阈下奖励调节认知控制的权衡

本研究采用奖励版的AX-CPT任务, 通过控制奖励线索和反馈的呈现方式, 设置出基线、阈上奖励、阈下奖励三种条件, 考察习得的奖励联结和奖励动机能否以潜意识的方式影响认知任务的表现和认知控制的权衡。结果显示：奖励线索只在阈上呈现时提高AX序列的任务表现; 与基线条件相比, 阈上和阈下奖励条件下认知控制的权衡均偏向主动性控制, 且这种偏向在两者间无显著差异。这表明习得的阈下奖励线索可以调节认知控制的权衡, 使被试像阈上奖励时那样偏向主动性控制。     

Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort,but do not change speed–accuracy tradeoffs

While both conscious and unconscious reward cues enhance effort to work on a task, previous research also suggests that conscious rewards may additionally affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs. Based on this idea, two experiments explored whether reward cues that are presented above (supraliminal) or below (subliminal) the threshold of conscious awareness affect such tradeoffs differently. In a speed–accuracy paradigm, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem to attain a supraliminally or subliminally presented high-value or low-value coin. Subliminal high (vs. low) rewards made participants more eager (i.e., faster, but equally accurate). In contrast, supraliminal high (vs. low) rewards caused participants to become more cautious (i.e., slower, but more accurate). However, the effects of supraliminal rewards mimicked those of subliminal rewards when the tendency to make speed–accuracy tradeoffs was reduced. These findings suggest that reward cues initially boost effort regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, but affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs only when the reward information is accessible to consciousness.     

Visible homonyms are ambiguous, subliminal homonyms are not: a close look at priming

Homonyms, i.e. ambiguous words like ‘score’, have different meanings in different contexts. Previous research indicates that all potential meanings of a homonym are first accessed in parallel before one of the meanings is selected in a competitive race. If these processes are automatic, these processes of selection should even be observed when homonyms are shown subliminally. This study measured the time course of subliminal and supraliminal priming by homonyms with a frequent (dominant) and a rare (subordinate) meaning in a neutral context, using a lexical decision task. In the subliminal condition, priming across prime-target asynchronies ranging from 100 ms to 1.5 s indicated that the dominant meaning of homonyms was facilitated and the subordinate meaning was inhibited. This indicates that selection of meaning was much faster with subliminal presentation than with supraliminal presentation. Awareness of a prime might decelerate an otherwise rapid selection process.     

Conscious and unconscious reward cues can affect a critical component of executive control

The present study investigates whether updating an important function of executive control can be driven by unconscious reward cues. Participants had to memorize several numbers and update those numbers independently according to a sequence of arithmetic operations. At the beginning of each trial, a reward (1 euro or 5 cents) was presented, either subliminally or supraliminally. Participants could earn the reward if they found the correct response on the updating task. Results showed better performance when a high (conscious or unconscious) reward was at stake compared to a low reward. This suggests that subliminal information can influence a component process of executive control traditionally thought to require consciousness.     

Personality modulation of (un)conscious processing: Novelty Seeking and performance following supraliminal and subliminal reward cues

This study provides evidence that personality traits associated with responsiveness to conscious reward cues also influence responsiveness to unconscious reward cues. Participants with low and high levels of Novelty Seeking (NS) performed updating tasks in which they could either gain 1 euro or 5 cents. Gains were presented either supraliminally or subliminally at the beginning of each trial. Results showed that low NS participants performed better in the high-reward than in the low-reward condition, whereas high NS participants' performance did not differ between reward conditions. Interestingly, we found that low NS participants performed significantly better when rewards were presented unconsciously, whereas high NS participants' performance did not differ whether reward cues were presented subliminally or supraliminally. Our findings highlight the necessity of taking personality into account in unconscious cognition research. They also suggest that individual differences might determine whether implicit and explicit motives have similar or complementary influences.     

Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

Effects of subliminal hints on insight problem solving

Two experiments tested a total of 509 participants on insight problems (the radiation problem and the nine-dot problem). Half of the participants were first exposed to a 1-min movie that included a subliminal hint. The hint raised the solution rate of people who did not recognize it. In addition, the way they solved the problem was affected by the hint. In Experiment 3, a novel technique was introduced to address some methodological concerns raised by Experiments 1 and 2. A total of 80 participants solved the 10-coin problem, and half of them were exposed to a subliminal hint. The hint facilitated solving the problem, and it shortened the solution time. Some implications of subliminal priming for research on and theorizing about insight problem solving are discussed.     

