Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969–974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337–1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883–896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78–86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.     

On the limits of statistical learning: Intertrial contextual cueing is confined to temporally close contingencies

Since the seminal study by Chun and Jiang (Cognitive Psychology, 36, 28–71, 1998), a large body of research based on the contextual-cueing paradigm has shown that the cognitive system is capable of extracting statistical contingencies from visual environments. Most of these studies have focused on how individuals learn regularities found within an intratrial temporal window: A context predicts the target position within a given trial. However, Ono, Jiang, and Kawahara (Journal of Experimental Psychology, 31, 703–712, 2005) provided evidence of an intertrial implicit-learning effect when a distractor configuration in preceding trials N ? 1 predicted the target location in trials N. The aim of the present study was to gain further insight into this effect by examining whether it occurs when predictive relationships are impeded by interfering task-relevant noise (Experiments 2 and 3) or by a long delay (Experiments 1, 4, and 5). Our results replicated the intertrial contextual-cueing effect, which occurred in the condition of temporally close contingencies. However, there was no evidence of integration across long-range spatiotemporal contingencies, suggesting a temporal limitation of statistical learning.     

Early and late cortical responses to directly gazing faces are task dependent

Gender categorisation of human faces is facilitated when gaze is directed toward the observer (i.e., a direct gaze), compared with situations where gaze is averted or the eyes are closed (Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, Psychological Science, 13(5), 460–464, 2002). However, the temporal dynamics underlying this phenomenon remain to some extent unknown. Here, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess the neural correlates of this effect, focusing on the event-related potential (ERP) components known to be sensitive to gaze perception (i.e., P1, N170, and P3b). We first replicated the seminal findings of Macrae et al. (2002, Experiment 1) regarding facilitated gender discrimination, and subsequently measured the underlying neural responses. Our data revealed an early preferential processing of direct gaze as compared with averted gaze and closed eyes at the P1, which reverberated at the P3b (Experiment 2). Critically, using the same material, we failed to reproduce these effects when gender categorisation was not required (Experiment 3). Taken together, our data confirm that direct gaze enhances the early P1, as well as later cortical responses to face processing, although the effect appears to be task dependent.     

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Kraut (Against absolute goodness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Sect. 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Sect. 3) and good for something (in Sect. 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue (in Sect. 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Sect. 6) on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.     

The influence of attention on value integration

People often have to make decisions based on many pieces of information. Previous work has found that people are able to integrate values presented in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream to make informed judgements on the overall stream value (Tsetsos et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(24), 9659–9664, 2012). It is also well known that attentional mechanisms influence how people process information. However, it is unknown how attentional factors impact value judgements of integrated material. The current study is the first of its kind to investigate whether value judgements are influenced by attentional processes when assimilating information. Experiments 1–3 examined whether the attentional salience of an item within an RSVP stream affected judgements of overall stream value. The results showed that the presence of an irrelevant high or low value salient item biased people to judge the stream as having a higher or lower overall mean value, respectively. Experiments 4–7 directly tested Tsetsos et al.’s (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(24), 9659–9664, 2012) theory examining whether extreme values in an RSVP stream become over-weighted, thereby capturing attention more than other values in the stream. The results showed that the presence of both a high (Experiments 4, 6 and 7) and a low (Experiment 5) value outlier captures attention leading to less accurate report of subsequent items in the stream. Taken together, the results showed that valuations can be influenced by attentional processes, and can lead to less accurate subjective judgements.     

Titchener’s ⊥ with its lines tilted—A partial replication and extension of Cormack and Cormack (1974)

Following Cormack and Cormack (Perception & Psychophysics, 16, 208–212, 1974), modified versions of Titchener’s (Experimental Psychology, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, 1901) ⊥, in which the ⊥’s lines were tilted (Experiment 1), or tilted and dissected into two separate lines (Experiment 2), were used as stimuli. In Experiment 1, the overestimation of the length of the ⊥’s vertical, undivided line tended to decrease with its tilt relative to the horizontal, divided line. For ⊥s rotated 90° or 270°, the divided line was tilted, and the overestimation of the length of the now horizontal, undivided line vanished except for ⊥s with orthogonal lines. Separation of the ⊥’s lines in Experiment 2 led to an attenuation of the overestimation of the length of the undivided line for the default ⊥, and an underestimation of the length of this line for rotated ⊥s. Results only partly confirm Cormack and Cormack, probably because of the different psychophysical methods used. Findings support the notion of a T-schema as a coherent unit in midlevel visual processing, but also suggest medium- and long-range interactions between orientation-sensitive neural mechanisms.     

Exclusion Problems and the Cardinality of Logical Space

Wittgenstein’s atomist picture, as embodied in his Tractatus, is initially very appealing. However, it faces the famous colour-exclusion problem. In this paper, I shall explain when the atomist picture can be defended (in principle) in the face of that problem; and, in the light of this, why the atomist picture should be rejected. I outline the atomist picture in Section 1. In Section 2, I present a very simple necessary and sufficient condition for the tenability (in principle) of the atomist picture. The condition is: logical space is a power of two. In Sections 3 and 4, I outline the colour-exclusion problem, and then show how the cardinality-condition supplies a response to exclusion problems. In Section 5, I explain how this amounts to a distillation of a proposal due to Moss (2012), which goes back to Carruthers (1990: 144–7). And in Section 6, I show how all this vindicates Wittgenstein’s ultimate rejection of the atomist picture. The brief reason is that we have no guarantee that there are any solutions to a given exclusion problem but, if there are any, then there are far too many.     

Bindings in working memory: The role of object-based attention

Over the past decade, it has been debated whether retaining bindings in working memory (WM) requires more attention than retaining constituent features, focusing on domain-general attention and space-based attention. Recently, we proposed that retaining bindings in WM needs more object-based attention than retaining constituent features (Shen, Huang, & Gao, 2015, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, doi: 10.1037/xhp0000018). However, only unitized visual bindings were examined; to establish the role of object-based attention in retaining bindings in WM, more emperical evidence is required. We tested 4 new bindings that had been suggested requiring no more attention than the constituent features in the WM maintenance phase: The two constituent features of binding were stored in different WM modules (cross-module binding, Experiment 1), from auditory and visual modalities (cross-modal binding, Experiment 2), or temporally (cross-time binding, Experiments 3) or spatially (cross-space binding, Experiments 4–6) separated. In the critical condition, we added a secondary object feature-report task during the delay interval of the change-detection task, such that the secondary task competed for object-based attention with the to-be-memorized stimuli. If more object-based attention is required for retaining bindings than for retaining constituent features, the secondary task should impair the binding performance to a larger degree relative to the performance of constituent features. Indeed, Experiments 1–6 consistently revealed a significantly larger impairment for bindings than for the constituent features, suggesting that object-based attention plays a pivotal role in retaining bindings in WM.     

Artifact and Essence

An essential property is a property that an object possesses in every possible world in which that object exists. An individual essence is a property (or set of properties) that an object possesses in every world in which that object exists, and that no other object possesses in any possible world. Call the claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence ‘artifactual essentialism’. I will argue that artifactual essentialism is true. In doing so, I will be responding to two recent arguments by Penelope Mackie against artifactual essentialism (Mackie (2006), esp. ch. 3.). In “Individual Essence Properties”, I will rehearse the qualifications that any property must meet if it is to constitute an individual essence, and in “Artifacts and the Recycling Problem” and “Artifacts and the Tolerance Problem”, I will rehearse Mackie’s arguments against artifactual essentialism. In “Artifacts and Weak Unshareability?” and “Artifacts and Strong Unshareability?”, I will show why both of these arguments fail. In “Mona Lisa’s Essence”, I will defend the interesting claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence. In the final section I will entertain some objections to my proposal.     

Effects of divided attention at encoding and retrieval: Further data

Division of attention (DA) at the time of learning has large detrimental effects on subsequent memory performance, but DA at retrieval has much smaller effects (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 518–540; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 159–180). Experiment 1 confirmed the relatively small effects of DA on retrieval and also showed that retrieval operations do consume processing resources. The experiment also found that the effect is not attributable to a trade-off in performance with the concurrent task or to recognition decisions made on the basis of familiarity judgments. Participants made levels-of-processing (LOP) judgments during encoding to check whether deeper semantic judgments were differentially vulnerable to the effects of DA. In fact DA did not interact with LOP. Experiment 2 explored reports that the comparatively slight effect of DA on recognition accuracy is accompanied by a compensatory increase in recognition latency (Baddeley et al., 1984). The experiment replicated findings that neither DA nor differential emphasis between recognition and a concurrent continuous reaction time (CRT) task affected recognition accuracy, but also found evidence for a lawful trade-off in decision latencies between recognition and CRT performance. Further analysis showed that the relationship between response rates on the two tasks was well described by a linear function, and that this function was demonstrated by the majority of individual participants. It is concluded that the small effect of DA on recognition performance is attributable to a trade-off within the recognition task itself; accuracy is maintained by a compensatory increase in decision latency.     

