Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

The influence of motor expertise and motor experience on action and actor recognition

Two experiments examined whether different levels of motor and visual experience influence action perception and whether this effect depends on the type of perceptual task. Within an action recognition task (Experiment 1), professional basketball players and novice college students were asked to identify basketball dribbles from point-light displays. Results showed faster reaction times and greater accuracy in experts, but no advantage when observing either own or teammates’ actions compared with unknown expert players. Within an actor recognition task (Experiment 2), the same expert players were asked to identify the model actors. Results showed poor discrimination between teammates and players from another team, but a more accurate assignment of own actions to the own team. When asked to name the actor, experts recognised themselves slightly better than teammates. Results support the hypothesis that motor experience influences action recognition. They also show that the influence of motor experience on the perception of own actions depends on the type of perceptual task.     

The Lower Visual Search Efficiency For Conjunctions Is Due To Noise and Not Serial Attentional Processing

Models of human visual processing start with an initial stage with parallel independent processing of different physical attributes or features (e.g. color, orientation, motion). A second stage in these models is a temporally serial mechanism (visual attention) that combines or binds information across feature dimensions. Evidence for this serial mechanism is based on experimental results for visual search. I conducted a study of visual search accuracy that carefully controlled for low-level effects: physical similarity of target and distractor, element eccentricity, and eye movements. The larger set-size effects in visual search accuracy for briefly flashed conjunction displays, compared with feature displays, are quantitatively predicted by a simple model in which each feature dimension is processed independently with inherent neural noise and information is combined linearly across feature dimensions. The data are not predicted by a temporally serial mechanism or by a hybrid model with temporally serial and noisy processing. The results do not support the idea that a temporally serial mechanism, visual attention, binds information across feature dimensions and show that the conjunction-feature dichotomy is due to the noisy independent processing of features in the human visual system.     

The role of kinematics in cortical regions for continuous human motion perception

It has been proposed that we make sense of the movements of others by observing fluctuations in the kinematic properties of their actions. At the neural level, activity in the human motion complex (hMT+) and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been implicated in this relationship. However, previous neuroimaging studies have largely utilized brief, diminished stimuli, and the role of relevant kinematic parameters for the processing of human action remains unclear. We addressed this issue by showing extended-duration natural displays of an actor engaged in two common activities, to 12 participants in an fMRI study under passive viewing conditions. Our region-of-interest analysis focused on three neural areas (hMT+, pSTS, and fusiform face area) and was accompanied by a whole-brain analysis. The kinematic properties of the actor, particularly the speed of body part motion and the distance between body parts, were related to activity in hMT+ and pSTS. Whole-brain exploratory analyses revealed additional areas in posterior cortex, frontal cortex, and the cerebellum whose activity was related to these features. These results indicate that the kinematic properties of peoples’ movements are continually monitored during everyday activity as a step to determining actions and intent.     

Recognizing people from their movement

Human observers demonstrate impressive visual sensitivity to human movement. What defines this sensitivity? If motor experience influences the visual analysis of action, then observers should be most sensitive to their own movements. If view-dependent visual experience determines visual sensitivity to human movement, then observers should be most sensitive to the movements of their friends. To test these predictions, participants viewed sagittal displays of point-light depictions of themselves, their friends, and strangers performing various actions. In actor identification and discrimination tasks, sensitivity to one's own motion was highest. Visual sensitivity to friends', but not strangers', actions was above chance. Performance was action dependent. Control studies yielded chance performance with inverted and static displays, suggesting that form and low-motion cues did not define performance. These results suggest that both motor and visual experience define visual sensitivity to human action.     

