The relationships between perceived control and episodic memory in adulthood: a review

The goal of the current paper is to review the literature on the relationships between perceived control and episodic memory throughout adulthood. More specifically, three major questions are pursued: (1) Are higher levels of perceived control related to better memory performance? (2) Is the relationship between perceived control and memory similar or different as a function of age? (3) Does perceived control moderate memory decline? Although there is a great deal of evidence that perceived control and episodic memory are positively related in adulthood, the current review showed that very few studies have investigated whether age moderated this relationship. Moreover, only a limited number of studies have explored the role of perceived control in memory decline, and the results are inconsistent. We suggest some avenues for future research that could help understand by which mechanisms, and under what circumstances, perceived control and episodic memory are related across the lifespan.     

Further evidence for temporal decay in working memory: reply to Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2009)

The sources of forgetting in working memory (WM) are a matter of intense debate: Is there a time-related decay of memory traces, or is forgetting uniquely due to representation-based interference? In a previous study, we claimed to have provided evidence supporting the temporal decay hypothesis (S. Portrat, P. Barrouillet, & V. Camos, 2008). However, reanalyzing our data, S. Lewandowsky and K. Oberauer (2009) demonstrated that they do not provide compelling evidence for temporal decay and suggested a class of alternative models favoring a representation-based interference account. In this article, we develop from the most recent proposals made by Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2 of the most plausible extensions of these alternative models. We show that neither of these extensions can account for recent findings related to between-domain WM performance and that both lead to predictions that are contradicted by new empirical evidence. Finally, we show that recent studies that have been claimed to rule out the temporal decay hypothesis do not resist close scrutiny. We conclude that the time-based resource-sharing model remains the most parsimonious way to account for forgetting and restoration of memory traces in WM.     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

Cue-framing effects in source remembering: A memory misattribution model

During source remembering, selectively emphasizing one source in the retrieval query “Is this item from Source A?” can yield different accuracy than emphasizing the alternate source in “Is this item from Source B?” even if those are the only two possible origins. One account of this cue-framing effect holds that it reflects different active monitoring strategies encouraged by the two cue frames. An item memory misattribution (IMM) model instead assumes that this effect reflects the uncontrolled use of item recognition during confirmatory source judgments, and an IMM model simulation predicted a quantitative relationship between recognition levels and the cue-framing effect. Experiments 1 and 3 confirmed these predictions by using study repetitions to manipulate recognition levels, and Experiments 2 and 3 also demonstrated the effect with new source tasks not previously considered. The data suggest that, in addition to qualitative monitoring strategies, subjects also use the availability of item memory in a heuristic fashion during confirmatory source attributions.     

A neural model of normal and abnormal learning and memory consolidation: adaptively timed conditioning,hippocampus, amnesia,neurotrophins, and consciousness

How do the hippocampus and amygdala interact with thalamocortical systems to regulate cognitive and cognitive-emotional learning? Why do lesions of thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, and cortex have differential effects depending on the phase of learning when they occur? In particular, why is the hippocampus typically needed for trace conditioning, but not delay conditioning, and what do the exceptions reveal? Why do amygdala lesions made before or immediately after training decelerate conditioning while those made later do not? Why do thalamic or sensory cortical lesions degrade trace conditioning more than delay conditioning? Why do hippocampal lesions during trace conditioning experiments degrade recent but not temporally remote learning? Why do orbitofrontal cortical lesions degrade temporally remote but not recent or post-lesion learning? How is temporally graded amnesia caused by ablation of prefrontal cortex after memory consolidation? How are attention and consciousness linked during conditioning? How do neurotrophins, notably brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), influence memory formation and consolidation? Is there a common output path for learned performance? A neural model proposes a unified answer to these questions that overcome problems of alternative memory models.     

Terms of the debate on the format and structure of visual memory

Our ability to actively maintain information in visual memory is strikingly limited. There is considerable debate about why this is so. As with many questions in psychology, the debate is framed dichotomously: Is visual working memory limited because it is supported by only a small handful of discrete “slots” into which visual representations are placed, or is it because there is an insufficient supply of a “resource” that is flexibly shared among visual representations? Here, we argue that this dichotomous framing obscures a set of at least eight underlying questions. Separately considering each question reveals a rich hypothesis space that will be useful for building a comprehensive model of visual working memory. The questions regard (1) an upper limit on the number of represented items, (2) the quantization of the memory commodity, (3) the relationship between how many items are stored and how well they are stored, (4) whether the number of stored items completely determines the fidelity of a representation (vs. fidelity being stochastic or variable), (5) the flexibility with which the memory commodity can be assigned or reassigned to items, (6) the format of the memory representation, (7) how working memories are formed, and (8) how memory representations are used to make responses in behavioral tasks. We reframe the debate in terms of these eight underlying questions, placing slot and resource models as poles in a more expansive theoretical space.     

