异质性与科学划界─—L.劳丹的划界理论

在一篇题为《划界问题的消亡》的文章中，劳丹说：“习惯上被视为科学活动和科学信念的内容都具有认识异质性（epistemichetero－geneity），这种异质性提醒我们注意，寻求划界标准的认识形式可能是无效的。经过详细分析，看来不存在一个认识常量。…划界问题——被波普尔称为‘认识论中心问题’的那一问题是虚假的，因为它预设了这一常量的存在。”①劳丹是循着以下思路得出上述结论的。首先，他设立了关于科学划界的三个元标准。然后他检查了新老划界主义传统，发现无一划界方案满足元标准。最后他才形成了异质性概念科学观。不难看出，此…     

社会科学的性质及其与人文科学的关系

一、关于社会科学的划界问题社会科学的划界问题,对于我国社会科学的发展,尤其是社会科学的方法论研究来说,有着特殊的含义和重要性。科学划界,本来是西方科学哲学中逻辑实证主义所提出的一个特殊问题,目的是依据经验或实证的标准,把科学与非科学,甚至把自然科学与社会、人文科学区别开来,认为实证性或客观性是科学的根本的、乃至唯一的特性或本质,只有符合这一标准的自然科学才是真正的科学;其他一切知识或理论,要成为科学,就必须把自然科学作为效仿的榜样,否则就不能晋升科学的行列。逻辑实证主义的划界理论由于偏执于实证性…     

社会科学划界问题刍议

一英国科学哲学家吉勒斯不久前在他的一部新著《20世纪的科学哲学：四个核心论题》中认为,20世纪的科学哲学主要集中于下面四个主题的讨论：（1）归纳主义和对它的批判;（2）约定论和迪昂一奎因命题;（3）观察的本性;（4）科学和形而上学的划界。他还进一步指出：“虽然所有这四个主题对科学的分析都是重要的,但只有划界问题才是关系到超出科学王国范围之外的普遍知识的论题。”[1]所以,在科学哲学中,划界问题往往被人们认为是衡量一种科学哲学学说成功与否的重要标志。科学划界问题其实不限于科学与形而上学的关系,按波普尔的说法…     

试论隋唐时期的科学观

科学观是人们对科学发展的哲学反思,它涉及到科学的起源,科学的本质,科学的作用和价值以及它在社会生活中的地位等一系列科学哲学问题,一个社会的科学技术能否大踏步地向前发展,与该社会的科学现水平有着极大的关系。探索中国历史上科学观的发展,应该是中国哲学史研究的重要内容之一。隋唐时期是中国古代科学观发展的一个重要时期。一方面,由于生产和生活日益离不开科学技术的帮助,而国家的统一和社会的安定又为科学的发展创造了一个良好的环境,因此这一时期的人们对于科学技术的社会作用已经有了比较充分的认识,朝野上下出现了一…     

实践建构论:对一种科学观的初步探讨

在分析和批判传统科学哲学理智主义科学观和科学知识社会学社会建构论科学观的基础上,本文试图提出一种可以被概括为“实践建构论”的科学观,其基本观点是认为科学在本质上是一种具有历史性和建构性的实践活动。从以下三个方面,可以初步探讨这种“实践建构论”科学观的基本路向,以及它对开辟理解科学的新视野的意义。一、科学在本质上是一种实践活动“实践建构论”首先把科学视为一种实践活动,这根本区别于理智主义科学观。在理智主义科学观看来,科学只是一种理性的认知行为,认知主体“看”与“思”的结合最终引向关于能够严格与主体两分的…     

科学划界视域下心理学学科焦虑与学科自觉

心理学科学划界是心理学发展史上的根本问题,构成了心理学发展历史研究的出发点和逻辑起点。心理学科学划界观点多样,争论不休,导致心理学处于学科焦虑当中。当前,心理学需要以文化文思促进学科自觉,这其中隐含的不仅仅是对心理学科学化追求道路的深入思考,同时,也是实现心理学话语方式转换以及与科学关系的深刻把握。     

从"平均"到"公正"的嬗变——中国公正观的价值维度转换

历史上的每一种公正观,都有它的核心价值指向,它们构成了公正思想的价值维度,引导着社会的基本治理方向和利益分配方式.中国社会的公正观经历了一个从"平均"到"公正"的发展过程.长期以来,它是以平均主义为核心价值取向而展开的,并因此而深刻地影响着中国社会.面对当今中国日趋扩大的利益分配差距,一种以公平正义为价值指向的公正观应运而生.公平正义的公正观是具有现实合理性和价值优越性的新型公正观.     

