Motivated to confront: How experiencing anger affects anchoring bias

Prior research has asserted that emotions affect anchoring bias in decision making through the emotion's certainty appraisal or through the emotion's action tendencies, but these prior studies investigate the role of each component—appraisal or action tendency—without accounting for potential effects of the other one. The current research investigates whether anger exerts a significant effect on anchoring bias by activating a desire to confront a potential anchor. Importantly, the studies compare the effect of anger versus disgust, emotions that differ in their action tendency but are similar in their certainty appraisal. In Study 1, participants completed an emotion induction task and then a negotiation task where the first offer from the negotiation partner served as a potential anchor. Anger led to more deviation from the anchor compared with disgust or neutral feelings. Subsequent studies provide evidence that the angry participants are less anchored when the anchor value comes from a more confrontable source (someone else vs. themselves in Study 2 and an out‐group member vs. an in‐group member in Study 3).     

Mad enough to see the other side: Anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation—the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to “move against” a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Mad enough to see the other side: anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation-the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to "move against" a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Sadness and susceptibility to judgmental bias: the case of anchoring

In a wide range of empirical paradigms, sadness has been associated with more extensive and detail-oriented thinking than happiness, resulting in reductions in judgmental bias that arise from reliance on stereotypes and other simple decision heuristics. It was hypothesized that anchoring would constitute a significant exception to this general pattern. Recent research on anchoring indicates that an active thought process underlies the emergence of this bias. If sad people are likely to think more actively about the judgmental anchor than their neutral-mood counterparts, their subsequent judgments should be more likely to be assimilated toward this reference point. This prediction was confirmed in two experiments demonstrating that sad people are indeed more susceptible to anchoring bias than are people in a neutral mood. Moreover, this effect generalized over judgments in positive, neutral, and negative content domains.     

When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self‐generated and externally provided anchors

Two experiments examined the impact of financial incentives and forewarnings on judgmental anchoring effects, or the tendency for judgments of uncertain qualities to be biased in the direction of salient anchor values. Previous research has found no effect of either manipulation on the magnitude of anchoring effects. We argue, however, that anchoring effects are produced by multiple mechanisms—one involving an effortful process of adjustment from “self‐generated” anchors, and another involving the biased recruitment of anchor‐consistent information from “externally provided” anchors—and that only the former should be influenced by incentives and forewarning. Two studies confirmed these predictions, showing that responses to “self‐generated” anchors are influenced by both incentives and forewarnings whereas responses to “externally provided” anchors are not. Discussion focuses on the implications of these effects for debiasing efforts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

愤怒和悲伤情绪对助人决策的影响:人际责任归因的作用

基于具体情绪理论——评价倾向框架理论(ATF),采用两项研究考察负性情绪愤怒和悲伤对助人决策的影响,并探究人际责任归因在这一关系中的作用。两项研究均采用自传体情绪记忆任务诱发情绪,研究一中自变量情绪为组间变量,包括愤怒、悲伤和中性三个水平,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费时间;研究二中自变量1为组间变量情绪,包括愤怒和悲伤,自变量2为组内变量人际责任归因,操作为模糊归因、不可控的情景归因、可控的自我归因三种情境,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费金钱。结果发现:(1)与愤怒情绪相比,悲伤情绪下个体为他人花费的时间和捐助的金钱更多;(2)在模糊的人际责任归因条件下,悲伤个体会比愤怒个体捐助更多的钱。研究表明:同为负性情绪的愤怒和悲伤在助人决策上的作用不同,悲伤个体比愤怒个体做出更多的助人决策;人际责任性归因会影响附带情绪和助人决策的关系。研究结论有助于理解附带情绪对助人决策的影响,进一步丰富并延伸ATF理论的证据和领域,对发挥情境中人际责任归因在助人决策中的作用具有一定的现实意义。     

Incidental anger and the desire to evaluate

Our results indicate that people experiencing incidental anger are more likely than people in neutral and other emotional states to prefer to perform evaluative tasks, even though their anger may bias the evaluations they make. Induced anger increased participants’ desire to evaluate others’ ideas (Experiment 1) and made the evaluations of those ideas more negative in valence (Experiment 2). Anger increased the appeal of evaluating ideas when evaluations were expected to be largely negative but not when evaluations were expected to be positive (Experiments 3 and 4). Mediation analyses revealed that this willingness to evaluate when angry stems from a belief that evaluating others can leave angry people in a positive mood. Because people are often free to decide when to perform the tasks required of them, this tendency may have implications for how and when ideas are evaluated.     

Revisiting the Effects of Anger on Risk‐Taking: Empirical and Meta‐Analytic Evidence for Differences Between Males and Females

That anger elicited in one situation can carry over to drive risky behavior in another situation has been described since the days of Aristotle. The present studies examine the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which such behavior occurs. Across three experiments, as well as a meta‐analytic synthesis of the data, results reveal that incidental anger is significantly more likely to drive risky decision making among males than among females. Moreover, the experiments document that, under certain circumstances, such risk‐taking pays off financially. Indeed, the present experiments demonstrate that, because the expected‐value‐maximizing strategy in these studies rewarded risk‐taking, angry‐male individuals earned more money than did both neutral‐emotion males and angry females. In sum, these studies found evidence for robust disparities between males and females for anger‐driven risk‐taking. Importantly, although men did not experience more anger than women, they did show a heightened tendency to respond to anger with risk‐taking. Published 2016. This article has been contributed to by US Government employees and their work is in the public domain in the USA.     

