People use the memory for past-test heuristic as an explicit cue for judgments of learning

When people estimate their memory for to-be-learned material over multiple study–test trials, they tend to base their judgments of learning (JOLs) on their test performance for those materials on the previous trial. Their use of this information—known as the memory for past-test (MPT) heuristic—is believed to be responsible for improvements in the relative accuracy (resolution) of people’s JOLs across learning trials. Although participants seem to use past-test information as a major basis for their JOLs, little is known about how learners translate this information into a judgment of learning. Toward this end, in two experiments, we examined whether participants factored past-test performance into their JOLs in either an explicit, theory-based way or an implicit way. To do so, we had one group of participants (learners) study paired associates, make JOLs, and take a test on two study–test trials. Other participants (observers) viewed learners’ protocols and made JOLs for the learners. Presumably, observers could only use theory-based information to make JOLs for the learners, which allowed us to estimate the contribution of explicit and implicit information to learners’ JOLs. Our analyses suggest that all participants factored simple past-test performance into their JOLs in an explicit, theory-based way but that this information made limited contributions to improvements in relative accuracy across trials. In contrast, learners also used other privileged, implicit information about their learning to inform their judgments (that observers had no access to) that allowed them to achieve further improvements in relative accuracy across trials.     

Illusions of competence during study can be remedied by manipulations that enhance learners’ sensitivity to retrieval conditions at test

Monitoring one's knowledge during study is susceptible to a foresight bias (Koriat and Bjork, 2005). Judgments of learning (JOLs) are inflated whenever information that is present at study and absent, but solicited, at test, such as the targets in cue-target paired associates, highlights aspects of cues that are less apparent when those cues are presented alone. The present findings demonstrate that foresight bias can be alleviated by study-test experience (Experiment 1), particularly test experience (Experiments 2 and 3), and by delaying JOLs after study (Experiment 4) and that both foresight bias and its alleviation have behavioral consequences, as measured by study time allocation (Experiment 5). Collectively, the findings suggest that overconfidence and misallocation of study time arise from a mismatch that is inherent to education--that the answer is present at study and absent at test--and that alleviating the problem requires creating conditions at study that sensitize learners to retrieval conditions at test.     

Exploring a mnemonic debiasing account of the underconfidence-with-practice effect

Judgments of learning (JOLs) underestimate the increase in recall that occurs with repeated study (the underconfidence-with-practice effect; UWP). The authors explore an account in terms of a foresight bias in which JOLs are inflated when the to-be-recalled target highlights aspects of the cue that are not transparent when the cue appears alone and the tendency of practice to alleviate bias by providing learners with cues pertinent to recall. In 3 experiments the UWP effect was strongest for items that induce a foresight bias, but delaying JOLs reduced the debiasing effects of practice, thereby moderating the UWP effect. This occurred when delayed JOLs were prompted by the cue alone (like during testing), not when prompted by the cue-target pair (like during study).     

小学生预见性偏差及其削弱

采用三种不同去偏差方法,对不同年龄儿童的预见性偏差及削弱进行探讨。实验结果发现,二年级和三年级出现了预见性偏差,五年级没有出现预见性偏差;对于二年级儿童,只有基于理论的去偏差方法才能削弱预见性偏差。而三年级儿童,三种方法都能削弱预见性偏差。结果说明帮助他们建立正确的元认知理论可以有效提高他们元认知监测水平。     

小学生预见性偏差及其削弱

采用三种不同去偏差方法,对不同年龄儿童的预见性偏差及削弱进行探讨。实验结果发现,二年级和三年级出现了预见性偏差,五年级没有出现预见性偏差;对于二年级儿童,只有基于理论的去偏差方法才能削弱预见性偏差。而三年级儿童,三种方法都能削弱预见性偏差。结果说明帮助他们建立正确的元认知理论可以有效提高他们元认知监测水平。     

