Effects of valence and framing in decision making II: Estimating subjective weighting1

Abstract: In comparison between choice options, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects.” Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiment used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess the decision maker's interpretation of choice tasks under the “framing effect” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. This study examined whether preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions under which preference reversals under the framing manipulations ceased to occur were examined. The effects of valence showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision makers maintained consistent task interpretations as pertaining to gains or to losses. Most importantly, the pattern of subjective weighting under the valence effects was consistent with previous explanation of valence effects ( Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996 ). Possibilities for extending the current findings to understanding related psychological phenomena are discussed.     

The Directionality of Verbal Probability Expressions: Effects on Decisions,Predictions, and Probabilistic Reasoning

Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are of two kinds: positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, and negative, drawing attention to its nonoccurrence (Teigen & Brun, 1995). This directionality is correlated with, but not identical to, high and low p values. Choice of phrase will in turn influence predictions and decisions. A treatment described as having “some possibility” of success will be recommended, as opposed to when it is described as “quite uncertain,” even if the probability of cure referred to by these two expressions is judged to be the same (Experiment 1). Individuals who formulate their chances of achieving a successful outcome in positive terms are supposed to make different decisions than individuals who use equivalent, but negatively formulated, phrases (Experiments 2 and 3). Finally, negative phrases lead to fewer conjunction errors in probabilistic reasoning than do positive phrases (Experiment 4). For instance, a combination of 2 “uncertain” outcomes is readily seen to be “very uncertain.” But positive phrases lead to fewer disjunction errors than do negative phrases. Thus verbal probabilistic phrases differ from numerical probabilities not primarily by being more “vague,” but by suggesting more clearly the kind of inferences that should be drawn.     

The effects of genotype, foraging role, and sucrose responsiveness on the tactile learning performance of honey bees (Apis mellifera L.)

We analyzed sucrose responsiveness and associative tactile learning in two genetic strains of honey bees under laboratory conditions. These strains differ in their foraging behavior. Bees of the "high" strain preferentially collect pollen. "Low"-strain bees mainly forage for nectar. Responsiveness to different sucrose concentrations and tactile learning were examined using the proboscis extension reflex. Acquisition, extinction of conditioned responses, and responses to an alternative tactile stimulus were tested. High-strain bees are more responsive to sucrose than low-strain bees. Regardless of genotype, pollen foragers are more responsive to sucrose than nectar foragers. In bees of both strains we find the same relationship between responsiveness to sucrose and acquisition. Bees responding to low sucrose concentrations show more often the conditioned response during acquisition than those responding only to higher sucrose concentrations. Extinction of conditioned responses depends on the response probability during acquisition. Discrimination between the two tactile stimuli is affected by genotype but not by responsiveness to sucrose. High-strain bees discriminate better than low-strain bees. Our experiments thus establish links between division of labor, responsiveness to sucrose, and associative learning in honey bees.     

Preference for local or general anesthesia,coping dispositions,learned resourcefulness and coping with surgery

Abstract

People were found to differ in their coping dispositions (as measured with the MBSS, Miller, 1987): those who habitually attend to threatening cues (“monitors”) and those who distract themselves from these cues (“blunters”). However, some people are equally high on both coping dispositions and they were considered to be in a “dispositional conflict”. Furthermore, under certain circumstances people may prefer to act in a way that is inconsistent with their coping disposition; monitors who prefer blunting strategies and blunters who prefer monitoring strategies (labeled here as “disposition-behavior conflict”). Both conflicts were hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of trait anxiety and poorer coping. 59 men scheduled for surgery were assessed as to their coping disposition (monitors or blunters) and their preference for local or general anesthesia, and their learned resourcefulness (selfantrol skills). Monitors who chose general anesthesia (and thus were unable to monitor their own surgery) and blunters who chose local anesthesia (and thus were unable to blunt) were defined as being in a disposition-behavior conflict. Re- and post-surgery measures of anxiety and dysphoria and post-surgery nurses' ratings were used for assessing coping with surgery. Patients who were either high on dispositional conflict or showed a disposition-behavior conflict were higher on trait anxiety and showed poorer post-surgery coping in comparison to patients without such conflicts. Learned resourcefulness was not related to better coping nor to the two conflicts with the exception that patients with a disposition-behavior conflict reported less confidence in their self-control abilities. Overall, preference for local anesthesia predicted better post-surgery coping.     

