Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players

Groups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single-trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff was induced by assigning to each group member a different points-to-money exchange rate. The results show that as the uncertainty about the pool size increases subjects (1) overestimate the pool size, (2) increase their requests, and (3) expect others to increase their requests. In addition (4) individual requests and expectations regarding others' requests are inversely related to the exchange rates, reflecting attempts to equate payoffs across group members.     

Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas

We report results of an experiment in which we examined consumption behavior of groups of players sharing a common resource pool under four distinct protocols of play. Under thesimultaneousprotocol all subjects make their requests simultaneously. In the other three protocols, players make requests, one at a time, but with various types and levels of information about the process: In thesequentialprotocol, subjects make requests with complete information about their position in the sequence and full disclosure of previous requests; In thepositionalprotocol, requests are made with precise information on one's position in the sequence order, but without disclosing the requests of previous players; Finally, under thecumulativeprotocol, subject make requests with complete information regarding the total previous requests, but do not know their exact position in the sequence. We found a significant "position effect" in all three nonsimultaneous protocols: Mean individual requests and position in the sequence are negatively correlated, reflecting an "early mover advantage" and a "late mover handicap." The effect is weakest in the positional protocol, whereas the sequential and cumulative protocols are, practically, identical. We conclude that although position effects can be induced by temporal priority, they are primarily driven by differential patterns of information regarding the behavior of the other group members. Although the request pattern was consistent with predictions based on the subjects' social orientation, the differences were not quite as pronounced (and significant) as in the "regular" simultaneous dilemmas. On the other hand, we found that the subjects' requests in the simultaneous protocol were an accurate predictor of their behavior in the other protocols as well.     

Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource dilemmas with incomplete information

We consider a class of resource dilemmas of the following form: members of groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j (j = 1,…,n) requests r_j from the resource pool. Requests are made either simultaneously or sequentially. If (r₁+r₂+…+r_n) x all members are granted their requests; otherwise, group members get nothing.

For each protocol of play we present two alternative models - a game theoretical equilibrium solution and a psychological model incorporating the notion of focal points. We then report the results of two experiments designed to compare the two models under the two protocols of play.     

Intertemporal Framing Issues in Management Compensation

This study investigates whether manager–decision-makers’ expectations about incentive compensation and environmental uncertainty influence investment decisions through their effect on the decision maker's implied discount rate. This is, to our knowledge, a first attempt to manipulate implicit risk, the risk to future payoffs associated with environmental uncertainty. Both these factors and waiting time are expected to influence implied discount rates. The study investigates discount rate influences under both bonus and penalty incentive plans. The hypothetical bonuses are year-end cash bonuses; the penalties are opportunity costs. Responses were analyzed using both analysis of variance and regression. The regression analysis was used to separate time discounting from the other factors affecting implied discount rates. Subjects’ responses to proposed changes in the timing of cash bonuses were dramatic when an expanding economy was suggested. However, subjects’ responses to penalty provisions were less dramatic than corresponding responses to the out-of-pocket negative outcomes studied in previous research. In some situations, penalty provisions may be more effective for inducing investment than bonus provisions. In addition, the results suggest that efforts to change management decision making using deferred compensation may require more deferred compensation than time discounting alone would require.     

Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncertain Resources

We report the results of three experiments in which groups of players share a common resource pool whose size is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. We study a new information structure - called the positional order protocol - under which requests are made in an exogenously determined and commonly known order without disclosing the requests of previous players in the sequence. Mean individual requests under this protocol of play are compared with data gathered under the more familiar simultaneous protocol (simultaneously made requests) and sequential protocol (sequentially made requests with full disclosure of previous requests). Previously reported effects of the resource uncertainty on individual requests obtained under the simultaneous and sequential protocols are generalized across different group sizes. In contrast to the game-theoretical prediction, which does not distinguish between the simultaneous and positional order protocols, mean individual requests and position in the sequence are highly and significantly correlated. We conclude that position effects can be induced by temporal priority, even in the absence of differential information.     