科学划界与中医

科学划界就是在科学与非科学之间作出区分,依据科学划界的逻辑主义的绝对标准、历史主义的相对标准以及重建划界的多元标准,中医不晃科学,但中医也不是伪科学,而是一门实用的技艺,因此中医科学化、现代化及中西医结合的提法有待于进一步商榷。我们反对把中医伪科学化,中医的出路只有一条,那就是融入现代医学的发展之中,为医学的发展而奉出自己的经验和思路。     

合理性·主体性·客观性

科学合理性问题作为科学哲学中的一个基本问题,隐含于科学划界、科学发现、科学评价以及科学进步诸问题之中,制约着它们并通过它们表征出来。正因为如此,在逻辑经验主义和批判理性主义盛行时,科学合理性并没有明确地作为问题提出来进行讨论,人们较多地是关注科学划界、科学评价等问题本身的研究。只是在历史主义取代了逻辑主义在西方科学哲学中的主导地位,从对科学的逻辑分析转向历史考察,科学活动的社会学因素和心理学因素被引入科学哲学的研究之后,科学合理性问题才受到科学哲学家们的重视。进入七十年代以来,西方科学哲学界对科学合理性问题众说纷纭,至今还没有获得为大家都普遍认同的圆满的解决。     

证实、证伪与对称破缺

证实、证伪与对称破缺魏屹东郭贵春（山西大学哲学系０３０００６）作为科学与非科学划界标准的逻辑实证主义的证实原则和证伪主义的证伪原则,不少科学哲学家对其合理性进行了批判。本文不打算在这方面进行评述,而力图从相变理论的“对称破缺”概念出发,对这两个原则进...     

Social genomics: genomic inventions in society. The nature of what's to come

This paper identifies several kinds of intellectual mistakes that proponents of genetic engineering make, in defending their views and characterizing the views of their opponents. Results from research in the social sciences and humanities illuminate the nature of these mistakes. The mistakes themselves play a role in allowing proponents to gather support from other protagonists in the social controversies involving science and technology. Understanding the controversies requires understanding that innovations are components of complex and ill-structured social problems; the "right answer" does not follow from scientific or technological breakthroughs. If the problems are identified correctly, issues of non-economic or non-market values and political and individual rights will need to be addressed.     

Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice

Our primary purpose in this article is to explore some of the issues, practical and conceptual, that arise in the attempt to study and cope with public policy controversies. We have organized the article into four sections. The first considers what problems a frame-critical approach seeks to address and explores, in particular, why social science methods seem unable to contribute to the resolution of public controversies. The second section asks what “frames” are and why they are critical to the study of controversy. Section three gives an overview of the elements in a frame-critical policy analysis and of the relationships between it and frame-reflective policy practice. In conclusion, section four examines the main issues that need to be addressed in analyzing and coping with policy controversies.     

Psychology and social justice: why we do what we do

Much of psychological science and knowledge is significantly relevant to social justice, defined here as the goal to decrease human suffering and to promote human values of equality and justice. A commitment to social justice has evolved as a more important value in the last few decades for psychology, including for the American Psychological Association (APA). The mission, vision, goals, Ethics Code, and strategic plan of APA all provide a rationale for psychologists' involvement in systematic and visible ways of applying our knowledge to social issues. Although psychology has not been immune to the application of psychological knowledge in destructive ways, overall, psychology, many psychologists, and APA have demonstrated a commitment to social justice. This article provides a brief review of the key proponents, debates, and controversies involved in applying psychological science and knowledge to complex societal problems. Psychologists often find themselves in conflict and honest disagreement when the association addresses complex and controversial issues. An important goal is that we continue to find ways to agree or disagree in a respectful manner regardless of where each of us stands on the various positions that APA takes.     

Science,Scientism and Imaginaries of Publics in the UK: Passive Objects,Incipient Threats

