Development and Validation of the Knowledge of Parenting Strategies Scale: Measuring Effective Parenting Strategies

The current study aimed to develop and evaluate a measure of parenting knowledge, the Knowledge of Parenting Strategies Scale (KOPSS); specifically, to establish the scales internal reliability, ensure a clinically appropriate length, provide a community sample for future comparison, demonstrate adequate test–retest reliability and convergent validity, and to compare the scale to dysfunctional discipline styles. A total of n?=?865 parents were involved in the development and evaluation of the scale. In Study 1, data was collected from n?=?229 parents and Rasch analyses revealed seven items did not fit the measurement model. Study 2 involved a further sample of community families (n?=?346) and revealed the scale could be further shortened to 16 items. Study 3 revealed the scale has good test–retest reliability over a one-week period (r?=?.88, p?<?.001). Study 4 demonstrated convergent validity through a comparison to the Knowledge of Effective Parenting Scale (r?=?.583, p?=?.009). Study 5 utilised a sample of community families (n?=?190), revealing the scale was negatively correlated with hostile and lax discipline (r?=??.29, p?<?.001; r?=??.15, p?<?.05). Lastly, Study 6 showed scores on the KOPSS significantly improved following clinic-based and Internet-based Behavioural Parent Training. The KOPSS was found to be a valid and reliable measure of parenting knowledge of effective parenting strategies, which can be used to evaluate knowledge acquisition in parenting programs, and test the role of knowledge in behaviour change.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

Does Group CBT for Depression Do What It Says on the Tin? A Systemic Review and Meta-analysis of Group CBT for Depressed Adults (2000–2016)

The present study aimed to update previous meta-analyses of gCBT, and focus specifically on recent studies in which the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) was used to assess outcome. PsycINFO, PubMed, EMBASE, and Cochrane were searched for eligible studies. Both randomized controlled trials (RTC, k = 9) and non-RTCs (k = 1) published since 2000 were included. On the BDI large significant effect sizes were found for gCBT compared with treatment as usual (TAU, d = 4.64), wailing list controls (WLC, d = 1.20), and both of these comparison conditions combined with studies of well-defined alternative treatments (ALT, d = 1.61). On the BDI a moderate effect size (d = 0.53) was found for comparisons of gCBT and ALT groups. gCBT also had large and significant effects on depressive cognition assessed with the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale compared with WLC and ALT comparison groups (d = 2.66). This meta-analysis shows that gCBT is a robust intervention for depression in adults.     

Algebraic Models of Mental Number Axes: Part II

The paper presents a formal model of the system of number representations as a multiplicity of mental number axes with a hierarchical structure. The hierarchy is determined by the mind as it acquires successive types of mental number axes generated by virtue of some algebraic mechanisms. Three types of algebraic structures, responsible for functioning these mechanisms, are distinguished: BASAN-structures, CASAN-structures and CAPPAN-structures. A foundational order holds between these structures. CAPPAN-structures are derivative from CASAN-structures which are extensions of BASAN-structures. The constructed formal model unifies two competitive conceptions of cognitive arithmetic: namely, the conception of the mental number line and the conception of parallel individuation. The paper is the continuation of a paper entitled Representational structures of arithmetical thinking, in which rich empirical evidence supporting the model is presented. The main result achieved in the present paper may be philosophically interpreted as an attempt to formalize the Kantian conception of the pure idea of time, understood as the a priori form of human arithmetical thinking. In this way, our theory may be comprehended as a result of applying the hard method of logical reconstruction of fundamental epistemological categories.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wh</Emphasis>-Questions,Universal Statements and Free Choice Inferences in Child Mandarin

This study investigated 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking children’s comprehension of wh-questions, universal statements and free choice inferences. Previous research has found that Mandarin-speaking children assign a universal interpretation to sentences with a wh-word (e.g., shei ‘who’) followed by the adverbial quantifier dou ‘all’ (Zhou in Appl Psycholinguist 36:411–435, 2013). Children also compute free choice inferences in sentences that contain a modal verb in addition to a wh-word and dou (Zhou, in: Nakayama, Su, Huang (eds.) Studies in Chinese and Japanese language acquisition: in honour of Stephen Crain. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp 223–235, 2017). The present study used a Question-Statement Task to assess children’s interpretation of sentences containing shei + dou, both with and without the modal verb beiyunxu ‘was allowed to’, as well as the contrast between sentences with shei + dou, which are statements for adults, versus ones with dou + shei, which are wh-questions for adults. The 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking child participants exhibited adult-like linguistic knowledge of the semantics and pragmatics of wh-words, the adverbial quantifier dou, and the deontic modal verb beiyunxu.     