The influence of object similarity and orientation on object-based cueing

Responses to targets that appear at a noncued position within the same object (invalid–same) compared to a noncued position at an equidistant different object (invalid–different) tend to be faster and more accurate. These cueing effects have been taken as evidence that visual attention can be object based (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 161–177, 1994). Recent findings, however, have shown that the object-based cueing effect is influenced by object orientation, suggesting that the cueing effect might be due to a more general facilitation of attentional shifts across the horizontal meridian (Al-Janabi & Greenberg, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 1–17, 2016; Pilz, Roggeveen, Creighton, Bennet, & Sekuler, PLOS ONE, 7, e30693, 2012). The aim of this study was to investigate whether the object-based cueing effect is influenced by object similarity and orientation. According to the object-based attention account, objects that are less similar to each other should elicit stronger object-based cueing effects independent of object orientation, whereas the horizontal meridian theory would not predict any effect of object similarity. We manipulated object similarity by using a color (Exp. 1, Exp. 2A) or shape change (Exp. 2B) to distinguish two rectangles in a variation of the classic two-rectangle paradigm (Egly et al., 1994). We found that the object-based cueing effects were influenced by the orientation of the rectangles and strengthened by object dissimilarity. We suggest that object-based cueing effects are strongly affected by the facilitation of attention along the horizontal meridian, but that they also have an object-based attentional component, which is revealed when the dissimilarity between the presented objects is accentuated.     

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants’ beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants’ beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants’ predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.     

Reliability of the sliding scale for collecting affective responses to words

Warriner, Shore, Schmidt, Imbault, and Kuperman, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71; 71–88 (2017) have recently proposed a slider task in which participants move a manikin on a computer screen toward or further away from a word, and the distance (in pixels) is a measure of the word’s valence. Warriner, Shore, Schmidt, Imbault, and Kuperman, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71; 71–88 (2017) showed this task to be more valid than the widely used rating task, but they did not examine the reliability of the new methodology. In this study we investigated multiple aspects of this task’s reliability. In Experiment 1 (Exps. 1.1–1.6), we showed that the sliding scale has high split-half reliability (r = .868 to .931). In Experiment 2, we also showed that the slider task elicits consistent repeated responses both within a single session (Exp. 2: r = .804) and across two sessions separated by one week (Exp. 3: r = .754). Overall, the slider task, in addition to having high validity, is highly reliable.     

Reconstructing the recent visual past: Hierarchical knowledge-based effects in visual working memory

This paper presents two experiments that examine the influence of multiple levels of knowledge on visual working memory (VWM). Experiment 1 focused on memory for faces. Faces were selected from continua that were constructed by morphing two face photographs in 100 steps; half of the continua morphed a famous face into an unfamiliar one, while the other half used two unfamiliar faces. Participants studied six sequentially presented faces each from a different continuum, and at test they had to locate one of these within its continuum. Experiment 2 examined immediate memory for object sizes. On each trial, six images were shown; these were either all vegetables or all random shapes. Immediately after each list, one item was presented again, in a new random size, and participants reproduced its studied size. Results suggested that two levels of knowledge influenced VWM. First, there was an overall central-tendency bias whereby items were remembered as being closer to the overall average or central tokens (averaged across items and trials) than they actually were. Second, when object knowledge was available for the to-be-remembered items (i.e., famous face or typical size of a vegetable) a further bias was introduced in responses. The results extend the findings of Hemmer and Steyvers (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 80–87, 2009a) from episodic memory to VWM and contribute to the growing literature which illustrates the complexity and flexibility of the representations subtending VWM performance (e.g., Bae, Olkkonen, Allred, & Flombaum, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(4):744–63, 2015).     

