Likelihood judgment based on previously observed outcomes: the alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm

Previous research has demonstrated that intuitive perceptions of certainty regarding a focal outcome are sensitive to variations in how evidence supporting nonfocal alternatives is distributed, even when such variations have no bearing on objective probability. We investigated this alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm in which participants made likelihood judgments on the basis of their memory for past observations of relevant outcomes. In Experiment 1, a manipulation of evidence (observed frequencies) across alternative outcomes influenced not only intuitive certainty estimates about a focal outcome but also numeric subjective probabilities. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that these effects were attributable to the influence of information loss on frequency estimations. The findings were consistent with the heuristic comparison account, which suggests that the judged likelihood of a focal outcome will be disproportionately influenced by the strength (frequency) of the strongest alternative outcome.     

Reality compared with its alternatives: age differences in judgments of regret and relief

Three experiments examined developmental change in children's understanding of regret and relief, two second-order emotions whose quality depends on a comparison between reality and "what might have been." In Experiment 1, participants 7 years of age and older, but not 5-year-olds, made regret-related emotion-response judgments that took into account a comparison of reality with its alternatives. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds judged that an individual would feel better, rather than worse, when a counterfactual outcome was better than what actually occurred (the opposite of the pattern found with older children and adults). Experiment 3 focused on the understanding of relief. In contrast to the findings from Experiment I, the 7-year-olds in Experiment 3 made their judgments solely on the basis of what actually occurred.     

The dud-alternative effect in likelihood judgment

The judged likelihood of a focal outcome should generally decrease as the list of alternative possibilities increases. For example, the likelihood that a runner will win a race goes down when 2 new entries are added to the field. However, 6 experiments demonstrate that the presence of implausible alternatives (duds) often increases the judged likelihood of a focal outcome. This dud-alternative effect was detected for judgments involving uncertainty about trivia facts and stochastic events. Nonnumeric likelihood measures and betting measures reliably detected the effect, but numeric likelihood measures did not. Time pressure increased the magnitude of the effect. The results were consistent with a contrast-effect account: The inclusion of duds increases the perceived strength of the evidence for the focal outcome, thereby affecting its judged likelihood.     

Determinants of the perception of choice

Two experiments were conducted to investigate possible determinants of perceived choice. The first experiment employed an observer paradigm and the second employed an actor paradigm. The results of both studies provided evidence for the hypotheses that perceived choice will be greater when there is a small difference in attractiveness between outcome alternatives than when there is a large difference and under conditions of low certainty about the attractiveness of each outcome alternative than under conditions of high certainty. Also, the results of both studies provided some evidence for the hypothesis that the effect of the relative difference in attractiveness upon perceived choice will be greater under conditions of low certainty than under conditions of high certainty. The hypothesis that perceived choice will be less when there is no difference in attractiveness between outcome alternatives than when there is a small difference was not supported by the results of the first experiment but was supported by the results of the second experiment. The hypothesis that perceived choice will be greater the more time a person takes to select an action from possible actions was supported by results of the first experiment but not by those of the second experiment. The results for the relative difference and certainty variables were discussed in terms of a theoretical analysis of perceived choice.     

Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: the effects of specific emotions on information processing.

The authors argued that emotions characterized by certainty appraisals promote heuristic processing, whereas emotions characterized by uncertainty appraisals result in systematic processing. The 1st experiment demonstrated that the certainty associated with an emotion affects the certainty experienced in subsequent situations. The next 3 experiments investigated effects on processing of emotions associated with certainty and uncertainty. Compared with emotions associated with uncertainty, emotions associated with certainty resulted in greater reliance on the expertise of a source of a persuasive message in Experiment 2, more stereotyping in Experiment 3, and less attention to argument quality in Experiment 4. In contrast to previous theories linking valence and processing, these findings suggest that the certainty appraisal content of emotions is also important in determining whether people engage in systematic or heuristic processing.     

