Use of the familiarity difference cue in inferential judgments

The familiarity difference cue has been regarded as a general cue for making inferential judgments (Honda, Abe, Matsuks, & Yamagishi in Memory and Cognition, 39(5), 851–863, 2011; Schwikert & Curran in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(6), 2341–2365, 2014). The current study tests a model of inference based on familiarity differences that encompasses the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, Goldstein & Gigerenzer in Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90, 2002). In two studies, using a large pool of stimuli, participants rated their familiarity of cities and made choices on a typical city-size task. The data were fitted with the r-s model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl in, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 37(4), 827–839, 2011), which was adapted to include familiarity differences. The results indicated that people used the familiarity difference cue because the participants ignored further knowledge in a substantial number of cases when the familiarity difference cue was available. An analysis of reaction-time data further indicated that the response times were shorter for heuristic judgments than for knowledge-only-based judgments. Furthermore, when knowledge was available, the response times were shorter when knowledge was congruent with a heuristic cue than when it was in conflict with it. Differences between the familiarity difference cue and the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005, Psychological Review, 112, 610–628) are discussed.     

Recall is not necessary for verbal sequence learning

The question of whether overt recall of to-be-remembered material accelerates learning is important in a wide range of real-world learning settings. In the case of verbal sequence learning, previous research has proposed that recall either is necessary for verbal sequence learning (Cohen & Johansson Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 139–143, 1967; Cunningham, Healy, & Williams Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 575–597, 1984), or at least contributes significantly to it (Glass, Krejci, & Goldman Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 189–199, 1989; Oberauer & Meyer Memory, 17, 774–781, 2009). In contrast, here we show that the amount of previous spoken recall does not predict learning and is not necessary for it. We suggest that previous research may have underestimated participants’ learning by using suboptimal performance measures, or by using manual or written recall. However, we show that the amount of spoken recall predicted how much interference from other to-be-remembered sequences would be observed. In fact, spoken recall mediated most of the error learning observed in the task. Our data support the view that the learning of overlapping auditory–verbal sequences is driven by learning the phonological representations and not the articulatory motor responses. However, spoken recall seems to reinforce already learned representations, whether they are correct or incorrect, thus contributing to a participant identifying a specific stimulus as either “learned” or “new” during the presentation phase.     

The Hidden Set-Theoretical Paradox of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tractatus</Emphasis>

We are familiar with various set-theoretical paradoxes such as Cantor's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, Russell's paradox, Russell-Myhill paradox and Kaplan's paradox. In fact, there is another new possible set-theoretical paradox hiding itself in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1989). From the Tractatus’s Picture theory of language (hereafter LP) we can strictly infer the two contradictory propositions simultaneously: (a) the world and the language are equinumerous; (b) the world and the language are not equinumerous. I call this antinomy the world-language paradox. Based on a rigorous analysis of the Tractatus, with the help of the technical resources of Cantor’s naive set theory (Cantor in Mathematische Annalen, 46, 481–512, 1895, Mathematische Annalen, 49, 207–246, 1897) and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (hereafter ZFC) (Jech 2006: 3–15; Kunen 1992: xv–xvi; Bagaria 2008: 619–622), I outline the world-language paradox and assess the unique possible solution plan, i.e., the mathematical plan utilizing ‘infinity’. I conclude that Wittgenstein cannot solve the hidden set-theoretical paradox of the Tractatus successfully unless he gives up his finitism.     

Estimating the average need of semantic knowledge from distributional semantic models

Continuous bag of words (CBOW) and skip-gram are two recently developed models of lexical semantics (Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 26, 3111–3119, 2013). Each has been demonstrated to perform markedly better at capturing human judgments about semantic relatedness than competing models (e.g., latent semantic analysis; Landauer & Dumais, Psychological Review, 104(2), 1997 211; hyperspace analogue to language; Lund & Burgess, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28(2), 203–208, 1996). The new models were largely developed to address practical problems of meaning representation in natural language processing. Consequently, very little attention has been paid to the psychological implications of the performance of these models. We describe the relationship between the learning algorithms employed by these models and Anderson’s rational theory of memory (J. R. Anderson & Milson, Psychological Review, 96(4), 703, 1989) and argue that CBOW is learning word meanings according to Anderson’s concept of needs probability. We also demonstrate that CBOW can account for nearly all of the variation in lexical access measures typically attributable to word frequency and contextual diversity—two measures that are conceptually related to needs probability. These results suggest two conclusions: One, CBOW is a psychologically plausible model of lexical semantics. Two, word frequency and contextual diversity do not capture learning effects but rather memory retrieval effects.     

