Goal-driven reasoning overcomes cell D neglect in contingency judgements

Research on contingency judgement typically shows cell weight inequality such that the information in cell A of a contingency table is considered more relevant than the information in cell D, even though both kinds of information have the same confirmatory meaning. Two studies tested whether goal-driven reasoning can lead people to realise the value of the information in cell D. Participants' goal to defend a particular conclusion for which the information in cell D was helpful was manipulated. Whereas participants who did not have that goal displayed the usual cell D neglect, goal-driven participants for whom cell D contained goal-relevant information considered it important. More importantly, in subsequent tasks with different contents where participants were no longer driven by any goal, they continued to consider information in cell D relevant (Study 1), and they were more likely to make correct contingency judgements, which depended on considering cell D (Study 2).     

The Getting and Losing Wisdom

SUMMARY

The role of aging and culture in the attainment of wisdom is examined m this chapter. The concept of wisdom m industrialised societies is briefly explored. It is argued that both biology and culture can be positive or negative factors m the capacity of a person to be “wise.” It is concluded that, for many, the negative impact of biological factors of aging are overwhelming, but, for a few, aging enriches their insight.     

Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning.     

Wisdom and abiding interest: Interviews with three noted historians in later life

This article explores the connections between wisdom-related attributes and abiding interest and draws upon material from interviews with three eminent historians in later life. It is proposed that one characteristic of wisdom, namely, the coordination of affective/attaching and cognitive/detaching modes of processing information, is related to abiding interest or the ability to self-regulate attention in a way that promotes lifelong learning. The article (a) reviews pertinent constructs in the literatures on adult development and wisdom; (b) presents selected excerpts from in-depth interviews; and (c) concludes by discussing the developmental implications of the ideas presented.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Mapping relational structure in spatial reasoning

Three experiments investigated whether the similarity of relational structures influences the interpretation of spatial representations. Adults were shown diagrams of hand gestures paired with simple statements and asked to judge the meaning of new gestures. In Experiment 1 the gestures were paired with active declarative statements. In Experiment 2, the gestures were paired with conjunctive and disjunctive relations. Experiment 3 used statements similar to those used in Experiment 1, but eliminated the initial object-to-object mapping provided in Experiments 1 and 2. In all three experiments, most participants chose an interpretation that set up a parallel relational structure between the gesture and its meaning: spatial elements were paired with conceptual elements and spatial relations were paired with conceptual relations. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that similarity of relational structures influences spatial reasoning, and have implications for analogical reasoning, diagrammatic reasoning, and language processing.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children

It is widely accepted that adults show an advantage for deontic over epistemic reasoning. Two published studies (Cummins, 1996b; Harris and Núñez, 1996, Experiment 4) found evidence of this “deontic advantage” in preschool-aged children and are frequently cited as evidence that preschoolers show the same deontic advantage as adults. However, neither study has been replicated, and it is not clear from either study that preschoolers were showing the deontic advantage under the same conditions as adults. The current research investigated these issues. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate both Cummins’s and Harris and Núñez’s studies with 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 56), replicating the former with 4-year-olds and the latter with both 3- and 4-year-olds. Experiment 2 modified Cummins’s task to remove the contextual differences between conditions, making it more similar to adult tasks, finding that 4-year-olds (n = 16) show no evidence of the deontic advantage when no authority figure is present in the deontic condition, whereas both 7-year-olds (n = 16) and adults (n = 28) do. Experiment 3 removed the authority figure from the deontic condition in Harris and Núñez’s task, again finding that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 28) show no evidence of the deontic advantage under these conditions. These results suggest that for preschoolers, the deontic advantage is reliant on particular contextual cues such as the presence of an authority figure, in the deontic condition. By 7 years of age, however, children are reasoning like adults and show evidence of the advantage when no such contextual cues are present.     

Wisdom and memory: Autobiographical memories as the foundation for the recall of wisdom incidents

This article explores how autobiographical memory serves as the foundation for people's accounts of their wisdom. Two complementary approaches to wisdom are introduced: an intrapersonal or person-based approach, which defines wisdom as personal qualities or personality traits, and an interactionist or endeavor-based approach, which focuses on wisdom incidents—people's displays of wisdom in real-life situations. The literatures on autobiographical memory and on wisdom suggest that, when wisdom is defined as personal qualities or personality traits, its foundation in autobiographical memory is self-concept. However, when wisdom is defined as actual displays of wisdom, its foundation in autobiographical memory is specific autobiographical memories. The article discusses how autobiographical memory grounds and constrains the memories of wisdom. Further, using research on autobiographical memory, it argues that memories of wisdom incidents serve self, directive, and social functions, and that such memories are highly accessible, vividly remembered, and reasonably accurate.     

Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.     

Common-sense reasoning as proto-scientific agent activity

We wish to model common-sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of proto-scientific reasoning, with a view to future elaboration and proof of concept. To model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the integrative formal computational machinery we have been developing and implementing for rational cooperative epistemic agents. In our logic-based framework, agents can update their own and each other's theories, which are comprised of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints, queries, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other queries; react to circumstances; plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates on self and others.     

Abstract reasoning and the interpretation of basic conditionals

Studies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms (If the ball is blue, then the shape is square). However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories (If it is a bori, then it has red wings), and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals must consider the semantic context.     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Wisdom and good lives: A process perspective

Wisdom and good lives are related. On one hand, judgments about whether wisdom has been manifested are often based on conceptions of what is a good life. On the other hand, wisdom, as manifested by human endeavors throughout history which contributed to the common good over the long term, can itself transform the standards that we use to evaluate good lives. In this article, wisdom is defined as a process encompassing three core components—cognitive integration, embodiment in action, and positive effects for oneself and others. One form of wisdom, which transforms our conceptions of a good life, is discussed, using Mother Teresa's endeavor as an example. Her endeavor which embodied an integrated idea—serving Christ by serving the poorest of the poor—generated positive effects for herself and others, and has transformed people's conceptions of a good life. The relationship of this form of wisdom to hardship, happiness, and old age is also discussed.     

Diagnostic causal reasoning with verbal information

In diagnostic causal reasoning, the goal is to infer the probability of causes from one or multiple observed effects. Typically, studies investigating such tasks provide subjects with precise quantitative information regarding the strength of the relations between causes and effects or sample data from which the relevant quantities can be learned. By contrast, we sought to examine people’s inferences when causal information is communicated through qualitative, rather vague verbal expressions (e.g., “X occasionally causes A”). We conducted three experiments using a sequential diagnostic inference task, where multiple pieces of evidence were obtained one after the other. Quantitative predictions of different probabilistic models were derived using the numerical equivalents of the verbal terms, taken from an unrelated study with different subjects. We present a novel Bayesian model that allows for incorporating the temporal weighting of information in sequential diagnostic reasoning, which can be used to model both primacy and recency effects. On the basis of 19,848 judgments from 292 subjects, we found a remarkably close correspondence between the diagnostic inferences made by subjects who received only verbal information and those of a matched control group to whom information was presented numerically. Whether information was conveyed through verbal terms or numerical estimates, diagnostic judgments closely resembled the posterior probabilities entailed by the causes’ prior probabilities and the effects’ likelihoods. We observed interindividual differences regarding the temporal weighting of evidence in sequential diagnostic reasoning. Our work provides pathways for investigating judgment and decision making with verbal information within a computational modeling framework.     

Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.     

Within-subject consistency and between-subject variability in Bayesian reasoning strategies

It is well known that people tend to perform poorly when asked to determine a posterior probability on the basis of a base rate, true positive rate, and false positive rate. The present experiments assessed the extent to which individual participants nevertheless adopt consistent strategies in these Bayesian reasoning problems, and investigated the nature of these strategies. In two experiments, one laboratory-based and one internet-based, each participant completed 36 problems with factorially manipulated probabilities. Many participants applied consistent strategies involving use of only one of the three probabilities provided in the problem, or additive combination of two of the probabilities. There was, however, substantial variability across participants in which probabilities were taken into account. In the laboratory experiment, participants’ eye movements were tracked as they read the problems. There was evidence of a relationship between information use and attention to a source of information. Participants’ self-assessments of their performance, however, revealed little confidence that the strategies they applied were actually correct. These results suggest that the hypothesis of base rate neglect actually underestimates people’s difficulty with Bayesian reasoning, but also suggest that participants are aware of their ignorance.