is argued that it is more fruitful to consider these
implicatures as rules of interpretation and to model them in an algebraic fashion than to consider them as nonmonotonic rules
of inference and to model them in a proof-theoretic way. 相似文献
5.
Michael McDermott 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(4):465-470
Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories
generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory
of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability;
but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way. 相似文献
6.
Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz 《Studia Logica》2008,90(2):211-247
The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs,
it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea
that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means
the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest
an extension to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device
of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic.
Presented by Heinrich Wansing 相似文献
7.
Roger Harris 《Axiomathes》2010,20(4):461-478
There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’.
I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared
by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach:
defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality.
I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my own, I amend his account, proposing that
possession of an extrinsic property consists in a relation to one or more actual or possible distinct concrete objects. Finally I indicate ways to avoid some apparent objections to this account. 相似文献
8.
9.
Srinivasan Venkatesan 《Psychological studies》2011,56(2):206-215
This cross-sectional survey on a sample of parent, teacher and child respondents (n = 195) elicited their perceptions on or
about the ‘reasons/causes’ for academic problems in school students. A semi-structured ‘Demographic Data Sheet’ and another
open ended exploratory ‘Causes of Academic Problems Interview Schedule’ (CAPIS) exclusively developed for this study was used.
A classification of the ‘causes’ for academic problems into four categories by two independent observers revealed preponderance
of ‘child-centered’ causes (N: 937), followed by ‘teacher-centered’ causes (N: 751), ‘parent-centered’ (N: 643) and ‘environment
centered’ causes (N: 362). Analysis of trends show significant statistical differences in reported perceptions between the
three respondents (p: < 0.04); with highest disparity between ‘teacher-centered’ causative perceptions (p: < 0.001). Concordance
rates as measured by Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient is reflected by greater agreements on or about the reasons for academic problems
between parent-teacher respondents (0.34) and least for child-teacher reports (−0.08). The results suggest an attitudinal
triangulation on or about the reasons attributed for academic problems between parents, teachers and the children. This opens
up the need for stepping up measures to de-triangulate or harmonize these varying inter personal perceptions for optimum benefit
of such children. 相似文献
10.
Moeketsi Letseka 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》2001,14(1):67-78
Conclusion This paper set out to provide a skeptical perspective to the view that IT has the potential to bring people into the global
community. While not doubting the merits of IT’s capabilities it proposed that such claims be qualified in view of disparities
in the distribution of wealth between nations and between peoples. It focused attention on the plight of students at the University
of Fort Hare, in the Eastern Cape, which is the poorest of South Africa’s nine provinces. It argued instead that IT has the
likelihood of accentuating instead of bridging existing inequalities in wealth between countries and between peoples. It contended
that not‘everybody’ is predisposed to becoming a role player in the global agenda given that access to IT and online facilities
is stratified by income. This, the paper posited, is most likely to exacerbate the "global digital divide"—the growing disparity
in wealth between countries of the North and the South, and between peoples, the information "haves" and "have-nots". The
U.S.’s 1999 expenditure on IT, which stood at $762 as opposed to South Africa’s expenditure in the same year, which was $10.6,
illustrates the "divide". But while on the surface the University of Fort Hare’s situation seemed very gloomy, the paper outlined
positive, but modest initiatives not only to provide access to IT and online facilities, but also to quip staff and students
with requisite skills to enable them to be role players in the global agenda.
He serves on the Editorial Committee of the South African Journal of Higher Education as Senior Consultant Editor, and is the Head of the Department of Foundations of Education at Fort Hare. 相似文献
11.
Alessandro Lanteri 《Philosophical Studies》2012,158(1):17-30
Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele recently proposed a ‘two-and-a-half rules’ theory of folk intentionality. They suggested that
laypersons attribute intentionality employing: one rule based on desire, one based on belief, and another principle based
on moral judgment, which may either reflect a folk concept (and so count as a third rule) or a bias (and so not count as a
rule proper) and which they provisionally count as ‘half a rule’. In this article, I discuss some cases in which an agent
is judged as having neither belief nor desire to bring about an action, and yet laypersons find the agent’s action to be intentional.
Many lay responses apparently follow a rule, but many other seem biased. The contribution of this study is two-fold: by addressing
actions performed without desire or belief, it expands Mele and Cushman’s account; it also helps discriminate between a two-rules
and a three-rules theory. As a conclusion, I argue in favor of a three-and-a-half concepts theory. 相似文献
12.
Gerald Vision 《Topoi》2010,29(2):109-123
Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform
implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional
with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting
to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising
deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail. 相似文献
13.
We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according
to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification
of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively
sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive
conditions such as ‘preface’ and ‘lottery’ rules.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献
14.
Nikk Effingham 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(2):225-240
This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal
part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from
Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this,
we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics,
we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set. 相似文献
15.
Tobias Rosefeldt 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):301-333
This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions).
In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism.
The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result
in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses
are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause
position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms,
but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and
it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification. 相似文献
16.
Diego Marconi 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):301-318
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent
entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled
out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true
in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of
w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w
and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who
hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A”
as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. 相似文献
17.
Ken Gemes 《Synthese》2007,157(2):161-166
Bayesians standardly identify irrelevance with probabilistic irrelevance. However, there are cases where e is probabilistically irrelevant to h but intuitively e is relevant to h. For instance, ‘Die A came up 1 and die B came up 1, 3, 5 or 6’ is probabilistically irrelevant to ‘Die A came up odd and
die B came up even’, yet, intuitively, it is not, irrelevant to that claim, in the sense that ‘Sydney has a harbour Bridge’
is irrelevant to it. In the context of decision making this notion of irrelevance combined with such rules as ‘Do not expend
resources on irrelevant evidence’ leads to bad results. A stronger notion of irrelevance fitting our intuitions and the contexts
of decision making is proposed: e is irrelevant to h if and only if every part of e is probabilistically irrelevant to every part of h. However, we need to take care in determining what counts as part of a statement. 相似文献
18.
19.
David E. Cooper 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(2-3):79-87
Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten
the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams,
as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs),
and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves
into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise
in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions
of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within
which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically
considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’
from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within
‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’. 相似文献
20.
There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins,
and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a
language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ordinary language’
view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a
major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I
shall show that (1)Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, (2) Chomsky’s
conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and (3) the ‘ordinary language’ view actually points to a promising
way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献