Magnitude effect contributes to the domain specificity in delay discounting

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding temporal choices. A person who prefers $50 immediately over $100 in 1 month exhibits a higher discount rate than a person deciding to wait for the higher payoff. Although previous research shows that discount rates are domain-specific, we propose an alternative to the domain specificity account. We suggest that differences in discounting alternatives across various domains may result not so much from the domains' nature per se but from differences in perceived attractiveness of the discounted alternatives. We replicated that an illustrative study evidencing domain specificity in discounting (Experiment 1) showed that people's subjective values of the payoffs in domains discounted in this experiment were different (Experiment 2) and used a novel method to match the attractiveness of the available alternatives across domains (Experiment 3). Finally, Experiment 4 showed that when matching was applied, the domain effect disappeared. We conclude that a magnitude effect can, at least partially, explain domain specificity in delay discounting.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

The role of alternative hypotheses in the integration of evidence that disconfirms an acquired belief

Two experiments examined the role of alternative hypotheses in the recognition of belief-incongruent evidence and the consequent attribution of probative value to that evidence. Using a contingency judgement and prediction task, subjects monitored multiple predictor-outcome contingencies. In a subset of three of these contingencies the evidence strongly endorsed a positive contingency in a first phase but strongly endorsed a negative contingency in a second phase. In Experiment 1 the negative evidence was presented, in part, in terms of an alternative contingency involving a new predictor or a new outcome, or in terms of no alternatives. The presence of alternative hypotheses did not influence the recognition of the negative evidence but significantly reduced the subjects' persistence in predicting the outcome in the presence of the predictor. Using the same positive-negative contingencies, Experiment 2 replicated this effect but also demonstrated that error in the feedback during the negative phase strengthened the perseverance in outcome predictions even when subjects acknowledged the negative nature of the evidence. Results from these two experiments indicate that prior beliefs do not bias the recognition of belief-incongruent evidence but the integration of that evidence is determined by the nature of the alternative hypotheses available to the reasoner.     

Attentional spreading in object-based attention: The roles of target–object integration and target presentation time

What is the best account to explain the object-based attentional benefit—that is, the spread of attention within an attended object or prioritization of search across possible target locations within an attended object? Using a task in which the location of the target was known with certainty, in the present study we systematically manipulated the type (letters or bites) and the presentation time (long or short) of the target and flankers in order to test the effects of target–object integration and target presentation time on object-based attention. The results showed that an object-based effect could appear when the target was a bite, no matter whether the target presentation time was long or short; but when the target was a letter, an object-based effect was only observed when the target presentation time was short enough. These findings provide additional evidence supporting the argument of attentional spreading in object-based attention. However, this spreading is moderated jointly by target–object integration and the target presentation time.     

The Binary Additivity of Subjective Probability Does not Indicate the Binary Complementarity of Perceived Certainty

People's numeric probability estimates for 2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive events commonly sum to 1.0, which seems to indicate the full complementarity of subjective certainty in the 2 events (i.e., increases in certainty for one event are accompanied by decreases in certainty for the other). In this article, however, a distinction is made between the additivity of probability estimates and the complementarity of internal perceptions of certainty. In Experiment 1, responses on a verbal measure of certainty provide evidence of binary noncomplementarity in the perceived likelihoods of possible scenario outcomes, and a comparison of verbal and numeric certainty estimates suggests that numeric probabilities overestimated the complementarity of people's certainty. Experiment 2 used a choice task to detect binary noncomplementarity. Soliciting numeric probability estimates prior to the choice task changed the participants' choices in a direction consistent with complementarity. Possible mechanisms yielding (non)complementarity are discussed.     

