Motivating meta-awareness of mind wandering: A way to catch the mind in flight?

Given the negative effects of mind wandering on performance, it may be profitable to be aware of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) as they occur. The present study investigated whether motivating people to catch TUTs increases meta-awareness. We offered incentives for increased self-catching during reading. To enhance the veracity of these self-reports, we used a “bogus-pipeline” procedure; we convinced participants that their mental states were being covertly monitored using physiological measures. In reality, mind wandering was assessed covertly by a secondary task (“gibberish detection”), and overtly by experience sampling. The results showed that incentives increased the number of self-catches without increasing overall mind wandering. Moreover, both the bogus pipeline and the opportunity for incentives increased the validity of self-reports, evidenced by significantly increased correlations between self-caught and behaviorally assessed mind wandering. We discuss the relevance of this methodological approach for research on mind wandering and research building on introspective reports more generally.     

Work values and work interests: Are they the same?

The hypothesis that the VPI and WVI are measuring the same domain based on theoretical similarities was tested using 195 male freshmen students. The data were analyzed by correlational technique including discriminant analysis. The results allow for the interpretation that the VPI and WVI are in fact measuring two distinctive domains.     

The Zeigarnik effect and intrinsic motivation: Are they the same?

The present study focused on delineating the parameters under which intrinsic motivation leads an individual to reengage an activity from those that result in the Zeigarnik effect. In a posttask free-choice period, participants not completing the experimental task displayed more reengagement behavior than participants completing the task (the Zeigarnik effect). When participants were also provided self-efficacious performance feedback via a prearranged competitive outcome manipulation, there was no evidence of the Zeigarnik effect, while there was support for intrinsic motivation from competent self-efficacious performance feedback. Results were discussed in terms of distinguishing between intrinsic motivation and the Zeigarnik effect as sources of reengagement motivation. It was concluded that, in the presence of self-efficacious performance feedback, the competent-incompetent impression was more salient than task-completion feedback.Preparation of this article was supported by Texas Christian University grant TCU/RF 5-23757.     

Bullies,aggressive victims,and victims: Are they distinct groups?

This study analyzed a sample representing six middle schools that included 206 pure bullies, 514 pure victims, and 206 aggressive victims. Aggressive or provocative victims are students who have been bullied but also bully other students. This research assessed whether aggressive victims engaged in different patterns of behavior and had dissimilar socialization experiences than pure bullies and pure victims. Factors that were considered include measures of parental socialization, family conflict, reactive and proactive aggression, low self‐control, social bonds, and other relevant factors, including demographic characteristics. Logistic regression analyses indicated that aggressive victims engaged in significantly different patterns of behavior than pure victims and pure bullies. The analyses also indicated that the socialization experiences of middle school aggressive victims more closely resembled the socialization experiences of pure bullies than pure victims. Aggr. Behav. 00:00–00, 2005. © 2005 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Logical and psychological partitioning of mind: Depicting the same map?

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. For the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou’s theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The second part of the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed.     

The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states’ constraints

The dynamic framework of mind wandering (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) is reviewed and modified through integrating the construct of mindful meta-awareness. The dynamic framework maintains that mind wandering belongs to a family of spontaneous thought phenomena. The key defining feature of mind wandering is ‘spontaneity’ which characterizes the dynamic nature of thoughts in the framework. The argument is made that incorporating the mindful meta-awareness construct modifies the dynamic framework as follows: (1) the framework’s criteria for mind wandering do not hold anymore as meta-awareness changes the relationship between thoughts and constraints, and (2) lucid dreaming can be categorized as unguided thought while at the same time being dependent on deliberate constraints. Finally, the application of this modified framework will be discussed in terms of the treatment of mental disorders related to spontaneous thought alterations, in particular depression and nightmares.     

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.     

Morphemic relationships in the lexicon: Are they distinct from semantic and formal relationships?

The influence of morphemic relationships on the repetition priming effect, which is presumed to provide an index of lexical organization, was examined in several experiments. An attempt was made in all experiments to minimize nonlexical contributions to these lexical effects by placing related items in a context of unrelated items. Priming among regularly and irregularly suffixed morphemic relatives, associates, and synonyms was examined. Morphemic relatives and associates yielded significant priming, although priming was largest for regularly suffixed morphemic relatives. Priming was not obtained for synonyms. In previous research (Napps & Fowler, 1987), priming was not found among orthographically and phonologically related words. The results are interpreted to mean that morphemic priming is not the result of the convergence of semantic, orthographic, and phonological relationships, but rather that morphemic relationships are represented explicitly in the lexicon.     

Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human,animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute‐based model of mind perception and the metaphor‐based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor‐based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as “killing machines” and “predators.” Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.     

Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: Just two words for the same thing?

Three- to 5-year-old children were tested on a traditional False Belief task, in which children have to predict where a protagonist will look for an unexpectedly moved object, and a new metalinguistic task. In this task children named an item (e.g., “rabbit”) and they had to monitor that another person used a synonym for naming the same item (e.g., “bunny”). Both tasks were mastered about the age of 4 years with a strong correlation between the two tasks that remained above .70 even after partialling out control measures and verbal intelligence. Moreover, younger children's difficulties with the metalinguistic task did not extend to a control task of equivalent logical structure and complexity. A simplified version of the task in which children had to produce synonyms themselves yielded very similar results. The findings confirm that metalinguistic awareness can be demonstrated around 4 years and they support the theory that the ability to understand belief relates to the development of understanding representations.     

Measures of depressive dimensions: are they interchangeable?

Several theorists have posited two focuses for depressive experience and/or vulnerability: dependency and rejection, and self-criticism and failure. In turn, three instruments have emerged, each addressing these two components, respectively: the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (DEQ; Dependent and Self-Critical scales), the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scales (SAS), and the Anaclitic and Introjective Dysfunctional Attitude Scales (DAS). In this study, we addressed the relations within and among these three pairs of scales in a large undergraduate sample. Generally, the DEQ-Dependent, SAS-Sociotrophy, and DAS-Anaclitic scales showed substantial convergent and discriminant validity. Although this was true also for the DEQ-Self-Critical and DAS-Introjective scales, neither scale was closely related to the SAS-Autonomy scale, which appeared instead to be a better measure of counter dependency than a measure of self-critical, introjective features.     

Past, present, and future (?); or the more things change the more they stay the same

The presidential address from the 27th Annual Meeting of the Society for Computers in Psychology, here slightly revised, traces a history of the Society through the papers that have been presented at previous annual meetings. Certain themes, such as the use of computers to facilitate teaching and research, emerge as constants over time. Computer technology has changed dramatically over those 27 years, however, as can be seen merely from the titles of the papers presented at the annual meetings. The present paper also proposes a direction for the Society’s future: the continuation of its strong history of facilitating communication among psychologists interested in applying the most current technology to their teaching and research.     

Three scales of alexithymia: do they measure the same thing?

The psychometric properties of three scales of alexithymia were examined in a sample of 187 female undergraduates. The Shalling Sifneos Personality Scale (SSPS) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Alexithymia scale had little internal consistency. The scored archetypal test with nine elements (SAT9) had very low interrater reliability. As predicted, the tree measures were not significantly related to one another and the SSPS had a more clearly defined factor structure than the MMPI scale. The MMPI and SSPS scales were differentially related to measures of symptomatology but were similarly related to extraversion, absorption, and SAT scores. Of the three scales, the SSPS appeared to have the highest content validity. The results suggest that alexithymia is not a unitary construct and that its reification as such may be premature.     

Test anxiety,anxiety disorders,and school-related wellbeing: Manifestations of the same or different constructs?

Previous studies have shown that highly test anxious persons are more likely to meet criteria for an anxiety disorder and report more frequent symptoms of anxiety disorders than their low test anxious counterparts. However, it is unclear whether test anxiety should be treated as distinct to, or a manifestation of, anxiety disorders. Furthermore, the Dual Factor Model of Mental Health proposes that high subjective wellbeing cannot be solely inferred from the absence of psychopathology. To date, no studies have examined the Dual Factor Model in relation to test anxiety. In the present study, we examined how test anxiety, two common anxiety disorders (i.e., generalized anxiety disorder [GAD] and panic disorder [PD]), and subjective wellbeing in the school domain (i.e., school-related wellbeing) were related in a sample of 918 adolescents (M age = 15.77 years) using network analysis and latent profile analysis. Results from the network analysis indicated that test anxiety, GAD, PD, and school-related wellbeing were represented as distinct constructs. Bridge nodes were identified that linked test anxiety with GAD, PD, and school-related wellbeing. The latent profile analysis identified three of the four profiles predicted by the Dual Factor Model, including (a) troubled (i.e., low school-related wellbeing, high test anxiety, GAD, and PD), (b) complete mental health (i.e., high school-related wellbeing, low test anxiety, GAD, and PD), and (c) symptomatic but content (i.e., average school-related wellbeing, test anxiety, GAD, and PD). We concluded that test anxiety was distinct from, rather than a manifestation of, GAD and PD. We found support for the Dual Factor Model, albeit not unequivocal, using test anxiety as an additional indicator of psychopathology to that of GAD and PD.     

Working memory and intelligence: the same or different constructs?

Several investigators have claimed over the past decade that working memory (WM) and general intelligence (g) are identical, or nearly identical, constructs, from an individual-differences perspective. Although memory measures are commonly included in intelligence tests, and memory abilities are included in theories of intelligence, the identity between WM and intelligence has not been evaluated comprehensively. The authors conducted a meta-analysis of 86 samples that relate WM to intelligence. The average correlation between true-score estimates of WM and g is substantially less than unity (p=.479). The authors also focus on the distinction between short-term memory and WM with respect to intelligence with a supplemental meta-analysis. The authors discuss how consideration of psychometric and theoretical perspectives better informs the discussion of WM-intelligence relations.     

Ideals,oughts, and self-regulation: Are there qualitatively distinct self-guides?

Self-regulation, the ability to regulate one's emotions and behavior with respect to important goals, is an important function. While a number of different self-regulatory models exist, self-discrepancy theory (SDT: Higgins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b) is the only model which proposes that there are distinct self-guides, the ideal and the ought self. Discrepancies or congruencies between the actual self and each type of self-guide is proposed to result in unique emotional and behavioral consequences. Some recent research findings have failed to demonstrate these unique consequences, causing the proposed distinction between the self-guides to be questioned in the literature. This paper suggests that this conclusion is based on the assumption that these effects must occur in every case. We argue that SDT does not propose that unique relationships between discrepancies and either emotions or behavior always occur; rather, it specifies moderators of these relationships. A review of recent research examining the effects of these moderators highlights not only that, indeed, such moderating effects are found, but also in some cases the moderating effect is different for relationships between emotions and the two types of discrepancies. It is concluded that these two different types of evidence, namely, the existence of moderator variables and their differential effects on ideal and ought self-regulation, provide compelling support for the distinct nature of the ideal and the ought self-guides.