Perceiving,its component stream of perceptual experience,and Gibson's ecological approach

Summary Gibson's theory nearly explicitly distinguishes the activity or process of perceiving from its component stream of perceptual experience (awareness). An activity of perceiving is a total process of a perceiver's using a perceptual system to perceive something in the environment or of himself or herself in that environment. An activity of perceiving includes, inter alia, an obtained stimulus energy flux at the respective receptors, as well as a stream of perceptual experience (awareness) which proceeds at certain brain centers of the respective perceptual system. Obtaining stimulation, though this be highly structured and nomically specific to environmental properties, is not the having of perceptual experience (awareness); in addition to information pick-up, there must take place, in the nervous system, extraction of informational features (invariants and variants) of the stimulus energy flux. But the Gibsonian Lombardo argues that perceptual awareness is not a brain process; it occurs, rather, at the ecological level of organization. In effect, this contradicts Gibson's theory, which holds (a) that information pick-up, but not extraction, occurs at the interface between perceiving and environment, and (b) perceptual experience (awareness), in contrast to perceiving, is not publicly observable, as it would be by definition if it occurred at the ecological level of organization.     

A Stochastic Version of General Recognition Theory

General recognition theory (GRT) is a multivariate generalization of signal detection theory. Past versions of GRT were static and lacked a process interpretation. This article presents a stochastic version of GRT that models moment-by-moment fluctuations in the output of perceptual channels via a multivariate diffusion process. A decision stage then computes a linear or quadratic function of the outputs from the perceptual channels, which drives a univariate diffusion process that determines the subject's response. Conditions are established under which the stochastic and static versions of GRT make identical accuracy predictions. These equivalence relations show that traditional estimates of perceptual noise may often be corrupted by decisional influences. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Transfer and Scaffolding of Perceptual Grouping Occurs Across Organizing Principles in 3- to 7-Month-Old Infants

ABSTRACT— Previous research has demonstrated that organizational principles become functional over different time courses of development: Lightness similarity is available at 3 months of age, but form similarity is not readily in evidence until 6 months of age. We investigated whether organization would transfer across principles and whether perceptual scaffolding can occur from an already functional principle to a not-yet-operational principle. Six- to 7-month-old infants (Experiment 1) and 3- to 4-month-old infants (Experiment 2) who were familiarized with arrays of elements organized by lightness similarity displayed a subsequent visual preference for a novel organization defined by form similarity. Results with the older infants demonstrate transfer in perceptual grouping: The organization defined by one grouping principle can direct a visual preference for a novel organization defined by a different grouping principle. Findings with the younger infants suggest that learning based on an already functional organizational process enables an organizational process that is not yet functional through perceptual scaffolding.     

Loss and persistence of implicit memory for sound: Evidence from auditory stream segregation context effects

An important question is the extent to which declines in memory over time are due to passive loss or active interference from other stimuli. The purpose of the present study was to determine the extent to which implicit memory effects in the perceptual organization of sound sequences are subject to loss and interference. Toward this aim, we took advantage of two recently discovered context effects in the perceptual judgments of sound patterns, one that depends on stimulus features of previous sounds and one that depends on the previous perceptual organization of these sounds. The experiments measured how listeners’ perceptual organization of a tone sequence (test) was influenced by the frequency separation, or the perceptual organization, of the two preceding sequences (context1 and context2). The results demonstrated clear evidence for loss of context effects over time but little evidence for interference. However, they also revealed that context effects can be surprisingly persistent. The robust effects of loss, followed by persistence, were similar for the two types of context effects. We discuss whether the same auditory memories might contain information about basic stimulus features of sounds (i.e., frequency separation), as well as the perceptual organization of these sounds.     

What is mental representation? A study of its elements and how they lead to language

Mental representation as a psychoanalytic concept has never found a central place in the family of psychoanalytic concepts and gradually has become a stepchild. A modest conceptual outline of infant mental development may help the mental representation concept become more central. The following ideas are hypothesized: (1) Registration is viewed separately from representation so that two distinct types of registration are initiated, one for distinctly mental phenomena, the other for unconscious, reflexive phenomena. (2) Perceptual-apperceptual focus is central, so that consciousness and interest in thinking always occur together whenever registrations are of the mental type. (3) A developmental schema process is proposed that will fill the humanistic object-self and motivational gap between Piaget's and Freud's ideas. (4) Analogy, metaphor, and syntax are seen to contribute to (in addition to being contributed to by) schema formation. (5) The mind is conceived as both an organization of information and as an organizer of information. This allows the separateness of representability from physical influences to be understood as both motivational and basically as process. With these hypotheses, mental representation may be viewed as central to mental organization.     

Programme for experiments on thinking

In remembering, items are used in the form in which they are alleged to have been perceived at some time in the past. In thinking, however, evidence is given and the essential character of the process is to move beyond this evidence, but in line with it, to something for which so far, no exact or complete perceptual basis is claimed.

From an experimental point of view the best approach is to consider thinking as a high level skill, and to design experiments in the light of what has been discovered during recent years about the learning, practice and achievements of skill on a psycho-motor level.

When this is done, it turns out that the thinking process can usefully be considered as one in which gaps are filled up in accord with specific evidence provided. The fundamental gap-filling processes are either of interpolation or of extrapolation.

In the present paper the methodology proposed is developed and illustrated in a preliminary manner.     

Meaning and modality: influences of context, semantic memory organization, and perceptual predictability on picture processing

Using event-related potentials (ERPs), the authors investigated the influences of sentence context, semantic memory organization, and perceptual predictability on picture processing. Participants read pairs of highly or weakly constraining sentences that ended with (a) the expected item, (b) an unexpected item from the expected semantic category, or (c) an unexpected item from an unexpected category. Pictures were unfamiliar in Experiment 1 but preexposed in Experiment 2. ERPs to pictures reflected both contextual fit and memory organization, as do ERPs to words in the same contexts (K. D. Federmeier & M. Kutas, 1999). However, different response patterns were observed to pictures than to words. Some of these arose from perceptual predictability differences, whereas others seem to reflect true modality-based differences in semantic feature activation. Although words and pictures may share semantic memory, the authors' results show that semantic processing is not amodal.     

Perceptual organization: To reverse back the inverted (upside-down) question of feature binding

In addressing the most fundamental question of “Where visual processing begins”, all theories of perception can be segregated into two contrasting lines of thinking: “early feature-analysis” (i.e., from local to global processing) and “early holistic registration” (i.e., from global to local processing). The problem of feature binding is then essentially a consequence of the particular local-to-global assumption. However, from the global-to-local perspective, the problem of feature binding may be a wrong question to ask to begin with, while the Gestalt concept of perceptual organization serves to reverse this inverted position. Inspired by the analysis of invariants over transformations, particularly shape-changing transformations, a topological approach has been proposed to describe precisely the nature and rules of perceptual organization. Evidence supporting topological perception will be illustrated in topics of visual sensitivity, apparent motion, illusory conjunctions, and the relative salience of different geometric invariants.     

Learning geographical information from hypothetical maps

People show biases or distortions in their geographical judgments, such as mistakenly judging Rome to be south of Chicago (the Chicago-Rome illusion). These errors may derive from either perceptual heuristics or categorical organization. However, previous work on geographic knowledge has generally examined people's judgments of real-world locations for which learning history is unknown. This article reports experiments on the learning of hypothetical geographical spaces, in which participants acquired information in a fashion designed to control real-world factors, such as variable travel experiences or stereotypes about other countries, as well as to mimic initial encounters with locations through reading or conventional school-based geography education. Five experiments combine to suggest that biases in judgment based on learning of this kind are different in key regards from those seen with real-world geography and may be based more on the use of perceptual heuristics than on categorical organization.     

Sound enhances visual perception: cross-modal effects of auditory organization on vision

Six experiments demonstrated cross-modal influences from the auditory modality on the visual modality at an early level of perceptual organization. Participants had to detect a visual target in a rapidly changing sequence of visual distractors. A high tone embedded in a sequence of low tones improved detection of a synchronously presented visual target (Experiment 1), but the effect disappeared when the high tone was presented before the target (Experiment 2). Rhythmically based or order-based anticipation was unlikely to account for the effect because the improvement was unaffected by whether there was jitter (Experiment 3) or a random number of distractors between successive targets (Experiment 4). The facilitatory effect was greatly reduced when the tone was less abrupt and part of a melody (Experiments 5 and 6). These results show that perceptual organization in the auditory modality can have an effect on perceptibility in the visual modality.     

