Multiple attentional control settings at distinct locations without the confounding of repetition priming

An attentional control setting (ACS), which is based on the task goal, induces involuntary attentional capture by a stimulus possessing a target-defining feature. It is unclear whether ACSs are maintained for multiple targets defined as conjunctions of a color and location. In the present study we examined the possibility of local ACSs for dual targets defined as combinations of color and location, using different paradigms: visual search in Experiment 1, and spatial cueing in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, a distractor captured attention only when its features matched the ACSs. Likewise, in Experiment 2, a significant attentional capture effect was found only with a matching cue, whose color and location were in line with the conjunction of the target definition. Importantly, the identical pattern of attentional capture was also obtained for a neutral-color target, which was unlikely to be primed by any color of the cue. Thus, these findings imply that the attentional bias depending on the match between the cue and target did not result from cue–target repetition priming. The present study highlights that top-down attentional control can be set flexibly to accomplish a complex task goal efficiently.     

Pavlovian reward learning underlies value driven attentional capture

Recent evidence shows that distractors that signal high compared to low reward availability elicit stronger attentional capture, even when this is detrimental for task-performance. This suggests that simply correlating stimuli with reward administration, rather than their instrumental relationship with obtaining reward, produces value-driven attentional capture. However, in previous studies, reward delivery was never response independent, as only correct responses were rewarded, nor was it completely task-irrelevant, as the distractor signaled the magnitude of reward that could be earned on that trial. In two experiments, we ensured that associative reward learning was completely response independent by letting participants perform a task at fixation, while high and low rewards were automatically administered following the presentation of task-irrelevant colored stimuli in the periphery (Experiment 1) or at fixation (Experiment 2). In a following non-reward test phase, using the additional singleton paradigm, the previously reward signaling stimuli were presented as distractors to assess truly task-irrelevant value driven attentional capture. The results showed that high compared to low reward-value associated distractors impaired performance, and thus captured attention more strongly. This suggests that genuine Pavlovian conditioning of stimulus-reward contingencies is sufficient to obtain value-driven attentional capture. Furthermore, value-driven attentional capture can occur following associative reward learning of temporally and spatially task-irrelevant distractors that signal the magnitude of available reward (Experiment 1), and is independent of training spatial shifts of attention towards the reward signaling stimuli (Experiment 2). This confirms and strengthens the idea that Pavlovian reward learning underlies value driven attentional capture.     

Mixed signals: The effect of conflicting reward- and goal-driven biases on selective attention

Attentional selection depends on the interaction between exogenous (stimulus-driven), endogenous (goal-driven), and selection history (experience-driven) factors. While endogenous and exogenous biases have been widely investigated, less is known about their interplay with value-driven attention. The present study investigated the interaction between reward-history and goal-driven biases on perceptual sensitivity (d’) and response time (RT) in a modified cueing paradigm presenting two coloured cues, followed by sinusoidal gratings. Participants responded to the orientation of one of these gratings. In Experiment 1, one cue signalled reward availability but was otherwise task irrelevant. In Experiment 2, the same cue signalled reward, and indicated the target’s most likely location at the opposite side of the display. This design introduced a conflict between reward-driven biases attracting attention and goal-driven biases directing it away. Attentional effects were examined comparing trials in which cue and target appeared at the same versus opposite locations. Two interstimulus interval (ISI) levels were used to probe the time course of attentional effects. Experiment 1 showed performance benefits at the location of the reward-signalling cue and costs at the opposite for both ISIs, indicating value-driven capture. Experiment 2 showed performance benefits only for the long ISI when the target was at the opposite to the reward-associated cue. At the short ISI, only performance costs were observed. These results reveal the time course of these biases, indicating that reward-driven effects influence attention early but can be overcome later by goal-driven control. This suggests that reward-driven biases are integrated as attentional priorities, just as exogenous and endogenous factors.     

Cue quality and criterion setting in recognition memory

Previous studies on how people set and modify decision criteria in old-new recognition tasks (in which they have to decide whether or not a stimulus was seen in a study phase) have almost exclusively focused on properties of the study items, such as presentation frequency or study list length. In contrast, in the three studies reported here, we manipulated the quality of the test cues in a scene-recognition task, either by degrading through Gaussian blurring (Experiment 1) or by limiting presentation duration (Experiment 2 and 3). In Experiments 1 and 2, degradation of the test cue led to worse old-new discrimination. Most importantly, however, participants were more liberal in their responses to degraded cues (i.e., more likely to call the cue “old”), demonstrating strong within-list, item-by-item, criterion shifts. This liberal response bias toward degraded stimuli came at the cost of increasing the false alarm rate while maintaining a constant hit rate. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 with additional stimulus types (words and faces) but did not provide accuracy feedback to participants. The criterion shifts in Experiment 3 were smaller in magnitude than Experiments 1 and 2 and varied in consistency across stimulus type, suggesting, in line with previous studies, that feedback is important for participants to shift their criteria.     