Obligation as Optimal Goal Satisfaction

Formalising deontic concepts, such as obligation, prohibition and permission, is normally carried out in a modal logic with a possible world semantics, in which some worlds are better than others. The main focus in these logics is on inferring logical consequences, for example inferring that the obligation O q is a logical consequence of the obligations O p and O (p → q). In this paper we propose a non-modal approach in which obligations are preferred ways of satisfying goals expressed in first-order logic. To say that p is obligatory, but may be violated, resulting in a less than ideal situation s, means that the task is to satisfy the goal p ∨ s, and that models in which p is true are preferred to models in which s is true. Whereas, in modal logic, the preference relation between possible worlds is part of the semantics of the logic, in this non-modal approach, the preference relation between first-order models is external to the logic. Although our main focus is on satisfying goals, we also formulate a notion of logical consequence, which is comparable to the notion of logical consequence in modal deontic logic. In this formalisation, an obligation O p is a logical consequence of goals G, when p is true in all best models of G. We show how this non-modal approach to the treatment of deontic concepts deals with problems of contrary-to-duty obligations and normative conflicts, and argue that the approach is useful for many other applications, including abductive explanations, defeasible reasoning, combinatorial optimisation, and reactive systems of the production system variety.     

Maternal Depression in Families of Children with ADHD: A Meta-Analysis

Although research has demonstrated a relationship between maternal depression and child attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); the strength of the relationship is currently unclear. The results of some studies have found a strong association between maternal depression and child ADHD, while other studies have found little or no association. A meta-analysis was conducted to clarify the strength of the association between maternal depression and child ADHD. The current study included 51 published and unpublished studies that included a quantitative comparison between maternal depression and child ADHD. Mothers of children with ADHD had significantly higher levels of depressive symptoms than mothers of children without ADHD (d?=?0.58; 95% CI [0.43, 0.74]; p?<?.001; k?=?18). The relationship between maternal depressive symptoms and child ADHD symptoms was moderate (r?=?.22; 95% CI [.17, .28]; p?<?.001; k?=?21). 17.11% of mothers of children with ADHD currently met criteria for a depressive disorder (95% CI [11.95, 23.89], p?<?.001, k?=?19). The DSM version used to evaluate child ADHD status was the only moderator that was statistically significant (p?=?.021, k?=?15). Specifically, studies that used the DSM-III or DSM-III-R were associated with larger effect sizes than studies that used the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR. The results suggest that clinicians should screen for the possible co-occurrence of maternal depression when working with families of children with ADHD.     

Semisimples in Varieties of Commutative Integral Bounded Residuated Lattices

In any variety of bounded integral residuated lattice-ordered commutative monoids (bounded residuated lattices for short) the class of its semisimple members is closed under isomorphic images, subalgebras and products, but it is not closed under homomorphic images, and so it is not a variety. In this paper we study varieties of bounded residuated lattices whose semisimple members form a variety, and we give an equational presentation for them. We also study locally representable varieties whose semisimple members form a variety. Finally, we analyze the relationship with the property “to have radical term”, especially for k-radical varieties, and for the hierarchy of varieties (WL_k)_k>0 defined in Cignoli and Torrens (Studia Logica 100:1107–1136, 2012 [7]).     

Closure,Contrast, and Answer

How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.     

A Definition Framework for the Terms <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanomaterial</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanoparticle</Emphasis>

Scientific writings and policy documents define the terms nanomaterial and nanoparticle in various ways. This variation is considered problematic because the absence of a shared definition is understood as potentially hindering nanomaterial knowledge production and regulation. Another view is that the existence of a shared definition may itself cause problems, as rigid definitions arguably exclude important aspects of the studied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to inform this state of disagreement by providing analytical concepts for a systematic understanding of how, and even whether, nanomaterial and nanoparticle could and should be defined. To do this, we review definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle presented in research articles and policy documents. Definitions were identified by first conducting a Scopus search and then tracing cited definitions back to their sources. In total, 36 definitions were identified. Theories of definition from philosophy and linguistics provide analytical guidance for structuring and categorizing the identified definitions, and the main analytical dimensions of the definitions are then identified and discussed. Finally, we propose a framework for understanding the process of defining nanomaterial and nanoparticle. This framework considers both the generality needed for a shared understanding (by suggesting proto-definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle) and the level of precision required for different purposes (by allowing for various explications of the proto-definitions).     

Contextual-Hierarchical Reconstructions of the Strengthened Liar Problem

In this paper we shall introduce two types of contextual-hierarchical (from now on abbreviated by ‘ch’) approaches to the strengthened liar problem. These approaches, which we call the ‘standard’ and the ‘alternative’ ch-reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, differ in their philosophical view regarding the nature of truth and the relation between the truth predicates T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ of different hierarchy-levels. The basic idea of the standard ch-reconstruction is that the T r ⁿ⁺¹-schema should hold for all sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\). In contrast, the alternative ch-reconstruction, for which we shall argue in section four, is motivated by the idea that T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ are coherent in the sense that the same sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\) should be true according to T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹. We show that instances of the standard ch-reconstruction can be obtained by iterating Kripke’s strong Kleene jump operator. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how instances of the alternative ch-reconstruction can be obtained by a slight modification of the iterated axiom system KF and of the iterated strong Kleene jump operator.     

English Orthographic Learning in Chinese-L1 Young EFL Beginners

English orthographic learning, among Chinese-L1 children who were beginning to learn English as a foreign language, was documented when: (1) only visual memory was at their disposal, (2) visual memory and either some letter-sound knowledge or some semantic information was available, and (3) visual memory, some letter-sound knowledge and some semantic information were all available. When only visual memory was available, orthographic learning (measured via an orthographic choice test) was meagre. Orthographic learning was significant when either semantic information or letter-sound knowledge supplemented visual memory, with letter-sound knowledge generating greater significance. Although the results suggest that letter-sound knowledge plays a more important role than semantic information, letter-sound knowledge alone does not suffice to achieve perfect orthographic learning, as orthographic learning was greatest when letter-sound knowledge and semantic information were both available. The present findings are congruent with a view that the orthography of a foreign language drives its orthographic learning more than L1 orthographic learning experience, thus extending Share’s (Cognition 55:151–218, 1995) self-teaching hypothesis to include non-alphabetic L1 children’s orthographic learning of an alphabetic foreign language. The little letter-sound knowledge development observed in the experiment-I control group indicates that very little letter-sound knowledge develops in the absence of dedicated letter-sound training. Given the important role of letter-sound knowledge in English orthographic learning, dedicated letter-sound instruction is highly recommended.     

Scientific Realism Within Perspectivism and Perspectivism Within Scientific Realism

Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in a way that can avoid subjectivism. Whereas the way of conceiving a notion is strictly subjective, the way of using it is open to intersubjective agreement, based on the practice of operations whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. Therefore, intersubjectivity (that is a ‘weak’ sense of objectivity) is possible within perspectivism. Perspectivism can also help understand the notion of ‘scientific objects’ in a referential sense: they are those ‘things’ that become ‘objects’ of a certain science by being investigated from the ‘point of view’ of that science. They are ‘clipped out’ of things (and constitute the ‘domain of objects’ or the ‘regional ontology’ of that particular science) by means of standardized operations which turn out to be the same as those granting intersubjectivity. Therefore this ‘strong’ sense of objectivity, which is clearly realist, coincides with the ‘weak’ one. The notion of truth appears fully legitimate in the case of the sciences, being clearly defined for the regional ontology of each one of them and, since this truth can be extended in an analogical sense to the theories elaborated in each science, it follows that are real also the unobservable entities postulated by those theories.     

Recognition during recall failure: Semantic feature matching as a mechanism for recognition of semantic cues when recall fails

Research suggests that a feature-matching process underlies cue familiarity-detection when cued recall with graphemic cues fails. When a test cue (e.g., potchbork) overlaps in graphemic features with multiple unrecalled studied items (e.g., patchwork, pitchfork, pocketbook, pullcork), higher cue familiarity ratings are given during recall failure of all of the targets than when the cue overlaps in graphemic features with only one studied target and that target fails to be recalled (e.g., patchwork). The present study used semantic feature production norms (McRae et al., Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 37, 547–559, 2005) to examine whether the same holds true when the cues are semantic in nature (e.g., jaguar is used to cue cheetah). Indeed, test cues (e.g., cedar) that overlapped in semantic features (e.g., a_tree, has_bark, etc.) with four unretrieved studied items (e.g., birch, oak, pine, willow) received higher cue familiarity ratings during recall failure than test cues that overlapped in semantic features with only two (also unretrieved) studied items (e.g., birch, oak), which in turn received higher familiarity ratings during recall failure than cues that did not overlap in semantic features with any studied items. These findings suggest that the feature-matching theory of recognition during recall failure can accommodate recognition of semantic cues during recall failure, providing a potential mechanism for conceptually-based forms of cue recognition during target retrieval failure. They also provide converging evidence for the existence of the semantic features envisaged in feature-based models of semantic knowledge representation and for those more concretely specified by the production norms of McRae et al. (Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 37, 547–559, 2005).     

$${\in_K}$$: a Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge

We present a new logic-based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics. \({\in_K}\) (Epsilon-K) is a non-Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K _i φ → φ and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem are avoided. Various stronger epistemic properties such as positive and/or negative introspection, the K-axiom, closure under logical connectives, etc. can be restored by imposing additional semantic constraints. This yields corresponding sublogics for which we present sound and complete axiomatizations. As a useful tool for general model constructions we study abstract versions of some 3-valued logics in which we interpret truth as knowledge. We establish a connection between \({\in_K}\) and the well-known syntactic approach to explicit knowledge proving a result concerning equi-expressiveness. Furthermore, we discuss some self-referential epistemic statements, such as the knower paradox, as relaxations of variants of the liar paradox and show how these epistemic “paradoxes” can be solved in \({\in_K}\). Every specific \({\in_K}\)-logic is defined as a certain extension of some underlying classical abstract logic.     

Rethinking social cognition in means-ends terms: A tale of two surprises

The resurgence of motivation science in recent decades ushers in a new functionalism whereby behavior, cognition and emotion are viewed as means to specific goals. Two classic social psychological issues are analyzed from the means-ends perspective: (1) humans’ alleged need (or drive) for cognitive consistency, and (2) the notion that attitudes drive behavior. A careful conceptual analysis yields, contrary to received views, that cognitive consistency, rather than constituting a general need or goal, represents instead a means of knowledge validation. Consequently, the degree to which inconsistency is experienced as aversive depends on the desirability of the knowledge that is being invalidated. Furthermore, the notion that attitudes directly drive behavior is contested on the grounds that attitudes (i.e., liking) must transmute into wanting and wanting must transmute into a (dominant) goal for behavior to be initiated. Major theories of attitude-behavior relations are discussed from this perspective and their supportive evidence is reinterpreted in the present means-ends terms.     

A Categorical Equivalence Motivated by Kalman’s Construction

An equivalence between the category of MV-algebras and the category \({{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}\) is given in Castiglioni et al. (Studia Logica 102(1):67–92, 2014). An integral residuated lattice with bottom is an MV-algebra if and only if it satisfies the equations \({a = \neg \neg a, (a \rightarrow b) \vee (b\rightarrow a) = 1}\) and \({a \odot (a\rightarrow b) = a \wedge b}\). An object of \({{\rm MV^{\bullet}}}\) is a residuated lattice which in particular satisfies some equations which correspond to the previous equations. In this paper we extend the equivalence to the category whose objects are pairs (A, I), where A is an MV-algebra and I is an ideal of A.