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities

The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky [44]; Lehrer and Wagner [34]; McConway Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(374), 410–414, [45]; Bordley Management Science, 28(10), 1137–1148, [5]; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487–501, [21]; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114–135, [23]; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66(2), 313–351, [46]; Clemen and Winkler Risk Analysis, 19(2), 187–203, [7]; Dietrich and List [14]; Herzberg Theory and Decision, 1–19, [28]). We argue that this assumption is not always in order. We show how to extend the canonical mathematical framework for pooling to cover pooling with imprecise probabilities (IP) by employing set-valued pooling functions and generalizing common pooling axioms accordingly. As a proof of concept, we then show that one IP construction satisfies a number of central pooling axioms that are not jointly satisfied by any of the standard pooling recipes on pain of triviality. Following Levi (Synthese, 62(1), 3–11, [39]), we also argue that IP models admit of a much better philosophical motivation as a model of rational consensus.     

Learning multiple rules simultaneously: Affixes are more salient than reduplications

Language learners encounter numerous opportunities to learn regularities, but need to decide which of these regularities to learn, because some are not productive in their native language. Here, we present an account of rule learning based on perceptual and memory primitives (Endress, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Mehler, Cognition, 105(3), 577–614, 2007; Endress, Nespor, & Mehler, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(8), 348–353, 2009), suggesting that learners preferentially learn regularities that are more salient to them, and that the pattern of salience reflects the frequency of language features across languages. We contrast this view with previous artificial grammar learning research, which suggests that infants “choose” the regularities they learn based on rational, Bayesian criteria (Frank & Tenenbaum, Cognition, 120(3), 360–371, 2013; Gerken, Cognition, 98(3)B67–B74, 2006, Cognition, 115(2), 362–366, 2010). In our experiments, adult participants listened to syllable strings starting with a syllable reduplication and always ending with the same “affix” syllable, or to syllable strings starting with this “affix” syllable and ending with the “reduplication”. Both affixation and reduplication are frequently used for morphological marking across languages. We find three crucial results. First, participants learned both regularities simultaneously. Second, affixation regularities seemed easier to learn than reduplication regularities. Third, regularities in sequence offsets were easier to learn than regularities at sequence onsets. We show that these results are inconsistent with previous Bayesian rule learning models, but mesh well with the perceptual or memory primitives view. Further, we show that the pattern of salience revealed in our experiments reflects the distribution of regularities across languages. Ease of acquisition might thus be one determinant of the frequency of regularities across languages.     

Imperfection,Indecision, and Hoarding

Hoarding disorder is a new DSM-5 disorder that causes functional impairment and affects 2 to 6% of the population (Frost and Steketee 2014). The current study evaluated a multiple mediation model with 243 undergraduate women in which indecisiveness (VOCI; Thordarson et al. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314, 2004) and decisional procrastination (DPS; Mann 1982) mediated the relationship between dimensions of perfectionism (F-MPS-B; Burgess et al. 2016a) and hoarding behavior (SI-R; Frost et al. Behaviour Research And Therapy, 42(10), 1163–1182, 2004) and excessive acquiring (CAS; Frost et al. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 219–242, 2012). Multiple mediational analyses indicated a significant indirect effect for decisional procrastination, but not indecisiveness, in mediating evaluative concerns (but not striving) to SI-R Total, SI-R Clutter, SIR Excessive Acquisition, and both CAS subscales. Both mediators were significant pathways between evaluative concerns and SI-R Difficulty Discarding. These findings support a cognitive behavioral model of hoarding, suggesting that evaluative concerns produces problems in decision-making that influence acquisition, discarding, and clutter.     

TISK 1.0: An easy-to-use Python implementation of the time-invariant string kernel model of spoken word recognition

This article describes a new Python distribution of TISK, the time-invariant string kernel model of spoken word recognition (Hannagan et al. in Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 563, 2013). TISK is an interactive-activation model similar to the TRACE model (McClelland & Elman in Cognitive Psychology, 18, 1–86, 1986), but TISK replaces most of TRACE’s reduplicated, time-specific nodes with theoretically motivated time-invariant, open-diphone nodes. We discuss the utility of computational models as theory development tools, the relative merits of TISK as compared to other models, and the ways in which researchers might use this implementation to guide their own research and theory development. We describe a TISK model that includes features that facilitate in-line graphing of simulation results, integration with standard Python data formats, and graph and data export. The distribution can be downloaded from https://github.com/maglab-uconn/TISK1.0.     

