The role of memory for past test in the underconfidence with practice effect

According to the Memory for Past Test (MPT) heuristic, judgments of learning (JOLs) may be based, in part, on memory for the correctness of answers on a previous test. The authors explored MPT as the source of the underconfidence with practice effect (UWP; A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, & H. Ma'ayan, 2002), whereby Trial 1 overconfidence switches to underconfidence by Trial 2. Immediate and delayed JOLs were contrasted because only immediate JOLs demonstrate UWP. Consistent with MPT for immediate JOLs, Trial 1 test performance better predicted Trial 2 JOLs than did Trial 2 test performance. Delayed JOLs showed the reverse. Furthermore, items forgotten on Trial 1 but remembered on Trial 2 contributed disproportionately to UWP, but only with immediate JOLs.     

The ease-of-processing heuristic and the stability bias: dissociating memory, memory beliefs, and memory judgments

Judgments about memory are essential in promoting knowledge; they help identify trustworthy memories and predict what information will be retained in the future. In the three experiments reported here, we investigated the mechanisms underlying predictions about memory. In Experiments 1 and 2, single words were presented once or multiple times, in large or small type. There was a double dissociation between actual memory and predicted memory: Type size affected predicted but not actual memory, and future study opportunities affected actual memory but scarcely affected predicted memory. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that beliefs and judgments are largely independent, and neither consistently resembles actual memory. Participants' underestimation of future learning-a stability bias-stemmed from an overreliance on their current memory state in making predictions about future memory states. The overreliance on type size highlights the fundamental importance of the ease-of-processing heuristic: Information that is easy to process is judged to have been learned well.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting in implicit memory tests: The role of test awareness

Retrieval practice with particular items in memory may result in decreased recall of different, semantically related, items. This retrieval-induced forgetting effect has been demonstrated in studies using explicit memory tests. Anderson and Spellman (1995) have attributed retrieval-induced forgetting to inhibitory mechanisms. This hypothesis predicts similar effects in implicit memory tasks. In our first experiment, using Anderson and Spellman’s original paradigm, retrieval-induced forgetting was found using an explicit memory test with independent extralist retrieval cues. In our second experiment, using the same materials, retrieval-induced forgetting was also found using an implicit memory test with independent extralist retrieval cues, but only for participants who were aware of the relationship between the study and practice phase on the one hand, and the test phase of the experiment on the other. Thus, test awareness seems to mediate retrieval-induced forgetting in implicit memory tasks.     

Exploring the forgetting mechanisms in working memory: Evidence from a reasoning span test

In working memory (WM) span tests participants have to maintain to-be-remembered information while processing other, potentially distracting, information. Previous studies have shown that WM span scores are greater when span lists start with a long processing task and end with a short processing task than when these processing tasks are presented in the reverse order (e.g., Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 2000). In Experiment 1, we obtained a similar stimulus order effect in a reasoning span test, using reasoning sentences that were equated for length in terms of the number of constituent words, but which differed in processing complexity; span scores were greater when lists began with a complex sentence and ended with a simple sentence than when this stimulus order was reversed. In Experiment 2, the stimulus order effect was not found when processing duration was held constant while sentence complexity was varied using a computer-paced moving window presentation paradigm. These results suggest that duration-based constraints can affect degree of forgetting independently of the load generated during processing phases in WM span performance and therefore imply that time-related forgetting can occur in WM span tests, particularly when the difficulty of the processing component blocks active maintenance of to-be-remembered material.     

Working memory and spatial judgments: Cognitive load increases the central tendency bias

Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the distribution of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, people underestimate values greater than the distribution’s average and overestimate values smaller than the average. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In largely separate literature, cognitive load (CL) experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe the effect on choice or judgments. In two experiments, we demonstrate that participants under high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias not described previously.     

The indirect effect of attention bias on memory via interpretation bias: Evidence for the combined cognitive bias hypothesis in subclinical depression

Little research has investigated functional relations among attention, interpretation, and memory biases in depressed samples. The present study tested the indirect effect of attention bias on memory through interpretation bias as an intervening variable in a mixed sample of non-depressed and subclinically depressed individuals. Subclinically depressed and non-depressed individuals completed a spatial cueing task (to measure attention bias), followed by a scrambled sentences test (to measure interpretation bias), and an incidental free recall task (to measure memory bias). Bias-corrected bootstrapping yielded evidence for the hypothesised indirect effect model, in that an emotional bias in attention is related to a congruent bias in interpretative choices which are in turn reflected in memory. These findings extend previous research and provide further support for the combined cognitive bias hypothesis in depression. Theoretical and clinical implications of our findings are discussed.     

The act of forgetting: Husserl on the constitution of the absent past

Continental Philosophy Review - I advance a phenomenology of forgetting based on Husserl’s accounts of time-consciousness and passive synthesis. This theory of forgetting is crucial for...     

The combined effect of ratee's bodyweight and past performance information on performance judgments

Few studies have examined how various biases operate in combination to influence performance judgments. Along these lines, the current study used experimental methods to test four competing models of the combined influence of ratee's bodyweight and past performance information on performance judgments. Results were consistent with an additive model, such that ratee's bodyweight and information about ratee's past performance combined independently to affect performance judgments. Consistent with a double disadvantage effect, the least favorable performance judgments were made for an overweight ratee with poor previous performance. Finally, mixed evidence was obtained for the interaction of ratee's bodyweight and perceptions of ratee's physical attractiveness, such that high‐perceived attractiveness buffered against the otherwise negative performance ratings associated with overweight status.     

Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate—as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge—does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed.     

Direct versus indirect tests of memory: Directed forgetting meets the generation effect

Subjects read 20 words and generated 20 others from definitions during a 40-item study phase. Production of each word was followed by an instruction to remember or to forget that word. In free recall, a direct test of memory, words that had been generated were recalled much better than words that had been read. The remember-forget instructional manipulation affected read words but not generated words. In speeded word reading, an indirect test of memory, all studied words showed priming, but read words showed more priming than generated words. Here, the effect of remember versus forget instructions appeared only for generated words. These dissociations of a direct and an indirect test indicate that two powerful encoding manipulations affect separable processes to which these tests are differentially sensitive.     

The modality effect in long-term memory: a test of the echoic-consolidation hypothesis

Thirty-four subjects performed a task which combined the running memory and ‘throughlist’ distractor paradigms and was designed to permit an echoic consolidation effect across all serial positions , The predicted long-term difference between reading aloud and reading silently was clearly demonstrated and the results were used to argue in support of the ‘indirect-echoic’ hypothesis.     

Practice and forgetting effects on vocabulary memory: an activation-based model of the spacing effect

An experiment was performed to investigate the effects of practice and spacing on retention of Japanese–English vocabulary paired associates. The relative benefit of spacing increased with increased practice and with longer retention intervals. Data were fitted with an activation-based memory model, which proposes that each time an item is practiced it receives an increment of strength but that these increments decay as a power function of time. The rate of decay for each presentation depended on the activation at the time of the presentation. This mechanism limits long-term benefits from further practice at higher levels of activation and produces the spacing effect and its observed interactions with practice and retention interval. The model was compared with another model of the spacing effect (Raaijmakers, 2003) and was fit to some results from the literature on spacing and memory.     

Proximity bias: Interactive effect of spatial distance and outcome valence on probability judgments

Across a range of decision contexts, we provide evidence of a novel proximity bias in probability judgments, whereby spatial distance and outcome valence systematically interact in determining probability judgments. Six hypothetical and incentive-compatible experiments (combined N = 4007) show that a positive outcome is estimated as more likely to occur when near than distant, whereas a negative outcome is estimated as less likely to occur when near than distant (studies 1–6). The proximity bias is explained by wishful thinking and thus perceptions of outcome desirability (study 3), and it does not manifest when an outcome is less relevant for the self, such as the case of outcomes with little consequence for the self (studies 4 and 5) or when estimating outcomes for others who are irrelevant to the self (study 6). Overall, the proximity bias we document deepens our understanding of the antecedents of probability judgments.     

The sensitivity of judgment-of-learning resolution to past test performance,new learning,and forgetting

When people judge their learning of items across study–test trials, their accuracy in discriminating between learned and unlearned items improves on the second trial. We examined the source of this improvement by estimating the contribution of three factors—memory for past test performance (MPT), new learning, and forgetting—to accuracy on trial 2. In Experiment 1, during an initial trial, participants studied paired associates, made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each one, and were tested. During the second trial, we manipulated two variables: when the JOL was made (either immediately before or after studying an item) and whether participants were told the outcome of the initial recall attempt on trial 1. In Experiment 2, the same procedure was used with a 1-week retention interval between study and test on trial 2. In both experiments, JOL resolution was higher on trial 2 than on trial 1. Fine-grained analyses of JOL magnitude and decomposition of resolution supported several conclusions. First, MPT contributed the most to boosts in JOL magnitude and improvements in resolution across trials. Second, JOLs and subsequent resolution were sensitive to new learning and forgetting, but only when participants’ judgments were made after study. Thus, JOLs appear to integrate information from multiple factors, and these factors jointly contribute to JOL resolution.     

The effects of list-method directed forgetting on recognition memory

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois It is an almost universally accepted claim that the list-method procedure of inducing directed forgetting does not affect recognition. However, previous studies have omitted a critical comparison in reaching this conclusion. This article reports evidence that recognition of material learnedafter cue presentation is superior for conditions in which the material that preceded cue presentation was designated as to-be-forgotten. Because the absence of an effect of directed-forgetting instructions on recognition is the linchpin of the theoretical claim that retrieval inhibition and not selective rehearsal underlies that effect, the present results call into question the need to postulate a role for inhibition in directed forgetting.     

The influence of working memory load on the Simon effect

The contribution of spatial and verbal working memory (WM) to the processing of stimulus location in the Simon task was examined in two experiments. Subjects performed the Simon task in single- and dual-task conditions. In the dual-task conditions, individuals first encoded the locations of four boxes/pseudocharacters or the identity of seven characters in memory, then responded to the color of a Simon stimulus, and finally received a test for the WM set. The Simon effect was insensitive to spatial WM load and was abolished by verbal WM load. These data reveal a role of verbal WM in the processing of spatial location in the Simon task. In addition, the data are inconsistent with dual-route models of the Simon effect and may support response discrimination accounts of the mechanisms underlying the processing of spatial location in the Simon task.