Sensitivity to value-driven attention is predicted by how we learn from value

Reward learning is known to influence the automatic capture of attention. This study examined how the rate of learning, after high- or low-value reward outcomes, can influence future transfers into value-driven attentional capture. Participants performed an instrumental learning task that was directly followed by an attentional capture task. A hierarchical Bayesian reinforcement model was used to infer individual differences in learning from high or low reward. Results showed a strong relationship between high-reward learning rates (or the weight that is put on learning after a high reward) and the magnitude of attentional capture with high-reward colors. Individual differences in learning from high or low rewards were further related to performance differences when high- or low-value distractors were present. These findings provide novel insight into the development of value-driven attentional capture by showing how information updating after desired or undesired outcomes can influence future deployments of automatic attention.     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945)) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

Spontaneous gestures influence strategy choices in problem solving

Do gestures merely reflect problem-solving processes, or do they play a functional role in problem solving? We hypothesized that gestures highlight and structure perceptual-motor information, and thereby make such information more likely to be used in problem solving. Participants in two experiments solved problems requiring the prediction of gear movement, either with gesture allowed or with gesture prohibited. Such problems can be correctly solved using either a perceptual-motor strategy (simulation of gear movements) or an abstract strategy (the parity strategy). Participants in the gesture-allowed condition were more likely to use perceptual-motor strategies than were participants in the gesture-prohibited condition. Gesture promoted use of perceptual-motor strategies both for participants who talked aloud while solving the problems (Experiment 1) and for participants who solved the problems silently (Experiment 2). Thus, spontaneous gestures influence strategy choices in problem solving.     

Dynamics of priming-effect for subliminally presented ambiguous pictures

ABSTRACT

The results of this study confirmed that people react differently to preferred meanings of ambiguous images (to those that will get into consciousness later) and to rejected meanings of ambiguous images (those that will not). We observed a facilitative after-effect of the preferred meaning which was expressed in the positive priming-effect, and the following dynamics of the rejected meaning after-effect: positive priming at small values of SOA (30?ms), negative at bigger SOA values (530?ms) and positive priming at all the following SOA values (1,030, 3,030 and 5,030?ms). These results imply that subliminal perception, as well as supraliminal, is selective. We believe that negative priming for one of the meanings of an ambiguous image presented subliminally might be associated with an unconscious decision as to whether or not a particular stimulus will enter into consciousness, in accordance with the negative choice theory.     

Exploring consciousness in emotional face decoding: an event-related potential analysis

The author analyzed the role of consciousness in emotional face comprehension. The author recorded psychophysiological measures of event-related potentials (ERPs), elicited by supraliminal and subliminal stimuli when participants viewed emotional facial expressions of 4 emotions or neutral stimuli. The author analyzed an ERP emotion-specific effect (N200 peak variation; temporal interval was 180-300 ms poststimulus) in terms of peak amplitude and latency variables. The results indicated 4 important findings. First, there was an emotional-specific ERP deflection only for emotional stimuli, not for neutral stimuli. Second, the unaware information processing was quite similar to that of aware in terms of peak morphology, but not in terms of latency. In fact, unconscious stimulation produced a more delayed peak variation than did conscious stimulation. Third, valence of facial stimulus (positive or negative) was supraliminally and subliminally decoded because it was showed by differences of peak deflection between negative high arousing (fear and anger) and low arousing (happiness, sadness, and neutral) stimuli. Finally, the author found a more posterior distribution of ERP as a function of emotional content of the stimulus. Cortical lateralization (right or left) was not correlated to conscious or unconscious stimulation. The author discussed the functional significance of her results in terms of supraliminal and subliminal conditions.     

Unconscious reward facilitates motion perceptual learning

Reward signal plays an important role in guiding human learning behaviour. Recent studies have provided evidence that reward signal modulates perceptual learning of basic visual features. Typically, the reward effects on perceptual learning were accompanied with consciously presented reward during the learning process. However, whether an unconsciously presented reward signal that minimizes the contribution of attentional and motivational factors can facilitate perceptual learning remains less well understood. We trained human subjects on a visual motion detection task and subliminally delivered a monetary reward for correct response during the training. The results showed significantly larger learning effect for high reward-associated motion direction than low reward-associated motion direction. Importantly, subjects could neither discriminate the relative values of the subliminal monetary reward nor correctly report the reward-direction contingencies. Our findings suggest that reward signal plays an important modulatory role in perceptual learning even if the magnitude of the reward was not consciously perceived.     

Capuchin monkeys’ use of human and conspecific cues to solve a hidden object-choice task

Learning by watching others can provide valuable information with adaptive consequences, such as identifying the presence of a predator or locating a food source. The extent to which nonhuman animals can gain information by reading the cues of others is often tested by evaluating responses to human gestures, such as a point, and less often evaluated by examining responses to conspecific cues. We tested whether ten brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) were able to use cues from monkeys and a pointing cue from a human to obtain hidden rewards. A monkey could gain access to a reward hidden in one of two locations by reading a cue from a conspecific (e.g., reaching) or a human pointing. We then tested whether they could transfer this skill from monkeys to humans, from humans to monkeys, and from one conspecific to another conspecific. One group of monkeys was trained and tested using a conspecific as the cue-giver and was then tested with a human cue-giver. The second group of monkeys was trained and tested with a human cue-giver and was then tested with a monkey cue-giver. Monkeys that were successful with a conspecific cue-giver were also tested with a novel conspecific cue-giver. Monkeys learned to use a human point and conspecific cues to obtain rewards. Monkeys that had learned to use the cues of a conspecific to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when they were transferred to the cues of a novel conspecific. Monkeys that learned to use a human point to obtain rewards performed significantly better than expected by chance when tested while observing conspecific cues. Some evidence suggested that transferring between conspecific cue-givers occurred with more facility than transferring across species. Results may be explained by simple rules of association learning and stimulus generalization; however, spontaneous flexible use of gestures across conspecifics and between different species may indicate capuchins can generalize learned social cues within and partially across species.     

Working memory demands in insight versus analytic problem solving

Working memory is one of the cognitive processes thought to differentiate insight and analytic forms of problem solving. The present research examined memory involvement in the solution of insight versus analytic problems. Participants completed verbal and spatial working memory and short-term memory measures and a series of analytic and insight problems. Results demonstrated a relationship between working-memory capacity and the solution of analytic problems and between verbal short-term memory capacity and the solution of insight problems. This distinction was generally though not universally supported when memory was examined in relation to individual problems. Memory involvement in insight problem solving was further examined to clarify whether restructuring in insight is the end result of active memory search or spontaneous processes. The present research supports the theory that differences exist in the cognitive processes underlying insight versus analytic problem solving, and provides support for the spontaneous theory of restructuring in insight.     

The Experience of Insight Follows Incubation in the Compound Remote Associates Task

The phenomenon of insight is frequently characterized by the experience of a sudden and certain solution. Anecdotal accounts suggest that insight frequently occurs after the problem solver has taken some time away from the problem (i.e., incubation). However, the mechanism by which incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving remains unclear. Here, we used compound remote associates problems to explore the likely mechanisms by which incubation may facilitate problem‐solving. First, we manipulated problem fixation to explore whether forgetting can explain incubation effects. Second, leveraging previous work linking the experience of insight to unconscious semantic integration, we asked participants to report their experience of insight after each problem solution, including problems solved after a period of distracted incubation. We hypothesized that incubation was not principally important for forgetting but rather frequently causes a shift to a more unconscious semantic integration strategy. Consistent with this we found that initial problem fixation did not predict the improvement in problem‐solving after incubation and that participants were more likely to report insight on problems solved after incubation. Our findings suggest that incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving leading to a mind‐set shift to a more unconscious problem‐solving strategy involving semantic integration.     

Unconscious processing modulates creative problem solving: Evidence from an electrophysiological study

Previous behavioral studies have identified the significant role of subliminal cues in creative problem solving. However, neural mechanisms of such unconscious processing remain poorly understood. Here we utilized an event-related potential (ERP) approach and sandwich mask technique to investigate cerebral activities underlying the unconscious processing of cues in creative problem solving. College students were instructed to solve divergent problems under three different conditions (conscious cue, unconscious cue and no-cue conditions). Our data showed that creative problem solving can benefit from unconscious cues, although not as much as from conscious cues. More importantly, we found that there are crucial ERP components associated with unconscious processing of cues in solving divergent problems. Similar to the processing of conscious cues, processing unconscious cues in problem solving involves the semantic activation of unconscious cues (N280–340) in the right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), new association formation (P350–450) in the right parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36), and mental representation transformation (P500–760) in the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22). The present results suggest that creative problem solving can be modulated by unconscious processing of enlightening information that is weakly diffused in the semantic network beyond our conscious awareness.     

线索类型对阈下注视线索效应的影响

实验结合连续闪烁抑制范式和线索化范式, 通过操纵直视面孔和斜视面孔的呈现方式, 考察了动静线索类型对注视线索效应的影响。结果表明：两种线索在阈上条件都能产生注视线索效应, 且动态线索诱发的效应更大; 无意识条件下有且仅有动态注视线索能诱发注视线索效应。这说明眼睛运动是产生阈下注视线索效应的必要条件; 眼睛运动会增强阈上注视线索效应, 静态注视线索效应依赖于意识。研究结果支持了社会知觉与心理理论交互模型。     

Depression and Approach Motivation: Differential Relations to Monetary,Social, and Food Reward

Depression is associated with blunted reward functioning. It remains unknown, however, whether depression is linked to diminished motivation to approach reward across categories of reward stimuli, or if depression is differentially related to approach motivation. The current study tested associations between depression and behavioral approach motivation to specific reward stimuli (i.e., money, social, food reward). In a two-visit study, university females (N = 122, M _age = 18.67) completed measures of depression and three behavioral approach motivation tasks (completed across visits). Differential findings emerged across behavioral reward tasks. Specifically, depressive symptoms were associated with decreased motivation to approach monetary and social reward but increased motivation to approach food reward. Results suggest a category-specific conceptualization of depressive symptomatology in relation to behavioral approach motivation, whereby women with elevated symptoms may be less likely to approach certain rewards, but more likely to approach others.