Prioritization to visual objects: Roles of sensory uncertainty

Two hypotheses, attentional prioritization and attentional spreading, have been proposed to account for object-based attention. The attentional-prioritization hypothesis posits that the positional uncertainty of targets is sufficient to resolve the controversy raised by the competing attentional-spreading hypothesis. Here we challenge the sufficiency of this explanation by showing that object-based attention is a function of sensory uncertainty in a task with consistent high positional uncertainty of the targets. In Experiment 1, object-based attention was modulated by sensory uncertainty induced by the noise from backward masking, showing an object-based effect under high as compared to low sensory uncertainty. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 with increased task difficulty, to exclude that as a confounding factor, and in Experiment 3 with a psychophysical method, to obtain converging evidence using perceptual threshold measurement. Additionally, such a finding was not observed when sensory uncertainty was eliminated by replacing the backward-masking stimuli with perceptually dissimilar ones in Experiment 4. These results reveal that object-based attention is influenced by sensory uncertainty, even under high positional uncertainty of the targets. Our findings contradict the proposition of attentional spreading, proposing instead an automatic form of object-based attention due to enhancement of the perceptual representation. More importantly, the attentional-prioritization hypothesis based solely on positional uncertainty cannot sufficiently account for object-based attention, but needs to be developed by expanding the concept of uncertainty to include at least sensory uncertainty.     

How to inhibit a distractor location? Statistical learning versus active,top-down suppression

Recently, Wang and Theeuwes (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 44(1), 13–17, 2018a) demonstrated the role of lingering selection biases in an additional singleton search task in which the distractor singleton appeared much more often in one location than in all other locations. For this location, there was less capture and selection efficiency was reduced. It was argued that statistical learning induces plasticity within the spatial priority map such that particular locations that are high likely to contain a distractor are suppressed relative to all other locations. The current study replicated these findings regarding statistical learning (Experiment 1) and investigated whether similar effects can be obtained by cueing the distractor location in a top-down way on a trial-by-trial basis. The results show that top-down cueing of the distractor location with long (1,500 ms; Experiment 2) and short stimulus-onset symmetries (SOAs) (600 ms; Experiment 3) does not result in suppression: The amount of capture nor the efficiency of selection was affected by the cue. If anything, we found an attentional benefit (instead of the suppression) for the short SOA. We argue that through statistical learning, weights within the attentional priority map are changed such that one location containing a salient distractor is suppressed relative to all other locations. Our cueing experiments show that this effect cannot be accomplished by active, top-down suppression. Consequences for recent theories of distractor suppression are discussed.     

Auditory attention switching and judgment switching: Exploring multicomponent task representations

An auditory attention-switching paradigm was combined with a judgment-switching paradigm to examine the interaction of a varying auditory attention component and a varying judgment component. Participants heard two dichotically presented stimuli—one spoken by a female speaker and one spoken by a male speaker. In each trial, the stimuli were a spoken letter and a spoken number. A visual explicit cue at the beginning of each trial indicated the auditory attention criterion (speaker sex/ear) to identify the target stimulus (Experiment 1) or the judgment that had to be executed (Experiment 2). Hence, the attentional selection criterion switched independently between speaker sexes (or between ears), while the judgment alternated between letter categorization and number categorization. The data indicate that auditory attention criterion and judgment were not processed independently, regardless of whether the attention criterion or the judgment was cued. The partial repetition benefits of the explicitly cued component suggested a hierarchical organization of the auditory attention component and the judgment component within the task set. We suggest that the hierarchy arises due to the explicit cuing of one component rather than due to a “natural” hierarchy of auditory attention component and judgment component.     

