Recall is not necessary for verbal sequence learning

The question of whether overt recall of to-be-remembered material accelerates learning is important in a wide range of real-world learning settings. In the case of verbal sequence learning, previous research has proposed that recall either is necessary for verbal sequence learning (Cohen & Johansson Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 139–143, 1967; Cunningham, Healy, & Williams Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 575–597, 1984), or at least contributes significantly to it (Glass, Krejci, & Goldman Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 189–199, 1989; Oberauer & Meyer Memory, 17, 774–781, 2009). In contrast, here we show that the amount of previous spoken recall does not predict learning and is not necessary for it. We suggest that previous research may have underestimated participants’ learning by using suboptimal performance measures, or by using manual or written recall. However, we show that the amount of spoken recall predicted how much interference from other to-be-remembered sequences would be observed. In fact, spoken recall mediated most of the error learning observed in the task. Our data support the view that the learning of overlapping auditory–verbal sequences is driven by learning the phonological representations and not the articulatory motor responses. However, spoken recall seems to reinforce already learned representations, whether they are correct or incorrect, thus contributing to a participant identifying a specific stimulus as either “learned” or “new” during the presentation phase.     

Increasing relational memory in childhood with unitization strategies

Young children often experience relational memory failures, which are thought to result from immaturity of the recollection processes presumed to be required for these tasks. However, research in adults has suggested that relational memory tasks can be accomplished using familiarity, a process thought to be mature by the end of early childhood. The goal of the present study was to determine whether relational memory performance could be improved in childhood by teaching young children memory strategies that have been shown to increase the contribution of familiarity in adults (i.e., unitization). Groups of 6- and 8-year-old children were taught to use visualization strategies that either unitized or did not unitize pictures and colored borders. Estimates of familiarity and recollection were extracted by fitting receiver operator characteristic curves (Yonelinas, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 20, 1341–1354, 1994, Yonelinas, Memory & Cognition 25, 747–763, 1997) based on dual-process models of recognition. Bayesian analysis revealed that strategies involving unitization improved memory performance and increased the contribution of familiarity in both age groups.     

Use of the familiarity difference cue in inferential judgments

The familiarity difference cue has been regarded as a general cue for making inferential judgments (Honda, Abe, Matsuks, & Yamagishi in Memory and Cognition, 39(5), 851–863, 2011; Schwikert & Curran in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(6), 2341–2365, 2014). The current study tests a model of inference based on familiarity differences that encompasses the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, Goldstein & Gigerenzer in Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90, 2002). In two studies, using a large pool of stimuli, participants rated their familiarity of cities and made choices on a typical city-size task. The data were fitted with the r-s model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl in, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 37(4), 827–839, 2011), which was adapted to include familiarity differences. The results indicated that people used the familiarity difference cue because the participants ignored further knowledge in a substantial number of cases when the familiarity difference cue was available. An analysis of reaction-time data further indicated that the response times were shorter for heuristic judgments than for knowledge-only-based judgments. Furthermore, when knowledge was available, the response times were shorter when knowledge was congruent with a heuristic cue than when it was in conflict with it. Differences between the familiarity difference cue and the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005, Psychological Review, 112, 610–628) are discussed.     

Conditioned task-set competition: Neural mechanisms of emotional interference in depression

Depression has been associated with increased response times at the incongruent-, neutral-, and negative-word trials of the classical and emotional Stroop tasks (Epp et al., Clinical Psychology Review, 32, 316–328, 2012). Response-time slowdown effects at incongruent- and negative-word trials of the Stroop tasks were reported to correlate with depressive severity, indicating strong relevance of the effects to the symptomatology. This study proposes a novel integrative computational model of neural mechanisms of both the classical and emotional Stroop effects, drawing on the previous prominent theoretical explanations of performance at the classical Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, Psychological Review, 97, 332–361, 1990; Herd, Banich, & O’Reilly, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 22–32, 2006), and in addition suggesting that negative emotional words represent conditioned stimuli for future negative outcomes. The model is shown to explain the classical Stroop effect and the slow (between-trial) emotional Stroop effect with biologically plausible mechanisms, providing an advantage over the previous theoretical accounts (Matthews & Harley, Cognition & Emotion, 10, 561–600, 1996; Wyble, Sharma, & Bowman, Cognition & Emotion, 22, 1019–1051, 2008). Simulation results suggested a candidate mechanism responsible for the pattern of depressive performance at the classical and the emotional Stroop tasks. Hyperactivity of the amygdala, together with increased inhibitory influence of the amygdala over dopaminergic neurotransmission, could be at the origin of the performance deficits.     

Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969–974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337–1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883–896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78–86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.     

Exploring the origin of the number-size congruency effect: Sensitivity or response bias?

Physical size modulates the efficiency of digit comparison, depending on whether the relation of numerical magnitude and physical size is congruent or incongruent (Besner & Coltheart, Neuropsychologia, 17, 467–472, 1979), the number-size congruency effect (NSCE). In addition, Henik and Tzelgov (Memory & Cognition, 10, 389–395, 1982) first reported an NSCE for the reverse task of comparing the physical size of digits such that the numerical magnitude of digits modulated the time required to compare their physical sizes. Does the NSCE in physical comparisons simply reflect a number-mediated bias mechanism related to making decisions and selecting responses about the digit’s sizes? Alternatively, or in addition, the NSCE might indicate a true increase in the ability to discriminate small and large font sizes when these sizes are congruent with the digit’s symbolic numerical meaning, over and above response bias effects. We present a new research design that permits us to apply signal detection theory to a task that required observers to judge the physical size of digits. Our results clearly demonstrate that the NSCE cannot be reduced to mere response bias effects, and that genuine sensitivity gains for congruent number-size pairings contribute to the NSCE.     

An examination of the processing capacity of features in the Thatcher illusion

Detection of the Thatcher illusion (Thompson, Perception, 9:483–484, 1980) is widely upheld as being dependent on configural processing (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, Cognitive Psychology, 25:281–316, 1993; Boutsen, Humphreys, Praamstra, & Warbrick, NeuroImage, 32:352–367, 2006; Donnelly & Hadwin, Visual Cognition, 10:1001–1017, 2003; Leder & Bruce, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A:513–536, 2000; Lewis, Perception, 30:769–774, 2001; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6:255–260, 2002; Stürzel & Spillmann, Perception, 29:937–942, 2000). Given that supercapacity processing accompanies configural processing (see Wenger & Townsend, 2001), supercapacity processing should occur in the processing of Thatcherised upright faces. The purpose of this study was to test for evidence that the grotesqueness of upright Thatcherised faces results from supercapacity processing. Two tasks were employed: categorisation of a single face as odd or normal, and a same/different task for sequentially presented faces. The stimuli were typical faces, partially Thatcherised faces (either eyes or mouth inverted) and fully Thatcherised faces. All of the faces were presented upright. The data from both experiments were analysed using mean response times and a number of capacity measures (capacity coefficient, the Miller and Grice inequalities, and the proportional-hazards ratio). The results of both experiments demonstrated some evidence of a redundancy gain for the redundant-target condition over the single-target condition, especially in the response times in Experiment 1. However, there was very limited evidence, in either experiment, that the redundancy gains resulted from supercapacity processing. We concluded that the oddity signalled by inversion of eyes and mouths does not arise from positive interdependencies between these features.     

Predicting eye-movement characteristics across multiple tasks from working memory and executive control

Individual differences in working memory (WM) and executive control are stable, related to cognitive task performance, and clinically predictive. Between-participant differences in eye movements are also highly reliable (Carter & Luke, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2018; Henderson & Luke, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 40(4), 1390–1400, 2014). However, little is known about how higher order individual differences in cognition are related to these eye-movement characteristics. In the present study, healthy college-age participants performed several individual difference tasks to measure WM span and executive control. Participants also performed three eye-movement tasks: reading, visual search, and scene viewing. Across all tasks, higher WM scores were related to reduced skewness in fixation duration distributions. In reading, higher WM scores predicted longer saccades. In scene viewing, higher WM scores predicted longer fixations. Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Analogous selection processes in declarative and procedural working memory: N-2 list-repetition and task-repetition costs