The semantic category-based grouping in the Multiple Identity Tracking task

In the Multiple Identity Tracking (MIT) task, categorical distinctions between targets and distractors have been found to facilitate tracking (Wei, Zhang, Lyu, & Li in Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 589, 2016). The purpose of this study was to further investigate the reasons for the facilitation effect, through six experiments. The results of Experiments 1–3 excluded the potential explanations of visual distinctiveness, attentional distribution strategy, and a working memory mechanism, respectively. When objects’ visual information was preserved and categorical information was removed, the facilitation effect disappeared, suggesting that the visual distinctiveness between targets and distractors was not the main reason for the facilitation effect. Moreover, the facilitation effect was not the result of strategically shifting the attentional distribution, because the targets received more attention than the distractors in all conditions. Additionally, the facilitation effect did not come about because the identities of targets were encoded and stored in visual working memory to assist in the recovery from tracking errors; when working memory was disturbed by the object identities changing during tracking, the facilitation effect still existed. Experiments 4 and 5 showed that observers grouped targets together and segregated them from distractors on the basis of their categorical information. By doing this, observers could largely avoid distractor interference with tracking and improve tracking performance. Finally, Experiment 6 indicated that category-based grouping is not an automatic, but a goal-directed and effortful, strategy. In summary, the present findings show that a semantic category-based target-grouping mechanism exists in the MIT task, which is likely to be the major reason for the tracking facilitation effect.     

On the Disambiguation of Meaning and the Effect of Cognitive Load

Most research supports a non-selective (or exhaustive) account of activation whereby multiple meanings of a word are initially activated (Degani and Tokowicz Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 1266-1303, 2010). But what happens to the non-selected meaning of an ambiguous word (e.g., bark) and how is the decision made to select one meaning over the other? A great deal of research by Gernsbacher and colleagues (e.g., Gernsbacher and Faust 1991a) suggests that the non-selected meaning is “discarded” via active suppression. The present paper examines meaning-selection in ambiguous words using a word to elicit meaning context (rather than a sentence). Additionally, a manipulation of cognitive load (Experiment 2) was employed to examine these processes. Results support a suppression account of meaning selection. An updated conceptualization of ambiguity resolution is proposed.     

Conflicting but close: Readers’ integration of information sources as a function of their disagreement

According to the documents model framework (Britt, Perfetti, Sandak, & Rouet, 1999), readers’ detection of contradictions within texts increases their integration of source–content links (i.e., who says what). This study examines whether conflict may also strengthen the relationship between the respective sources. In two experiments, participants read brief news reports containing two critical statements attributed to different sources. In half of the reports, the statements were consistent with each other, whereas in the other half they were discrepant. Participants were tested for source memory and source integration in an immediate item-recognition task (Experiment 1) and a cued recall task (Experiments 1 and 2). In both experiments, discrepancies increased readers’ memory for sources. We found that discrepant sources enhanced retrieval of the other source compared to consistent sources (using a delayed recall measure; Experiments 1 and 2). However, discrepant sources failed to prime the other source as evidenced in an online recognition measure (Experiment 1). We argue that discrepancies promoted the construction of links between sources, but that integration did not take place during reading.     

No advantage for remembering horizontal over vertical spatial locations learned from a single viewpoint

Previous behavioral and neurophysiological research has shown better memory for horizontal than for vertical locations. In these studies, participants navigated toward these locations. In the present study we investigated whether the orientation of the spatial plane per se was responsible for this difference. We thus had participants learn locations visually from a single perspective and retrieve them from multiple viewpoints. In three experiments, participants studied colored tags on a horizontally or vertically oriented board within a virtual room and recalled these locations with different layout orientations (Exp. 1) or from different room-based perspectives (Exps. 2 and 3). All experiments revealed evidence for equal recall performance in horizontal and vertical memory. In addition, the patterns for recall from different test orientations were rather similar. Consequently, our results suggest that memory is qualitatively similar for both vertical and horizontal two-dimensional locations, given that these locations are learned from a single viewpoint. Thus, prior differences in spatial memory may have originated from the structure of the space or the fact that participants navigated through it. Additionally, the strong performance advantages for perspective shifts (Exps. 2 and 3) relative to layout rotations (Exp. 1) suggest that configurational judgments are not only based on memory of the relations between target objects, but also encompass the relations between target objects and the surrounding room—for example, in the form of a memorized view.