Attention enhances apparent perceptual organization

Perceptual organization and selective attention are two crucial processes that influence how we perceive visual information. The former structures complex visual inputs into coherent units, whereas the later selects relevant information. Attention and perceptual organization can modulate each other, affecting visual processing and performance in various tasks and conditions. Here, we tested whether attention can alter the way multiple elements appear to be perceptually organized. We manipulated covert spatial attention using a rapid serial visual presentation task, and measured perceptual organization of two multielements arrays organized by luminance similarity as rows or columns, at both the attended and unattended locations. We found that the apparent perceptual organization of the multielement arrays is intensified when attended and attenuated when unattended. We ruled out response bias as an alternative explanation. These findings reveal that attention enhances the appearance of perceptual organization, a midlevel vision process, altering the way we perceive our visual environment.     

Necessary considerations for a theory of form perception: a theoretical and empirical reply to Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986)

Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986) recently defended their version of the minimum principle, called structural information theory or SIT, against a varied set of criticisms. Two of the most notable of these criticisms are (i) that perceptual organization can proceed as a piecemeal, rather than as a global, process (as demonstrated by partially-biased Necker cubes and 'impossible' figures), and (ii) that perceptual organization is influenced by subjective variables as well as by stimulus variables (Peterson and Hochberg 1983). The second criticism was acknowledged by Boselie and Leeuwenberg but not addressed. The first criticism was addressed by the introduction of two new variables into SIT in order to argue that the perceived organization of partially-biased Necker cubes and impossible figures can be predicted by a global coding scheme, thereby supporting rather than refuting global minimum principles. It is argued here that the criticisms cannot be dismissed by this rebuttal, which is focused narrowly on single examples rather than on the general principles embodied by the demonstrations. The implications of piecemeal perception and subjective mediation are spelled out, and both old and new data showing that the applicability of global minimum principles must be reexamined, not merely defended, are discussed. Finally, the argument for a richer, more interacting, theory of form perception is presented.     

When does grouping happen?

Recent research on perceptual grouping is described with particular emphasis on identifying the level(s) at which grouping factors operate. Contrary to the classical view of grouping as an early, two-dimensional, image-based process, recent experimental results show that it is strongly influenced by phenomena related to perceptual constancy, such as binocular depth perception, lightness constancy, amodal completion, and illusory contours. These findings imply that at least some grouping processes operate at the level of phenomenal perception rather than at the level of the retinal image. Preliminary evidence is reported showing that grouping can affect perceptual constancy, suggesting that grouping processes must also operate at an early, preconstancy level. If so, grouping may be a ubiquitous, ongoing aspect of visual organization that occurs for each level of representation rather than as a single stage that can be definitively localized relative to other perceptual processes.     

The interaction of objective and subjective organizations in a localization search task

We investigated how both objective and subjective organizations affect perceptual organization and how this perceptual organization, in turn, influences observers’ performance in a localization search task. Two groups of observers viewing exactly the same stimuli (objective organization) performed in significantly different ways, depending on how they were induced to parse the display (subjective organization). In Experiments 1 and 2, the observers were asked to describe the location of a tilted target among a varying number of vertical or horizontal distractors. Subjective organization was induced by instructing observers to parse the display into either three horizontal regions (rows) or three vertical regions (columns). The position of the target was critical: location performance, as assessed by reaction time and errors, was consistently impaired at the locations adjacent to the boundaries defining the regions, producing what we refer to as thesubjective boundary effect. Furthermore, the extent of this effect depended on whether the stimulus-driven and conceptually driven information concurred or conflicted. This made location information more or less accessible. In Experiment 1, the strength of objective grouping was a function of the proximity of the items (near or far conditions) and their orientation in a 6×6 matrix. In Experiment 2, the strength of objective grouping was a function of similarity of color (items were color coded by rows or by columns) and the orientation of the items in a 9×9 matrix. The subjective boundary effect was more pronounced when the display promoted grouping in the direction orthogonal to that of the task (e.g., when observers parsed by rows but vertical distractors were closer together [Experiment 1] or color coded [Experiment 2] to induce global columns). In contrast, this effect decreased when the direction of both objective and subjective organizations was parallel (e.g., when observers parsed by rows and horizontal distractors were closer together [Experiment 1] or were color coded [Experiment 2] to induce global rows). A localization search task proved to be an ideal forum in which objective and subjective organizations interacted. We discuss how these results indicated that observers’ performance in a localization task was determined by the interaction of objective and subjective organizations, and that the resulting perceptual organization constrained coarse location information.     

Evidence that an episodic mode of thinking facilitates encoding of perceptually rich memories for naturalistic events relative to a gist-based mode of thinking

ABSTRACT

Several studies have demonstrated that an episodic specificity induction (ESI) can influence cognitive abilities that involve episodic processes at retrieval. To better understand the downstream implications of an “episodic mode of thinking,” we investigate whether an ESI influences encoding of new events. In a between-subjects design, participants were given an ESI or gist (control) induction. In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants then were shown film clips of naturalistic events. After a filled delay, participants were given a surprise memory test, which required narrative recollection of the film clips. Participants who received the ESI generated narratives that contained more perceptual details specifically. Relative to gist thinking, an episodic mode of thinking appears to facilitate encoding of perceptually rich memories for naturalistic events.     

Structural salience and the nonaccidentality of a gestalt

We perceive structure through a process of perceptual organization. Here we report a new perceptual organization phenomenon-the facilitation of visual grouping by global curvature. Observers viewed patterns that they perceived as organized into collections of curves. The patterns were perceptually ambiguous such that the perceived orientation of the patterns varied from trial to trial. When patterns were sufficiently dense and proximity was equated for the predominant perceptual alternatives, observers tended to perceive the organization with the greatest curvature. This effect is tantamount to visual grouping by maximal curvature and thus demonstrates an unprecedented effect of global structure on perceptual organization. We account for this result with a model that predicts the perceived organization of a pattern as function of its nonaccidentality, which we define as the probability that it could have occurred by chance. Our findings demonstrate a novel relationship between the geometry of a pattern and the visual salience of global structure.     

Perceptual organization of apparent motion in the Ternus display

A typical Ternus display has three sequentially presented frames, in which frame 1 consists of three motion tokens, frame 2 (blank) defines the interstimulus interval, and frame 3 has similar motion tokens with their relative positions shifted to the right. Interestingly, what appears to be a seemingly simple arrangement of stimuli can induce one of two distinct apparent-motion percepts in the observer. The first is an element-motion perception where the left-end token is seen to jump over its two neighboring tokens (inner tokens) to the right end of the display. The second is a group-motion perception where the entire display of the three tokens is seen to move to the right. How does the visual system choose between these two apparent-motion perceptions? It is hypothesized that the choice of motion perception is determined in part by the perceptual organization of the motion tokens. Specifically, a group-motion perception is experienced when a strong grouping tendency exists among the motion tokens belonging to the same frame. Conversely, an element-motion perception is experienced when a strong grouping tendency exists between the inner motion tokens in frames 1 and 3 (i.e. the two tokens that overlap in space between frames). We tested this hypothesis by varying the perceptual organization of the motion tokens. Both spatial (form similarity, 3-D proximity, common surface/common region, and occlusion) and temporal (motion priming) factors of perceptual organization were tested. We found that the apparent-motion perception of the Ternus display can be predictably affected, in a manner consistent with the perceptual organization hypothesis.     

Interpreting ambiguous stimuli: Separating perceptual and judgmental biases

Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s [Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59–108] diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment.     

Preparing for the 21st Century: Some Goals and Challenges for Studies of Infant Sensory and Perceptual Development

While acknowledging that there has been enormous progress in our understanding of sensory and perceptual development in human infancy over the past three decades, this paper looks toward future directions in preparation for the 21st century. It is argued that investigators should move away from the categorical thinking that dominates the field and focus more on developmental process in studying the acquisition of perceptual skills. Also, more attention should be paid to the functional role of perceptual skills and less to demonstrations of discrimination. In addition, researchers should attempt to bring their work and conceptualizations more in line with that on adults and older children. Future work on sensory and perceptual development in infancy will be heavily influenced by our understanding of how the brain works, especially with refinements in brain imaging and neurophysiology and with developments in computational modeling of perceptual processes. Finally, it is likely that there will be increased application of research findings to such problems as identification of infants at risk.     

Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception

Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our beliefs and past experiences? Cognitive penetration describes the influence of higher level cognitive factors on perceptual experience and has been a debated topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Here, we focus on visual perception, particularly early vision, and how it is affected by contextual expectations and memorized cognitive contents. We argue for cognitive penetration based on recent empirical evidence demonstrating contextual and top-down influences on early visual processes. On the basis of a perceptual model, we propose different types of cognitive penetration depending on the processing level on which the penetration happens and depending on where the penetrating influence comes from. Our proposal has two consequences: (1) the traditional controversy on whether cognitive penetration occurs or not is ill posed, and (2) a clear-cut perception–cognition boundary cannot be maintained.