Behavioral momentum and stimulus fading in the acquisition and maintenance of child compliance in the home

The provision of a series of requests to which compliance is highly likely (high-probability requests) immediately antecedent to low-probability requests has been used to establish behavioral momentum of compliance. We evaluated a fading procedure for maintaining high levels of compliance obtained with high-probability requests. Fading involved a systematic reduction in the number of high-probability requests and an increase in the latency between the high- and low-probability requests. High levels of compliance for both "do" and "don't" requests were maintained for 16 weeks in a 5-year-old boy with developmental disabilities after the high-probability request sequence was faded. Similar maintenance was obtained for "do" requests in a 15-year-old girl with developmental disabilities. For this subject, however, the high-probability request sequence was ineffective with "don't" requests. When "don't" requests were phrased as "do" requests, the high-probability request sequence produced high levels of compliance to the low-probability request. High levels of compliance to these "do" requests were maintained for 16 weeks after the high-probability request sequence was faded.     

Synchronous activity boosts compliance with requests to aggress

An experiment demonstrates that cultural practices involving physical synchrony can emotionally bind people together, making those people more likely to comply with others' requests to engage in aggressive behavior. Participants who acted in synchrony with a confederate were more likely than were participants in the asynchronous and control conditions to comply with the confederate's request to administer a noise blast to another group of participants. Increased feelings of emotional connection with the confederate mediated the relationship between synchrony and heightened compliance with the request to engage in aggressive behavior.     

True versus strategic fairness in a common resource dilemma: Evidence from the dual‐process perspective

Common resource dilemmas involve collectively coordinating individual choices to promote group efficiency. Equal division represents one of the most important coordination rules. Previous research suggests that individuals follow the equality rule for different reasons. Some individuals behave cooperatively out of their concern for other's welfare, whereas some individuals cooperate strategically to enhance personal gains. Building on the dual‐process perspective, the authors aim to differentiate strategic fairness from true fairness in solving a resource dilemma. In four experiments, the effect of cognitive processing manipulations on individual harvesting behavior in a one‐shot resource dilemma was tested against participants with different social values. Results consistently showed that prosocials, who value joint outcome and equality, requested significantly less money than did proselfs, who value personal gain. More importantly, prosocials in the intuition and deliberation conditions request similar amounts, whereas proselfs in the intuition condition request more money than those in the deliberation condition. The results were further validated by a follow‐up meta‐analysis based on the four experiments. The implications of the dual‐process perspective for social coordination research are discussed.     

Public good provision under environmental and social uncertainty

Social dilemmas face people with various kinds of uncertainty. To extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in resource dilemmas (i.e. uncertainty about the resource size), the present experiment examines the effects of Environmental Uncertainty (low, high uncertainty about the provision point) and Social Uncertainty (low, high uncertainty about others' cooperation) in a public goods dilemma. In line with Social Comparison Theory, it was predicted and found that Environmental Uncertainty decreases cooperation only under High Social Uncertainty, but not under Low Social Uncertainty. The detrimental effects of Environmental Uncertainty can be counteracted by uncertainty reducing information on the provision point and/or on others' contributions as well. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EFFECTS OF HIGH-PROBABILITY REQUESTS ON THE ACQUISITION AND GENERALIZATION OF RESPONSES TO REQUESTS IN YOUNG CHILDREN WITH BEHAVIOR DISORDERS

The failure to respond to requests in young children often is maintained by the reactions of the adults that encounter this behavior. This failure to respond to requests has been identified as a primary reason for the children's exclusion from community, social, and instructional opportunities. Numerous interventions that target the failure to respond have consisted of punishment and reinforcement procedures. More recently, antecedent interventions have focused on changing the context in which a request is delivered. In the current study, high-probability requests were provided as an antecedent to delivering a low-probability request. The requests were delivered by multiple trainers in an attempt to produce generalized appropriate responding to adults who did not use the high-probability sequence. Results showed an immediate increase in appropriate responding in 2 children when the intervention was delivered. In addition, when the intervention was implemented by more than one adult, spontaneous increases in responding also were observed toward adults who had never implemented the request sequence. Improvements in responding to requests were maintained after the intervention was discontinued.     

