Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of autobiographical event representations

Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g., family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These methods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbelieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and re-experiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6–11). Cueing for “events” vs. “memories” revealed that “memory” cues lead to retrieval of a more homogeneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollection. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection for autobiographical events.     

Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.     

Qualities of memories for performed and imagined actions

When people imagine performing simple actions they can sometimes become confused about whether they actually performed the actions or only imagined doing so. In the present study participants performed, imagined, and heard groups of actions. During a second session participants imagined some of the earlier actions as well as some entirely new actions. On a later memory test participants sometimes falsely indicated that they had performed actions that they had only imagined and this tendency was a positive function of number of imaginings. We also found that true and false memories differed in terms of degree of perceptual detail, associated thoughts, emotions, contextual information, and kinesthetic detail. Differences between true and false memories were smaller when the action was imagined five times but were not entirely eliminated. These findings suggest that false memories produced in this paradigm can be both compelling and yet subtly different from true memories. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The predictive validity of belief in future occurrence

Prospection is associated, in varying degrees, with a sense that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future—referred to as belief in future occurrence. The present research investigated to what extent this belief is justified and predicts the actual occurrence of events in the future. In two studies, participants rated their belief in the future occurrence of events imagined to happen in the coming month (Study 1) or week (Study 2), and the actual occurrence of events was then assessed. Results showed that the odds of event occurrence were about 2 times higher with an increase of 1 unit on the belief scale. Belief was particularly pronounced for temporally close events and was largely determined by the congruence of events with autobiographical knowledge. These results suggest that belief in future occurrence has some truth value and may inform decisions and actions.     

Belief and recollection of autobiographical memories

In three experiments, undergraduates rated autobiographical memories on scales derived from existing theories of memory. In multiple regression analyses, ratings of the degree to which subjects recollected (i.e., relived) their memories were predicted by visual imagery, auditory imagery, and emotions, whereas ratings of belief in the accuracy of their memories were predicted by knowledge of the setting. Recollection was predicted equally well in between- and within-subjects analyses, but belief consistently had smaller correlations and multiple regression predictions between subjects; individual differences in the cognitive scales that we measured could not account well for individual differences in belief. In contrast, measures of mood (Beck Depression Index) and dissociation (Dissociative Experience Scale) added predictive value for belief, but not for recollection. We also found that highly relived memories almost always had strong visual images and that remember/know judgments made on autobiographical memories were more closely related to belief than to recollection.     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

Confidence,not consistency,characterizes flashbulb memories

On September 12, 2001, 54 Duke students recorded their memory of first hearing about the terrorist attacks of September 11 and of a recent everyday event. They were tested again either 1, 6, or 32 weeks later. Consistency for the flashbulb and everyday memories did not differ, in both cases declining over time. However, ratings of vividness, recollection, and belief in the accuracy of memory declined only for everyday memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings correlated with later belief in accuracy, but not consistency, for flashbulb memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings predicted later posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Flashbulb memories are not special in their accuracy, as previously claimed, but only in their perceived accuracy.     

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.     

Involuntary and voluntary recall of musical memories: A comparison of temporal accuracy and emotional responses

Comparisons between involuntarily and voluntarily retrieved autobiographical memories have revealed similarities in encoding and maintenance, with differences in terms of specificity and emotional responses. Our study extended this research area into the domain of musical memory, which afforded a unique opportunity to compare the same memory as accessed both involuntarily and voluntarily. Specifically, we compared instances of involuntary musical imagery (INMI, or “earworms”)—the spontaneous mental recall and repetition of a tune—to deliberate recall of the same tune as voluntary musical imagery (VMI) in terms of recall accuracy and emotional responses. Twenty participants completed two 3-day tasks. In an INMI task, participants recorded information about INMI episodes as they occurred; in a VMI task, participants were prompted via text message to deliberately imagine each tune they had previously experienced as INMI. In both tasks, tempi of the imagined tunes were recorded by tapping to the musical beat while wearing an accelerometer and additional information (e.g., tune name, emotion ratings) was logged in a diary. Overall, INMI and VMI tempo measurements for the same tune were strongly correlated. Tempo recall for tunes that have definitive, recorded versions was relatively accurate, and tunes that were retrieved deliberately (VMI) were not recalled more accurately in terms of tempo than spontaneous and involuntary instances of imagined music (INMI). Some evidence that INMI elicited stronger emotional responses than VMI was also revealed. These results demonstrate several parallels to previous literature on involuntary memories and add new insights on the phenomenology of INMI.     