Numerosity estimates for attended and unattended items in visual search

The goal of this research was to examine memories created for the number of items during a visual search task. Participants performed a visual search task for a target defined by a single feature (Experiment 1A), by a conjunction of features (Experiment 1B), or by a specific spatial configuration of features (Experiment 1C). On some trials following the search task, subjects were asked to recall the total number of items in the previous display. In all search types, participants underestimated the total number of items, but the severity of the underestimation varied depending on the efficiency of the search. In three follow-up studies (Experiments 2A, 2B, and 2C) using the same visual stimuli, the participants’ only task was to estimate the number of items on each screen. Participants still underestimated the numerosity of the items, although the degree of underestimation was smaller than in the search tasks and did not depend on the type of visual stimuli. In Experiment 3, participants were asked to recall the number of items in a display only once. Subjects still displayed a tendency to underestimate, indicating that the underestimation effects seen in Experiments 1A-1C were not attributable to knowledge of the estimation task. The degree of underestimation depends on the efficiency of the search task, with more severe underestimation in efficient search tasks. This suggests that the lower attentional demands of very efficient searches leads to less encoding of numerosity of the distractor set.     

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants’ beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants’ beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants’ predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.     

Spontaneous prospective-memory processing: Unexpected fluency experiences trigger erroneous intention executions

Event-based prospective memory is the ability to remember to execute an intention when an environmental cue occurs. It has been argued that, due to their special meaning, these cues are discrepant from their environment and therefore are sometimes spontaneously noticed. In line with this assumption, the likelihood that an intention will be executed increases with increased cue-discrepancy. It is not yet clear, however, whether these improvements are due to facilitated spontaneous noticing rather than to an increase in the efficiency of controlled cue-processing. To further investigate the spontaneous nature of cue-discrepancy benefits, we presented participants with stimuli that were unrelated to the intention but discrepant from other stimuli. Therefore, we experimentally increased the processing fluency of some stimuli for participants currently holding an intention by using different priming procedures. We found that stimuli whose fluency was increased via spaced repeated stimulus presentation (Experiment 1) or via short pre-exposure (Experiment 2a to 3) elicited a tendency to fulfill the intention despite its actual inappropriateness. Findings were inconsistent as to whether cue-memory uncertainty fosters the reliance on cue discrepancy for intention retrieval (Experiments 2a and 3). Taken together, the present findings provide converging evidence for a spontaneous discrepancy-based prospective-memory process which works independent of controlled processes.     

Alertness and cognitive control: Is there a spatial attention constraint?

Congruency effects in arrow flanker tasks are often larger when subjects are more alert, suggesting an unusual connection between alertness and cognitive control. Theoretical accounts of the alerting–congruency interaction differ with respect to whether and how spatial attention is involved. In the present study, the author conducted eight experiments to determine whether there is a spatial attention constraint linking alertness to cognitive control. Alertness was manipulated in color-word Stroop tasks involving stimuli that were spatially integrated (Experiments 1–3) or separated (Experiments 4 and 5), as well as in Stroop-like tasks involving spatially separated stimuli for which the irrelevant stimulus features were spatial words (Experiments 6 and 7) or arrows (Experiment 8). All experiments yielded effects of alerting and congruency, but none produced the alerting–congruency interaction typically found with arrow flanker tasks. The results suggest that there is a spatial attention constraint on the relationship between alertness and cognitive control, part of which might involve having a task goal associated with spatial information processing.     

The influence of attention on value integration

People often have to make decisions based on many pieces of information. Previous work has found that people are able to integrate values presented in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream to make informed judgements on the overall stream value (Tsetsos et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(24), 9659–9664, 2012). It is also well known that attentional mechanisms influence how people process information. However, it is unknown how attentional factors impact value judgements of integrated material. The current study is the first of its kind to investigate whether value judgements are influenced by attentional processes when assimilating information. Experiments 1–3 examined whether the attentional salience of an item within an RSVP stream affected judgements of overall stream value. The results showed that the presence of an irrelevant high or low value salient item biased people to judge the stream as having a higher or lower overall mean value, respectively. Experiments 4–7 directly tested Tsetsos et al.’s (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(24), 9659–9664, 2012) theory examining whether extreme values in an RSVP stream become over-weighted, thereby capturing attention more than other values in the stream. The results showed that the presence of both a high (Experiments 4, 6 and 7) and a low (Experiment 5) value outlier captures attention leading to less accurate report of subsequent items in the stream. Taken together, the results showed that valuations can be influenced by attentional processes, and can lead to less accurate subjective judgements.     

