Delaying judgments of learning affects memory,not metamemory

Judgments of learning (JOLs) for cue-target word pairs correlate particularly well with later target recall when made under conditions that permit delayed attempts to retrieve the targets--the delayed-JOL effect. Metamemory theories claim that memory monitoring improves under these conditions. However, another theory--the memory hypothesis--claims that the correlation increases because retrieved items receive a boost in recall from spaced study and are assigned high JOLs, whereas unretrieved items receive no spaced study and, therefore, no boost in recall and, consequently, are assigned low JOLs. When we eliminated differences in spaced study by reexposing word pairs following their JOLs, the delayed-JOL effect disappeared, supporting the memory hypothesis.     

Why metrical properties are not powers

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws.     

Why faces are and are not special: an effect of expertise

Recognition memory for faces is hampered much more by inverted presentation than is memory for any other material so far examined. The present study demonstrates that faces are not unique with regard to this vulnerability to inversion. The experiments also attempt to isolate the source of the inversion effect. In one experiment, use of stimuli (landscapes) in which spatial relations among elements are potentially important distinguishing features is shown not to guarantee a large inversion effect. Two additional experiments show that for dog experts sufficiently knowledgeable to individuate dogs of the same breed, memory for photographs of dogs of that breed is as disrupted by inversion as is face recognition. A final experiment indicates that the effect of orientation on memory for faces does not depend on inability to identify single features of these stimuli upside down. These experiments are consistent with the view that experts represent items in memory in terms of distinguishing features of a different kind than do novices. Speculations as to the type of feature used and neuropsychological and developmental implications of this accomplishment are offered.     

Vowel and consonant judgments are not independent when cued by the same information

Despite many attempts to define the major unit of speech perception, none has been generally accepted. In a unique study, Mermelstein (1978) claimed that consonants and vowels are the appropriate units because a single piece of information (duration, in this case) can be used for one distinction without affecting the other. In a replication, this apparent independence was found, instead, to reflect a lack of statistical power: The vowel and consonant judgments did interact. In another experiment, interdependence of two phonetic judgments was found in responses based on the fricative noise and the vocalic formants of a fricative-vowel syllable. These results show that each judgment made on speech signals must take into account other judgments that compete for information in the same signal. An account is proposed that takes segments as the primary units, with syllables imposing constraints on the shape they may take.     

Evidence that judgments of learning are causally related to study choice

Three experiments investigated whether study choice was directly related to judgments of learning (JOLs) by examining people’s choices in cases in which JOLs were dissociated from recall. In Experiment 1, items were given either three repetitions or one repetition on Trial 1. Items given three repetitions received one on Trial 2, and those given one repetition received three on Trial 2—equating performance at the end of Trial 2, but yielding different immediate Trial 2 JOLs. Study choice followed the “illusory” JOLs. A delayed JOL condition in Experiment 2 did not show this JOL bias and neither did study choice. Finally, using a paradigm (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) in which similar JOLs are given to forward and backward associative pairs, despite much worse performance on the backward pairs, study choice again followed the mistaken JOLs. We concluded that JOLs—what people believe they know—directly influence people’s study choices.     

Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to implicit interference effects at retrieval

We conducted three experiments to determine whether metamemory predictions at encoding, immediate judgments of learning (IJOLs) are sensitive to implicit interference effects that will occur at retrieval. Implicit interference was manipulated by varying the association set size of the cue (Experiments 1 and 2) or the target (Experiment 3). The typical finding is that memory is worse for large-set-size cues and targets, but only when the target is studied alone and later prompted with a related cue (extralist). When the pairs are studied together (intralist), recall is the same regardless of set size; set size effects are eliminated. Metamemory predictions at retrieval, such as delayed JOLs (DJOLs) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments accurately reflect implicit interference effects (e.g., Eakin & Hertzog, 2006. In all three experiments, we found that DJOLs and FOKs accurately predicted set size effects on retrieval but that IJOLs did not. The findings provide further evidence that metamemory predictions are inferred from information other than direct access to the state of the memory trace, as well as indicate that inferences are based on different sources depending on when in the memory process predictions are made.     