The Double Standard at Sexual Debut: Gender,Sexual Behavior and Adolescent Peer Acceptance

In this paper, a vision for the future of U.S. NCAA Division I university sport is presented. It is argued that this context could serve as the place where performance “excellence” is rooted in caring. However, U.S. sport at this level must become purposefully structured to include educational components related to moral thinking, feeling, and behaving. Otherwise, it will continue to foster a type of disconnected or “game reasoning” mentality, building “characters” vs. character (Shields & Bredemeier, 1995). Using U.S.-focused feminism as the necessary first intervention, the paper is situated within a care moral orientation (e.g., Gilligan 1979, 1982) as well as sport psychology moral development scholarship (e.g., Bredemeier 1992; Fisher 1993; Kavussanu 2008; Oglesby 1990; Solomon 1993; Stephens 1993). A brief review of the current state of affairs in U.S. NCAA Division I university sport is presented first. Next, selected literature related to a care moral orientation and moral disconnection in U.S. psychology and sport psychology is highlighted. Finally, one vision of what a model of conscious, caring and connected U.S. NCAA Division I sport research and practice could look like is offered. Specifically, those who have the power to influence sport would develop character and the related skills of moral consciousness, caring, and connection, undergirded by feminist moral principles and reflective practice. Feminist (and all) sport psychology professionals are in a prime position to engage with sport constituents to enhance athletes’ overall experience, where character does matter, and, so, too, does performance.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">i</Emphasis>Map4: An open source toolbox for the statistical fixation mapping of eye movement data with linear mixed modeling

A major challenge in modern eye movement research is to statistically map where observers are looking, by isolating the significant differences between groups and conditions. As compared to the signals from contemporary neuroscience measures, such as magneto/electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, eye movement data are sparser, with much larger variations in space across trials and participants. As a result, the implementation of a conventional linear modeling approach on two-dimensional fixation distributions often returns unstable estimations and underpowered results, leaving this statistical problem unresolved (Liversedge, Gilchrist, & Everling, 2011). Here, we present a new version of the iMap toolbox (Caldara & Miellet, 2011) that tackles this issue by implementing a statistical framework comparable to those developed in state-of-the-art neuroimaging data-processing toolboxes. iMap4 uses univariate, pixel-wise linear mixed models on smoothed fixation data, with the flexibility of coding for multiple between- and within-subjects comparisons and performing all possible linear contrasts for the fixed effects (main effects, interactions, etc.). Importantly, we also introduced novel nonparametric tests based on resampling, to assess statistical significance. Finally, we validated this approach by using both experimental and Monte Carlo simulation data. iMap4 is a freely available MATLAB open source toolbox for the statistical fixation mapping of eye movement data, with a user-friendly interface providing straightforward, easy-to-interpret statistical graphical outputs. iMap4 matches the standards of robust statistical neuroimaging methods and represents an important step in the data-driven processing of eye movement fixation data, an important field of vision sciences.     

Temporal encoding strategies result in boosts to final free recall performance comparable to spatial ones

The method of loci is a highly effective mnemonic that recruits existing salient memory for spatial locations and uses the information as a scaffold for remembering a list of items (Yates, 1966). One possible account for the effectiveness of the spatial method of loci comes from the perspective that it utilizes evolutionarily preserved mechanisms for spatial navigation within the hippocampus (Maguire et al. in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 97(8), 4398–4403, 2000; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Rodriguez et al. in Brain Research Bulletin, 57(3), 499–503, 2002). Recently, though, neurons representing temporal information have also been described within the hippocampus (Eichenbaum in Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15(11), 732–744, 2014; Itskov, Curto, Pastalkova, & Buzsáki in The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(8), 2828–2834, 2011; MacDonald, Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum in Neuron, 71(4), 737–749, 2011; Mankin et al. in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(47), 19462–19467, 2012; Meck, Church, & Matell in Behavioral Neuroscience, 127(5), 642, 2013), challenging the primacy of spatial-based functions to hippocampal processing. Given the presence of both spatial and temporal coding mechanisms within the hippocampus, we predicted that primarily temporal encoding strategies might also enhance memory. In two different experiments, we asked participants to learn lists of unrelated nouns using the (spatial) method of loci (i.e., the layout of their home as the organizing feature) or using two novel temporal methods (i.e., autobiographical memories or using the steps to making a sandwich). Participants’ final free recall performance showed comparable boosts to the method of loci for both temporal encoding strategies, with all three scaffolding approaches demonstrating performance well above uninstructed free recall. Our findings suggest that primarily temporal representations can be used effectively to boost memory performance, comparable to spatial methods, with some caveats related to the relative ease with which participants appear to master the spatial versus temporal methods.     

Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell (Theoria, 74, 331–351 2008), Dreier (2009) and MacFarlane and Kolodny (The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 115–143 2010) are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer (1986) and Lewis (1975) leads to counterexamples to modus ponens (cp. Charlow Synthese, 190, 2291–2323 2013; Khoo Philosophical Studies, 166, 153–64 2013). This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too.     

The influence of object similarity and orientation on object-based cueing

Responses to targets that appear at a noncued position within the same object (invalid–same) compared to a noncued position at an equidistant different object (invalid–different) tend to be faster and more accurate. These cueing effects have been taken as evidence that visual attention can be object based (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 161–177, 1994). Recent findings, however, have shown that the object-based cueing effect is influenced by object orientation, suggesting that the cueing effect might be due to a more general facilitation of attentional shifts across the horizontal meridian (Al-Janabi & Greenberg, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 1–17, 2016; Pilz, Roggeveen, Creighton, Bennet, & Sekuler, PLOS ONE, 7, e30693, 2012). The aim of this study was to investigate whether the object-based cueing effect is influenced by object similarity and orientation. According to the object-based attention account, objects that are less similar to each other should elicit stronger object-based cueing effects independent of object orientation, whereas the horizontal meridian theory would not predict any effect of object similarity. We manipulated object similarity by using a color (Exp. 1, Exp. 2A) or shape change (Exp. 2B) to distinguish two rectangles in a variation of the classic two-rectangle paradigm (Egly et al., 1994). We found that the object-based cueing effects were influenced by the orientation of the rectangles and strengthened by object dissimilarity. We suggest that object-based cueing effects are strongly affected by the facilitation of attention along the horizontal meridian, but that they also have an object-based attentional component, which is revealed when the dissimilarity between the presented objects is accentuated.     

Pinocchio against the Semantic Hierarchies

The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue (the Pinocchio principle). What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 70(2): 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the Tarskian-Kripkean solutions to the Liar paradox that use language hierarchies. Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 71(2): 306-8, 2011) also set the Pinocchio paradox against semantic dialetheic solutions to the Liar. Beall (2011) argued the Pinocchio story was just an impossible story. Eldridge-Smith (Analysis, 72(3): 749-752, 2012b) responded that unless the T-schema is a necessary truth of some sort (logical, metaphysical or analytic), the Pinocchio principle is possible. Luna (Mind & Matter 14(1): 77–86, 2016) argues that the Pinocchio contradiction proves the principle is false. D’Agostini & Ficara (2016) discuss a more plausible physical truth-tracking trait, the Blushing Liar, and argue that the Pinocchio contradiction is not a metaphysical dialetheia. I respond to Luna, and D’Agostini & Ficara, and prove that the Pinocchio paradox is a counterexample to hierarchical solutions to the Liar.     

Lost in Translation: Religion in The Public Sphere

This paper proposes a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the prism of translation that frames the recent literature about the debate between Rawls and Habermas on the role of religious reasons in the public sphere (Habermas 2008; Weithman 2006; Wolterstorff 1997). This debate originates with the introduction of Rawls’s proviso in his conception of the public use of reason (Rawls The University of Chicago Law Review, 64(3), 765-807, 1997), which consists in the “translation” of religious reasons into secular ones, which he thinks is necessary in order for religious reasons to be legitimate in the public sphere (Courtois Dialogue, 49, 91-112, 2010; Loobuyck and Rummens Ars disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5, 237–249, 2011; Sikka The Review of Politics, 78, 91-116, 2016). Even though Wittgenstein is not himself concerned with religious pluralism as a political issue, there are numerous scholars who have discussed the political implications of his remarks (Gunnell Contemporary Political Theory, 12 80-101, 2013; Livingston Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33(6), 691–715, 2007; Moore Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36(9), 1113-1136 2010; Pohlhaus and Wright Political Theory, 30(6), 800–27, 2002). The thesis of this paper is that the interpretation proposed by Cora Diamond (2000) in regards to ethical and religious questions turns out to be a suitable way out of the “translation requirement”. According to this solution, if there is to be an understanding between secular and religious citizens on the basis of religious reasons, it should not rely on a “translation” but rather on mutual self-representation.     