跨期选择单维占优模型的过程检验

跨期选择需要决策者在眼前与未来的损益之间做出权衡与取舍。主流跨期选择理论认为, 跨期选择是把未来价值折扣到现在, 根据折扣后的价值进行选择的过程; 而单维占优模型则认为决策者把“结果”维度上的差异和“延迟”维度上的差异进行比较(维度间差异比较), 然后根据差异更大的维度(即占优势的维度)进行决策。跨期选择众理论之争无果的原因之一或是研究者未能找到揭示其心理过程的令人信服的证据。为此, 本研究采用过程检验而非结果拟合的方法, 首创了“直观模拟天平”任务, 对维度间差异比较的大小进行测量, 从而为验证单维占优模型提供了支持性的证据。实验1A证明了维度间差异大小中介了选择结果, 被试认为“结果”维度上的差异相对于“延迟”维度上的差异越大, 越倾向于选择延迟长、结果大的选项; 反之, 被试认为“延迟”维度上的差异相对于“结果”维度上的差异越大, 越倾向于选择延迟短、结果小的选项。实验1B证明了维度间差异比较是在选择时实时(而不是在选择后)进行的。实验1C通过调整实验程序消减了共同方法偏差对结果的影响。实验2进一步证明维度间差异比较可以解释众多的跨期选择异象。通过4个实验, 本研究揭示了维度间差异比较构成了跨期选择的重要(尽管可能不是唯一)决策过程, 为支持单维占优模型提供了重要的过程验证证据。     

愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响：确定感和控制感的中介作用

本研究基于评估倾向理论, 通过3项实验考察了特定负性情绪(愤怒)对延迟折扣的影响, 并探究确定感和控制感评估倾向在这一关系中的作用。实验1考察愤怒情绪对延迟折扣的影响, 结果发现, 愤怒组被试的延迟满足倾向显著强于恐惧组和控制组。实验2采用实验因果链设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 愤怒情绪可以有效增强个体的确定感和控制感(实验2a), 同时确定感和控制感能够增强个体的延迟满足倾向(实验2b)。实验3采用中介测量设计考察确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中的作用, 结果发现, 确定感和控制感评估倾向在愤怒情绪影响个体延迟折扣中起完全中介作用。本研究结果表明, 当个体进行跨期决策时, 体验到与确定感和控制感有关的偶然愤怒情绪会增强其延迟满足倾向。本研究对探究特定负性情绪对个体延迟折扣的影响具有一定的启示意义。     

Illusory Control as a Function of Motivation for a Specific Outcome in a Chance-Based Situation

Previous research has provided evidence that an individual's need for a chance-based outcome positively affects perceptions of the skill involved in attaining the outcome as well as certainty of winning. Two experiments were conducted to test several competing alternative interpretations for this effect. In Experiment 1, food-satiated (low-need) and food-deprived (high-need) subjects were given the opportunity to win a food incentive in a chance-based card-drawing game either in the presence or absence of situational cues previously shown to induce skill orientations. Skill and confidence-in-winning ratings were found to be positive function of outcome need regardless of the cues condition, thus not supporting an attentional or vigilance interpretation of the general effect. In Experiment 2, food-satiated and food-deprived subjects faced a similar card-drawing game, but this time were given the opportunity to choose whether or not they wanted to be personally involved in various facets of the game (e.g., shuffling the cards). As predicted, high-need subjects showed a greater propensity to want to be personally involved in playing the game, a finding offering support for a control interpretation. Overall results are discussed in terms of control theory.     

The compatibility heuristic in non-categorical hypothetical reasoning: Inferences between conditionals and disjunctions

A new theory explains how people make hypothetical inferences from a premise consistent with several alternatives to a conclusion consistent with several alternatives. The key proposal is that people rely on a heuristic that identifies compatible possibilities. It is tested in 7 experiments that examine inferences between conditionals and disjunctions. Participants accepted inferences between conditionals and inclusive disjunctions when a compatible possibility was immediately available, in their binary judgments that a conclusion followed or not (Experiment 1a) and ternary judgments that included it was not possible to know (Experiment 1b). The compatibility effect was amplified when compatible possibilities were more readily available, e.g., for ‘A only if B’ conditionals (Experiment 2). It was eliminated when compatible possibilities were not available, e.g., for ‘if and only if A B’ bi-conditionals and exclusive disjunctions (Experiment 3). The compatibility heuristic occurs even for inferences based on implicit negation e.g., ‘A or B, therefore if C D’ (Experiment 4), and between universals ‘All A’s are B’s’ and disjunctions (Experiment 5a) and universals and conditionals (Experiment 5b). The implications of the results for alternative theories of the cognitive processes underlying hypothetical deductions are discussed.     

The outcome specificity of learned predictiveness effects: parallels between human causal learning and animal conditioning

Two experiments examined the outcome specificity of a learned predictiveness effect in human causal learning. Experiment 1 indicated that prior experience of a cue-outcome relation modulates learning about that cue with respect to a different outcome from the same affective class but not with respect to an outcome from a different affective class. Experiment 2 ruled out an interpretation of this effect in terms of context specificity. These results indicate that learned predictiveness effects in human causal learning index an associability that is specific to a particular class of outcomes. Moreover, they mirror demonstrations of the reinforcer specificity of analogous effects in animal conditioning, supporting the suggestion that, under some circumstances, human causal learning and animal conditioning reflect the operation of common associative mechanisms.     

Not all contrast effects are created equal: extent of processing affects contrast strength

Prevailing theories of judgmental contrasts propose mechanisms ranging from relatively low versus high degrees of thought. The present research tests the hypothesis that the degree of thought involved in producing judgmental contrast has important implications. In three experiments, participants' ability or motivation to engage in effortful thinking was manipulated. In Experiment 1, varying personal relevance produced equivalent contrast effects, but these judgments differed in certainty. In two additional studies, despite equivalent amounts of contrast, a manipulation of the order of the standards and target of comparison led to differences in certainty (Experiment 2) and attitude–behavioral intention correspondence (Experiment 3). This is the first research to show that amount of thinking has implications for the strength and consequences of the judgment.     

高确定性情绪（开心、愤怒）与低确定性情绪（悲伤）对信任的影响

本研究通过信任游戏的实验范式探讨了在与“受信任者”高/低可信赖性有关的信任线索时,具体情绪的确定性维度对信任行为的影响。实验一发现,当被试被告知“受信任者”在可信赖量表上的得分（高/低）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断上更容易被受信任者的“可信赖性”水平的高低所影响;实验二发现,当告知被试“受信任者”的群体身份（内/外群）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断更容易被受信任者的“内外群”身份所影响。上述结果表明,高确定性的情绪比低确定性的情绪更容易使被试的信任判断受到与“受信任者”是否值得信赖有关的线索所影响。     

Distraction of Counting by the Meaning of Background Speech: Are Spatial Memory Demands a Prerequisite?

This paper reexamines the effects of background speech on counting. Previous studies have shown that background sound disrupts counting in comparison with silence, but the magnitude of disruption is no larger for spoken numbers compared with that for non‐number speech (there is no effect of the meaning of background speech). The typical task used previously has been to count the number of sequentially presented visual events. We replicated the general finding in Experiment 1—that there is no effect of the meaning of background speech—in the context of the classic sequence counting task. In Experiment 2, the task was changed by having to‐be‐counted dots presented simultaneously and randomly across the visual field. Here, an effect attributable to the meaning of background speech emerged. Background speech that is similar in meaning to the focal task process contributes to the magnitude of disruption, but apparently only when spatial memory processes are a task prerequisite. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of contingency violations on the extinction of a conditioned fear inhibitor and a conditioned fear excitor

Rats were used in a conditioned-suppression paradigm to assess the effects of contingency variations on responding to a conditioned inhibitor (CS-) and a conditioned excitor (CS+). In Experiment 1, various unconditioned stimulus (US) frequencies were equated across the presence and absence of a CS- in the context of either background cues (continuous-trial procedure) or an explicit neutral event (discrete-trial procedure). With both procedures, a CS-alone treatment enhanced inhibition, whereas treatments involving 50% or 100% reinforcement for the CS- eliminated inhibition without conditioning excitation to that CS. The latter outcome also occurred in Experiment 2, with discrete-trial training equating considerably reduced US frequencies for the presence and absence of the CS-. In further evidence that inhibition was eliminated without conditioning excitation to the CS-, Experiment 3 showed that a novel CS did not acquire excitation when 25%, 50%, or 100% reinforcement was equated across the presence and absence of that CS in the context of a discrete-trial event. Using the procedures of Experiment 1, Experiment 4 showed that a CS+ was extinguished by a CS-alone treatment but was substantially maintained by treatments involving 50% or 100% uncorrelated reinforcement. These effects for a CS+ and a CS- implicate CS-US contiguity, rather than contingency, as the factor determining the extinction of a CS.