Working memory (WM) holds and manipulates representations for ongoing cognition. Oberauer (Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51, 45–100, 2009) distinguishes between two analogous WM sub-systems: a declarative WM which handles the objects of thought, and a procedural WM which handles the representations of (cognitive) actions. Here, we assessed whether analogous effects are observed when participants switch between memory sets (declarative representations) and when they switch between task sets (procedural representations). One mechanism assumed to facilitate switching in procedural WM is the inhibition of previously used, but currently irrelevant task sets, as indexed by n-2 task-repetition costs (Mayr & Keele, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 4–26, 2000). In this study we tested for an analogous effect in declarative WM. We assessed the evidence for n-2 list-repetition costs across eight experiments in which participants switched between memory lists to perform speeded classifications, mental arithmetic, or a local recognition test. N-2 list-repetition costs were obtained consistently in conditions assumed to increase interference between memory lists, and when lists formed chunks in long-term memory. Further analyses across experiments revealed a substantial contribution of episodic memory to n-2 list-repetition costs, thereby questioning the interpretation of n-2 repetition costs as reflecting inhibition. We reanalyzed the data of eight task-switching experiments, and observed that episodic memory also contributes to n-2 task-repetition costs. Taken together, these results show analogous processing principles in declarative and procedural WM, and question the relevance of inhibitory processes for efficient switching between mental sets.     

Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell (Theoria, 74, 331–351 2008), Dreier (2009) and MacFarlane and Kolodny (The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 115–143 2010) are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer (1986) and Lewis (1975) leads to counterexamples to modus ponens (cp. Charlow Synthese, 190, 2291–2323 2013; Khoo Philosophical Studies, 166, 153–64 2013). This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too.     

On the limits of statistical learning: Intertrial contextual cueing is confined to temporally close contingencies

Since the seminal study by Chun and Jiang (Cognitive Psychology, 36, 28–71, 1998), a large body of research based on the contextual-cueing paradigm has shown that the cognitive system is capable of extracting statistical contingencies from visual environments. Most of these studies have focused on how individuals learn regularities found within an intratrial temporal window: A context predicts the target position within a given trial. However, Ono, Jiang, and Kawahara (Journal of Experimental Psychology, 31, 703–712, 2005) provided evidence of an intertrial implicit-learning effect when a distractor configuration in preceding trials N ? 1 predicted the target location in trials N. The aim of the present study was to gain further insight into this effect by examining whether it occurs when predictive relationships are impeded by interfering task-relevant noise (Experiments 2 and 3) or by a long delay (Experiments 1, 4, and 5). Our results replicated the intertrial contextual-cueing effect, which occurred in the condition of temporally close contingencies. However, there was no evidence of integration across long-range spatiotemporal contingencies, suggesting a temporal limitation of statistical learning.     

From anticipation to integration: the role of integrated action-effects in building sensorimotor contingencies

Ideomotor approaches to action control have provided evidence that the activation of an anticipatory image of previously learned action-effects plays a decisive role in action selection. This study sought for converging evidence by combining three previous experimental paradigms: the response–effect compatibility protocol introduced by Kunde (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(2), 387–394, 2001), the acquisition-test paradigm developed by Elsner and Hommel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(1), 229, 2001), and the object-action compatibility manipulation of Tucker and Ellis (Visual Cognition, 8(6), 769–800, 2001). Three groups of participants first performed a response–effect compatibility task, in which they carried out power and precision grasps that produced either grasp-compatible or grasp-incompatible pictures, or no action effects. Performance was better in the compatible than in the incompatible group, which replicates previous observations and extends them to relationships between grasps and objects. Then, participants were to categorize object pictures by carrying out grasp responses. Apart from replicating previous findings of better performance in trials in which object size and grasp type was compatible, we found that this stimulus–response compatibility effect depended on previous response-effect learning. Taken together, these findings support the assumption that the experience of action–effect contingencies establishes durable event files that integrate representations of actions and their effects.     

The Challenges of the Schooling from Cultural Psychology of Education

Education is in the core of societal change in all its different forms—from kindergartens to vocational schools and lifelong learning. Education—understood as goal-oriented personal movement—re-structures personal lives both inside school and outside the school. This special issue stems from the Cultural Psychology of Education (Marsico Culture & Psychology, 21(4), 445–454, 2015a, b, Journal for the Study of Education and Development, 40(4), 754–781, 2017)—a new approach to the field of education that examines how educational experience is culturally organized. This special issue is focused on the work of schooling as a crucial scientific arena to investigate. It is the follow up of an international workshop host by the Centre for Cultural Psychology (at Aalborg University, Demark) that was very thought provoking and from where several outcomes came out. Some of them are the papers here presented that tried to illuminate the different dimensions of the educational context in the East and West society with specific attention to the Chinese and Scandinavian educational practices. The dialogue between Chinese, European and North American scholars offered a complex view of the current educational challenges in the age of globalization. In this paper I try to focus on some of the most debated and challenging aspects in educational psychology worldwide: diversity, values and practical usability of psychology at school. I re-read these “hot topics” with the help of the themes developed by the authors of this special issue and in light of Cultural Psychology of Education. Then, I conclude by proposing a new agenda for the education of the future.     

Effects of divided attention at encoding and retrieval: Further data

Division of attention (DA) at the time of learning has large detrimental effects on subsequent memory performance, but DA at retrieval has much smaller effects (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 518–540; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 159–180). Experiment 1 confirmed the relatively small effects of DA on retrieval and also showed that retrieval operations do consume processing resources. The experiment also found that the effect is not attributable to a trade-off in performance with the concurrent task or to recognition decisions made on the basis of familiarity judgments. Participants made levels-of-processing (LOP) judgments during encoding to check whether deeper semantic judgments were differentially vulnerable to the effects of DA. In fact DA did not interact with LOP. Experiment 2 explored reports that the comparatively slight effect of DA on recognition accuracy is accompanied by a compensatory increase in recognition latency (Baddeley et al., 1984). The experiment replicated findings that neither DA nor differential emphasis between recognition and a concurrent continuous reaction time (CRT) task affected recognition accuracy, but also found evidence for a lawful trade-off in decision latencies between recognition and CRT performance. Further analysis showed that the relationship between response rates on the two tasks was well described by a linear function, and that this function was demonstrated by the majority of individual participants. It is concluded that the small effect of DA on recognition performance is attributable to a trade-off within the recognition task itself; accuracy is maintained by a compensatory increase in decision latency.     

Lost in Translation: Religion in The Public Sphere

This paper proposes a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the prism of translation that frames the recent literature about the debate between Rawls and Habermas on the role of religious reasons in the public sphere (Habermas 2008; Weithman 2006; Wolterstorff 1997). This debate originates with the introduction of Rawls’s proviso in his conception of the public use of reason (Rawls The University of Chicago Law Review, 64(3), 765-807, 1997), which consists in the “translation” of religious reasons into secular ones, which he thinks is necessary in order for religious reasons to be legitimate in the public sphere (Courtois Dialogue, 49, 91-112, 2010; Loobuyck and Rummens Ars disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5, 237–249, 2011; Sikka The Review of Politics, 78, 91-116, 2016). Even though Wittgenstein is not himself concerned with religious pluralism as a political issue, there are numerous scholars who have discussed the political implications of his remarks (Gunnell Contemporary Political Theory, 12 80-101, 2013; Livingston Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33(6), 691–715, 2007; Moore Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36(9), 1113-1136 2010; Pohlhaus and Wright Political Theory, 30(6), 800–27, 2002). The thesis of this paper is that the interpretation proposed by Cora Diamond (2000) in regards to ethical and religious questions turns out to be a suitable way out of the “translation requirement”. According to this solution, if there is to be an understanding between secular and religious citizens on the basis of religious reasons, it should not rely on a “translation” but rather on mutual self-representation.     

Sex-Specific Effect of Recalled Parenting on Affective and Cognitive Empathy in Adulthood

Previous research has demonstrated the influence of parenting on the development of children’s empathy. However, few studies have considered the impact of parents on empathy in adulthood, specific components of empathy, or the importance of parent and child biological sex. In the present study, 226 participants (71 men) completed online versions of the Parental Bonding Instrument (Parker et al. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 52, 1–10 1979), Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34, 163–175 2004), and Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85 1980). Paternal care and overprotection influenced affective empathy in men, whilst maternal overprotection predicted affective empathy in women. Further, maternal care related to cognitive empathy in men, whilst none of the parental care variables related to cognitive empathy in women. Findings are discussed in relation to sex differences in childhood parenting experiences on adult cognitive and affective empathy.     

