Between reasoning

In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog]_{referent_expression} is to the left of [the frog]_{relatum_expression}; [the snake]_{referent_expression} is between [the donkey and the deer]_{relatum_expression}). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given-new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.     

Between reasoning

In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog]_{referent_expression} is to the left of [the frog]_{relatum_expression}; [the snake]_{referent_expression} is between [the donkey and the deer]_{relatum_expression}). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given–new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.     

Word order variation in spatial descriptions with adverbs

Previous research has shown that in a three-term spatial reasoning task, the second premise of a German premise pair is especially easy to comprehend if (1) the prepositional object rather than the grammatical subject denotes the given entity, and if (2) the term denoting the given entity precedes the term denoting the new entity. Accordingly, the second premise is easiest to comprehend with noncanonical word order--that is, with the prepositional object in preverbal position denoting the given entity (e.g., To the right of the given object is the new subject). This finding is explained in terms of contextual licensing of noncanonical word order. Here, we discuss and tested two alternative accounts of contextual licensing, given-new and partially ordered set relations (Poset). The given-new account claims that noncanonical word order is licensed by the term denoting the given entity preceding the term denoting the new entity. On the Poset account, noncanonical word order is licensed if the preverbal constituent introduces a new entity that stands in a transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric relation to a given entity. Comprehension times for second premises with spatial adverbs in four different word orders support both accounts of contextual licensing; Poset licensing was stronger than given-new licensing.     

Phonological activation in anaphoric lexical access (ALA).

Simner and Smyth (1998) propose that anaphoric lexical access (ALA) occurs at an anaphor and targets the lexical entry (specifically, the lemma) of the antecedent. Since the word frequency effect (e.g., Rubenstein et al., 1970) resides at the lexeme (Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994) Simner and Smyth predict, and subsequently illustrate, that ALA exhibits no frequency effect. A problem arises, however: if ALA does not access the lexeme, how do we account for phonological priming at anaphor sites (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1985)? We claim that this is the result of "incidental" lemma-to-lexeme activation. Furthermore, we argue that since lexeme activation is not crucial to anaphor comprehension, anaphor reading times indicate lemma search times only (therefore there is no frequency effect). An experiment is presented demonstrating that lemma-access during ALA can cause incidental lexeme activation without invoking a frequency effect.     

Developmental and content effects in reasoning with causal conditionals

Two predictions derived from Markovits and Barrouillet's (2001) developmental model of conditional reasoning were tested in a study in which 72 twelve-year-olds, 80 fifteen-year-olds, and 104 adults received a paper-and-pencil test of conditional reasoning with causal premises ("if cause P then effect Q"). First, we predicted that conditional premises would induce more correct uncertainty responses to the Affirmation of the consequent and Denial of the antecedent forms when the antecedent term is weakly associated to the consequent than when the two are strongly associated and that this effect would decrease with age. Second, uncertainty responding to the Denial of the antecedent form ("P is not true") should be easier when the formulation of the minor premise invites retrieval of alternate antecedents ("if something other than P is true"). The results were consistent with the hypotheses and indicate the importance of retrieval processes in understanding developmental patterns in conditional reasoning with familiar premises.     

Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning: II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation

Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model.     

How do we process novel conceptual combinations in context?

Most theories of how people interpret novel noun-noun combinations (e.g., ghost forest) do not sufficiently address the role of context, which is surprising given that novel combinations are generally encountered in discourse contexts. We evaluated three hypotheses for the role of context in interpretation. The generation hypothesis states that interpretation is based on sense generation both in and out of context. The anaphor resolution hypothesis states that interpretation initially involves identifying a referent from the prior discourse context, and meaning generation occurs only if anaphoric processing fails. The dual-process hypothesis states that sense generation and anaphor resolution operate in parallel, and both may influence initial interpretation. In two experiments, we examined reading times on novel combinations when the dominant meaning (most likely interpretation) or subordinate meaning (infrequent interpretation) preceded or followed the combination in text. Results supported the dual-process hypothesis.     

Selection mechanisms in reading lexically ambiguous words

Readers' eye movements were monitored as they read sentences containing lexically ambiguous words. The ambiguous words were either biased (one strongly dominant interpretation) or nonbiased. Readers' gaze durations were longer on nonbiased than biased words when the disambiguating information followed the target word. In Experiment 1, reading times on the disambiguating word did not differ whether the disambiguation followed the target word immediately or occurred several words later. In Experiment 2, prior disambiguation eliminated the long gaze durations on nonbiased target words but resulted in long gaze durations on biased target words if the context demanded the subordinate meaning. The results indicate that successful integration of one meaning with prior context terminates the search for alternative meanings of that word. This results in selective (single meaning) access when integration of a dominant meaning is fast (due to a biasing context) and identification of a subordinate meaning is slow (a strongly biased ambiguity with a low-frequency meaning).     

Are conjunctive inferences easier than disjunctive inferences? A comparison of rules and models

We report four experiments investigating conjunctive inferences (from a conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from a disjunction and the same two conditionals). The mental model theory predicts that the conjunctive inferences, which require one model, should be easier than the disjunctive inferences, which require multiple models. Formal rule theories predict either the opposite result or no difference between the inferences. The experiments showed that the inferences were equally easy when the participants evaluated given conclusions, but that the conjunctive inferences were easier than the disjunctive inferences (1) when the participants drew their own conclusions, (2) when the conjunction and disjunction came last in the premises, (3) in the time the participants spent reading the premises and in responding to given conclusions, and (4) in their ratings of the difficulty of the inferences. The results support the model theory and demonstrate the importance of reasoners' inferential strategies.     

Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

Limits on literal processing during idiom interpretation

Two experiments investigated the extent to which literal processing occurs in comprehending figurative idiomatic expressions. Subjects read stories on a cathode-ray tube (CRT). Target phrases, some of which were idioms, contained nouns which were potential anaphors of previously mentioned referents. A method developed by Dell, McKoon and Ratcliff (1983) was used to determine whether subjects carried out semantic processing resulting in activation of the referents of those anaphors. In Experiment 1 the targets consisted of either an idiom or a literal phrase, each including the same potential anaphor, or a control phrase. Results suggest that the preceding referent was activated by the anaphor in the literal phrase, but not by the potential anaphor in the idiomatic phrase. Experiment 2 showed that these results were not due to differences in the materials used. These results are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that when an idiomatic phrase is interpreted figuratively full literal semantic processing of that phase is not necessarily carried out.This research was conducted while the author was a graduate student at the Department of Psychology, Northeastern University.     

How do we process novel conceptual combinations in context?

Most theories of how people interpret novel noun–noun combinations (e.g., ghost forest) do not sufficiently address the role of context, which is surprising given that novel combinations are generally encountered in discourse contexts. We evaluated three hypotheses for the role of context in interpretation. The generation hypothesis states that interpretation is based on sense generation both in and out of context. The anaphor resolution hypothesis states that interpretation initially involves identifying a referent from the prior discourse context, and meaning generation occurs only if anaphoric processing fails. The dual-process hypothesis states that sense generation and anaphor resolution operate in parallel, and both may influence initial interpretation. In two experiments, we examined reading times on novel combinations when the dominant meaning (most likely interpretation) or subordinate meaning (infrequent interpretation) preceded or followed the combination in text. Results supported the dual-process hypothesis.     

Event-related responses to pronoun and proper name anaphors in parallel and nonparallel discourse structures.

The present study investigated event-related potential (ERP) effects of pronoun and proper name anaphors in both parallel and nonparallel discourse structures. Thirty-seven students processed 400 semantically different text passages. Each trial consisted of two sentences and a comprehension question. The first sentence introduced a protagonist who was referred to by an anaphoric word in the second sentence. The anaphoric word was either a pronoun or a repetition of the proper name of the protagonist and had either the same or a different syntactic role as its antecedent (subject or object). The sentences were presented word by word as rapid serial visual display. Event-related potentials were recorded from 61 scalp electrodes. In agreement with the parallel function strategy, nonparallel discourse structures required longer decision times and exhibited higher error rates than parallel structures. The ERPs revealed two effects: First, pronoun anaphors evoked a more pronounced negativity than proper name anaphors between 270 and 420 ms latency over the frontal cortex electrodes. Another relative negativity occurred between 510 and 600 ms over the parietal cortex electrodes. Second, anaphors in nonparallel positions were accompanied by a more pronounced negativity over the parietal cortex. These data support the idea that an anaphor in nonparallel position triggers extra processing steps, probably search processes in working memory which integrate currently encountered information with previously activated representations.     

Event boundaries and anaphoric reference

The current study explored the finding that parsing a narrative into separate events impairs anaphor resolution. According to the Event Horizon Model, when a narrative event boundary is encountered, a new event model is created. Information associated with the prior event model is removed from working memory. So long as the event model containing the anaphor referent is currently being processed, this information should still be available when there is no narrative event boundary, even if reading has been disrupted by a working-memory-clearing distractor task. In those cases, readers may reactivate their prior event model, and anaphor resolution would not be affected. Alternatively, comprehension may not be as event oriented as this account suggests. Instead, any disruption of the contents of working memory during comprehension, event related or not, may be sufficient to disrupt anaphor resolution. In this case, reading comprehension would be more strongly guided by other, more basic language processing mechanisms and the event structure of the described events would play a more minor role. In the current experiments, participants were given stories to read in which we included, between the anaphor and its referent, either the presence of a narrative event boundary (Experiment 1) or a narrative event boundary along with a working-memory-clearing distractor task (Experiment 2). The results showed that anaphor resolution was affected by narrative event boundaries but not by a working-memory-clearing distractor task. This is interpreted as being consistent with the Event Horizon Model of event cognition.     

文本阅读中回指推理发生的整合性因素

探讨回指距离、干扰词的精细描述、干扰词的典型性 对回指推理（先行词通达）的影响。包括2个实验,被试是华南师范大学一二年级本科生164名。采用移动窗口技术,要求被试阅读一定篇数（如,实验1a每个被试阅读15篇）的文章,对不同条件的探测词的反应时进行统计。实验1探讨干扰词精细描述类型（精细描述高和精细描述低）对回指推理的影响。结果表明,干扰的精细描述并非是影响回指推理的主要因素。实验2探讨干扰词和先行词的典型性类型的相对变化对回指推理的影响。结果表明高典型干扰在不同回指距离条件下都会对回指推理产生影响。本研究结果初步证明在影响回指推理的干扰典型性和干扰精细描述的二个因素中,起主要作用的是干扰的典型性     

Hemispheric differences in semantic processing: Category matching is not the same as category membership

Two closely related semantic processing tasks were studied under identical procedural conditions in order to examine lateral visual field effects on reaction times. In Experiment 1, reaction times did not differ as a function of visual field when subjects decided whether a lateral word was a member of a foveally presented category word (category membership task). On the other hand, reaction times were faster for right than for left visual field stimulus presentations when subjects decided whether two words, one lateral and one foveal, belonged to the same category (category matching task), although this advantage did not occur immediately. In Experiment 2, the laterality effect in the category matching task was studied as a function of word familiarity. Two groups of subjects performed the matching task for two blocks of trials, one group receiving the same word list in each block and the other receiving different lists. No visual field differences in reaction times were observed for either group during the first block of trials, but a distinct right field advantage appeared for both during the second block. The data from these experiments suggest that category matching strategies rely upon structures or processes localized in the left hemisphere, although their influence is not immediate. Category membership strategies, on the other hand, do not depend upon such localized structures.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

Working memory,reading ability and the effects of distance and typicality on anaphor resolution in children

We investigated the time course of anaphor resolution in children and whether this is modulated by individual differences in working memory and reading skill. The eye movements of 30 children (10–11 years) were monitored as they read short paragraphs in which (1) the semantic typicality of an antecedent and (2) its distance in relation to an anaphor were orthogonally manipulated. Children showed effects of distance and typicality on the anaphor itself and also on the word to the right of the anaphor, suggesting that anaphoric processing begins immediately but continues after the eyes have left the anaphor. Furthermore, children showed no evidence of resolving anaphors in the most difficult condition (distant atypical antecedent), suggesting that anaphoric processing that is demanding may not occur online in children of this age. Finally, working memory capacity and reading comprehension skill affect the magnitude and time course of typicality and distance effects during anaphoric processing.     

Interpreting conjoined noun phrases and conjoined clauses: Collective versus distributive preferences

Two experiments are reported that show that introducing event participants in a conjoined noun phrase (NP) favours a single event (collective) interpretation, while introducing them in separate clauses favours a separate events (distributive) interpretation. In Experiment 1, acceptability judgements were speeded when the bias of a predicate toward separate events versus a single event matched the presumed bias of how the subjects' referents were introduced (as conjoined noun phrases or in conjoined clauses). In Experiment 2, reading of a phrase containing an anaphor following conjoined noun phrases was facilitated when the anaphor was they, relative to when it was neither/each of them; the opposite pattern was found when the anaphor followed conjoined clauses. We argue that comprehension was facilitated when the form of an anaphor was appropriate for how its antecedents were introduced. These results address the very general problem of how we individuate entities and events when presented with a complex situation and show that different linguistic forms can guide how we construe a situation. The results also indicate that there is no general penalty for introducing the entities or events separately—in distinct clauses as “split” antecedents.     

指代者对其先行词可提取性的影响

三个实验,考察了在理解含有指代法表述的句子过程中,指代者对其先行词(即所指者)的可提取性的影响及其与先述参与者可提取性上的优势之间的关系。结果表明：(1)指代者对所指者的激活有促进作用,对非所指者有一定的抑制作用,从而提高了所指者的可提取性;(2)指代者对所指者和非所指者的这种作用有一定的时间进程;(3)指代者对所指者产生作用的时间进程随指代法表述的特性而变化;(4)句子先述参与者在可提取性上的优势是一种较普遍的认知现象。它与指代法表述中所指者的易提取性现象是一种动态的关系,指代法表述或者增强先述参与者可提取性的优势,或者会消除这种优势。