The lure technique: Generalization and moderating effects

IntroductionThe lure technique, first studied by Joule, Gouilloux and Weber (1989), involves three stages: (1) an individual is led to make a rewarding decision to realize a given behavior; (2) he is informed of the impossibility of realizing this behavior; (3) we propose making a new less rewarding decision based on another behavior (target-request).ObjectiveFive experiments are presented in this paper that tested the effect of the delay between the two requests, whether the same experimenter or a further made the second request and whether the two requests concerned or not the same specific goal.Method and resultsIn the experiments, the rewarding decision deals with participating in a paid and interesting research project (viewing a video before answering a questionnaire) and the target-request concerns participating in an unpaid and more tedious research project (copying symbols). As expected, the participants subjected to the lure technique were significantly more numerous to accept the target-request than the participants in the control group. This effect was obtained independently of the sex of the experimenter and the participants (Experiment 1), whether the same experimenter successively makes the first and second request or the two requests are made by two different experimenters (Experiment 2). It was also obtained when the initial request and the target-request do not concern the same specific goal (Experiment 3), but it is no longer obtained when a delay separates the target-request from the announcement of the impossibility of carrying out the first decision (Experiments 4 and 5).ConclusionThe discomfort aroused by the fact of not being able to carry out the first request and pressure to reduce such discomfort was used to explain the lure technique effect.     

THE CLASS SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE TRAINING WITH “DO” AND “DON'T” REQUESTS: ANALOGUE ANALYSIS AND CLASSROOM APPLICATION

Two experiments are reported in which the relationship between compliance with “do” and “don't” requests was examined with developmentally disabled children. In Experiment 1, a multiple baseline design across subjects with counterbalanced treatment conditions was used to evaluate a compliance training program composed of four phases: (a) baseline, during which no consequences were delivered for compliance, (b) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “do” request, (c) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “don't” request, and (d) follow-up with reinforcement on a variable ratio schedule for compliance with any “do” or “don't” request. Results of probes conducted before and after training within each condition indicated that generalized compliance occurred only with requests of the same type as the target exemplar (“do” or “don't”). In Experiment 2, these results were replicated in a classroom setting. Following collection of baseline probe data on student compliance, a teacher training program was successfully implemented to increase reinforcement of compliance first with one “do” and subsequently with one “don't” request of a target student. Results of multiple baseline probes across “do” and “don't” requests indicated that the teacher generalized and maintained reinforcement of compliance with other requests of the same type and to other students, with a resulting increase in student compliance with the type of requests reinforced. The impact of treatment on both teacher and student behavior was socially validated via consumer ratings. Implications of these findings with respect to response class formation and compliance training programs are discussed.     

Effects of High-Probability Request Sequences on Preschoolers' Compliance and Disruptive Behavior

A high-probability request sequence was implemented with three preschool children with developmental delays within their classroom during typical activities. A multiple baseline design across subjects was used to evaluate the effects of the high-probability request sequence on compliant responding to low-probability requests and the occurrence of disruptive behavior. Results of the study indicate that the use of the high-probability request sequence was effective in increasing compliant responding to low-probability requests delivered by two different trainers for all children. No increases in disruptive behavior were noted as a result of using the high-probability request sequence. When the high-probability request sequence was withdrawn, compliant responding to low-probability requests was maintained for all children across time and in different settings.     