Developmental changes in memory source monitoring.

Previous research suggests that children are more likely than adults to confuse memories of actions they imagined themselves performing with memories of actions they actually performed (Realization Judgments), but are not more likely to confuse memories of actions they had imagined performing with memories of actions they saw another person perform (Reality Monitoring). We approach these findings in terms of a theory about the processes by which people identify the sources of their recollections (Source Monitoring). This approach suggests that children may be more likely than adults to confuse memories from different sources whenever the sources are highly similar to one another. Experiments 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis by manipulating the perceptual and semantic similarity of two sources of information and testing 4- and 6-year-old and adult subjects' recollection of the sources of particular pieces of information. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that children are more likely than adults to mistakenly identify memories of things they imagined another person doing as memories of things they witnessed that person doing. The findings indicate that (a) people are more likely to confuse memories from similar than dissimilar sources, (b) source monitoring improves during the preschool and childhood years, and (c) children may be especially vulnerable to the effects of source similarity.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

Compelling untruths: content borrowing and vivid false memories

False memories are sometimes accompanied by surprisingly vivid experiential detail that makes them difficult to distinguish from actual memories. Such strikingly real false memories may be produced by a process called content borrowing in which details from presented items are errantly borrowed to corroborate the occurrence of the false memory item. In 2 experiments using think-out-loud protocols at both study and test, evidence for content borrowing occurred for more than half of the false remember judgments participants reported. The present study also provides evidence consistent with recollection rejection and distinctiveness playing a role in false-memory editing.     

So that's why I don't remember: normalizing forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalizing the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the "forgetting rationale" substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

The role of self-aspects in emotions elicited by threats to physical health

In two studies, we examined the relationship between self-aspects and socially engaging and socially disengaging emotions elicited by imagined and real physical health problems. In Study 1, participants imagined themselves experiencing a health problem described in a hypothetical scenario and rated the extent to which they would experience a list of emotions. The experience of socially engaging emotions such as shame and embarrassment was predicted by the endorsement of collective self. In Study 2, participants recalled a past health problem and emotions they experienced during its course. Again, collective self predicted the extent to which people mentioned socially engaging emotions in their free recall of emotions. Independent self was not related to the imagined experience of socially disengaging emotions in Study 1 or the recollection of such emotions in Study 2.     

Subjective impact, meaning making, and current and recalled emotions for self-defining memories

Two studies examined the impact of self-defining events on individuals (i.e., subjective impact), meaning making with regard to these events, and how subjective impact may account for the pattern of current and recalled emotions for these self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). In Study 1, participants recalled self-defining memories, indicating how much impact the recalled events have had on them and described meaning making for these events. Subjective impact was shown to be a good marker for meaning making. Participants in Study 2 each recalled five self-defining memories, reporting their current emotions about the events, the emotions they recalled feeling at the time, and the impact the events have had on them. As expected, for negative memories, people reported less negative emotion (e.g., sadness) and more positive emotion (e.g., pride) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. For positive memories, people reported equally intense positive emotion (e.g., love) and less negative emotion (e.g., fear) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. These patterns of current and recalled emotions were accounted for by impact ratings.     