Decision deadlines and uncertainty monitoring: the effect of time constraints on uncertainty and perceptual responses

The behavioral uncertainty response has grounded the study of animal metacognition and influenced the study of human psychophysics. However, the interpretation of this response is debated—especially whether it is a behavioral index of metacognition. The authors advanced this interpretation using the dissociative technique of response deadlines. Uncertainty responding, if it is higher level or metacognitive, should depend on a slower, more controlled decisional process and be more vulnerable to time constraints. Humans performed sparse–uncertain–dense or sparse–middle–dense discriminations in which, respectively, they could decline difficult trials or positively identify middle stimuli. Uncertainty responses were sharply and selectively reduced under a decision deadline, as compared to primary perceptual responses (i.e., “sparse,” “middle,” and “dense” responses). This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response does reflect a higher-level, decisional response. It grants the uncertainty response a distinctive psychological role in its task and encourages an interpretation of this response as an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty that deserves continuing research.     

Waiting by mistake: Symbolic representation of rewards modulates intertemporal choice in capuchin monkeys,preschool children and adult humans

In the Delay choice task subjects choose between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed option. This paradigm, also known as intertemporal choice task, is frequently used to assess delay tolerance, interpreting a preference for the larger delayed option as willingness to wait. However, in the Delay choice task subjects face a dilemma between two preferred responses: “go for more” (i.e., selecting the larger, but delayed, option) vs. “go for sooner” (i.e., selecting the immediate, but smaller, option). When the options consist of visible food amounts, at least some of the choices of the larger delayed option might be due to a failure to inhibit a prepotent response towards the larger option rather than to a sustained delay tolerance. To disentangle this issue, we tested 10 capuchin monkeys, 101 preschool children, and 88 adult humans in a Delay choice task with food, low-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-one correspondence with food items), and high-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-many correspondence with food items). This allows evaluating how different methods of representing rewards modulate the relative contribution of the “go for more” and “go for sooner” responses. Consistently with the idea that choices for the delayed option are sometimes due to a failure at inhibiting the prepotent response for the larger quantity, we expected high-symbolic tokens to decrease the salience of the larger option, thus reducing “go for more” responses. In fact, previous findings have shown that inhibiting prepotent responses for quantity is easier when the problem is framed in a symbolic context. Overall, opting for the larger delayed option in the visible-food version of the Delay choice task seems to partially result from an impulsive preference for quantity, rather than from a sustained delay tolerance. In capuchins and children high-symbolic stimuli decreased the individual’s preference for the larger reward by distancing from its appetitive features. Conversely, the sophisticated symbolic skills of adult humans prevented the distancing effect of high-symbolic stimuli in this population, although this result may be due to methodological differences between adult humans and the other two populations under study. Our data extend the knowledge concerning the influence of symbols on both human and non-human primate behavior and add a new element to the interpretation of the Delay choice task. Since high-symbolic stimuli decrease the individual’s preference for the larger reward by eliminating those choices due to prepotent responses towards the larger quantity, they allow to better discriminate responses based on genuine delay aversion. Thus, these findings invite greater caution in interpreting the results obtained with the visible-food version of the Delay choice task, which may overestimate delay tolerance.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision-making: Assessing decision-makers' perceived domains of choice

Abstract: In comparison between choice alternatives, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects”. Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996 ) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiments used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess decision‐maker's interpretation of choice tasks under “framing effects” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. Two experiments showed that preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions wherein the framing manipulations lose the effectiveness were examined. Valence effects showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision‐makers maintained consistent domain perceptions as pertaining to gains or to losses, across the domains of gains and losses. Implications are discussed.     

Peak shift in honey bee olfactory learning

If animals are trained with two similar stimuli such that one is rewarding (S+) and one punishing (S?), then following training animals show a greatest preference not for the S+, but for a novel stimulus that is slightly more different from the S? than the S+ is. This peak shift phenomenon has been widely reported for vertebrates and has recently been demonstrated for bumblebees and honey bees. To explore the nature of peak shift in invertebrates further, here we examined the properties of peak shift in honey bees trained in a free-flight olfactory learning assay. Hexanal and heptanol were mixed in different ratios to create a continuum of odour stimuli. Bees were trained to artificial flowers such that one odour mixture was rewarded with 2 molar sucrose (S+), and one punished with distasteful quinine (S?). After training, bees were given a non-rewarded preference test with five different mixtures of hexanal and heptanol. Following training bees’ maximal preference was for an odour mixture slightly more distinct from the S? than the trained S+. This effect was not seen if bees were initially trained with two distinct odours, replicating the classic features of peak shift reported for vertebrates. We propose a conceptual model of how peak shift might occur in honey bees. We argue that peak shift does not require any higher level of processing than the known olfactory learning circuitry of the bee brain and suggest that peak shift is a very general feature of discrimination learning.     

Defining reward value by cross-modal scaling

Researchers in comparative psychology often use different food rewards in their studies, with food values defined by a pre-experimental preference test. While this technique rank orders food values, it provides limited information about value differences because preferences may reflect not only value differences, but also the degree to which one good may “substitute” for another (e.g., one food may substitute well for another food, but neither substitutes well for water). We propose scaling the value of food pairs by a third food that is less substitutable for either food offered in preference tests (cross-modal scaling). Here, Cebus monkeys chose between four pairwise alternatives: fruits A versus B; cereal amount X versus fruit A and cereal amount Y versus fruit B where X and Y were adjusted to produce indifference between each cereal amount and each fruit; and cereal amounts X versus Y. When choice was between perfect substitutes (different cereal amounts), preferences were nearly absolute; so too when choice was between close substitutes (fruits); however, when choice was between fruits and cereal amounts, preferences were more modest and less likely due to substitutability. These results suggest that scaling between-good value differences in terms of a third, less-substitutable good may be better than simple preference tests in defining between-good value differences.     

Behavioral ephemera,difficult discriminations,and behavioral stability

Every species possesses abilities for successfully interacting with its environment. These result from phylogeny. In the laboratory, one may arrange artificial conditions that thwart an organism's abilities. The result may be a “phenomenon.” With sufficient training, however, the phenomenon may prove to be ephemeral, as the organism's basic abilities reassert themselves. Pigeons respond extremely well to differences and nondifferences in rate of obtaining food. This ability may be thwarted in a variety of ways, but the results tend to be ephemeral. An example is an experiment that pitted pigeons' preference for unimpeded responding against their ability to respond to food rate. In a concurrent-chains procedure, the terminal links were identical variable-interval schedules, but in one terminal link, every response produced a timeout. The duration of the timeout varied, and preference varied with it, but the relation vanished with training, in keeping with the equality of food rate across the 2 terminal links. Some other examples of “phenomena” that tend to disappear with sufficient training and sufficient variation in experimental parameters are behavioral contrast, conditioned reinforcement, resistance to extinction, and suboptimal choice. These “phenomena” depend on pigeons' failing to make difficult discriminations. They appear to be behavioral ephemera.     

不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响及其情景依赖性

采用2(不确定性容忍度：高、低)×2(跨期日期：今天/14天、今天/180天)×2(延迟奖赏值：200元、1000元)混合实验设计,探讨不同任务特征下不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响。结果表明：跨期日期为180天时,不确定性容忍度主效应边缘显著;不确定性容忍度与延迟奖赏值交互作用显著：在200元时低容忍度个体对延迟奖赏的折扣程度大于高容忍度个体,在1000元时无此效应;跨期日期为14天时,不确定性容忍度的主效应及其与延迟奖赏值交互作用均不显著。这表明,不确定性容忍度对跨期选择存在影响,但这种影响受到跨期日期和延迟奖赏值的调节,具有情景依赖性。     

The nature and acquisition of a preference for chili pepper by humans

This paper deals with the general problem of the acquisition of positive affective responses, by study of the reversal of an innate aversion to the irritant properties of chili pepper. Interviews, observations, and measurements were carried out in both Mexico and the United States. Exposure to gradually increasing levels of chili in food seems to be a sufficient condition for preference development. Chili likers are not insensitive to the irritation that it produces. They come to like the same burning sensation that deters animals and humans that dislike chili; there is a clear hedonic shift. This could be produced by association with positive events, including enhancement of the taste of bland foods, postingestional effects, or social rewards. It is also possible that the initial negative response to chili pepper is essential for the eventual liking. Chili stimulates an innate sensory “warning” system but is not harmful. The enjoyment of the irritation may result from the user's appreciation that the sensation and the body's defensive reaction to it are harmless. Eating of chili, riding on roller coasters, taking very hot baths, and many other human activities can be considered instances of thrill seeking or enjoyment of “constrained risks.” Evidence for and against various explanations of chili ingestion is presented.     

Uncertainty Avoidance Influences Choices for Potential Gains but not Losses

Uncertainty of outcomes is a primary dimension underlying human judgment and decision making, and is a defining feature of risk. Even though uncertainty almost always exists in decision making contexts, individuals and cultures vary in their preference for avoiding uncertainty. This study examines how uncertainty avoidance influences judgments involving uncertain and risky alternatives. Participants were presented with problems that involve potential gains or losses and contain options reflecting uncertain or certain outcomes. Greater uncertainty avoidance predicted choices for uncertain outcomes that involved gains, which tend to promote risk aversion, but not for uncertain outcomes that led to losses, which tend to promote risk seeking. These results demonstrate that culturally-relevant dispositions such as uncertain avoidance can have complex effects on judgment.     

THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM REVISITED Responses to Dissimilar Others

A laboratory study investigated the effects of three kinds of information on response to dissimilar others. A2 × 2 × 2 design with two levels of “expectation of evaluation” (expressed like or dislike), two levels of “message openness” (open or closed), and two levels of “attribution of intent” (expressed desire to share or change attitudes) was employed to test hypotheses related to impression formed, defensiveness of response, and attraction toward a dissimilar other. Results from a multivariate analysis showed that response to dissimilarity differed significantly with variation in expectation of evaluation and message openness, but that responses did not vary in relation to attribution of intent. Results support uncertainty reduction theory, and it is suggested that some of the rewards normally associated with similarity can also be associated with dissimilar others, thus making for a more positive response to dissimilarity.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anxiety and intertemporal decision making: The effect of the behavioral inhibition system and the moderation effects of trait anxiety on both state anxiety and socioeconomic status

Based on Gray's theory, which links the behavioral inhibition motivation system (BIS) to the personality trait of “anxiety”, the present study examined whether anxiety (trait vs. state), BIS sensitivity, and family socioeconomic status in childhood (SES) had an interactive or independent impact on intertemporal decision-making processes. The study also investigated whether participants with high trait anxiety had a significantly different choice preference on the immediate but smaller (SS) rewards over the larger but delayed (LL) rewards. Participants (N = 108) were randomly assigned to either the anxiety or the control condition. Results showed that people with a higher BIS score tended to choose less SS rewards. Trait anxiety was found to moderate both state anxiety and childhood SES to influence intertemporal decision processes. We further found high or low trait anxiety significantly influenced people's choice preference. Speculations on the psychological meanings of the findings were discussed from the perspective of biased risk perception. Limitations and implications were also discussed.     

“It All Comes Down to Imagination”: Reply to Commentary

In her generous and full discussion of my paper, Doris Brothers writes about patient's efforts to restore themselves following trauma and how that runs into walls caused by their “systemically emergent certainties.” She beautifully writes, “Since our capacity to hope depends on being able to tolerate uncertainty we sometimes join our patients in their hopelessness” (p. 231). Brothers emphasizes how Murakami can help us tolerate uncertainty. My emphasis is on how writers like Murakami help us restore our imaginative and empathic capacities. Frozen landscapes, as evoked by Murakami in “UFO in Kushiro,” are depictions of shut-down psychic states. Animated imagery helps to melt the ice, creating living motion in thought and affect. Both Brothers and I are looking at the crucial movement from simplified to complex shared states of mind. We seem at first to differ in our understanding of the function of rage in treatment, though I believe we may be discussing different clinical situations.     

Reinforcement: Food Signals the Time and Location of Future Food

It has long been understood that food deliveries may act as signals of future food location, and not only as strengtheners of prefood responding as the law of effect suggests. Recent research has taken this idea further—the main effect of food deliveries, or other “reinforcers”, may be signaling rather than strengthening. The present experiment investigated the ability of food deliveries to signal food contingencies across time after food. In Phase 1, the next food delivery was always equally likely to be arranged for a left‐ or a right‐key response. Conditions were arranged such that the next food delivery was likely to occur either sooner on the left (or right) key, or sooner on the just‐productive (or not‐just‐productive) key. In Phase 2, similar contingencies were arranged, but the last‐food location was signaled by a red keylight. Preference, measured in 2‐s bins across interfood intervals, was jointly controlled by the likely time and location of the next food delivery. In Phase 1, when any food delivery signaled a likely sooner next food delivery on a particular key, postfood preference was strongly toward that key, and moved toward the other key across the interreinforcer interval. In other conditions in which food delivery on the two keys signaled different subsequent contingencies, postfood preference was less extreme, and quickly moved toward indifference. In Phase 2, in all three conditions, initial preference was strongly toward the likely‐sooner food key, and moved to the other key across the interfood interval. In both phases, at a more extended level of analysis, sequences of same‐key food deliveries caused a small increase in preference for the just‐productive key, suggesting the presence of a “reinforcement effect”, albeit one that was very small.     

The secretary problem as a model of choice

The finite “secretory problem” in dynamic programming generates a set of mathematically optimal criteria for search strategies in sequential decisions. One of the limitations on its applicability has been its failure to allow for the uncertainty of whether or not a choice alternative which has been inspected sometime previous to the present, will be “available.” In this paper, extensions of the model are presented which incorporate not only a parameter for the uncertain availability of previous alternatives, but for the uncertain availability of an alternative currently being observed. The paper emphasizes socalled heuristic strategies which may be used to approximate optimal solutions, and which entail very reasonable demands on the processing capacity of the decision-maker. Laboratory realizations and potential applications are discussed.     

时间洞察力对跨期选择偏好的预测

利用津巴多时间洞察力问卷,采用跨期选择经典范式,考察“现在享乐型”和“未来定向型”两类时间洞察力个体在跨期选择上的偏好,从人格特质角度来探究跨期选择的认知机制。结果发现：(1)现在享乐定向组的延迟折扣率显著高于未来定向组;(2)未来定向组在时间洞察力量表“未来维度”得分与延迟折扣率显著负相关。这说明时间洞察力对个体延迟折扣率具有预测作用,支持了跨期选择的时间感知基础模型。