Differentiating the effects of anger and sadness: A perspective of spontaneous trait inference

In the present research, three experiments were conducted to examine the effects of anger and sadness on spontaneous trait inferences (STIs). Using a probe recognition paradigm, Experiment 1 revealed that angry participants made more errors in response to probes following trait‐implying behaviours than sad participants did. Using a false recognition paradigm, Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that angry participants made more errors in response to systematic pair trials than sad participants did. The three experiments provided convergent evidence that angry individuals were more inclined to form STIs than sad individuals were. The current research first demonstrated the different effects of specific negative mood states (anger vs. sadness) on STIs, providing further insight into the relationship between mood and STIs.     

锚定效应的产生前提及作用机制

为了探讨锚定效应的产生前提以及基础锚定效应的理论解释,设计了两个实验。实验一选取高、低、无三种锚值,设置了15ms、45ms、75ms、1000ms四种呈现时间,结果发现只有15ms条件下未出现锚定效应,随着呈现时间增加,锚定效应不断增大,低锚下的锚定效应高于高锚下的锚定效应。实验二设置了语意相同但表述形式不同的两种水平的锚值,结果发现两者引发的锚定效应不同。锚定效应的产生前提是注意,数字启动假说可以更好地解释基础锚定效应。     

Creative production by angry people peaks early on, decreases over time, and is relatively unstructured

Anecdotes and introspective reports from eminent scientists and artists aside, a systematic test of the putative creativity-enhancing effect of anger is missing. This article fills this void with three experiments examining creativity as a function of anger (vs. sad or a mood-neutral control state). Combining insights from the literatures on creativity and on mood and information processing the authors predicted that anger (vs. sadness and a mood-neutral control state) triggers a less systematic and structured approach to the creativity task, and leads to initially higher levels of creativity (as manifested in original ideation and creative insights). Following work on resource depletion, the authors further predicted that anger more than sadness depletes resources and that, therefore, creative performance should decline over time more for angry than for sad people. Results supported predictions. Implications for creativity, information processing, and resource depletion are discussed.     

Mellow Monday and furious Friday: The approach-related link between anger and time representation

Time can be represented spatially in two prevalent metaphors; ego-moving has the self moving “forward” towards the future while time-moving has the future moving “forward” towards the self. Anger also is represented spatially by an approach-related motivation. Because time and anger share an approach-related spatial representation, we hypothesised a link between anger and the ego-moving time perspective. In Study 1, participants naturally adopting an ego-moving representation of time had higher trait anger than those adopting a time-moving representation. Study 2 showed that processing an angry event (vs. an emotionally neutral event) predicted more ego-moving spatial interpretations of time. In Study 3, a scheduling task priming ego-moving (vs. time-moving) time representation prompted higher state anger. Our results reveal a novel bi-directional link between the seemingly unrelated but similarly embodied abstract domains of anger and time.     

Short-term memory for emotional faces in dysphoria

The study aimed to determine if the memory bias for negative faces previously demonstrated in depression and dysphoria generalises from long- to short-term memory. A total of 29 dysphoric (DP) and 22 non-dysphoric (ND) participants were presented with a series of faces and asked to identify the emotion portrayed (happiness, sadness, anger, or neutral affect). Following a delay, four faces were presented (the original plus three distractors) and participants were asked to identify the target face. Half of the trials assessed memory for facial emotion, and the remaining trials examined memory for facial identity. At encoding, no group differences were apparent. At memory testing, relative to ND participants, DP participants exhibited impaired memory for all types of facial emotion and for facial identity when the faces featured happiness, anger, or neutral affect, but not sadness. DP participants exhibited impaired identity memory for happy faces relative to angry, sad, and neutral, whereas ND participants exhibited enhanced facial identity memory when faces were angry. In general, memory for faces was not related to performance at encoding. However, in DP participants only, memory for sad faces was related to sadness recognition at encoding. The results suggest that the negative memory bias for faces in dysphoria does not generalise from long- to short-term memory.     

Emotion differentiation moderates aggressive tendencies in angry people: A daily diary analysis

Anger is commonly associated with aggression. Inefficient anger-coping strategies increase negative affect and deplete the regulatory resources needed to control aggressive impulses. Factors linked with better emotion regulation may then weaken the relationship between anger and aggression. The current work explored one factor associated with emotion regulation-differentiating one's emotions into discrete categories-that may buffer angry people from aggression. Three diary studies (N = 628) tested the hypothesis that emotion differentiation would weaken the relationship between anger and aggression. In Study 1, participants high in emotion differentiation reported less daily aggressive tendencies when angry, compared to low differentiators. In Study 2, compared to low differentiators, high differentiators reported less frequent provocation in daily life and less daily aggression in response to being provoked and feeling intense anger. Study 3 showed that high daily emotional control mediated the interactive effect of emotion differentiation and anger on aggression. These results highlight the importance of considering how angry people differentiate their emotions in predicting their aggressive responses to anger.     