The independence of endogenous and exogenous temporal attention

Temporal attention is the focusing of perceptual resources at a particular point in time. Valid temporal cue information has the capability to improve performance by reducing reaction times, while invalid information has the possibility of impairing performance. The performance difference between valid and invalid conditions is called a temporal cueing effect (TCE). We explored how different alerting mechanisms interact with a participant’s ability to utilize temporal information cues, using the Kingstone (The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44(1), 69–104, 1992) temporal cueing paradigm. Extracting the alerting procedure from Lawrence and Klein (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(2), 560–572, 2013), one of two different temporally contingent warning signals were presented to participants during a trial. The “hi-intensity” warning signal increases intensity and elicits both exogenous and endogenous alerting mechanisms. The “no-intensity” warning signal is isointense relative to baseline and elicits only endogenous alerting mechanisms. Two experiments conducted previously using a discrimination task showed interference between the signal intensity and task difficulty, where the “no-intensity” signal failed to elicit TCEs. In the present study, we implemented a detection task, reducing the mental effort required for a response. The results showed equal TCEs in both signal conditions. We argue for independence of these alerting mechanisms, by way of Sternberg’s (Acta Psychologica, 30, 276–315, 1969) additive factor method. Arguments contrasting what mechanism is being impacted by this paradigm are further outlined.     

On the Disambiguation of Meaning and the Effect of Cognitive Load

Most research supports a non-selective (or exhaustive) account of activation whereby multiple meanings of a word are initially activated (Degani and Tokowicz Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 1266-1303, 2010). But what happens to the non-selected meaning of an ambiguous word (e.g., bark) and how is the decision made to select one meaning over the other? A great deal of research by Gernsbacher and colleagues (e.g., Gernsbacher and Faust 1991a) suggests that the non-selected meaning is “discarded” via active suppression. The present paper examines meaning-selection in ambiguous words using a word to elicit meaning context (rather than a sentence). Additionally, a manipulation of cognitive load (Experiment 2) was employed to examine these processes. Results support a suppression account of meaning selection. An updated conceptualization of ambiguity resolution is proposed.     

Subjective Cognitive Complaints and Objective Cognitive Function in Aging: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Recent Cross-Sectional Findings

Research investigating how subjective cognitive complaints (SCCs) might reliably indicate impairments in objective cognitive functioning has produced highly varied findings, and despite attempts to synthesise this literature (e.g., Jonker et al. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 15, 983–991, 2000; Reid and MacLullich Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 22(5–6), 471–485, 2006; Crumley et al. Psychology and Aging, 29(2), 250–263, 2014), recent work continues to offer little resolution. This review provides both quantitative and qualitative synthesis of research conducted since the last comprehensive review in 2006, with the aim of identifying reasons for these discrepancies that might provide fruitful avenues for future exploration. Meta-analysis found a small but significant association between SCCs and objective cognitive function, although it was limited by large heterogeneity between studies and evidence of potential publication bias. Often, assessments of SCCs and objective cognitive function were brief or not formally validated. However, studies that employed more comprehensive SCC measures tended to find that SCCs were associated independently with both objective cognitive function and depressive symptoms. Further explicit investigation of how assessment measures relate to reports of SCCs, and the validity of the proposed ‘compensation theory’ of SCC aetiology, is recommended.     

The Effects of the Activation of Money and Credit Card vs. that of Activation of Spirituality – Which One Prompts Pro-Social Behaviours?

Pro-social behaviours may be prompted or inhibited depending on the situation. Numerous experiments show that, when exposed to the idea of money, people are less willing to help, devote their time or share their resources with others (Vohs et al. Science, 314, 1154–1156, 2006, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(3), 208–212, 2008). Conversely, when exposed to the idea of spirituality, they often cheat less and are more willing to help others (Mazar and Ariely Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 633–644, 2008; Randolph-Seng and Nielsen The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 17(4), 303–315, 2007). The aim of this article is to present the results of two experiments in which we activated thoughts about money, i.e. both cash and credit cards, and thoughts about spirituality in order to find out in what way these two kinds of activation may influence pro-social behaviours. In experiment 1, participants, when reminded of money, offered lower donations to others whereas those reminded of spirituality offered higher donations. In experiment 2, those participants reminded of money offered to devote less time to help others whereas those reminded of spirituality offered to devote more time to help others.