Great expectations: Temporal expectation modulates perceptual processing speed

In a crowded dynamic world, temporal expectations guide our attention in time. Prior investigations have consistently demonstrated that temporal expectations speed motor behavior. We explore effects of temporal expectation on perceptual speed in three nonspeeded, cued recognition paradigms. Different hazard rate functions for the cue-stimulus foreperiod were used to manipulate temporal expectations. By computational modeling we estimated two distinct components of visual attention: the temporal threshold of conscious perception (t? ms) and the speed of subsequent encoding into visual short-term memory (v items/s). Notably, these components were measured independently of any motor involvement. The threshold t? was unaffected by temporal expectation, but perceptual processing speed v increased with increasing expectation. By employing constant hazard rates to keep expectation constant over time, we further confirmed that the increase in perceptual speed was independent of the cue-stimulus duration. Thus, our results strongly suggest temporal expectations optimize perceptual performance by speeding information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Lying and deceiving--moral choice in public and private life

Suppose that there are good or morally defensible reasons for not responding truthfully to a question or request for information. Is a lie or a deception better as a means to avoid telling the truth? There are many situations in public and private life in which the answer to this question would serve as a useful moral guide, for instance, clinical situations involving dying patients, educational situations, involving young children and personal situations involving close friends. Intuitively, we feel that there is a moral asymmetry in favor of deceiving over lying. However, doubts have been cast on such intuition. The aim of this paper is to bolster this intuition. It will be argued that the claim of moral asymmetry in favor of deception can be supported on a consideration of the different degrees of expectation involved in communicative ethics. Two other objections to the claim of asymmetry will also be considered.     

Something in the way we move: Motion dynamics, not perceived sex, influence head movements in conversation

During conversation, women tend to nod their heads more frequently and more vigorously than men. An individual speaking with a woman tends to nod his or her head more than when speaking with a man. Is this due to social expectation or due to coupled motion dynamics between the speakers? We present a novel methodology that allows us to randomly assign apparent identity during free conversation in a video-conference, thereby dissociating apparent sex from motion dynamics. The method uses motion-tracked synthesized avatars that are accepted by naive participants as being live video. We find that 1) motion dynamics affect head movements but that apparent sex does not; 2) judgments of sex are driven almost entirely by appearance; and 3) ratings of masculinity and femininity rely on a combination of both appearance and dynamics. Together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis of separate perceptual streams for appearance and biological motion. In addition, our results are consistent with a view that head movements in conversation form a low level perception and action system that can operate independently from top-down social expectations.     

Wrongness and Reasons

Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘?-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on all the relevant reasons for and against ?-ing. If that ?-ing is wrong, while being an all things considered verdict, would itself be a reason, it would upset the balance of reasons: it would be a further reason which has not yet been considered in reaching the verdict. Hence, the judgment wasn’t ‘all things considered' after all. I show that the argument against wrongness being a reason is unsuccessful, because its main assumption is false. Is main assumption is that a consideration which necessarily does not affect the balance of reasons is not a reason. I also argue that there can be no deontic buck-passing account.     

Hobbes’s materialism and Epicurean mechanism

ABSTRACT

Hobbes belonged to philosophical and scientific circles grappling with the big question at the dawn of modern physics: materialism and its consequences for morality. ‘Matter in motion’ may be a core principle of this materialism but it is certainly inadequate to capture the whole project. In wave after wave of this debate the Epicurean view of a fully determined universe governed by natural laws, that nevertheless allows to humans a sphere of libertas, but does not require a creator god or teleology to explain it, comes up against monotheism and its insistence on the incoherence of an ordered world in the absence of a God and his purposes. The following questions were central to this debate: (1) Can we understand the universe as law-governed in the absence of a god? (2) If so, what room is there in a fully determined mechanical universe for human freedom? (3) If humans do enjoy freedom, does the same hold for other animals? (4) Is this freedom compatible with standard views of morality? (5) Is there an analogue between the material world as law-governed and human social order? (6) If so does it also obtain for other animals?     

On the causal mechanisms of stereotype threat: can skills that don't rely heavily on working memory still be threatened?

Recent work suggests that stereotype threat (ST) harms performance by reducing available working memory capacity. Is this the only mechanism by which ST can occur? Three experiments examined ST's impact on expert golf putting, which is not harmed when working memory is reduced but is hurt when attention is allocated to proceduralized processes that normally run outside working memory. Experiment 1 showed that well learned golf putting is susceptible to ST. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that giving expert golfers a secondary task eliminates ST-induced impairment. Distracting attention away from the stereotype-related behavior eliminates the harmful impact of negative stereotype activation. These results are consistent with explicit monitoring theories of choking under pressure, which suggest that performance degradation can occur when too much attention is allocated to processes that usually run more automatically. Thus, ST alters information processing in multiple ways, inducing performance decrements for different reasons in different tasks.     

The effect of depressed mood on the interpretation of ambiguity,with and without negative mood induction

Is there an effect of depressed mood on the interpretation of ambiguity? Are depressed individuals biased to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner? We used a cross-modal semantic priming task to look for evidence of a negative interpretative bias. Participants listened to ambiguous prime sentences (e.g., Joan was stunned by her final exam mark) and made lexical decisions to target words presented immediately after the sentence offset or after a delay of 1000 ms or 2000 ms. For the semantically related targets, the target was negatively related (distress), positively related (success), or neutrally related (grades) to the ambiguous prime. The experiment was conducted with and without a negative mood induction. The expectation was that depressed participants would be more likely to consider the negative interpretations of the ambiguous primes and would therefore experience larger priming effects for negatively related targets. Although there were large priming effects for all semantically related targets, there was no evidence of a negative interpretative bias.     

RETRACTED ARTICLE: Considering the Relationship Between Language,Culture and Cognition to Scrutinize the Lexical Influences on Cognition

In this paper, we examine the interrelationships among language, culture, and cognition. The central notion that individuals with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds think differently is not far from our everyday experience. If you have had the opportunity to engage in a conversation with a person whose native language is not English, you may have found that communication breaks down at times and that some concepts are not easily translated into another language. Or if you happen to be a fluent bilingual or multilingual, you may agree with those bilinguals or multilinguals who mention that they think differently in each of their language. A number of intriguing questions arise here. Is there a particular style of thinking that is natural for speakers of each language? If so, is it possible for a person to think in a different way, one that is not natural for that individual? Is this style of thinking imparted by the language, the culture, or both? These and lots of other questions have engaged the attention of anthropologists, linguists and psychologists, but the point that we are going to explore is the lexical influences on cognition considering the relationship between language, culture and cognition.     

Wading Through the Quagmire of Religious History

How should we teach religious history? What is the impact of our methodology on what, and on how, our students learn? Is there a methodology that cultivates an awareness of the multiculturalism and the need for deeper social interaction that characterizes many of our classrooms? This essay proposes and briefly explores the potential value of empathetic engagement as a pedagogical tool in response to these concerns. A specific application of empathetic engagement is made to teaching and learning about the history of American Catholicism.     

FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

Effects and aftereffects of stressor expectations

Is stressor exposure necessary to produce "stress" effects, or can these effects result from stressor anticipation alone? The present research explores whether it is possible to obtain "stress responses" during and after the period in which stressor exposure is being anticipated. In the first study, the expectation of submerging one's hand in ice water resulted in decreased frustration tolerance and increased blood pressure when compared with control groups not expecting this stressor. A second study replicated and extended these results to show that the expectation of control over the stressor ameliorates the negative impact of stressor expectation. The second study also examined the aftereffects of expectations. Particularly, it found that despite being relieved of the expectation that they would immerse their hand in ice water, subjects who had expected stressor exposure had decreased frustration tolerance when compared with either subjects who had expected a nonstressful procedure or those who had expected to have control over stressor termination. A third study, using noise as the expected stressor, replicated both the aftereffect of the anticipation period and the moderation of that effect by perceived control. The discussion (a) focuses on the implications of this work for understanding why aftereffects occur and (b) proposes that previously observed stressor exposure effects may in fact be postexpectation effects.     

Organ sales and moral distress

abstract The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to many of us. However, powerful arguments have been provided recently supporting legalisation (I consider two of those arguments: the Consequentialist Argument and the Autonomy Argument). Is our instinctive reaction against a market of organs irrational then? The aim of this paper is not to prove that legalization would be immoral, all things considered, but rather to show, first, that there are some kinds of arguments, offered in favour of legalisation, that are, in an important sense, illegitimate, and second, that even if legalisation might not be wrong all things considered, there are good reasons for our negative moral intuitions. Moreover, identifying these reasons will help highlight some features of moral decisions in non‐ideal situations, which in turn might be relevant to some other moral or policy choices.     

Self-reference during explicit memory retrieval: an event-related potential analysis

Is there a specific neurocognitive system underlying the subjective sense of having a unitary continuous self across time? If so, it should be possible to isolate functions involved in the sense of self from those supporting mental activities that the self is currently engaged in. We report a study of real-time noninvasive recordings of the brain's electrical activity (event-related potentials, ERPs). We found a common neural signature that is associated with self-referential processing regardless of whether subjects are retrieving general knowledge (noetic awareness) or reexperiencing past episodes (autonoetic awareness). These ERP data are consistent with models of autobiographical memory that postulate a single locus of control over explicit memory for various kinds of self-related information. The temporal properties and scalp distribution of this novel self-reference ERP effect also suggest that it may be a neurophysiological correlate of self-related activation in medial prefrontal and parietal neocortical circuits identified in functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments.