Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Methodological individualism in experimental games: not so easily dismissed

Orthodox game theory and social preference models cannot explain why people cooperate in many experimental games or how they manage to coordinate their choices. The theory of evidential decision making provides a solution, based on the idea that people tend to project their own choices onto others, whatever these choices might be. Evidential decision making preserves methodological individualism, and it works without recourse to social preferences. Rejecting methodological individualism, team reasoning is a thinly disguised resurgence of the group mind fallacy, and the experiments reported by Colman et al. [Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (this issue). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica, doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003.] do not offer evidence that uniquely supports team reasoning.     

Team reasoning and collective rationality: piercing the veil of obviousness

The experiments reported in our target article provide strong evidence of collective utility maximization, and the findings suggest that team reasoning should now be included among the social value orientations used in cognitive and social psychology. Evidential decision theory offers a possible alternative explanation for our results but fails to predict intuitively compelling strategy choices in simple games with asymmetric team-reasoning outcomes. Although many of our experimental participants evidently used team reasoning, some appear to have ignored the other players' expected strategy choices and used lower-level, nonstrategic forms of reasoning. Standard payoff transformations cannot explain the experimental findings, nor team reasoning in general, without an unrealistic assumption that players invariably reason nonstrategically.     

The effects of social ties on coordination: conceptual foundations for an empirical analysis

This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper.     

Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games

Topoi - Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such...     

The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task

In order to successfully engage in social exchange--cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit--humans must be able to solve a number of complex computational problems, and do so with special efficiency. Following Marr (1982), Cosmides (1985) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) used evolutionary principles to develop a computational theory of these adaptive problems. Specific hypotheses concerning the structure of the algorithms that govern how humans reason about social exchange were derived from this computational theory. This article presents a series of experiments designed to test these hypotheses, using the Wason selection task, a test of logical reasoning. Part I reports experiments testing social exchange theory against the availability theories of reasoning; Part II reports experiments testing it against Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) permission schema theory. The experimental design included eight critical tests designed to choose between social exchange theory and these other two families of theories; the results of all eight tests support social exchange theory. The hypothesis that the human mind includes cognitive processes specialized for reasoning about social exchange predicts the content effects found in these experiments, and parsimoniously explains those that have already been reported in the literature. The implications of this line of research for a modular view of human reasoning are discussed, as well as the utility of evolutionary biology in the development of computational theories.     

Counterfactual reasoning and the problem of selecting antecedent scenarios

A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of selecting antecedent scenarios,” and show that this is an essential challenge in real-life counterfactual reasoning. Then, I demonstrate that the major extant theories of counterfactuals (especially the Lewis/Stalnaker theory and Igal Kvart’s rival account) are unable to solve this problem. I show that there are instances of real-life counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences that are counterexamples to both of these accounts. And finally, I develop a new theory of how to select antecedent scenarios that overcomes these difficulties, and so would be part of a more adequate theory of counterfactuals (and counterfactual reasoning).     

The utility of modern theories of intergroup bias for research on antecedents to team identification

ObjectivesMuch of the literature on team identification has focused on assessing outcomes to the construct rather than on motives for its development and maintenance. This article comments on research and theorising in social psychology that can contribute to an understanding of motives for team identification.DesignA review and comment on the application of theories of intergroup bias to the study of team identification.MethodFour modern theories of intergroup bias—social identity theory, optimal distinctiveness theory, uncertainty-identity theory, and terror management theory—are overviewed. Potential applications of these theories to future research on motives for team identification are also offered.ResultsIt is argued that the four theories share similar tenets with reference to motives for social identity. A programme of research that evaluates these motives in the context of sport team identification is offered.ConclusionsIt is hoped that this paper will stimulate research into precursors of team identification and that the findings from such research will help sport teams and governing bodies to promote or control certain types of spectator behaviour.     

Data versus Spock: lay theories about whether emotion helps or hinders

The android Data from Star Trek admired human emotion whereas Spock viewed emotion as irrational and maladaptive. The theory that emotions fulfil adaptive functions is widely accepted in academic psychology but little is known about laypeople’s theories. The present study assessed the extent to which laypeople share Data’s view of emotion as helpful or Spock’s view of emotion as a hindrance. We also assessed how help and hinder theory endorsement were related to reasoning, emotion regulation, and well-being. Undergraduates (N?=?630) completed a stressful timed reasoning task and questionnaires that assessed their theories of emotion, emotion regulation strategies, happiness, and social support. Overall, participants viewed emotion more as a help than a hindrance. The more they endorsed the view that emotion helps, the better their reasoning scores. Endorsing a help theory also predicted the use of reappraisal which, in turn, predicted greater happiness and social support. In contrast, endorsing the view that emotion hinders was associated with emotion suppression and less social support. Thus, people’s theories about the functionality of emotion may have important implications for their reasoning and emotional well-being.     

Reasoning across continuous landscapes: A nonlinear dynamical systems theory approach to reasoning

Dual-processing theories of reasoning have gained renewed attention in recent years, particularly in the fields of decision-making under uncertainty, learning, and social judgment. Although the various accounts differ, the common thread is the distinction between two qualitatively different reasoning processes, such as automatic/controlled, fast/slow, and unconscious/conscious. Accordingly, much research is focused on elucidating the nature of the two processes in terms of the kinds of information they process and respond to. Less extensive are attempts to identify mediators that underlie changes between the two reasoning strategies. We argue that nonlinear dynamical systems theory may be able to provide a fresh perspective on reasoning. Nonlinear dynamical systems theory allows us to shift the perspective to the dynamic interactions and transitions among continuous yet qualitatively different reasoning processes. We apply the approach to reasoning in decision-making and judgment under uncertainty. Our primary claim is that using different reasoning strategies is better understood as phase transitions among a landscape of continuous reasoning capacities.     

Domain-specific reasoning: social contracts, cheating, and perspective change.

What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach. Cosmides' (1989) social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a "social contract" from that of a "cheater-detection algorithm". We demonstrate that the fact that a rule is perceived as a social contract--or a conditional permission or obligation, as Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed--is not sufficient to elicit Cosmides' striking results, which we replicated. The crucial issue is not semantic (the meaning of the rule), but pragmatic: whether a person is cued into the perspective of a party who can be cheated. In the second part, we distinguish between social contracts with bilateral and unilateral cheating options. Perspective change in contracts with bilateral cheating options turns P & not-Q responses into not-P & Q responses. The results strongly support social contract theory, contradict availability theory, and cannot be accounted for by pragmatic reasoning schema theory, which lacks the pragmatic concepts of perspectives and cheating detection.     

From Games to Truth Functions: A Generalization of Giles’s Game

Motivated by aspects of reasoning in theories of physics, Robin Giles defined a characterization of infinite valued ?ukasiewicz logic in terms of a game that combines Lorenzen-style dialogue rules for logical connectives with a scheme for betting on results of dispersive experiments for evaluating atomic propositions. We analyze this game and provide conditions on payoff functions that allow us to extract many-valued truth functions from dialogue rules of a quite general form. Besides finite and infinite valued ?ukasiewicz logics, also Meyer and Slaney’s Abelian logic and Cancellative Hoop Logic turn out to be characterizable in this manner.     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.     

No interpretation without representation: the role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task

The Wason selection task is a tool used to study reasoning about conditional rules. Performance on this task changes systematically when one varies its content, and these content effects have been used to argue that the human cognitive architecture contains a number of domain-specific representation and inference systems, such as social contract algorithms and hazard management systems. Recently, however, Sperber, Cara & Girotto (Sperber, D., Cara, F., & Girotto, V. (1995). Relevance theory explains the selection task. Cognition, 57, 31-95) have proposed that relevance theory can explain performance on the selection task - including all content effects - without invoking inference systems that are content-specialized. Herein, we show that relevance theory alone cannot explain a variety of content effects - effects that were predicted in advance and are parsimoniously explained by theories that invoke domain-specific algorithms for representing and making inferences about (i) social contracts and (ii) reducing risk in hazardous situations. Moreover, although Sperber et al. (1995) were able to use relevance theory to produce some new content effects in other domains, they conducted no experiments involving social exchanges or precautions, and so were unable to determine which - content-specialized algorithms or relevance effects - dominate reasoning when the two conflict. When experiments, reported herein, are constructed so that the different theories predict divergent outcomes, the results support the predictions of social contract theory and hazard management theory, indicating that these inference systems override content-general relevance factors. The fact that social contract and hazard management algorithms provide better explanations for performance in their respective domains does not mean that the content-general logical procedures posited by relevance theory do not exist, or that relevance effects never occur. It does mean, however, that one needs a principled way of explaining which effects will dominate when a set of inputs activate more than one reasoning system. We propose the principle of pre-emptive specificity - that the human cognitive architecture should be designed so that more specialized inference systems pre-empt more general ones whenever the stimuli centrally fit the input conditions of the more specialized system. This principle follows from evolutionary and computational considerations that are common to both relevance theory and the ecological rationality approach.     

Needs, Wants and Goals: Wellbeing, Quality of Life and Public Policy

This paper considers the possible contribution of Quality of Life methods in international development policy and practice. It discusses the role of theories of human needs in how public policy makers and implementors might distinguish between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’. There is a good case for extending theories of human need to encompass social and psychological needs, but when we do so the ability of theory to distinguish between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ begins to evaporate. Rather, by virtue of the core relationship between needs denial and harm, it is argued that a theory of human need can provide a framework for reasoning about what constitute needs. Empirical quality of life data can then assist policy makers to identify what constitute needs satisfiers in particular societal and cultural contexts. They also can provide important information to enable processes of public reasoning about the relative societal importance of different needs claims. The paper uses data generated through the application of two Quality of Life methods in Southern and Northeast Thailand, which were employed as part of a comprehensive study of the social and cultural construction of wellbeing in developing countries, to illustrate its arguments. The paper concludes that if routinely incorporated into local policy process, such quality of life methods have a possible contribution to make to effective democratic governance for development.     

The Logic of Team Reasoning

Abstract

Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the same principle. It argues that there can be such assurance even when no individual has an obligation to act on team reasoning.     

Semantic components and conceptual development

Several phenomena in the acquisition of word meanings may be accounted for by a theory of component-by-component acquisition, a mechanism analogous to that proposed for phonological development. By defining a concept as an habitual plan, and a component as a subplan, we may extend this theory to acquisition of concepts in general. This theory may be applied to logical concepts, physical reasoning and moral reasoning as well as verbal concepts. The ideas of component-by-component acquisition and of transfer of learning between concepts sharing components thus provide an alternative to developmental stage theories.     

Comparisons in research and reasoning: Toward an integrative theory of social induction

Strong scientific theories give coherence to a body of research findings, make precise predictions about key phenomena, and guide the search for new discoveries. In social psychology, some contemporary theories fall short of this ideal. Mini-theories are prevalent (cf. Van Lange, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2011), many predictions are merely directional (like this one!) and theorizing post-hoc. Guided by experimental reasoning, many researchers emphasize—and reify—empirical differences. Taking the experimental method as an epistemological gold standard, they regard comparative thinking as a criterion of rational thinking. Using examples from social judgment and decision making, we show how comparative reasoning can constrain theoretical development and bias assessments of human rationality. To encourage movement toward stronger theory, we describe a model of inductive reasoning in social contexts.     

Explanatory Effort and Structure as Contributors to the Good Life Among University Students

Ample theory and case evidence suggest the salutary role of making sense or explaining social reality for people's well-being. However, empirical evidence in support of the proposition is slim. To examine this proposition in a testable way, the present study employed a longitudinal panel design to assess associations between earlier reasoning on later well-being among a sample of 151 university students in Hong Kong. At the first wave, it measured reasoning in terms of explanatory consolidation and explanatory effort. Explanatory consolidation referred to a student's consistent agreement or disagreement with propositions of sociological theories that explain social problems, protest, and crime. Explanatory effort concerned the student's tendency to explain social problems. At the second wave, the study measured five good-life indicators to represent well-being. Results showed that explanatory consolidation and effort have significant relations with good life characteristics that are consistent with Chinese culture. These findings support social constructionist claims about the contribution of reasoning in the educational setting.     

类比推理的发展理论评析

类比在认知科学领域具有特殊的地位,儿童类比推理能力的发展是其认知发展的重要成分之一。本文系统介绍了类比推理发展研究中的几个重要理论,即能力限制说、知识经验说和关系转换说等。在此基础上,作者进一步对类比推理发展研究中涉及的几个焦点问题,如类比推理出现的最早年龄,类比推理发展的影响因素及类比推理的发展趋势等进行了综合评析。