Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

Are you sure you forgot? Feeling of knowing in directed forgetting.

One significant issue in metamemory is how variables increasing memorability affect metamemory. Previous research has produced inconsistent results. The effect of directed forgetting on the magnitude and accuracy of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments was investigated. Participants were presented with word pairs, some to be remembered and some to be forgotten, and then were asked to recall all target words regardless of initial instructions. For unrecalled items, they were asked to give FOK judgments about performance in a future memory task: a cued stem-completion task (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). This encoding manipulation increased both the memory performance and the magnitude of FOK judgments. However, no such effect on the accuracy of FOK judgments was observed.     

Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.     

Easily perceived, easily remembered? Perceptual interference produces a double dissociation between metamemory and memory performance

A recent candidate for explaining metamemory judgments is the perceptual fluency hypothesis, which proposes that easily perceived items are predicted to be remembered better, regardless of actual memory performance (Rhodes & Castel Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615–625, 2008). In two experiments, we used the perceptual interference manipulation to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with intact and backward-masked words during encoding, followed by a metamemory prediction (a list-wide judgment of learning, JOL) and then a free recall test. Participants predicted that intact words would be better recalled, despite better actual memory for words in the perceptual interference condition, yielding a crossed double dissociation between predicted and actual memory performance. In Experiment 2, JOLs were made after each study word. Item-by-item JOLs were likewise higher for intact than for backward-masked words, despite similar actual memory performance for both types of words. The results are consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based metamemory judgments.     

The More You Ask For,the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts

The ‘anchoring and adjustment’ bias was demonstrated in a personal injury case using mock jurors. In Experiment 1, the ad damnum, or requested compensation, was manipulated across participants. In Experiment 2, anchors were operationalized as the strength of the legal evidence. Both monetary and causal anchors systematically influenced judgments of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries, compensation awarded, and perceptions of the litigants. These results indicate that anchoring occurs in legal applications, and that plaintiffs would do well to request large compensation awards. In addition, anchors expressed on one scale affected judgments expressed on another scale. This cross-modality anchoring stands in contrast to previous studies. Finally, these anchoring effects are unlikely to be explained by either demand effects or perceived relevance of the anchor.     

Uninformative Anchors Have Persistent Effects on Valuation Judgments

Anchoring effects influence a wide range of numeric judgments, including valuation judgments, such as willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). However, prior research has not established whether anchoring only temporarily distorts responses or exerts persistent influence on preferences. This article presents three incentive compatible experiments examining the long‐term effects of random anchoring on WTP. Study 1 evaluated the persistence of anchoring effects over long durations, and showed that the strength of the effect decayed but did not disappear completely even 8 weeks later. In Study 2, a random anchor significantly influenced WTP after one week, regardless of whether WTP was also elicited immediately following the anchoring procedure, showing that consistency motivations do not account for persistence of anchoring effects. Study 3 showed relatively low anchors resulted in more stable valuations, compared with participants who reported WTP with no anchoring procedure. Together with the pattern of decay over time in Study 1, this suggests that anchoring facilitates the “imprinting” of valuation judgments for later retrieval. These studies show that anchoring effects can lead to lasting changes in valuation judgments, providing the first demonstration of long‐term persistence of constructed preferences as a result of an uninformative and arbitrary manipulation.     

Anchoring effects on performance judgments

Three studies were conducted investigating the effects of irrelevant anchors on performance judgments. Both a lab and field study demonstrated that an alternative anchoring manipulation that did not involve an explicit comparative question had effects on performance judgments similar to a traditional anchoring manipulation. The final study examined whether the anchoring effects were more likely when the anchor was highly applicable to the final judgment. The results indicated that both highly applicable and low applicable anchors produced an anchoring effect, but the highly applicable anchors had a larger effect on performance judgments. Evidence was also found for asymmetrical anchoring effects. In two of the three studies, high anchors increased performance judgments relative to the control group, whereas low anchors were not significantly different from the control group.     

Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning

The feeding of knowing refers to predictions about subsequent memory performance on previously nonrecalled items. The most frequently investigated type of subsequent performance has been recognition. The present research explored predictive accuracy with two new feeling-of-knowing criterion tests (in addition to recognition): relearning and perceptual identification. In two experiments, people attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions such as, "What is the capital of Australia?", then made feeling-of-knowing predictions for all nonrecalled answers, and finally had a criterion test to assess the accuracy of the feeling-of-knowing predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceptual identification can be employed successfully as a criterion test for the feeling of knowing. This opens a new way for metamemory research via perception. Moreover, the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting perceptual identification was not significantly correlated with the feeling-of-knowing accuracy for predicting recognition, in accord with the idea that these two tests assess memory differently. Experiment 2 demonstrated that relearning performance can also be predicted by feeling-of-knowing judgments. Both experiments showed that there is a positive relationship between the feeling of knowing and the amount of time elapsing before a memory search is terminated during recall. Further analyses showed that this relationship is substantial for nonrecalled items for which the person did not guess an answer (omission errors), but the relationship is null or negative for nonrecalled items that the person guessed incorrectly (commission errors). Several theoretical mechanisms that may underlie the feeling of knowing are proposed.     

Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to implicit interference effects at retrieval

We conducted three experiments to determine whether metamemory predictions at encoding, immediate judgments of learning (IJOLs) are sensitive to implicit interference effects that will occur at retrieval. Implicit interference was manipulated by varying the association set size of the cue (Experiments 1 and 2) or the target (Experiment 3). The typical finding is that memory is worse for large-set-size cues and targets, but only when the target is studied alone and later prompted with a related cue (extralist). When the pairs are studied together (intralist), recall is the same regardless of set size; set size effects are eliminated. Metamemory predictions at retrieval, such as delayed JOLs (DJOLs) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments accurately reflect implicit interference effects (e.g., Eakin & Hertzog, 2006. In all three experiments, we found that DJOLs and FOKs accurately predicted set size effects on retrieval but that IJOLs did not. The findings provide further evidence that metamemory predictions are inferred from information other than direct access to the state of the memory trace, as well as indicate that inferences are based on different sources depending on when in the memory process predictions are made.     

Global Predictions of Memory in Alzheimer’s Disease: Evidence for Preserved Metamemory Monitoring

Previous researchers have argued that there is a metamemory monitoring deficit in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) because patients tend to overestimate their recall performance on a word list. We propose that these previous results are a misleading by-product of the methodologies used, rather than evidence of an underlying metamemory deficit. In two experiments, AD patients and older adult controls made predictions of performance both before and after encoding a to-be-remembered list. Metamemory function was measured by observing the shift in predictions made with, and without, an opportunity to monitor the list. Experiment 1 found that although there were differences between the groups’ accuracy for their prestudy predictions of recall, both groups were equally accurate after encoding. Experiment 2 explored this using four lists that varied in item difficulty and semantic relatedness. This experiment replicated the findings of Experiment 1, and it was also found that the AD group became more accurate at predicting their performance with more exposure to study-test trials. These studies suggest that metamemory monitoring is intact in AD, because AD patients utilize information gained during processing the to-be-remembered items to revise their predictions of subsequent performance.     

间隔学习与测试效应对学习判断的影响

文章两个实验用于研究间隔学习和测试效应对即刻学习判断及其准确性的影响,结果表明：（1）间隔学习促进记忆保持力,降低即刻学习判断中对困难学习材料的高估并提高学习判断相对准确性。（2）重学前预测试具有增强记忆痕迹的功能,在间隔学习的基础上显著提高了学习判断相对准确性。（3）外部线索应当区分,间隔学习和预测试属于不同的外部线索。     

Memory and metamemory performance in older adults: One deficit or two?

In two separate experiments, three groups of older adults (50-80 years old) were shown lists of forename-surname pairs. At test subjects were cued with the surname and asked whether they knew the forename (prospective evaluation). Subjects attempted recall for those items they claimed to know and rated their confidence in their answer (retrospective evaluation). In Experiment 1 subjects saw the name list on 5 successive occasions and attempted recall after each. The older subjects recalled fewer items, but there were no age differences on retrospective memory evaluation. There was a marginally significant age effect on the prospective memory evaluation, which on closer inspection appeared to be a scaling effect related to recall performance. Experiment 2 verified this conclusion in a sample of older adults taking part in a training study extended over many weeks. The main implication of this work is that studies that compare metamemory accuracy in groups that differ in baseline memory performance should be careful before drawing conclusions about metamemory independently of memory performance.     

Memory and metamemory for semantic information in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Several studies have been conducted on OCD patients' memory and metamemory performance in episodic tasks. However, there is a clear lack of research addressing these issues for semantic memory (i.e., retrieval of information from long-term memory). Although findings regarding a memory deficit is somewhat equivocal, the empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that OCD patients with primarily checking compulsions show reduced confidence in their memory performance. The purpose of the present study was to investigate memory and metamemory performance of checkers in semantic memory domain. We compared checker OCD patients, non-checker OCD patients and normal controls on their ability to retrieve answers to general knowledge questions with a recall as well as a recognition test. We also investigated prospective (feeling-of-knowing (FOK)) and retrospective (confidence) metamemory judgments. Checker OCs were not poorer in retrieving semantic information from long-term memory. Neither were they less confident about their ability to remember currently unrecallable information in the future (FOK judgments) or about the accuracy of retrieved information (confidence judgments). Moreover, accuracy of metamemory judgments were comparable across groups. Overall, our results revealed that checker OCs do not show a memory or metamemory deficit when semantic memory was concerned, suggesting that any memory and metamemory deficit may be special to recently experienced materials.     

价值-项目间隔和项目呈现时间对价值导向元记忆的影响*

采用选择性任务范式,用2个实验考察价值-项目间隔和项目呈现时长对价值导向元记忆的影响。实验1考察不同价值-项目间隔（无, 1s, 2s）时被试的选择性记忆指标SI和记忆成绩。结果发现,随价值-项目间隔增加,被试的记忆选择性逐渐下降,间隔1s时对高价值项目的选择性仍存在,但间隔2s时消失;实验2选取实验1的两种价值-项目间隔（无, 1s）条件,延长其项目呈现时间至4.5s,考察项目呈现时间对价值导向元记忆的影响。结果发现,两种价值-项目间隔条件下记忆选择性水平（SI）均显著降低,但对高价值项目的选择性加工优势并没消失。结论：价值导向元记忆受价值-项目间隔和项目呈现时间的影响。     

Effects of alcohol intoxication on metamemory and on retrieval from long-term memory

In a balanced-placebo design, people expected either an alcohol drink or placebo drink and consumed either alcohol (1 ml/kg) or placebo. Shortly thereafter, each person attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions (e.g., "What is the capital of Chile?"), made confidence judgments about the accuracy of recall, made feeling-of-knowing judgments on all nonrecalled items, and received a recognition test. Unanticipated outcomes included: Alcohol intoxication significantly hindered recall from long-term memory, contrary to previous conclusions that alcohol does not affect retrieval; people's expectancy of alcohol had no significant effect on memory or metamemory performance, contrary to its established effects on other kinds of performance; and alcohol intoxication produced no significant overconfidence in judgments about recall or in feeling-of-knowing judgments, contrary to the overconfidence produced in other kinds of judgments such as an intoxicated person's assessment of his driving ability. This last outcome implies that alcohol intoxication does not produce a general lowering of the threshold for confidence but rather has effects that are situation specific.     

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce—and fail to produce—hindsight bias.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

The roles of meaningfulness and prior knowledge in younger and older adults' memory performance

Meaningfulness and prior knowledge can have differing effects on both metamemory and memory performance. Personally relevant information may be deemed more meaningful, which often can serve as a mediating factor in memory performance. Additionally, information that is congruent with prior knowledge has been shown to be judged as easier to remember and often is better remembered. Both of these effects are most pronounced in older adults. The current study aimed to examine the impact of meaningfulness and prior knowledge on age‐related differences in metamemory (i.e., judgments of learning) and memory performance (i.e., recall and recognition) by manipulating subjective a priori familiarity and personal relevance using age‐relevant study materials (i.e., a student loan application and a Medicare application). Recall metamemory and recall performance results indicate that older adults, but not younger adults, were able to utilize meaningfulness and prior knowledge to boost memory performance.     

Revelation effect in metamemory

Test items are more likely to be judged as previously studied if they need to be discovered before the recognition decision. In the present experiments, this revelation effect was extended to metamemory judgments. Participants studied word pairs and then tried to recall the second word of each pair when given the first word as a cue. In Experiment 1, a fragment of the target was either gradually increased in size or held constant, and in Experiment 2, sometimes an anagram of the cue was given instead of the cue itself. Thus, for some items, there was a revelation task before a recall attempt. If recall failed, the participants gave feeling-of-knowing (FOK) ratings. In both experiments, the participants gave higher FOK ratings after a revelation task, even though the items that these FOKs referred to remained unrecalled. Analyses showed a criterion shift but no differences in sensitivity.