Hierarchies of Self-Organizing Maps for action recognition

We propose a hierarchical neural architecture able to recognise observed human actions. Each layer in the architecture represents increasingly complex human activity features. The first layer consists of a SOM which performs dimensionality reduction and clustering of the feature space. It represents the dynamics of the stream of posture frames in action sequences as activity trajectories over time. The second layer in the hierarchy consists of another SOM which clusters the activity trajectories of the first-layer SOM and learns to represent action prototypes. The third- and last-layer of the hierarchy consists of a neural network that learns to label action prototypes of the second-layer SOM and is independent – to certain extent – of the camera’s angle and relative distance to the actor. The experiments were carried out with encouraging results with action movies taken from the INRIA 4D repository. In terms of representational accuracy, measured as the recognition rate over the training set, the architecture exhibits 100% accuracy indicating that actions with overlapping patterns of activity can be correctly discriminated. On the other hand, the architecture exhibits 53% recognition rate when presented with the same actions interpreted and performed by a different actor. Experiments on actions captured from different view points revealed a robustness of our system to camera rotation. Indeed, recognition accuracy was comparable to the single viewpoint case. To further assess the performance of the system we have also devised a behavioural experiments in which humans were asked to recognise the same set of actions, captured from different points of view. Results form such a behavioural study let us argue that our architecture is a good candidate as cognitive model of human action recognition, as architectural results are comparable to those observed in humans.     

Sociomotor action control

Our actions affect the behavior of other people in predictable ways. In the present article, we describe a theoretical framework for action control in social contexts that we call sociomotor action control. This framework addresses how human agents plan and initiate movements that trigger responses from other people, and we propose that humans represent and control such actions literally in terms of the body movements they consistently evoke from observers. We review evidence for this approach and discuss commonalities and differences to related fields such as joint action, intention understanding, imitation, and interpersonal power. The sociomotor framework highlights a range of open questions pertaining to how representations of other persons’ actions are linked to one’s own motor activity, how specifically they contribute to action initiation, and how they affect the way we perceive the actions of others.     

Visual aftereffects for walking actions reveal underlying neural mechanisms for action recognition

The results of this study illustrate a new high-level visual aftereffect: Observing actors walking forward, without horizontal translation, makes subsequent actors appear to walk backward, and the opposite effect is obtained after observing backward walking. We used this aftereffect, which cannot be explained by simple low-level adaptation to motion direction, to investigate the properties of neural mechanisms underlying recognition of walking actions. Our results suggest that the perception of walking and the perception of static images of actors in walking postures rely on common brain mechanisms that are primarily object centered, rather than viewer centered, and that are blind to the identity of the actor. These results, obtained with human psychophysical adaptation techniques, support previous evidence accumulated using single-unit recording in nonhuman primates. In addition, these results provide evidence that current models of human action recognition require an object-centered processing stage.     

That’s the man who did it,or was it a woman? Actor similarity and binding errors in event memory

Mistakes in eyewitness identification frequently occur when incorrect associations are made between a familiar person and the actions of another person. The present research demonstrates that actors do not need to be similar in appearance for such conjunction errors to occur. The actors can, in fact, be very different in appearance, even of different sexes. Participants attempted to remember a series of brief everyday events, each involving an actor performing an action. Increases in actor similarity led to increases in conjunction errors in which participants incorrectly associated a familiar actor with a familiar action that was actually performed by someone else, but conjunction errors frequently occurred even when the familiar actor was of a different sex than the original actor, arguing against the hypothesis that these conjunction errors are due solely to mistaken identity.     

Infants' understanding of object-directed action

When and in what ways do infants recognize humans as intentional actors? An important aspect of this larger question concerns when infants recognize specific human actions (e.g. a reach) as object-directed (i.e. as acting toward goal-objects). In two studies using a visual habituation technique, 12-month-old infants were tested to assess their recognition that an adult's reach is directed toward its target object. Infants in the experimental condition were habituated to a display in which an actor reached over a wall-like barrier with an arcing arm movement, to pick up a ball. After habituation infants saw two test displays, for which the barrier was removed. In the direct test event the actor reached directly for the ball, the arm tracing a visually new path, but the action consistent with attempting to reach for the object as directly as possible. In the indirect test event the actor traced the old path, reaching over in an arc, even though the wall was no longer present. This arm movement was identical to that in habituation but no longer displayed a reach going directly to its object. In a control condition infants saw the same movements but in a situation with no goal-object. In the experimental conditions, with a goal object present, infants looked longer at the indirect test event in comparison to the direct test event. In the control conditions infants looked equally at both indirect and direct test events. We conclude that sensitivity to human object-directed action is established by 12-month-olds and compare these results to recent findings by [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193] and [Woodward, A. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 69, 1-34].     

Culpable Control and Causal Deviance

Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM) is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. In this paper, we describe six types of deviant causal chains; those in which: an actor’s attempt is obviated by the intervention of another person or the environment; the intended effects could not have been produced regardless of the actor’s behavior; other causes diminish the actor’s causal role; the actor brings about foreseen but undesired consequences as a result of pursuing his or her focal goal; the focal action produces a chain of increasingly remote causal events; and the actor derives unforeseen benefits from his or her nefarious actions. A basic assumption of the CCM in these cases is that attributions for the participants’ actions will depend on positive and negative evaluations of their intentions and behaviors. We describe empirical findings that are consistent with this assumption, and predict other findings for causal deviance phenomena that have not yet been investigated empirically.     

Can you see me in the snow? Action simulation aids the detection of visually degraded human motion

Using a novel paradigm, we demonstrate that action simulation can directly facilitate ongoing perception of people's movements. Point-light actors (PLAs) representing common human motions were shown embedded in a visual noise reminiscent of "TV snow". At first, the PLAs were perceived clearly, then occluded from view for a short duration, during which it was hypothesized that a real-time action simulation was generated tracking the motion's course. The PLA then reappeared in motion at variable visibility against the noise, whilst detection thresholds for the reappearance were measured. In the crucial manipulation, the test motion was either temporally congruent with the motion as it would have continued during occlusion, and thus temporally matching the simulation, or temporally incongruent. Detection thresholds were lower for congruent than for incongruent reappearing motions, suggesting that reappearing motion that temporally matched the internal action simulation was more likely to be detected.     

Does own experience affect perception of others’ actions in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)?

Anticipating another’s actions is an important ability in social animals. Recent research suggests that in human adults and infants one’s own action experience facilitates understanding and anticipation of others’ actions. We investigated the link between first-person experience and perception of another’s action in adult tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella spp., formerly Cebus apella spp.). In Experiment 1, the monkeys observed a familiar human (actor) trying to open a container using either a familiar or an unfamiliar action. They looked for longer when the actor tried to open the container using a familiar action. In Experiment 2, the actor performed two novel actions on a new container. The monkeys looked equally at the two actions. In Experiment 3, the monkeys were trained to open the container using one of the novel actions in Experiment 2. After training, we repeated the same procedure as in Experiment 2. The monkeys looked for longer when the actor manipulated the container using the action they had practiced than when she used the unfamiliar action. These results show that knowledge derived from one’s own experience impacts perception of another’s action in these New World monkeys.     

社会行为的效价信息对注意捕获的影响：基于帮助和阻碍行为的探讨

采用学习-测验两任务范式, 通过3项实验探讨了社会行为的效价信息对注意捕获的影响。在学习阶段, 被试观看具有积极效价的帮助行为(某智能体帮助另一智能体爬山)和消极效价的阻碍行为(某智能体阻碍另一智能体爬山), 以及与各自运动特性匹配的无社会交互行为, 其目的为建立不同智能体颜色与社会行为效价信息的联结关系。在测验阶段, 则分别检验社会行为中的施动方(帮助者和阻碍者)颜色和受动方(被帮助者和被阻碍者)颜色的注意捕获效应。结果发现, 消极社会行为中施动方颜色和受动方颜色均更容易捕获注意, 而积极社会行为效价信息并没有改变联结特征值的注意捕获效应; 且相比于受动方, 与消极社会行为效价建立联结的施动方颜色的注意捕获效应更强。该结果提示, 存在消极社会行为效价驱动的注意捕获, 且消极的效价信息与卷入社会行为所有个体的特征建立联结, 但该联结中施动方物理特征具有更高的注意优先性。这一发现暗示, 声誉信息与对社会交互行为的整体表征可能综合作用于对社会交互事件的注意选择。     

Focusing on the relation: fewer exemplars facilitate children's initial verb learning and extension

One of the most prominent theories for why children struggle to learn verbs is that verb learning requires the abstraction of relations between an object and its action (Gentner, 2003). Two hypotheses suggest how children extract relations to extend a novel verb: (1) seeing many different exemplars allows children to detect the invariant relation between actions in different contexts (Gentner, 2003), and (2) repetition of fewer exemplars allows children to move beyond the entities involved to extract the relation (Kersten & Smith, 2002). We tested 2 1/2- and 3-year-olds' ability to extend a novel verb after viewing the repetition of one novel actor compared to four different actors performing a novel action. Both ages were better at learning and extending a novel verb to a novel actor when shown only one actor rather than four different actors. These results indicate that during initial verb learning less information is more effective.     

Actor or victim of aggression: Divergent perspectives—divergent evaluations

The present study investigated the general assumption of perspective-specific dissent between actor and victim in evaluating aggressive interactions. Four experimental designs were established to test the relation of evaluations between (a) actor versus victim when judging a single act, (b) initiator versus reactor when judging action and reaction, and (c) actor as well as recipient when judging own versus other's behaviour. Results of 2 × 2 ANOVAs supported the hypotheses showing a consistently more favourable evaluation of identical actions by actors versus recipients with respect to the dependent variable ‘appropriateness’. For the second dependent variable ‘aggressiveness’ differences were not significant.     

Typical predictive eye movements during action observation without effector-specific motor simulation

When watching someone reaching to grasp an object, we typically gaze at the object before the agent’s hand reaches it—that is, we make a “predictive eye movement” to the object. The received explanation is that predictive eye movements rely on a direct matching process, by which the observed action is mapped onto the motor representation of the same body movements in the observer’s brain. In this article, we report evidence that calls for a reexamination of this account. We recorded the eye movements of an individual born without arms (D.C.) while he watched an actor reaching for one of two different-sized objects with a power grasp, a precision grasp, or a closed fist. D.C. showed typical predictive eye movements modulated by the actor’s hand shape. This finding constitutes proof of concept that predictive eye movements during action observation can rely on visual and inferential processes, unaided by effector-specific motor simulation.     

不同目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响

本研究考察不同权威目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响。实验以90个7~8岁儿童为被试,采用3(行为情境)×3(目击权威类型)的组间设计,考察了不同权威目击者条件下儿童对不同行为者的道德情绪判断和归因。结果发现,目击权威的类型对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响在不同的行为情境条件下是不同的。成人权威目击条件下,儿童对亲社会行为者的道德情绪判断分数最高,即更多判断他们会感到高兴,对损人者的道德情绪判断分数最低,即更多判断他们会感到不高兴。而同龄权威和非权威目击条件下儿童对不同行为者的情绪判断分数不存在显著差异。不同权威目击条件下儿童对行为者的情绪归因存在显著差异,奖惩定向更多出现在成人权威目击条件。研究显示,成人权威对儿童道德情绪的培养具有重要意义,能够显著影响儿童的道德情绪判断与归因。     

How do 8‐month‐old infants recognize causality in object motion and that in human action?1

Abstract: In Experiment 1, 8‐month‐old infants were first habituated to the event in which a moving object collided with another behind an occluder, then they were shown the two test events with no occluder: the contact event, in which the two objects actually collided, and the non‐contact event, in which the second object started to move without contact with the first. The infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. In Experiment 2, in which the first object was a human actor, however, infants looked at the non‐contact event reliably longer than the contact event. In Experiment 3, in which both objects were human actors stood face‐to‐back, infants looked at the non‐contact event longer, whereas in Experiment 4, in which human actors faced toward each other, infants looked at both events equally. In Experiment 5, in which the first actor told the second to go, 10‐month‐old infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. These results suggest that 8‐ and 10‐month‐old infants appreciate different causal principles between objects and humans, and that, in doing this, they may acknowledge the possibility of communication between humans.