Drivers Display Anger‐Congruent Attention to Potential Traffic Hazards

Previous research has suggested that angry drivers may respond differently to potential hazards. This study replicates and extends these findings. Under simulated driving conditions, two groups of drivers experienced conditions that would either increase angry mood (N = 12; men = 6) or not (control group, N = 12; men = 6). All drivers then performed a neutral drive, during which they encountered a number of traffic events not experienced in the initial drive. These included vehicles emerging from driveways into their path and jaywalking pedestrians. Subjective anger, eye‐movement behaviour and driving behaviours (speed and reaction times) were measured as drivers drove. Subjective moods (Profile of Mood States) were assessed before and after each drive. Anger‐provoked drivers reported reliably higher increases in angry mood when compared with the control group after the initial drive, and these increases remained stable across the subsequent neutral drive. During the neutral drive, anger‐provoked drivers demonstrated evidence of more heuristic style processing of potential hazards, with shorter initial gazes at less apparent hazards and longer latencies to look back at jaywalking pedestrians obscured by parked vehicles. Anger‐provoked drivers also took longer to make corrective actions to avoid potential collisions. It is concluded that anger‐provoked drivers may initially make more superficial assessments of certain driving situations and consequently underestimate the inherent risk. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motion or emotion: Infants discriminate emotional biological motion based on low-level visual information

Infants’ ability to discriminate emotional facial expressions and tones of voice is well-established, yet little is known about infant discrimination of emotional body movements. Here, we asked if 10–20-month-old infants rely on high-level emotional cues or low-level motion related cues when discriminating between emotional point-light displays (PLDs). In Study 1, infants viewed 18 pairs of angry, happy, sad, or neutral PLDs. Infants looked more at angry vs. neutral, happy vs. neutral, and neutral vs. sad. Motion analyses revealed that infants preferred the PLD with more total body movement in each pairing. Study 2, in which infants viewed inverted versions of the same pairings, yielded similar findings except for sad-neutral. Study 3 directly paired all three emotional stimuli in both orientations. The angry and happy stimuli did not significantly differ in terms of total motion, but both had more motion than the sad stimuli. Infants looked more at angry vs. sad, more at happy vs. sad, and about equally to angry vs. happy in both orientations. Again, therefore, infants preferred PLDs with more total body movement. Overall, the results indicate that a low-level motion preference may drive infants’ discrimination of emotional human walking motions.     

Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by children

Two studies are discussed in which children's use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was considered. Study one is a modification of the classic multiplication task devised by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). Results indicate that children in grades 4, 6, 8 and adults are affected by the order of numbers provided in an addition task. In addition, younger children display the tendency to over adjust, yielding higher estimates. In the second study, third and fifth grade participants and adults were provided anchors and estimated the number of jellybeans in a glass container. A main effect for condition is indicated, with lower anchors leading to lower estimates. Results of both studies are consistent with the an anchoring and adjustment explanation.     

The development of emotion recognition from facial expressions and non‐linguistic vocalizations during childhood

Sensitivity to facial and vocal emotion is fundamental to children's social competence. Previous research has focused on children's facial emotion recognition, and few studies have investigated non‐linguistic vocal emotion processing in childhood. We compared facial and vocal emotion recognition and processing biases in 4‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Eighty‐eight 4‐ to 11‐year‐olds and 21 adults participated. Participants viewed/listened to faces and voices (angry, happy, and sad) at three intensity levels (50%, 75%, and 100%). Non‐linguistic tones were used. For each modality, participants completed an emotion identification task. Accuracy and bias for each emotion and modality were compared across 4‐ to 5‐, 6‐ to 9‐ and 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. The results showed that children's emotion recognition improved with age; preschoolers were less accurate than other groups. Facial emotion recognition reached adult levels by 11 years, whereas vocal emotion recognition continued to develop in late childhood. Response bias decreased with age. For both modalities, sadness recognition was delayed across development relative to anger and happiness. The results demonstrate that developmental trajectories of emotion processing differ as a function of emotion type and stimulus modality. In addition, vocal emotion processing showed a more protracted developmental trajectory, compared to facial emotion processing. The results have important implications for programmes aiming to improve children's socio‐emotional competence.     

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.     

Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by children

Two studies are discussed in which children's use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was considered. Study one is a modification of the classic multiplication task devised by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). Results indicate that children in grades 4, 6, 8 and adults are affected by the order of numbers provided in an addition task. In addition, younger children display the tendency to over adjust, yielding higher estimates. In the second study, third and fifth grade participants and adults were provided anchors and estimated the number of jellybeans in a glass container. A main effect for condition is indicated, with lower anchors leading to lower estimates. Results of both studies are consistent with the an anchoring and adjustment explanation.