基于期望值最大化的理论何时失效：风险决策中为自己-为所有人决策差异的眼动研究

主流的风险决策理论专家发展了一系列基于期望值最大化(expectation-maximization)的理论, 以期捕获所有人的风险决策行为。然而大量证据表明, 这些基于期望值最大化的理论并不能如同描述性理论那样理想地描述单一个体的决策行为。本研究采用眼动追踪技术, 系统考察了个体在为所有人决策与为自己决策时的风险决策行为及信息加工过程的差异。本研究发现, 基于期望值最大化的理论可捕获为所有人决策或为自己多次决策时的情况, 却不能很好捕获个体为自己进行单次决策时的情况。本研究结果有助于理解基于期望值最大化的理论与启发式/非基于期望值最大化的理论的边界, 为风险决策理论的划分和发展提供实证参考。     

A Social Values Analysis of Self–Other Differences in Decision Making Involving Risk

Three experiments tested our social values analysis of self–other differences in decision making under risk. In Experiment 1, we showed that people make riskier decisions for others in domains where risk taking is valued but not in those where risk is not valued. Experiment 2 documented that it is considered more inappropriate to make a risk-averse decision for another person than for oneself in situations where risk is valued. Experiment 3 showed that self–other differences in decision making occur even when there are no self–other differences in prediction and for decisions made for a typical student as well as for a friend. We use these results to argue that decision making for others is based predominantly on the perceived value placed on risk, leading to a norm for how to decide for others in situations where such a social value exists.     

Effects of self-other decision making on regulatory focus and choice overload

A growing stream of research is investigating how choices people make for themselves are different from choices people make for others. In this paper, I propose that these choices vary according to regulatory focus, such that people who make choices for themselves are prevention focused, whereas people who make choices for others are promotion focused. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, in particular work on errors of omission and commission, I hypothesize that people who make choices for others experience a reversal of the choice overload effect. In 6 studies, including a field study, I found that people who make choices for themselves are less satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options, yet, people who make choices for others are more satisfied after selecting among many options compared to few options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision making are discussed.     

Consumer decisions in relationships

Most research on consumer choice assumes that decisions are usually made by individuals, and that these decisions are based on an individual's personal attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. Yet, much consumer behavior—from joint decisions to individual choices—is directly or indirectly shaped by people with whom we have some relationship. In this target article, we examine how each member in a relationship can affect how consumer decisions are made. After reviewing foundational work in the area, we introduce a powerful and statistically sophisticated methodology to study decisions within relationships—a dyadic framework of decision-making. We then discuss how the study of consumer decisions in relationships can be informed by different theories in the relationships field, including attachment, interdependence, social power, communal/exchange orientations, relationship norms, and evolutionary principles. By building on the seminal foundations of prior joint-decision making research with theories and methods from contemporary relationship science, we hope to facilitate the integration of the consumer and relationships literature to better understand and generate novel hypotheses about consumer decisions in relationships.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

With age comes wisdom: decision making in younger and older adults

In two experiments, younger and older adults performed decision-making tasks in which reward values available were either independent of or dependent on the previous sequence of choices made. The choice-independent task involved learning and exploiting the options that gave the highest rewards on each trial. In this task, the stability of the expected reward for each option was not influenced by the previous choices participants made. The choice-dependent task involved learning how each choice influenced future rewards for two options and making the best decisions based on that knowledge. Younger adults performed better when rewards were independent of choice, whereas older adults performed better when rewards were dependent on choice. These findings suggest a fundamental difference in the way in which younger adults and older adults approach decision-making situations. We discuss the results in the context of prominent decision-making theories and offer possible explanations based on neurobiological and behavioral changes associated with aging.     

高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异：预期内疚的作用

本研究首次探讨高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异。结果发现：（1）当科目难度与兴趣存在冲突时,个体倾向于为自己选择低难度低兴趣科目,而为他人选择高难度高兴趣科目;（2）自我-他人决策差异存在程度效应：为近的社会距离他人（朋友）选科时自我-他人决策差异缩小;（3）预期内疚在高中生选科的自我-他人决策差异中起中介作用：相较于为自己选科,为陌生人选择低难度低兴趣科目诱发更高的预期内疚,从而降低其为陌生人选择低难度低兴趣科目的偏好。这些发现拓展了自我-他人决策差异的研究范畴,对家长、学校和教育咨询公司的选科指导具有一定的参考价值。     

Perceived Risk and Worry: The Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Fly1

Most decision-making models rely on affect-free variables to understand the decisions that people make. We tested an affectively-loaded variable—worry—as a predictor of decision making in an affectively laden context: willingness to fly after 9/11. College students rated their willingness to fly to New York City or Washington, DC, in a study conducted 34 days after 9/11. They also recorded their beliefs about the likelihood that more terrorist attacks would occur, the severity of such attacks if they were to occur, and how much they worried about flying. Finally, they made these estimates for similar others. Results showed that worry was the most powerful predictor of one's own and similar others' willingness to fly. These findings suggest that models of how people make decisions may sometimes need to take feelings into account.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.     

Effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice

The effects of self–other decision-making on intertemporal choice have been revealed in many studies using a monetary outcome. However, the outcome of intertemporal choice is not restricted to money; time is also a scarce and nonrenewable resource outcome. Thus, we conducted a series of experiments to address the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, a type of intertemporal choice that uses time as an outcome. Over the course of three experiments, differences in self–other decision-making were evidenced. Participants who made decisions for others were more likely to prefer the smaller but sooner (SS) option over the larger but later (LL) option and considered the gain of the SS option to be significantly greater than that of the LL option. Participants who made decisions for themselves were likely to prefer the LL option over the SS option. However, they considered the gains of the LL and the SS option to be indifferent. Changing the role of decision-making could affect the ability of individuals to consider the future consequences of their decisions. The effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice could be explained by the accounts of economic reasoning and construal level theory. The findings indicated that the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, which could be generated simply by rewording questions, can help individuals make optimal long-term choices without the need for increased control.     

Burger or yogurt? Indulgent consumption in impression management contexts

We conducted three studies to investigate indulgent choice in settings with and without impression management by public–private manipulation with evaluation. Study 1 showed that the participants were less indulgent under public scrutiny due to the employment of impression management. Study 2 focused on the impression management context to test the moderate effect of self‐consciousness in two impression managed contexts. Study 3 focused on context without impression management to test the moderate effects of self‐awareness on choices. We found that depending on differences in primed personality, individuals tended to make choices other than those they favoured privately when anticipating that others might form impressions of them based on the decisions made. The findings of all three studies support our basic prediction that people are less indulgent under impression management and suggest that people tend to manage their impression by eating healthier (less indulgently) in public.     

Your Data are (Not) My Data: The Role of Social Value Orientation in Sharing Data About Others

The personal data consumers share with companies on a daily basis often also involves other people. However, prior research has focused almost exclusively on how consumers make decisions about their own data. In this research, we explore how consumers’ social value orientation impacts their decisions regarding data about others. In contrast to the notion of proselfs as “selfish” decision-makers, across four studies we find that proselfs are less likely than prosocials to share data about others with third parties. We show that this effect arises because proselfs feel less ownership over data they hold about others than prosocials, which in turn reduces their willingness to share it. Overall, this work contributes to literature on social value orientation as well as privacy decision-making and helps marketers and policy makers in designing interdependent privacy choice contexts.     

The foreign-language effect: thinking in a foreign tongue reduces decision biases

Would you make the same decisions in a foreign language as you would in your native tongue? It may be intuitive that people would make the same choices regardless of the language they are using, or that the difficulty of using a foreign language would make decisions less systematic. We discovered, however, that the opposite is true: Using a foreign language reduces decision-making biases. Four experiments show that the framing effect disappears when choices are presented in a foreign tongue. Whereas people were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses when choices were presented in their native tongue, they were not influenced by this framing manipulation in a foreign language. Two additional experiments show that using a foreign language reduces loss aversion, increasing the acceptance of both hypothetical and real bets with positive expected value. We propose that these effects arise because a foreign language provides greater cognitive and emotional distance than a native tongue does.     

厌恶和恐惧情绪对跨期选择的不同影响：基于ERP的研究

本研究运用事件相关电位技术(ERPs)考察厌恶和恐惧情绪对跨期选择的影响。其中,厌恶和恐惧情绪采用情绪面孔图片进行启动,分析跨期选择任务中评估阶段所诱发的ERP成分。行为结果发现,与中性面孔相比,厌恶面孔启动使个体倾向于选择立即奖赏。ERP结果发现,在选项评估阶段,厌恶面孔比中性和恐惧面孔启动诱发更大的P2、P3和LPP波幅。这说明,厌恶情绪促使个体投入更多的注意和动机资源对跨期选项进行评估,进而使个体倾向即时满足。     

厌恶和恐惧情绪对跨期选择的不同影响：基于ERP的研究

本研究运用事件相关电位技术(ERPs)考察厌恶和恐惧情绪对跨期选择的影响。其中,厌恶和恐惧情绪采用情绪面孔图片进行启动,分析跨期选择任务中评估阶段所诱发的ERP成分。行为结果发现,与中性面孔相比,厌恶面孔启动使个体倾向于选择立即奖赏。ERP结果发现,在选项评估阶段,厌恶面孔比中性和恐惧面孔启动诱发更大的P2、P3和LPP波幅。这说明,厌恶情绪促使个体投入更多的注意和动机资源对跨期选项进行评估,进而使个体倾向即时满足。     

Do consumers ever learn? Analysis of segment behavior in experimental markets

Economists argue that, despite cognitive limitations, economic agents arrive at optimal choice rules by learning. The assumption is that consumers, for example, are adaptively rational. Adaptive rationality raises a host of issues. We address three of these in the context of experimental markets: do consumers differ on the basis of learning; how do these differences, when aggregated, affect market efficiency; and how do consumers learn? Analysis of our experimental data reveals the following. First, multiple segments of consumers exist on the basis of learning. Second, the largest segment consists of subjects who do not learn despite timely feedback and motivation. Third, although some consumers do learn to make optimal choices, the effect of this segment on market efficiency is cancelled by an equal number of subjects who ‘learn' false relations. Finally, although subjects do not learn strict rationality even with experience, they are in the aggregate not so irrational as to allow highly suboptimal brands to survive. Further analysis of how consumers learn, specifically on the cues (signals) and the rules consumers employ in making choices over time leads to the following two conclusions. First, some signals make learning more easy than others: for example, providing market share information improves learning but not as much as providing quality information does. Second, people employ different rules depending upon the type of information they have. For example, consumers making decisions based only on price information are more likely to use a heuristic like ‘buy a medium‐priced product provided it has not failed in the past'. Consumers making decisions based on price and quality information may employ a heuristic such as ‘buy top quality products regardless of price'. We discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Achievement motivation theory and occupational choice

Two studies are reported which aimed to answer several questions relating to Atkinson's model of achievement motivation. Firstly, how successfully the theory can predict the occupational choices of two different populations and what changes, if any, need to be made to the model to make it more suited to such predictions. Several conceptual errors were found in the theory which make it unsuitable in its present form for predicting occupational choices and suggestions are made as to the possible correction of these. Secondly, a comparison is made between Atkinson's model and the expectancy-valence models currently utilized to describe and predict occupational decision-making. In particular Atkinson's incentive component is contrasted with the valence measure described by expectancy-valence models, and the possible influences of the motive factors (motive to succeed and motive to avoid failure) are considered since these are typically omitted by other models of career choice. Finally, the existence of sex differences in career choice, as well as in the various components of the model are studied and discussed. The changing conceptualization of ‘fear of success’ is also included in this consideration.     

It was intuitive,and it felt good: a daily diary study on how people feel when making decisions

ABSTRACT

In daily life, people make plenty of decisions, either intuitively or based on analysis. So far, research has examined when decision-making leads to correct or biased outcomes. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective and explored how decision-making is associated with how people feel. In an observational study, 134 healthy participants retrospectively reported on six evenings which decisions they had made during that day (total N?=?3,850 decisions). They were also asked to indicate how they had felt before/after each decision. Multilevel regression analyses revealed that (a) people reported having felt better prior to intuitive as compared to analytical decisions, (b) people reported having felt better after as compared to before the decision, and (c) this increase in positive feeling was more pronounced for intuitive decisions. The latter two associations were robust to statistically controlling for the life domain in which the decisions occurred, the decisions’ importance and ease, and daily mood. The retrospective design and the single-item measure of mood are among the limitations of this study. Altogether, the results are in line with the idea that making everyday life decisions intuitively makes people feel good.     

Mixing virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic

Many of the most significant choices that people make are between vices, which exchange small immediate rewards for large delayed costs, and virtues, which exchange small immediate costs for large delayed rewards. We investigate the consequences of making a series of such choices either simultaneously or sequentially. We made two predictions. First, because many alternatives chosen under simultaneous choice will only be experienced following a delay, and because hyperbolic time discounting predicts that people will prefer delayed virtues but immediate vices, we predicted that people would choose more virtues in simultaneous than sequential choice. Second, due to the tendency to diversify portfolios of choices, we predicted a greater mix of virtues and vices in simultaneous than sequential choice. These predictions were confirmed in two experiments involving real choices; one between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ movies, and the other between ‘instant‐win’ and ‘prize‐draw’ lottery tickets. We conclude by posing the question of whether simultaneous or sequential choice results in decisions that more closely approximate what people ‘really’ want. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing effects under cognitive load: The role of working memory in risky decisions

Framing effects occur in a wide range of laboratory and natural decision contexts, but the underlying processes that produce framing effects are not well understood. We explored the role of working memory (WM) in framing by manipulating WM loads during risky decisions. After starting with a hypothetical stake of money, participants were then presented a lesser amount that they could keep for certain (positive frame) or lose for certain (negative frame). They made a choice between the sure amount and a gamble in which they could either keep or lose all of the original stake. On half of the trials, the choice was made while maintaining a concurrent WM load of random letters. In both load and no-load conditions, we replicated the typical finding of risk aversion with positive frames and risk seeking with negative frames. In addition, people made fewer decisions to accept the gamble under conditions of higher cognitive load. The data are congruent with a dual-process reasoning framework in which people employ a heuristic to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort.