A visual familiarity account of evidence for orthographic processing in pigeons <Emphasis Type="Italic">(Columbia livia)</Emphasis>: a reply to Scarf,Corballis, Güntürkün,and Colombo (2017)

Scarf et al. (Proc Natl Acad Sci 113(40):11272–11276, 2016) demonstrated that pigeons, as with baboons (Grainger et al. in Science 336(6078):245–248, 2012; Ziegler in Psychol Sci.  https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612474322, 2013), can be trained to display several behavioural hallmarks of human orthographic processing. But, Vokey and Jamieson (Psychol Sci 25(4):991–996, 2014) demonstrated that a standard, autoassociative neural network model of memory applied to pixel maps of the words and nonwords reproduces all of those results. In a subsequent report, Scarf et al. (Anim Cognit 20(5):999–1002, 2017) demonstrated that pigeons can reproduce one more marker of human orthographic processing: the ability to discriminate visually presented four-letter words from their mirror-reversed counterparts (e.g. “LEFT” vs. “ Open image in new window ”). The current report shows that the model of Vokey and Jamieson (2014) reproduces the results of Scarf et al. (2017) and reinforces the original argument: the recent results thought to support a conclusion of orthographic processing in pigeons and baboons are consistent with but do not force that conclusion.     

An examination of the processing capacity of features in the Thatcher illusion

Detection of the Thatcher illusion (Thompson, Perception, 9:483–484, 1980) is widely upheld as being dependent on configural processing (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, Cognitive Psychology, 25:281–316, 1993; Boutsen, Humphreys, Praamstra, & Warbrick, NeuroImage, 32:352–367, 2006; Donnelly & Hadwin, Visual Cognition, 10:1001–1017, 2003; Leder & Bruce, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A:513–536, 2000; Lewis, Perception, 30:769–774, 2001; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6:255–260, 2002; Stürzel & Spillmann, Perception, 29:937–942, 2000). Given that supercapacity processing accompanies configural processing (see Wenger & Townsend, 2001), supercapacity processing should occur in the processing of Thatcherised upright faces. The purpose of this study was to test for evidence that the grotesqueness of upright Thatcherised faces results from supercapacity processing. Two tasks were employed: categorisation of a single face as odd or normal, and a same/different task for sequentially presented faces. The stimuli were typical faces, partially Thatcherised faces (either eyes or mouth inverted) and fully Thatcherised faces. All of the faces were presented upright. The data from both experiments were analysed using mean response times and a number of capacity measures (capacity coefficient, the Miller and Grice inequalities, and the proportional-hazards ratio). The results of both experiments demonstrated some evidence of a redundancy gain for the redundant-target condition over the single-target condition, especially in the response times in Experiment 1. However, there was very limited evidence, in either experiment, that the redundancy gains resulted from supercapacity processing. We concluded that the oddity signalled by inversion of eyes and mouths does not arise from positive interdependencies between these features.     

Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell (Theoria, 74, 331–351 2008), Dreier (2009) and MacFarlane and Kolodny (The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 115–143 2010) are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer (1986) and Lewis (1975) leads to counterexamples to modus ponens (cp. Charlow Synthese, 190, 2291–2323 2013; Khoo Philosophical Studies, 166, 153–64 2013). This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too.     

Family Policy Indicators and Well-Being in Europe from an Evolutionary Perspective

Social progress and the evolution of civilizations have traditionally been predominant fields of study for sociology and important topics on political action for modern states as part of the concept of the Welfare State. The study, assessment, and design of social policies related to welfare have always focused on material indicators. However, some recent studies (Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2005; Gauthier 1996; Held 2006; Daly and Lewis 2000) argue for the inclusion of subjective indicators to cater for aspects traditionally relegated to families’ private lives such as care or the perception of happiness. This article deals with the need to go beyond welfare to well-being from an evolutionary perspective. To do this, we propose a comparative study of different variables used by the European Social Survey (2010) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) family policy database (2013b) to analyze (a) possible variations in family policy in European countries, (b) links between well-being and the family policies being implemented, (c) the extent to which traditional indicators can measure the development of families’ needs, and (d) ways in which these indicators could be improved.     

Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.     

Jesus loves you!

According to orthodox semantics, a given sentence as used at a given situation expresses at most one content. In the last decade, this view has been challenged with several objections. Many of them have been addressed in the literature. But one has gone almost unheeded. It stems from sentences that are used to address several people individually, like ‘Jesus loves you!’ as uttered by a priest at a sermon. Cappelen (Philos Perspect 22(1):23–46, 2008), Egan (Synthese 166(2):251–279, 2009), López de Sa (Erkenntnis 79(1):241–253, 2014), and MacFarlane (Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, ch. 4) claim that, to account for such cases, one has to adopt a pluralist semantics, according to which the sentences in question express more than one content. In this paper, I shall counter this objection. Exploiting different so far underappreciated features of singular and plural ‘you,’ I argue, orthodox semantics can very well account for the cases in question.     

Power,Situation, and Character: A Confucian-Inspired Response to Indirect Situationist Critiques

Indirect situationist critiques of virtue ethics grant that virtue exists and is possible to acquire, but contend that given the low probability of success in acquiring it, a person genuinely interested in behaving as morally as possible would do better to rely on situationist strategies - or, in other words, strategies of environmental or ecological engineering or control (Doris, 2002, 1998; see also Levy 2012). In this paper, I develop a partial answer to this critique drawn from work in early Confucian ethics and in contemporary philosophy and psychology. From early Confucian ethics, I lean on the concept of li, or ritual. Ritual represents both a set of situational manipulations that are especially effective at directly producing moral behavior and at indirectly cultivating virtue over time, and also a virtue that consists of facility with and expertise in these situational manipulations (Mower 2013; Slingerland, 2011; Sarkissian, 2010; and Hutton, 2006). Appealing to the particular example of social power, I then argue that one is justified in attempting to acquire virtue if one (a) knows that one will frequently encounter circumstances in which purely situationist strategies lose effectiveness, (b) if these circumstances also carry moral urgency: the risk of great harm or opportunity for great benefit to others is high, and (c) if utilizing the potent combination of situationist strategies and virtue envisioned by the early Confucians as ritual is possible.     

Learning to Live in the Anthropocene: Our Children and Ourselves

This essay responds to recent philosophical interest in the Anthropocene by asking (Trachtenberg in Inhabiting the Anthropocene: how we live changes everything, 2016): Can and should educators adopt, form, transmit, teach ways of living to maintain, if not enhance Earth’s habitability, especially its habitability for diverse children? This inquiry therefore calls for conceptual study of learning to live through the Anthropocene—with, despite, after, before, amid, among, away from, and against its myriad harms, possible and actual, especially its harms to children. Examining cases of environmental racism in Checker’s Polluted Promises (2005), and other cases of environmental threats to children’s health, in Steingraber’s Raising Elijah (2011), this study begins by proposing the ecological gap in philosophy of education consequential for children resides within another epistemological gap, variously designated gender gap, love gap, care gap (Martin in The schoolhome: rethinking schools for changing families. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992; Education reconfigured: culture, encounter, and change. Routledge, New York, 2011; Warren in Ecofeminist philosophy: a Western persepctive on what it is and why it matters. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2000). Ruddick’s maternal thinking (1984, 1988) provides a conceptual frame for theorizing three moral aims of learning to live in the Anthropocene that might inform public schooling.     

Incorporating Jewish Texts with REBT in the Treatment of Clinical Anger

Although there are some major philosophical differences between the underpinnings of REBT and religion, REBT has still been used effectively with religious clients (DiGiuseppe et al. in A practitioner’s guide to rational-emotive behavior therapy, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014). To date, most of the literature on using REBT with religious clients has focused on Christians and Christianity (e.g. Johnson in Cognit Behav Pract 8(1):39–47, 2002; Nielsen in Cognit Behav Pract 8(1):34–39, 2002; Ellis in Prof Psychol Res Pract 31(1):29–33, 2000; amongst others), with less attention given to other religions. This paper provides examples for the therapeutic use of Jewish texts from Biblical and Rabbinic literature to help religious Jewish clients who present with clinical anger. The texts are used to highlight and accompany disputations and other REBT therapeutic techniques. Before offering the disputes and the techniques, a brief history of REBT and religion is presented, followed by general ethical guidelines for treating religious clients. A review of different Jewish denominations and a background to Biblical and Rabbinic sources are described as well.     

Why realists must reject normative quietism

The last two decades have seen a surge of support for normative quietism: most notably, from Dworkin (1996, 2011), Nagel (1996, 1997), Parfit (2011a, b) and Scanlon (1998, 2014). Detractors like Enoch (2011) and McPherson (2011) object that quietism is incompatible with realism about normativity. The resulting debate has stagnated somewhat. In this paper I explore and defend a more promising way of developing that objection: I’ll argue that if normative quietism is true, we can create reasons out of thin air, so normative realists must reject normative quietism.     

A Geometric Analysis of When Fixed Weighting Schemes Will Outperform Ordinary Least Squares

Many researchers have demonstrated that fixed, exogenously chosen weights can be useful alternatives to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation within the linear model (e.g., Dawes, Am. Psychol. 34:571–582, 1979; Einhorn &; Hogarth, Org. Behav. Human Perform. 13:171–192, 1975; Wainer, Psychol. Bull. 83:213-217, 1976). Generalizing the approach of Davis-Stober, Dana, and Budescu (Psychometrika 75:521–541, 2010b), I present an analytic method to determine when a choice of fixed weights will incur less mean squared error than OLS as a function of sample size, error variance, and model predictability. Geometrically, I solve for the region of population β that favors a choice of fixed weights over OLS. I derive closed-form upper and lower bounds on the volume of this region, giving tight bounds on the proportion of population β favoring a choice of fixed weights. I illustrate this methodology with several examples and provide a MATLAB^© (The MathWorks, Matlab software, version 2009b, 2010) programming implementation of the major results.     

The Varieties of Moral Improvement,or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress

Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent or -dependent. For the metaethical constructivist, however, I add that moral progress ought also mean that agents come to be or could come to be motivated to act in light of the right kind of moral judgments. Together I take this to mean that, for all forms of constructivism, moral progress must be explained as a form of moral improvement, or agents aspiring to be better sorts of moral agents. In what moral improvement consists differs for various forms of constructivism. Here I distinguish between three different versions of metaethical constructivism: Humean constructivists as represented by Street (2008, 2010, 2012), Kantian constitutivist constructivists as represented by Korsgaard, and constructivists about practical reason as represented by Carla Bagnoli (2002, 2013). I conclude by showing that only constructivism as a view about practical reason can fully account for moral progress qua the opportunity for moral improvement.     

Pure Modal Logic of Names and Tableau Systems

By a pure modal logic of names (PMLN) we mean a quantifier-free formulation of such a logic which includes not only traditional categorical, but also modal categorical sentences with modalities de re and which is an extension of Propositional Logic. For categorical sentences we use two interpretations: a “natural” one; and Johnson and Thomason’s interpretation, which is suitable for some reconstructions of Aristotelian modal syllogistic (Johnson in Notre Dame J Form Logic 30(2):271–284, 1989; Thomason in J Philos Logic 22(2):111–128, 1993 and J Philos Logic 26:129–141, 1997. In both cases we use Johnson-like models (1989). We also analyze different kinds of versions of PMLN, for both general and singular names. We present complete tableau systems for the different versions of PMLN. These systems enable us to present some decidability methods. It yields “strong decidability” in the following sense: for every inference starting with a finite set of premises (resp. every syllogism, every formula) we can specify a finite number of steps to check whether it is logically valid. This method gives the upper bound of the cardinality of models needed for the examination of the validity of a given inference (resp. syllogism, formula).     

