Experienced utility: Utility theory from Jeremy Bentham to Daniel Kahneman

Utility is sometimes defined as being a way to summarise choice, and sometimes as the benefit we get from experience. In economics, the twentieth century saw the former definition supplant the latter. Recent research by Kahneman and colleagues has undertaken to resurrect the latter definition under the heading of “experience utility”. In this paper I give a brief history of the concept of experience utility, and examine three normative claims that have been made about it: that it avoids the problem of dependent utilities, that it can be measured from an invariant “zero point”, and that it allows intrapersonal comparison of utilities.     

Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility

Utilitarians are attracted to the idea that an act is morally right iff it leads to the best outcome. But critics have pointed out that in many cases we cannot determine which of our alternatives in fact would lead to the best outcome. So we can’t use the classic principle to determine what we should do. It’s not “practical”; it’s not “action-guiding”. Some take this to be a serious objection to utilitarianism, since they think a moral theory ought to be practical and action-guiding. In response, some utilitarians propose to modify utilitarianism by replacing talk of actual utility with talk of expected utility. Others propose to leave the original utilitarian principle in place, but to combine it with a decision procedure involving expected utility. What all these philosophers have in common is this: they move toward expected utility in order to defend utilitarianism against the impracticality objection. My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on this way of replying to the objection. My central claim is that if utilitarians are worried about the impracticality objection, they should not turn to expected utility utilitarianism. That theory does not provide the basis for a cogent reply to the objection. Originally presented at the 2004 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Bellingham Washington, August 2, 2004, with comments by Gustaf Arrhenius and Elizabeth Harman. I am grateful to Arrhenius and Harman for their challenging criticism, as well as to Chris Heathwood, Michael Zimmerman, Owen McLeod, Elinor Mason, Eric Moore and other participants at the Bellingham Conference for comments and suggestions. In October, 2004 I discovered Mark Strasser’s ‘Actual Versus Probable Utilitarianism’. I see that in that paper Strasser anticipates a number of the points I make here.     

The Utility of Utility Analysis

Recent research on utility analysis that focuses on estimating the dollar value of performance gains was critically reviewed and a case was made that other metrics for expressing utility may be desirable. The need to validate the accu- racy of utility predictions was emphasized, and factors that could adversely affect their accuracy were described in a framework of criteria types and job types. A set of research propositions was offered and implications for future work on utility were discussed. In addition to its traditional role as an aid to decision making, utility analysis as a means to understanding the perform- ance construct was emphasized.     

Utility Monsters for the Fission Age

One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter‐intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible (though not uncontroversial) doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so‐called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit‐style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics.     

SMARTS and SMARTER: Improved Simple Methods for Multiattribute Utility Measurement

This paper presents two approximate methods for multiattribute utility measurement, SMARTS and SMARTER, each based on an elicitation procedure for weights. Both correct an error in SMART, originally proposed by Edwards in 1977, and in addition SMARTER is simpler to use. SMARTS uses linear approximations to single-dimension utility functions, an additive aggregation model, and swing weights. The paper proposes tests for the usability of these approximations. SMARTER, based on a formally justifiable weighting procedure developed by Barron and Barrett, uses the same procedures as SMARTS except that it omits the second of two elicitation steps in swing weights, substituting calculations based on ranks. It can be shown to perform about 98% as well as SMARTS does, without requiring any difficult judgments from elicitees.     

Career Development Concepts: Significance and Utility

Trustees of four appropriate professional associations determined the relative value of significant career-development concepts from a preselected list. Comparisons among the trustee groups are made, composite data are reported, suggestions for using the rank-ordered concepts in research as an external criterion are provided, and ideas for incorporating the concepts as topics for group guidance classes are given.     

Cognitive strategies for controlling emotional contagion

This study examined strategies for limiting susceptibility to “catching” negative emotions from others. Participants watched 3 videos of happy or sad individuals, as though they were therapists interacting with clients. The entire process was videotaped. Emotional contagion was measured by facial affect and self‐reports. Prior to viewing the videos, participants were assigned one of 4 cognitive strategies: (a) empathic imagery; (b) dissociation; (c) reflection; or (d) no instruction (control). Empathic imagery was expected to increase contagion vs. the control, while dissociation and reflection were expected to decrease contagion. Results indicated that only dissociation decreased contagion on both measures.     

Parallel computations for controlling an arm

In order to control a reaching movement of the arm and body, several different computational problems must be solved. Some parallel methods that could be implemented in networks of neuron-like processors are described. Each method solves a different part of the overall task. First, a method is described for finding the torques necessary to follow a desired trajectory. The methods is more economical and more versatile than table look-up and requires very few sequential steps. Then a way of generating an internal representation of a desired trajectory is described. This method shows the trajectory one piece at a time by applying a large set of heuristic rules to a "motion blackboard" that represents the static and dynamic parameters of the state of the body at the current point in the trajectory. The computations are simplified by expressing the positions, orientations, and motions of parts of the body in terms of a single, non-accelerating, world-based frame of reference, rather than in terms of the joint-angles or an egocentric frame based on the body itself.     

Treatment Utility of Universal Screening for Behavioral Risk: A Manipulated Assessment Study

In recent years, schools have started implementing preventive practices such as universal screening. Yet, researchers have not evaluated the extent to which universal screening contributes to academic and behavioral outcomes. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the treatment utility of universal screening for behavioral risk. Student participants were randomly assigned to two groups, corresponding to a different method of identification (office discipline referrals and universal screening). Participants identified as at risk, based on their office discipline referral data or universal screening data, and selected for intervention, received a Tier 2 intervention. Data were analyzed using a fixed-effects regression model. Analyses identified no statistically significantly differences between the two groups with regard to various academic and behavioral outcomes, suggesting universal screening did not contribute to changes in student functioning.     

Parent Informants for Child Personality: Agreement,Discrepancies, and Clinical Utility

A long-standing issue in child clinical research is the integration of various informants, but this topic has not been comprehensively applied to the domain of child personality. Mothers and fathers rated their children (N = 346) on personality traits and behavioral problems. Mother–father agreement was highest for Conscientiousness and lowest for Neuroticism and Agreeableness. Each parent's ratings added incremental variance in predicting behavioral problems, and mother–father discrepancy predicted internalizing problems. These results suggest that both parents should be used as informants in child personality assessment and discrepancies might reflect meaningful variance with clinical utility.     

Many tests of significance: new methods for controlling type I errors

There have been many discussions of how Type I errors should be controlled when many hypotheses are tested (e.g., all possible comparisons of means, correlations, proportions, the coefficients in hierarchical models, etc.). By and large, researchers have adopted familywise (FWER) control, though this practice certainly is not universal. Familywise control is intended to deal with the multiplicity issue of computing many tests of significance, yet such control is conservative--that is, less powerful--compared to per test/hypothesis control. The purpose of our article is to introduce the readership, particularly those readers familiar with issues related to controlling Type I errors when many tests of significance are computed, to newer methods that provide protection from the effects of multiple testing, yet are more powerful than familywise controlling methods. Specifically, we introduce a number of procedures that control the k-FWER. These methods--say, 2-FWER instead of 1-FWER (i.e., FWER)--are equivalent to specifying that the probability of 2 or more false rejections is controlled at .05, whereas FWER controls the probability of any (i.e., 1 or more) false rejections at .05. 2-FWER implicitly tolerates 1 false rejection and makes no explicit attempt to control the probability of its occurrence, unlike FWER, which tolerates no false rejections at all. More generally, k-FWER tolerates k - 1 false rejections, but controls the probability of k or more false rejections at α =.05. We demonstrate with two published data sets how more hypotheses can be rejected with k-FWER methods compared to FWER control.     

Alcohol and aggression: A replication study controlling for potential confounding variables

An experiment tested whether the Taylor reaction time paradigm generates a valid measure of aggression when used in alcohol research and when identified confounding influences are controlled. The Alcohol group drank 1.2 ml of 100% alcohel/kg body weight and was compared with a Control group drinking the equivalent amount of tonic. Subjects were tested in an exact replica of Taylor's paradigm. Results indicated that intoxicated subjects were more aggressive both when provoked and when not provoked, which was interpreted as supportive of the validity of this procedure. Discussion was concentrated on the role of dose level and number of and form of available alternatives to behave in the test situation.     

Utility of Philosophy

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Philosophy is an incredible intellectual enterprise that promotes comprehensive exposure to creative and critical thinking. The paper is...     

Utility of cognitive-behavioral procedures for social skills training with children: A critical review

Thirty-three studies that have used cognitive-behavioral social skills training procedures were critically reviewed. These studies were classified under four broad categories: (a) modeling, (b) coaching, (c) treatment packages, and (d) social problem solving. Seven criteria were used to critically evaluate these studies: (a) subject characteristics, (b) treatment specification, (c) out come measures, (d) statistical analyses, (e) experimental design, (f) generalization, and (g) cost effectiveness.