小学高年级学生的学习判断绝对准确性及预见偏差

本研究以小学高年级学生为被试,选取高熟悉度的具体名词组成的联结词对为实验材料,考察不同判断模式下学习判断的准确性及预见偏差。研究发现:(1)小学高年级学生的学习判断绝对准确性存在年级差异。总体来看,小学六年级学生在即时判断和延迟判断模式下都具有较好的绝对准确性,而四年级和五年级学生在即时判断时出现显著的高估,而在延迟判断模式下具有较好的绝对准确性。具体分析正向词对和反向词对的准确性发现,在即时判断模式下,五、六年级学生的正向联结词对有较好的准确性,而四年级的正向联结词对出现高估;三个年级的学生的反向词对都出现高估。在延迟判断模式下,三个年级学生在正向词对和反向词对上都有较好的准确性。(2)小学五年级学生的学习判断开始出现预见偏差。(3)延迟判断能够提高小学高年级学生的学习判断准确性,减小甚至消除预见偏差。     

Illusions of competence and overestimation of associative memory for identical items: Evidence from judgments of learning

The relation between subjects’ predicted and actual memory performance is a central issue in the domain of metacognition. In the present study, we examined the influence of item similarity and associative strength on judgments of learning (JOLs) in a cued recall task. We hypothesized that encoding fluency would cause a foresight bias, so that subjects would overestimate recall of identical pairs (scale-scale), as compared with strong associates (weight-scale) or unrelated pairs (mask-scale). In Experiment 1, JOLs for identical word pairs were higher than those for related and unrelated pairs, but later recall of identical pairs was lower than recall of related pairs. In Experiment 2, the effect of encoding fluency (inferred from self-paced study time) was examined, and a similar pattern of results was obtained, with subjects spending the least amount of time studying identical pairs. We conclude that overconfidence for identical pairs reflects an assessment of item similarity when JOLs are made, despite associative strength being a better predictor of later retrieval.     

Fluency of retrieval at study affects judgments of learning (JOLs): An analytic or nonanalytic basis for JOLs?

The fluency of retrieval during a test of memory has been implicated as a cue for judgments of learning (JOLs), but little is known about how fluency affects JOLs. In three experiments, we investigated (1) whether the fluency of generation during study may be a cue for JOLs and (2) whether such fluency effects are mediated by an analytic or nonanalytic inference. To accomplish our goals, we used a learner-observer-judge method. While studying paired associates, learners generated some targets at study. For these items, their JOLs were negatively correlated with the time taken to generate targets. Observers watched learners generate targets and then predicted learners' memory performance. Judges also made JOLs but did not watch the learners generate targets. JOLs from all groups were negatively related to learners' latencies to generate targets, with the magnitude of the relationship equivalent for learners and observers and lower for judges. These and other findings are consistent with the conclusions that the fluency of generation at study is a cue for JOLs and that such fluency effects are partly mediated by an analytic inference about how fluency is related to memory.     

Predicting one's own forgetting: the role of experience-based and theory-based processes

The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs.     

Multiple study trials and judgments of learning

We compared judgments of learning (JOLs) that were made either (a) after 1 study trial, (b) 2 study trials, or (c) in-between the 1st and 2nd study trials. In regard to the absolute accuracy of JOLs at predicting subsequent recall, we replicated previous findings of an underconfidence-with-practice effect for immediate JOLs and report for the first time a new finding of an underconfidence-with-practice effect for delayed JOLs (i.e., delayed JOLs after one trial overestimated the likelihood of subsequent recall, whereas delayed JOLs after two trials underestimated that likelihood). Also, although delayed JOLs always had a greater relative accuracy than did immediate JOLs, the relative accuracy of immediate and delayed JOLs was approximately the same after 1 versus 2 study trials. These results demonstrate that additional study trials affect the absolute accuracy of all JOLs but not the relative accuracy of any JOLs. Thus an increase in the number of study trials produced an increasing bias to be underconfident about the subsequent likelihood of recall but did not affect people's ordering of which items had been more (versus less) well-learned.     

Metacognition of the testing effect: Guiding learners to predict the benefits of retrieval

If the mnemonic benefits of testing are to be widely realized in real-world learning circumstances, people must appreciate the value of testing and choose to utilize testing during self-guided learning. Yet metacognitive judgments do not appear to reflect the enhancement provided by testing Karpicke & Roediger (Science 319:966–968, 2008). In this article, we show that under judicious conditions, learners can indeed reveal an understanding of the beneficial effects of testing, as well as the interaction of that effect with delay (Experiment 1). In that experiment, subjects made judgments of learning (JOLs) for previously studied or previously tested items in either a cue-only or a cue–target context, and either immediately or after a 1-day delay. When subjects made judgments in a cue-only context, their JOLs accurately reflected the effects of testing, both immediately and at a delay. To evaluate the potential of exposure to such conditions for promoting generalized appreciation of testing effects, three further experiments elicited global predictions about restudied and tested items across two study/test cycles (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). The results indicated that learners’ global naïve metacognitive beliefs increasingly reflect the beneficial effects of testing when learners experience these benefits with increasing external support. If queried under facilitative circumstances, learners appreciate the mnemonic enhancement that testing provides on both an item-by-item and global basis but generalize that knowledge to future learning only with considerable guidance.     

学习和测验经验对学习判断中UWP效应的影响

针对重复学习判断中出现的练习伴随低估效应（UWP效应）,目前存在多种理论解释。本研究基于过去测验记忆假说,在学习阶段和测验阶段引入两种判断：学习判断准确性的判断和回溯性信心判断,通过两个实验考察学习经验和测验经验对UWP效应的影响。结果发现：在学习判断中学习判断准确性的判断和回溯性信心判断均消除了UWP效应,间接证明了学习和测验经验均影响到UWP效应的出现。     

Lack of pervasiveness of the underconfidence-with-practice effect: boundary conditions and an explanation via anchoring

The authors investigated whether underconfidence in judgments of learning (JOLs) is pervasive across multiple study-test trials as suggested by A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, and H. Ma'ayan (2002) or whether underconfidence with practice (UWP) might be a kind of anchoring-and-adjustment effect, such that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the UWP effect depends on whether recall is above a psychological anchor. Participants studied normatively difficult items or normatively easy items and made immediate JOLs or delayed JOLs. The UWP effect occurred for easy items, but for difficult items an overconfidence-with-practice (OWP) effect occurred for delayed JOLs and no bias occurred for immediate JOLs. The systematic occurrence of all 3 outcomes establishes boundary conditions for the UWP effect and confirms the hypothesis that underconfidence (or the lack thereof) may arise at least in part from an anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism.     

Metamemory and memory efficiency: Implications for student learning

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are metamemory judgments about the likelihood of remembering later an item that we are currently studying. Much research has documented that JOLs are accurate at discriminating easy from difficult items (resolution), but often fail to account for other factors such as the advantages of retrieval practice, overlearning, spacing, and desirable difficulty, thus resulting in poor calibration. This implies that JOLs should not be used to determine how long or in what manner to study, although they can be used to determine what to study. To counter poor calibration, explicit metamemory knowledge can be learned and applied in order for students to become more efficient learners. Our goal is to focus on how metamemory influences decisions about studying, and how we might use metamemory to improve our learning efficiency.     

Using the past to predict the future

This research addressed three issues. First, we examined whether retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) and judgments of learning (JOLs) assess memory differently. Second, we examined the relative accuracy of JOLs and RCJs at predicting future recall performance. Third, we examined whether making JOLs improves subsequent recall better than making RCJs or making no metacognitive judgment. Results suggest that RCJs and JOLs are both based on retrievability, but that participants use their memory differently when making JOLs. RCJs were more accurate than JOLs at predicting future recall for some subsets of items, but the reverse was true for other subsets of items. Finally, eventual recall performance was facilitated when participants made JOLs but not when they made RCJs, suggesting that the JOL task helps to improve people's learning of the items.     

Multiple bases for young and older adults' judgments of learning in multitrial learning

Prior work has suggested that participants use a memory-for-past-tests (MPT) heuristic for judgments of learning (JOLs) in a multitrial learning scenario. That is, when learning the same material in multiple sessions, previous memory performance can be used as a basis for later memory predictions. We explored this issue by evaluating the impact of healthy aging on the use of MPT across trials. Young adults and healthy older adults learned pairs of words, made JOLs, and received a memory test in three study-test trials on the same material. Results indicated that both young and older adults relied on MPT as a basis for JOLs and changes in MPT across trials were nominal. Further, only the most-recent past test influenced JOLs, whereas earlier tests were unrelated to later judgments. JOLs were also influenced by prior-trial JOLs and were related to subsequent memory performance on the same trial. We suggest that these data support both indirect- and direct-memory mechanisms as the bases for the MPT heuristic. Further, in a multitrial learning scenario, in which the same information was being learned, young and older adults used the same bases for their JOLs.     

延迟学习判断的时间加工进程

学习判断是指人们在学习之后对自己学习效果所做的一种预测,是元记忆监测性判断的一种形式。学习判断按其发生时间的不同可以分为即时学习判断和延迟学习判断。与即时学习判断相比,延迟学习判断的相对准确性较高,被称为延迟学习判断效应。实验借助事件相关电位技术探究延迟学习判断的时间加工进程,发现高等级学习判断比低等级学习判断诱发了更大的时间窗为400-600ms的早期新旧效应和800-1200ms的晚期右侧额区新旧效应。上述结果表明,延迟学习判断包含不止一个加工过程,早期新旧效应反映了线索再认的过程,晚期右侧额区效应则反映了对提取之后的评估过程,该结果进一步验证了两阶段模型解释延迟学习判断效应的有效性。     

Metacognitive illusions can be reduced by monitoring recollection during study

Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.     

A stochastic detection and retrieval model for the study of metacognition

We present a signal detection-like model termed the stochastic detection and retrieval model (SDRM) for use in studying metacognition. Focusing on paradigms that relate retrieval (e.g., recall or recognition) and confidence judgments, the SDRM measures (1) variance in the retrieval process, (2) variance in the confidence process, (3) the extent to which different sources of information underlie each response, (4) simple bias (i.e., increasing or decreasing confidence criteria across conditions), and (5) metacognitive bias (i.e., contraction or expansion of the confidence criteria across conditions). In the metacognition literature, gamma correlations have been used to measure the accuracy of confidence judgments. However, gamma cannot distinguish between the first 3 attributes, and it cannot measure either form of bias. In contrast, the SDRM can distinguish among the attributes, and it can measure both forms of bias. In this way, the SDRM can be used to test competing process theories by determining the attribute that best accounts for a change across conditions. To demonstrate the SDRM's usefulness, we investigated judgments of learning (JOLs) followed by cued-recall. Through a series of nested and non-nested model comparisons applied to a new experiment, the SDRM determined that a reduction in variance during the confidence process is the most likely explanation of the delayed-JOL effect, and a stronger relation between information underlying JOLs and recall is the most likely explanation of the testing-JOL effect. Following a brief discussion of implications for JOL theories, we conclude with a broader discussion of how the SDRM can benefit metacognition research.     

学习不良儿童的元认知偏差：内部线索的影响

通过改变实验材料内部线索,旨在考察内部线索在学习不良儿童元认知偏差形成过程中的影响。实验1发现,学习不良儿童低关联字对的元认知偏差显著高于一般儿童,关联强度对学习判断的影响显著小于对测试成绩的影响;实验2发现,学习不良儿童反向方向字对的元认知偏差显著高于一般儿童,关联方向对学习判断的影响显著小于对测试成绩的影响。综合以上研究发现,相对一般儿童,学习不良儿童存在更大的元认知偏差,内部线索对学习判断和测试成绩的影响不一致模式适用于两组儿童。