Gender Differences in Experiences with Couples Treatment for IPV

Evidence suggests that conjoint treatment can be effective for certain violent couples in certain situations (Finkel in Rev Gen Psychol 11:193–207, 2007; LaTaillade et al. in J Cogn Psychother 20:393–410, 2006; Fals-Stewart et al. in J Consult Clin Psych 73:239–248, 2005; Stith et al. in J Marital Fam Ther 29(3):407–426, 2003). However, not as much is known about which aspects of conjoint treatment make a difference, nor if male and female participants experience these elements of treatment differently. Knowing which components of couples’ treatment clients perceive as helpful—and whether their perceptions differ by gender—will allow us to redefine models with an eye toward making them more effective. In this study we used qualitative methods to examine the aspects of a particular couples’ treatment program (Stith and McCollum in Aggress Violent Beh 16(4):312–318, 2011) that clients found useful while also considering the differences between men’s and women’s responses. Fourteen couples, in which the male had been identified as the primary aggressor, were interviewed multiple times to gain their perspectives about components of the program they found helpful and their suggestions for program improvement. Themes are analyzed by gender. Implications for treatment and future research are provided.     

Distilling Common History and Practice Elements to Inform Dissemination: Hanf-Model BPT Programs as an Example

There is a shift in evidence-based practice toward an understanding of the treatment elements that characterize empirically supported interventions in general and the core components of specific approaches in particular. The evidence base for behavioral parent training (BPT) and the standard of care for early-onset disruptive behavior disorders (oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder), which frequently co-occur with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, are well established, yet an ahistorical, program-specific lens tells little regarding how leaders, University of Oregon Medical School, shaped the common practice elements of contemporary evidence-based BPT. Accordingly, this review summarizes the formative work of Hanf, as well as the core elements, evolution, and extensions of her work, represented in Community Parent Education (COPE; (Cunningham et al. in J Child Psychol Psychiatry 36:1141–1159, 1995; Cunningham et al. in COPE, the community parent education program: large group community-based workshops for parents of 3- to 18-year-olds, COPE Works, Hamilton, 2009), Defiant Children (DC; (Barkley in Defiant children: a clinician’s manual for assessment and parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 1987; Barkley in Defiant children: a clinician’s manual for assessment and parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 2013), Helping the Noncompliant Child (HNC; Forehand and McMahon in Helping the noncompliant child: a clinician’s guide to parent training, Guilford Press, New York, 1981; McMahon and Forehand in Helping the noncompliant child: family-based treatment for oppositional behavior, 2nd ed., Guilford Press, New York, 2003), Parent–child interaction therapy (PCIT; Eyberg and Robinson in J Clin Child Adolesc Psychol 11:130–137, 1982. doi:10.1080/15374418209533076; Eyberg in Child Fam Behav Ther 10:33–46, 1988; Eyberg and Funderburk in Parent–child interaction therapy protocol, PCIT International, Gainesville, 2011), and the Incredible Years (IY; (Webster-Stratton in Behav Ther 12:634–642, 1981. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(81)80135-9; Webster-Stratton in J Pediatr Psychol 7:279–294, 1982. doi:10.1093/jpepsy/7.3.279; Webster-Stratton in The incredible years: parents and children series. Leader’s guide: preschool version of BASIC (ages 3–6 years, The Incredible Years, Seattle, 2008). Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive review of the evidence base for the Hanf-Model programs, rather our intention is to provide a template of sorts from which agencies and clinicians can make informed choices about how and why they are using one program versus another, as well as how to make inform flexible use one program or combination of practice elements across programs, to best meet the needs of child clients and their families. Clinical implications and directions for future work are discussed.     

Validation of a Brief Version of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS-18) in Five Samples

The field of affective clinical science has expanded dramatically over the past several decades (Rottenberg and Gross 2003; Tracy et al. 2014). An important part of this research is understanding emotion regulation and dysregulation, in particular, how individuals differ in their ability to identify, accept, and manage their emotional experiences. One of the most common and widely cited measures of emotion dysregulation is the Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz and Roemer 2004), which has been extensively used to facilitate understanding of how emotion dysregulation is associated with psychiatric symptoms, other emotion-related constructs, and treatment progress. While this scale has contributed greatly to our understanding of emotion regulation problems, its length makes its inclusion in brief study protocols difficult, limiting its utility and increasing participant burden. In order to address this issue, we developed a short form version of the DERS (DERS-18) composed of the strongest items from each of the measure’s six subscales from the original DERS publication (Gratz and Roemer 2004), and then validated this measure in five datasets that vary in age and sample type. Our results demonstrate that an 18-item short-form of the DERS exhibits a similar structure as the original 36-item DERS, demonstrates excellent reliability and validity, and performs similarly to the original DERS despite comprising half the items. The DERS-18 has the potential to improve and expand emotion regulation assessment while reducing demands on research participants.     

Hyperbole,abstract motion and spatial knowledge: sequential versus simultaneous scanning

Hyperbole is an interesting trope in the perspective of Space Grammar, since it is related to the displacing of a limit (Lausberg in Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. M.H. Verlag, Munchen 1967; see the Ancient Greek meaning ‘to throw over’ > ‘exaggerate’). Hyperbole semantic mechanisms are related to virtual scanning (Holmqvist and P?uciennik in Imagery in language. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, pp 777–785, 2004). Basic concepts of SIZE and QUANTITY, related image-schemas (IS) and conceptual metaphors (UP IS MORE; IMPORTANT IS BIG: Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987) are implied in hyperbole processing. The virtual scanning is the simulation of a perceptual domain (here, the vertically oriented space). The virtual limit is defined by expected values on the relevant scale. Since hyperbole is a form of intensification, its linguistic interest lies in cases involving the extremes of a scale, for which a limit can be determined (Schemann 1994). In this experimental study, we analyze the concept of ‘limit’ in terms of ‘abstract motion’ and ‘oriented space’ domains (Langacker 1990) with respect to hyperboles expressed by Italian Verbs of movement. The IS considered are PATH and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. The latter corresponds to a virtual scale whose limit is arrived at, or overcome, in hyperboles.     

Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):427–446, 1970, Australas J Philos 50:249–258, 1972) and Jackson (Monist 77:93–110, 1994, 1998). There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between conceptual analysis, as it is typically employed in the Canberra plan, and a version of it defended by Jackson himself. In this paper, I elucidate this distinction, and employ examples from the history of science to argue the use of the former, but not the latter, incurs certain problems of conceptual change. Moreover, I also argue neither can be used to undertake serious metaphysics—the former because of the aforementioned problems, and the latter due to the machinery it employs to solve them.     

Scientific Progress,Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park

Dellsén (2016) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015); epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. An important upshot of the paper is that we should distinguish between episodes that constitute and promote scientific progress, and evaluate account of scientific progress in terms of how they classify different episodes with respect to these categories.     

Revalidation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sat</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Chit</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ananda</Emphasis> Scale

Sat-Chit-Ananda is an indigenous construct that refers to absolute bliss and consciousness. The present study aimed to strengthen the psychometric properties of the newly developed Sat-Chit-Ananda scale (Singh et al. in Int J Vedic Found Manag 1(2):54–74, 2014). A total of 398 students aged 17–36 years (mean age = 21.33 years, SD = 2.2, 70% males) participated in this study. An exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analysis was computed for the 17-item scale. Its’ concurrent validity was established by assessing its correlation with other well-being measures, namely Flourishing (Diener et al. in Soc Indic Res 97:143–156 2010) and Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (Diener et al. 2010). Satisfactory results were obtained from both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Sat-Chit-Ananda and its factors were found to be significantly positively correlated with Flourishing and Positive Experiences and were negatively correlated with Negative Experiences. Thus, the validity of the Sat-Chit-Ananda (Singh et al. 2014) scale stands further substantiated—offering this scale as a promising new assessment tool.