The scope of formal explanation

The existence of multiple modes of explanation means that a crucial step in the process of generating explanations has to be selecting a particular mode. The present article identifies the key conceptual, as well as some pragmatic and epistemological, considerations that license the use of the formal mode of explanation, and thus that enter into the process of selecting and generating a formal explanation. Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in an instance of a kind by reference to the kind of thing it is (e.g. That has four legs because it is a dog). As such, this mode of explanation is intrinsically tied to kind representations and is applicable domain-generally. Although it is possible for formal explanation to apply domain-generally, for any given kind it is selective in its application, in that it can explain some, but not all, properties of the instances of a kind. It also appears that different types of properties can receive formal explanations across different domains. This article provides a sketch of a theory of the selectivity of formal explanation that results from the manner in which kinds of different types are distinguished. The present discussion also suggests how the mechanisms underlying formal explanations may contribute to the illusion of explanatory depth Keil (Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368–373,2003), the operation of the inherence heuristic Cimpian & Salomon (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 461–480, 2014a; Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 506–527,2014b), and psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003).     

Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969–974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337–1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883–896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78–86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.     

Conditioned task-set competition: Neural mechanisms of emotional interference in depression

Depression has been associated with increased response times at the incongruent-, neutral-, and negative-word trials of the classical and emotional Stroop tasks (Epp et al., Clinical Psychology Review, 32, 316–328, 2012). Response-time slowdown effects at incongruent- and negative-word trials of the Stroop tasks were reported to correlate with depressive severity, indicating strong relevance of the effects to the symptomatology. This study proposes a novel integrative computational model of neural mechanisms of both the classical and emotional Stroop effects, drawing on the previous prominent theoretical explanations of performance at the classical Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, Psychological Review, 97, 332–361, 1990; Herd, Banich, & O’Reilly, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 22–32, 2006), and in addition suggesting that negative emotional words represent conditioned stimuli for future negative outcomes. The model is shown to explain the classical Stroop effect and the slow (between-trial) emotional Stroop effect with biologically plausible mechanisms, providing an advantage over the previous theoretical accounts (Matthews & Harley, Cognition & Emotion, 10, 561–600, 1996; Wyble, Sharma, & Bowman, Cognition & Emotion, 22, 1019–1051, 2008). Simulation results suggested a candidate mechanism responsible for the pattern of depressive performance at the classical and the emotional Stroop tasks. Hyperactivity of the amygdala, together with increased inhibitory influence of the amygdala over dopaminergic neurotransmission, could be at the origin of the performance deficits.     

Agency,Chance, and the Scientific Status of Psychology

Psychologists generally reject the reductionist, physicalist, “nothing but” stance of the natural sciences. At the same time they consider their discipline a science and wonder why it does not enjoy the status (and funding) of the natural sciences. Ferguson American Psychologist, 70, 527-542 (2015), Lilienfeld American Psychologist, 67, 111-129 (2012), and Schwartz et al. American Psychologist, 71, 52-70 (2016) are among those who adopt a soft naturalism of nonreductive physicalism which declares, or implies, that when it comes to humans, there is more than what the natural sciences can unravel. They envision psychology as scientific in the epistemological sense of generating reproducible results, but reject the reductive ontology of science which currently points to the undeterminable chance of quantum theory as the closest physics has come to the beginnings and what might loosely be called the foundation of the universe (e.g., Bridgman Harper's, 158, 443-451 1929; Eddington 1948). The case made here is that any science, including a psychological one, must be based on a naturalist ontology. This implies restricting the term science to disciplines which not only meet epistemological criteria like reproducibility, but which also adopt—on the ontological level—the parsimonious assumption that at present it makes sense to think that “there is nothing but time and chance” (e.g., Cox and Forshaw 2011; Crease and Goldhaber 2014; Rorty 1989). From this perspective, psychology emerges as two distinct disciplines, one a natural science, the other a human science in the broad sense of science as scientia.     

Ontological Issues and the Possible Development of Cultural Psychology

Ontological issues have a bad reputation within mainstream psychology. This paper, however, is an attempt to argue that ontological reflection may play an important role in the development of cultural psychology. A cross-reading of two recent papers on the subject (Mammen & Mironenko, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49(4), 681–713, 2015; Simão Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 50, 568–585, 2016), aimed at characterizing their respective approaches to ontological issues, sets the stage for a presentation of Cornelius Castoriadis’ ontological reflections. On this basis, a dialogue is initiated with E.E. Boesch’s Symbolic Activity Theory that could contribute to a more refined understanding of human psychological functioning in its full complexity.