The strategic control of prospective memory monitoring in response to complex and probabilistic contextual cues

Participants use simple contextual cues to reduce deployment of costly monitoring processes in contexts in which prospective memory (PM) targets are not expected. This study investigated whether this strategic monitoring pattern is observed in response to complex and probabilistic contextual cues. Participants performed a lexical decision task in which words or nonwords were presented in upper or lower locations on screen. The specific condition was informed that PM targets (“tor” syllable) would occur only in words in the upper location, whereas the nonspecific condition was informed that targets could occur in any location or word type. Context was blocked such that word type and location changed every 8 trials. In Experiment 1, the specific condition used the complex contextual cue to reduce monitoring in unexpected contexts relative to the nonspecific condition. This pattern largely was not evidenced when the complex contextual cue was probabilistic (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 confirmed that strategic monitoring is observed for a complex cue that is deterministic, but not one that is probabilistic. Additionally, Experiments 1 and 3 demonstrated a disadvantage associated with strategic monitoring—namely, that the specific condition was less likely to respond to a PM target in an unexpected context. Experiment 3 provided evidence that this disadvantage is attributable to impaired noticing of the target. The novel findings suggest use of a complex contextual cue per se is not a boundary condition for the strategic, context-specific allocation of monitoring processes to support prospective remembering; however, strategic monitoring is constrained by the predictive utility of the complex contextual cue.     

Relationship between vection and motion perception in depth

This study examined the effects of cues to motion in depth – namely, stereoscopic (i.e., changing-disparity cues and interocular velocity differences) and changing-size cues on forward and backward vection. We conducted four experiments in which participants viewed expanding or contracting optical flows with the addition of either or both cues. In Experiment 1, participants reported vection by pressing a button whenever they felt it. After each trial, they also rated the magnitude of the vection (from 0 to 100). In Experiments 2 and 3, the participants rated the perceived velocity and motion-in-depth impression of the flows relative to standard stimuli, respectively. In Experiment 4, the participants rated the perceived depth and distance of the display. We observed enhancements in vection, motion-in-depth impression, and perceived depth and distance when either or both types of cues indicated motion-in-depth, as compared to those when the cues did not (Experiments 1, 3, and 4). The perceived velocity changed with cue conditions only for the high velocity condition (Experiment 2). Correlational analyses showed that the vection can be best explained by the motion-in-depth impression. This was partially supported by the multiple regression analyses. These results indicate that the enhancement of vection caused by cues is related to the impression of motion-in-depth rather than the perceived velocity and perceived three-dimensionality.     

The mere exposure effect for visual image

Mere exposure effect refers to a phenomenon in which repeated stimuli are evaluated more positively than novel stimuli. We investigated whether this effect occurs for internally generated visual representations (i.e., visual images). In an exposure phase, a 5 × 5 dot array was presented, and a pair of dots corresponding to the neighboring vertices of an invisible polygon was sequentially flashed (in red), creating an invisible polygon. In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, participants visualized and memorized the shapes of invisible polygons based on different sequences of flashed dots, whereas in Experiment 3, participants only memorized positions of these dots. In a subsequent rating phase, participants visualized the shape of the invisible polygon from allocations of numerical characters on its vertices, and then rated their preference for invisible polygons (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). In contrast, in Experiment 4, participants rated the preference for visible polygons. Results showed that the mere exposure effect appeared only when participants visualized the shape of invisible polygons in both the exposure and rating phases (Experiments 1 and 2), suggesting that the mere exposure effect occurred for internalized visual images. This implies that the sensory inputs from repeated stimuli play a minor role in the mere exposure effect. Absence of the mere exposure effect in Experiment 4 suggests that the consistency of processing between exposure and rating phases plays an important role in the mere exposure effect.     

Revisiting von Restorff’s early isolation effect

An item that is conceptually or physically different from other items in a series is often remembered well. This isolation effect has been found independent of the position of the isolated item in the list, suggesting that special attention to or processing of the isolated item is not a necessary precondition of the effect. Three experiments are reported that challenge this conclusion. In Experiment 1a, we compared memory for conceptually isolated items to memory for the same items in unrelated and homogeneous lists. Under moderately distracting conditions, isolation effects were observed with midlist but not with early isolates. In fact, early isolation impaired memory for the conceptually distinct items relative to the same items in homogeneous lists. Experiment 1b replicated this memory impairment for early conceptual isolates and extended it to nondistracting conditions. In Experiment 2, we focused on early isolation, manipulating the type of isolation and whether or not participants performed judgments of learning (JOLs). An early isolation effect was observed for numbers isolated in lists of words (and vice versa), but not for conceptual isolates. Performing the JOL task reduced the size of the early isolation effect. These results suggest that number/word stimulus contrasts are coded automatically and support an isolation effect independent of list position. However, conceptual contrasts require relational processing and will only support an early isolation effect when such processing occurs. The results of Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 suggest that attentional resources during list presentation and a favorable retrieval environment combine to support good memory for distinctive events.     