Imagination equally influences false memories of high and low plausibility events

To examine the effects of event plausibility on people's false beliefs and memories for imagined childhood events, subjects took part in a three‐stage procedure. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events. They also rated their memories of the events. Second, 1 week later, subjects imagined one high, one moderate and one low plausibility event. Third, 1 week later (and 2 weeks after their initial ratings), subjects rated their confidence and memory a second time. Imagining the events made subjects more confident that they were genuine experiences and gave subjects clearer and more complete memories. Plausibility did not affect subjects' confidence but it did affect their memories. Subjects developed clearer and more complete memories for high, followed by moderate, followed by low plausibility events regardless of whether those events were imagined. We use a nested model of plausibility, belief and memory to discuss our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The memory‐impairing effects of simulated amnesia for a mock crime

The present study examined whether mock offenders, who were instructed to falsely deny crime details or to simulate amnesia, would consequently experience impaired memory. Ninety‐three university students were first asked to commit a mock crime and were then assigned to three different conditions (i.e., false denial, simulated amnesia, and truth telling) and then received the first memory test. The following day, participants completed a second memory test. Results showed that the memory impairment was not observed in participants in the false denial condition. However, in the simulated amnesia group, memory about being interviewed in the first session was impaired. The simulated amnesia group also had lower recollection and belief ratings in the occurrence of true details for the mock event. Findings suggest that after simulating amnesia, offenders can forget details related to the interview and exhibit diminished ratings for the recollection of and belief in their memory for experienced events.     

Driving without memory: The strength of schema-consistent false memories

Drivers’ memory for their recent trips has been shown to be surprisingly poor, with relatively low accuracy of both recall and recollection and substantial levels of false memories. Driving research has suggested that arousal, such as from risk, leads to more accurate memories. Memory research suggests that the typicality of objects and events makes them harder to remember accurately, compared to schema-inconsistent or atypical objects, and leads to greater likelihood of false memories. In contrast, it has been suggested that memory for actions is different to memory for objects, and that typical actions are remembered more accurately than atypical actions. The present research examined the role of typicality or schema consistency in the accuracy of memory for driving. Participants drove a 15 km route in their own cars and then answered questions about their drive. The results showed that atypical objects and actions were recalled with greater accuracy than typical objects and actions. The results also showed that false memories were most common for typical objects, but not for typical actions. We interpret these results in terms of both memory theory and implications for understanding skilled behaviour such as driving.     

Metamemory and reality monitoring

Metamemory judgements and reality monitoring judgements were compared for real and imagined stimuli. Line drawings of everyday items were either perceived or imagined in differing ratios, to (a) investigate people's ability to predict the class of item that would be better recalled (Judgements of Learning, JOL), and the class of item which would be better sourced (Judgements of Source, JOS) in a future recall test, and (b) test the hypothesis that participants would show a bias towards calling remembered items real when the source had been forgotten. Although participants' JOLs indicated that they believed real items would be more memorable than imagined, in both experiments a larger proportion of items from either class (real or imagined) was only recalled when presentation modality was less frequent for that class. By contrast, JOSs were no different for real or imagined items, even though source attribution was more accurate for real than imagined items. An attribution of memories to real rather than to imagined events that often occurs when participants are unsure about the source (labelled a ‘bias towards the real’) was due to phenomenological qualities of the memories. The results are discussed in terms of Johnson and Raye's ( 1981 ) reality‐monitoring model. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparing two perceived characteristics of autobiographical memory: Memory detail and accessibility

Four samples of participants recalled autobiographical memories. While some evidence emerged from regression analyses suggesting that judgements of the amount of detail contained in each memory and judgements of the ease with which events could be recalled were partially independent, the analyses generally showed that these judgements were similarly predicted by various event characteristics (age, typicality, self-importance, emotional intensity at event occurrence, rehearsal types). Co-occurrence frequency data yielded similar conclusions, showing that while ease ratings and detail ratings occasionally diverged, they were more often consistent with each other. Finally, the data also suggested that events that prompted emotional ambivalence were not judged to be more easily recalled, or to contain more detail, than non-ambivalent events.