Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

Behavioral routines in decision making: the effects of novelty in task presentation and time pressure on routine maintenance and deviation

This article examines the role of behavioral routines in decision making. In order to induce routines, participants were confronted with recurrent route decisions in a computer-controlled trucking game, which allows for manipulation of routine acquisition and strength. During the final round of the game, time pressure and novelty in task presentation were varied as between-factors. It was hypothesized that time pressure would increase the likelihood of routine maintenance and novelty would increase the likelihood of deviation. Besides individual choices, response latencies and self-reports were additionally assessed to measure the amount of deliberation during decision making. Results show that time pressure strongly increased the probability of routine maintenance, even though the situation indicated the inadequacy of the routine. In contrast, novelty in task presentation provoked routine deviation and increased deliberation, as evident from response latencies and self-reports. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation

Despite much psychological research regarding jury decision making, surprisingly little is known about the deliberation process that gives rise to jury verdicts. We review classic jury decision-making research regarding the importance of deliberation and more recent research, investigating deliberation and hung juries, that challenges the view that deliberation does not have an important impact on verdicts. We advocate greater attention to potential cognitive processes during deliberation that might explain the transition between predeliberation preferences and a jury’s ultimate verdict. We then review cognitive work in the group context generally, and the jury context specifically, illustrating the promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation. Finally, we identify cognitive phenomena likely to be particularly valuable in illuminating deliberation behavior.     

Pre- versus postdecisional deliberation and goal commitment: The positive effects of defensiveness

Building on Gollwitzer's (1990) mindset theory of action phases, it is proposed that the effects of assigned balanced deliberation on subsequent goal commitment are moderated by people's pre- versus postdecisional status. A balanced deliberation and impartial assessment of pros and cons is expected to reduce goal commitment in predecisional individuals, whereas a distortion of the assigned balanced deliberation and a partial focus on the pros of goal pursuit should defend and strengthen goal commitment in postdecisional individuals. Indeed, in Study 1, assigned deliberation on the pros and cons of pursuing a focal goal promoted stronger reported goal commitment in participants who had decided to pursue this goal, but reduced goal commitment for people who had not yet made such a decision. In Study 2, the same pattern of results emerged when goal commitment was indicated by planning to act on the goal. Study 3 replicated findings using a different decision status manipulation and goal persistence as a measure of commitment. Finally, results of Study 4 suggested that the increase in commitment produced by defensive postdecisional deliberation is consequential as it was found to drive real-life behavior by promoting goal-directed action. Moreover, Study 2: deliberation effects on subsequent planning activity, Study 3: deliberation effects on goal persistence, Study 4: deliberation effects on real-life behavior explored the underlying process and provided evidence that it is the partial focus on the pros of goal pursuit, meant to defend existing goal commitment, that drives postdecisional deliberation's strengthening effects on goal commitment. Implications for mindset theory, goal commitment theory, and decision making are discussed.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreign Language Effect and Psychological Distance

Does using a foreign language result in forming different moral decisions than using our mother tongue? Two studies were conducted to investigate whether there is a relationship between foreign language effects (differences between native vs. foreign language conditions) and psychological distance. Study 1 tested four moral dilemmas adapted from Greene et al. (Cognition 107: 1144–1155, 2008). Non-fluent Korean–English bilingual participants (N = 161) indicated decisions regarding four moral dilemmas in either Korean or English languages. The study found that for personal moral conflict situations, in which emotion and automatic intuition were more important than deliberation, there were significant differences in ratios of utilitarian decisions between the native language (L1) and the foreign language (L2) conditions. The participants tended to make more utilitarian decisions in L2 than in L1, which implies reduced emotionality in L2. Study 2 examined whether the psychological distance increased using the foreign language (English) utilizing an automatic self-test. Nonproficient Korean–English bilinguals (N = 26) formed associations between three kinds of geometric shapes (ellipses, rectangles and triangles) and three kinds of labels (‘me’, ‘friends’ and ‘others’). The results of the study found the self-bias effect decreased when labels were presented in the foreign language (in English). This implies that the foreign language effect resulted from the reduced emotional response, and deliberation in decision making which may result from increased psychological distance.     

Moral judgments and the role of social harm: Differences in automatic versus controlled processing

The social intuitionist model has served as an important corrective to the earlier dominance of rational deliberation in moral psychology. Yet the relationship between intuition and deliberation in moral judgments remains largely unexplored. Three studies were conducted to explore the role of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgments. Results suggest that controlled processing is attuned to instances of social harm. Immoral acts (i.e., cases of serious academic dishonesty) that involved diffuse harm in the form of flouting societal rules did not result in increased moral censure under deliberation. In contrast, similar dishonest acts that involved direct social harm to others resulted in harsher, more punitive moral judgments under deliberation, providing evidence of augmentation of automatic responses under controlled processing. The results suggest that the intuitionist sensitivity to direct physical harm has parallels in the controlled processing system, which seems sensitive to non-physical instances of social harm, such as over-benefiting the self at the expense of deserving others.     