Bindings in working memory: The role of object-based attention

Over the past decade, it has been debated whether retaining bindings in working memory (WM) requires more attention than retaining constituent features, focusing on domain-general attention and space-based attention. Recently, we proposed that retaining bindings in WM needs more object-based attention than retaining constituent features (Shen, Huang, & Gao, 2015, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, doi: 10.1037/xhp0000018). However, only unitized visual bindings were examined; to establish the role of object-based attention in retaining bindings in WM, more emperical evidence is required. We tested 4 new bindings that had been suggested requiring no more attention than the constituent features in the WM maintenance phase: The two constituent features of binding were stored in different WM modules (cross-module binding, Experiment 1), from auditory and visual modalities (cross-modal binding, Experiment 2), or temporally (cross-time binding, Experiments 3) or spatially (cross-space binding, Experiments 4–6) separated. In the critical condition, we added a secondary object feature-report task during the delay interval of the change-detection task, such that the secondary task competed for object-based attention with the to-be-memorized stimuli. If more object-based attention is required for retaining bindings than for retaining constituent features, the secondary task should impair the binding performance to a larger degree relative to the performance of constituent features. Indeed, Experiments 1–6 consistently revealed a significantly larger impairment for bindings than for the constituent features, suggesting that object-based attention plays a pivotal role in retaining bindings in WM.     

Filtering visual onsets via habituation: A context-specific long-term memory of irrelevant stimuli

The fact that we are often immediately attracted by sudden visual onsets provides a clear advantage for our survival. However, how can we resist from being continuously distracted by irrelevant repetitive onsets? Since the seminal work of Sokolov (1963), habituation of the orienting of attention has long been proposed to be a possible filtering mechanism. Here, in two experiments, we provide novel evidence showing that (a) habituation of capture of focused visual attention relies on a stored representation of the distractor onsets in relation to their context, and (b) that once formed such representation endures unchanged for weeks without any further exposure to the distractors. In agreement with the proposal of Wagner (1979) concerning the associative nature of habituation, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that habituation of attentional capture is context specific. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 show that to filter visual distractors our cognitive system uses long-lasting memories of the irrelevant information. Although distractor filtering can be implemented via top-down inhibitory control, neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying habituation provide a straightforward explanation for the reduced distraction obtained with training, thus working like an automatic filter that prevents irrelevant recurring stimuli from gaining access to higher stages of analysis.     

Imagining the near and far future: The role of location familiarity

Plausible personal events envisioned as occurring in the near future tend to be reported as more vivid than those set in the far future. Why is this? The present set of three experiments identified one’s familiarity with the location in which the event is placed as critical in this regard. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that amongst a wide range of phenomenological characteristics, clarity of location appears to drive the overall difference in vividness between events imagined to take place in the near and the far future. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to further elucidate this finding. Experiment 2 demonstrated that near future events are more likely than far future events to be imagined in familiar locations. Experiment 3 showed that future events set in familiar locations tend to be imagined with greater clarity than those set in unfamiliar locations. The results of all three experiments converge on the conclusion that the difference in vividness of events imagined as occurring in the near and far future is mediated by one’s familiarity with the location in which the event is imagined to occur.     

Pavlovian reward learning elicits attentional capture by reward-associated stimuli

Feature–reward association elicits value-driven attentional capture (VDAC) regardless of the task relevance of associated features. What are the necessary conditions for feature–reward associations in VDAC? Recent studies claim that VDAC is based on Pavlovian conditioning. In this study, we manipulated the temporal relationships among feature, response, and reward in reward learning to elucidate the necessary components of VDAC. We presented reward-associated features in a variety of locations in a flanker task to form a color–reward association (training phase) and then tested VDAC in a subsequent visual search task (test phase). In Experiment 1, we showed reward-associated features in a task display requiring response selection and observed VDAC, consistent with most previous studies. In Experiment 2, features presented at a fixation display before a task display also induced VDAC. Moreover, in Experiment 3, we reduced the time interval between features and rewards so that features appeared after a task display and we obtained marginally significant VDAC. However, no VDAC was observed when features and rewards were simultaneously presented in a feedback display in Experiments 4 and 5, suggesting that a direct association between feature and reward is not sufficient for VDAC. These results are in favor of the idea that response selection does not mediate feature–reward association in VDAC. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the time interval of feature and reward is flexible with some restriction in the learning of feature–reward association. The present study supports the hypothesis that theories of Pavlovian conditioning can account for feature–reward association in VDAC.