Mother–child disputes as arenas for fostering negotiation skills

Valsiner's concepts of the zone of free movement (ZFM) and the zone of promoted actions (ZPA) were applied to mother-child disputes to study how mothers discharge their role as experts in negotiation. Twenty mothers of 3-5-year-olds each reported 20 disputes, 10 in which the mother was making a request and 10 in which she was refusing her child's request. The disputes were analysed sequentially using four models, preservation, copycat, reward/punishment, and provision of a rationale. The results showed that perseveration and copycat models were more likely to apply when there was negative affect. Mother's re-requests fitted the reward/punishment model whereas mother's refusals better fitted the provision of a rationale model. Information from follow-up interviews supported the notion that requests and refusals are being socialized differently. The results imply that, whereas children's requests and refusals are within the ZFM, only their requests are within the ZPA.     

Individual Accountability in Cooperative Learning Groups at the College Level: Differential Effects on High,Average, and Low Exam Performers

Over a three-semester period in a large undergraduate human development course, students were assigned to 5–7 member groups to work together in preparing for an exam in one of the five content units in the course. Their exam performance was tracked over three units: a baseline unit in which students worked only individually, a unit in which they worked in cooperative teams, and a follow-up unit in which the formal cooperative team structure was removed. Three different bonus-credit contingencies were used in the cooperative learning unit across the three semesters: (a) awarding full bonus credit to each individual in the group if the group as a whole improved its exam performance by the specified amount, (b) awarding partial bonus credit to each individual in the group if the group as a whole improved it exam performance by the specified amount and full bonus credit to each individual who also improved by the specified amount, and (c) awarding full bonus credit to an individual in the group if both the group and the individual improved exam performance by the specified amount. The three contingencies produced somewhat similar patterns of change for low and average performers, but the high performers fared better under the last two contingencies than under the group-only contingency.     

The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

We describe and empirically investigate a hybrid social dilemma that merges give-some and take-some dilemmas by allowing individuals to choose to either give or to take resources from a shared resource pool. Study 1 finds that (a) group size increases the inequality among group members and the likelihood of creating the public good, while reducing the amount of wasted resources; (b) larger bonuses increase provision rates; and (c) asymmetry in the wealth distribution of the group members induces higher levels of inequality of the final outcomes. Following the logic of appropriateness, players with high (low) endowments were more likely to give toward (take from) the shared resource. Study 2 finds that the tendency of the players with high (low) endowments to give (take) is amplified as the difference between endowment levels increased, and the players’ behavior is correlated with, and predictable from, independent judgments of what is perceived as appropriate.     

Immediate and sustaining effects of extrinsic rewards on specific exploratory behavior

The purpose of the present investigation was to examine the immediate and sustaining effects of monetary and social rewards on specific exploratory behavior. Specific exploratory behavior was conceived as a behavioral expression of intrinsic motivation and was measured by the number of additional requests for viewing blurred tachistoscopically presented slides of varying degrees of uncertainty. The results of the study showed that when monetary and social rewards were presented contingent on performance, exploration increased at the upper levels of uncertainty above a control group. It was also found that after removal, females who had previously received social rewards sustained a significantly higher level of exploration above the control group, while males who had previously received social rewards, as well as both males and females who had previously received monetary rewards, did not differ significantly from the control. The discrepany between these findings and previous findings is explained in terms of theoretical differences in defining and measuring intrinsic motivation.     

Individual Restraint and Group Efficiency in Commons Dilemmas: The Effects of Two Types of Environmental Uncertainty1

In most real-world commons, the exact resource quantity is rarely known, and the rate at which the resource regenerates is not always predictable. Annual salmon runs, for example, are based on breeding rates and many other factors; those fishing never know exactly how many fish will be available for next year's season. The present study employed a computerized commons dilemma simulation to investigate the impact of uncertainty in pool size and regeneration rate on individuals harvest choice and the efficiency with which groups managed the resource pool. Both types of uncertainty produced significant declines in individual restraint and group efficiency, although the group-level effects tended to be stronger than those at the individual level. Implications for the management of real-world commons are discussed.