Informed Decision-Making in the Context of Prenatal Chromosomal Microarray

The introduction of chromosomal microarray (CMA) into the prenatal setting has involved considerable deliberation due to the wide range of possible outcomes (e.g., copy number variants of uncertain clinical significance). Such issues are typically discussed in pre-test counseling for pregnant women to support informed decision-making regarding prenatal testing options. This research study aimed to assess the level of informed decision-making with respect to prenatal CMA and the factor(s) influencing decision-making to accept CMA for the selected prenatal testing procedure (i.e., chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis). We employed a questionnaire that was adapted from a three-dimensional measure previously used to assess informed decision-making with respect to prenatal screening for Down syndrome and neural tube defects. This measure classifies an informed decision as one that is knowledgeable, value-consistent, and deliberated. Our questionnaire also included an optional open-ended question, soliciting factors that may have influenced the participants’ decision to accept prenatal CMA; these responses were analyzed qualitatively. Data analysis on 106 participants indicated that 49% made an informed decision (i.e., meeting all three criteria of knowledgeable, deliberated, and value-consistent). Analysis of 59 responses to the open-ended question showed that “the more information the better” emerged as the dominant factor influencing both informed and uninformed participants’ decisions to accept prenatal CMA. Despite learning about the key issues in pre-test genetic counseling, our study classified a significant portion of women as making uninformed decisions due to insufficient knowledge, lack of deliberation, value-inconsistency, or a combination of these three measures. Future efforts should focus on developing educational approaches and counseling strategies to effectively increase the rate of informed decision-making among women offered prenatal CMA.     

Accounting for Time Preference in Management Decisions: An Application to Invasive Species

Managers of invasive species seek to prevent and mitigate their impact, which vary in the time horizon over which they are realized. Likewise, stakeholders vary in the time horizons they consider relevant. Agricultural impacts might reasonably be considered over two or three decades, although ecologists typically consider environmental impacts over much longer time frames. Although time preference plays a critical role in decision making, it has largely been ignored in multicriteria analyses. In this study, we examine how time has been treated in previous decision analyses of invasive species management, focusing on the differences between multicriteria and economic cost–benefit analyses. We then outline a method for incorporating time preference information into multicriteria decision analyses to ensure that criteria weights remain a faithful representation of the decision maker's preferences. To illustrate how time preference can be elicited for invasive species problems involving both monetary and nonmonetary consequences, we describe a small empirical study we conducted with a small group of experts and managers. By outlining a way to consider time preference information in multicriteria analyses of invasive species management, we hope to facilitate better decision making that is reflective of the decision maker's true preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual strategy preferences and decisional fit

The present research introduces the concept of decisional fit. A decision maker experiences decisional fit when the individually preferred decision strategy fits the actually applied strategy. In accordance to other fit‐concepts in psychology (e.g., person–environment fit), we expected positive effects of decisional fit. Five studies examine the effects of a fit between the individual preference for intuition and deliberation (PID) and the actually used decision strategy (intuition or deliberation). A comparison of extreme types (according to participants' values on the PID scale) revealed that decisional fit enhances the perceived value of the chosen or evaluated object (Studies 1–3). In Studies 4 and 5, participants experienced less regret after decisional fit. The findings highlight the importance of considering individual differences when comparing intuitive and deliberate decision making, because strategy preferences interact with applied strategies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision making the case of the Cuban missile crisis

This case study explores reference level effects on group decision making during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The group is composed of American President John F. Kennedy and his advisers. The results are consistent with much experimental evidence showing that reference levels play an important role in determining preferences. The results also extend the notion of reference-dependent risky choice to the group level, where the group consists of seasoned experts who each have a different role to play within the group and who are dealing with an issue of great importance.     

Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert

Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases.     

Expertise-based differences in search and option-generation strategies

The current work builds on option-generation research using experts of various skill levels in a realistic task. We extend previous findings that relate an athlete's performance strategy to generated options and subsequent choices in handball. In a 2-year longitudinal study, we present eye-tracking data to independently verify decision strategies previously inferred from patterns of generated options. A verbal protocol identified the option-generation process for each individual prior to an allocation decision. Although athletes of varying expertise generated the same number of options on average, these options differed in quality between expert, near-expert, and nonexpert athletes for both their initial and final choices. These and other key results are formalized to elaborate a model of option generation, deliberation, and selection.     

A reconnection with life: Helping donor families cope after loss

Helping professionals are often faced with problems of decision making with clients. Often these decisions, while on the surface appearing to be simple, have far-reaching ethical implications. This article focuses on a decision made by a beleagured daughter in relation to her father's well-being. While she has reached a decision, more careful deliberation regarding the ethical considerations embedded in the decision might have led her to a different action.     

Cognitive mapping approach analyzing societal decision‐making

Cognitive mapping (CM) approach is reviewed, and the method is applied in analyzing an important case of societal decision‐making. It is shown that CM is an effective way of representing argumentation, consequences, and the linkage between the concepts. The method integrates causal modelling and rational choice theory with parts of cognitive psychology. CM allows for a systematic arguing of issues. The decision‐making problem described here concerns building a new nuclear power plant in Finland. There occurred strong proponents representing mainly the industry and technocratic and engineering experts, and an equally strong resistance represented by ordinary citizens, parliamentarians, and experts. The argumentation went ten years pro and cons before the parliament in 1993 decided against building the proposed nuclear power plant. It gives an ideal case to study the argumentation and contradictions there in as a whole by developing and applying a cognitive mapping approach.     

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.     

The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief (e.g. accepting some hypothesis as the most likely one), whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude.     

Domain‐based perceptions of risk: a case study of lay and technical community attitudes toward managed aquifer recharge

Despite growing water scarcity, communities in many parts of the developed world often reject technically and economically sound options for water augmentation. This paper reports findings from a study investigating risk perceptions associated with a proposed managed aquifer recharge scheme in Australia. Q Methodology was used to compare decision‐making frameworks of lay community and “technical expert” participants. Technical expert participants were also asked to approximate the decision‐making framework of a “typical” community member. The emerging contrasts between lay community frameworks and those approximated by technical experts suggest that there are prevailing yet errant assumptions about lay community attitudes toward new technologies. The findings challenge the characterization of the lay community and technical experts as being in entrenched opposition with one another.