Two-way public engagement with science is an important modern democratic practice that paradoxically coincides with the intensifications of state surveillance and policing of publics and social movements engaging with issues involving science. This raises important questions about the contemporary anatomies of publics, and what count as legitimate expressions of public concern over scientific stakes within the knowledge economy. Implicit in the tension between inclusion and surveillance are concerns over the social meaning and authority of science amongst both scientific practitioners and publics. Bringing science and technology studies (STS) and social movement studies (SMS) into dialogue offers a means to explore the neglected ontological stakes in the framing of scientific imaginaries of publics, and public imaginaries of science. Post-WWII UK science–publics relations have emerged in three significant modalities, with publics imagined: as passive non-entities, circa 1950–1990 (continuing); as incipient threats due to presumed deficits in their grasp of science 1990–2000 (continuing); and, since circa 2000, as politicised threats requiring state control. Each modality is shaped by elite denial of the normative commitments embedded within science as surrogate politics—scientism. In each mode, scientistic elite emphasis on epistemic issues forecloses engagement with broader public meanings expressing legitimate normative and ontological differences. Fusing the more epistemic focus of STS with SMS's emphasis on meaning and democratic process offers a route to deeper democratic forms of public engagement with what is called science, which would also precipitate more accountability in elite discourses around science and technology.     

“One Never Knows,Do One?”: Commentary on Paper by the Boston Change Process Study Group

I discuss the work of the Boston Change Process Study Group, focusing on the paper in this issue of Psychoanalytic Dialogues, but also addressing broader issues across the range of their work. After describing the considerable similarities between their views and mine, I focus on three areas about which I have questions: the concept and clinical use of mutual enactment, BCPSG's use of nonlinear dynamic systems theory, and certain problems revolving around science and social construction.     

Moving Life Science Ethics Debates Beyond National Borders: Some Empirical Observations

The life sciences are increasingly being called on to produce “socially robust” knowledge that honors the social contract between science and society. This has resulted in the emergence of a number of “broad social issues” that reflect the ethical tensions in these social contracts. These issues are framed in a variety of ways around the world, evidenced by differences in regulations addressing them. It is important to question whether these variations are simply regulatory variations or in fact reflect a contextual approach to ethics that brings into question the existence of a system of “global scientific ethics”. Nonetheless, within ethics education for scientists these broad social issues are often presented using this scheme of global ethics due to legacies of science ethics pedagogy. This paper suggests this may present barriers to fostering international discourse between communities of scientists, and may cause difficulties in harmonizing (and transporting) national regulations for the governance of these issues. Reinterpreting these variations according to how the content of ethical principles is attributed by communities is proposed as crucial for developing a robust international discourse. To illustrate this, the paper offers some empirical fieldwork data that considers how the concept of dual-use (as a broad social issue) was discussed within African and UK laboratories. Demonstrating that African scientists reshaped the concept of dual-use according to their own research environmental pressures and ascribed alternative content to the principles that underpin it, suggests that the limitations of a “global scientific ethics” system for these issues cannot be ignored.     

Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself.     

Science and Religion: Some Demarcation Criteria

Discussions on the congruence, compatibility, and contradictions between science and religion have been going on since the rise of modern science. In our own times, there are many efforts to build bridges of harmony between the two. Most of these are anchored to particular religious traditions or denominations and also (often) to specific disciplines, notably cosmology, physics, and biology. Though these discussions serve commendable purposes for members of specific faiths and/or disciplines, they are also, for precisely this reason, of restricted appeal. There are not too many discussions of the topic that consider science and religion from a global perspective. It will therefore be useful to define science and religion in terms of their unique characteristics, draw the line of demarcation between them, and show where they overlap. This is what this paper attempts to do.     

The study of socioethical issues in systems biology

Systems biology is the rapidly growing and heavily funded successor science to genomics. Its mission is to integrate extensive bodies of molecular data into a detailed mathematical understanding of all life processes, with an ultimate view to their prediction and control. Despite its high profile and widespread practice, there has so far been almost no bioethical attention paid to systems biology and its potential social consequences. We outline some of systems biology's most important socioethical issues by contrasting the concept of systems as dynamic processes against the common static interpretation of genomes. New issues arise around systems biology's capacities for in silico testing, changing cultural understandings of life, synthetic biology, and commercialization. We advocate an interdisciplinary and interactive approach that integrates social and philosophical analysis and engages closely with the science. Overall, we argue that systems biology socioethics could stimulate new ways of thinking about socioethical studies of life sciences.     

Structure and Scientific Controversies

In this paper, I highlight the importance of models and social structure to Kuhn’s conception of science, and then use these elements to sketch a Kuhnian classification of scientific controversies. I show that several important sorts of non-revolutionary scientific disagreements were both identified and analyzed in Structure. Ultimately, I contend that Kuhn’s conception of science supports an approach to scientific controversies that has the potential to both reveal the importantly different sources of scientific disagreements and to provide useful resources for understanding their endurance and eventual termination. Several brief examples are used to suggest the power of a Kuhnian analysis and this analysis is contrasted with several more contemporary alternatives.