Self-Doubt: Why We are not Identical to Things of Any Kind

There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one’s experiences, that to which one’s experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self’s being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher‐order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of ‘I’, that one’s body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one’s body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be identical only to that which is one’s self or is the referent of one’s uses of ‘I’.     

Adolescents with learning disabilities: Psychic structures that are not conducive to learning

In this paper, I attempt to make links between theoretical concepts derived from the work of Bion (in particular, the 'ego-destructive super-ego', and the function he termed '-K' in thinking disorders) and the nature of the transference relationship that became evident in my clinical work with some adolescents with learning disabilities. I use three clinical examples to illustrate these ideas and suggest that learning can be facilitated for this patient group by addressing difficulties which arise in the therapist's countertransference related to the theoretical concepts cited above.     

Bias and learning in temporal binding: Intervals between actions and outcomes are compressed by prior bias

It has consistently been shown that agents judge the intervals between their actions and outcomes as compressed in time, an effect named intentional binding. In the present work, we investigated whether this effect is result of prior bias volunteers have about the timing of the consequences of their actions, or if it is due to learning that occurs during the experimental session. Volunteers made temporal estimates of the interval between their action and target onset (Action conditions), or between two events (No-Action conditions). Our results show that temporal estimates become shorter throughout each experimental block in both conditions. Moreover, we found that observers judged intervals between action and outcomes as shorter even in very early trials of each block. To quantify the decrease of temporal judgments in experimental blocks, exponential functions were fitted to participants’ temporal judgments. The fitted parameters suggest that observers had different prior biases as to intervals between events in which action was involved. These findings suggest that prior bias might play a more important role in this effect than calibration-type learning processes.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Implementations are not conceptualizations: revising the verb learning model.

In a recent issue of this journal, Pinker and Prince (1988) and Lachter and Bever (1988) presented detailed critiques of Rumelhart and McClelland's (1986) connectionist model of the child's learning of the phonological form of the English past tense. In order to address these criticisms, a new connectionist model was constructed using the back-propagation algorithm, a larger input corpus, a fuller paradigm, and a new phonological representation. This new implementation successfully addressed the criticisms of the phonological representation used by Rumelhart and McClelland. It did a much better job of learning the past tense using a fuller input set with realistic frequencies of occurrence. Ancillary simulations using the same network were able to deal with the homonymy problem and the generation of forms like "ated" from "ate". The one feature not provided by the new model was a way of modeling early correct production of irregular forms. The success of the new model can be used to help clarify the extent to which the published critiques apply to a particular connectionist implementation as opposed to fundamental principles underlying the broader connectionist conceptualization.     

Differences in judgments of learning difficulty

Academically successful and less successful fifth graders were asked to make judgments about the ease of understanding and remembering various sentences and were given the opportunity to attempt to remember some of them before being asked to judge new sets of sentences. The results of the first experiment indicate that, at the beginning of the experiment, the successful students were much more likely than their less successful peers to realize that sentences expressing arbitrary relationships were more difficult to remember. These differences became even greater after students were given the opportunity to attempt to remember some of the sentences they had judged initially. The memory performance of the successful students also improved as they became more familiar with the experimental task, but the performance of the less successful students did not. The results of the second experiment showed that less successful students who had received appropriate training were able to use information about the arbitrariness of relationships as the basis for their judgments of learning difficulty. The training also facilitated their ability to remember. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Same-different judgments of multiletter strings: insensitivity to positional bias and spacing

Several recent studies of multiletter matching have included pairs of strings that have the same letters in different positions (rearranged pairs). The task can be defined such that these rearranged pairs are correctly classified as different (i.e., subjects respond "same" only if the strings have the same letters in the same positions--the order task) or as same (i.e., subjects respond "same" if the strings have the same letters regardless of their positions--the item task). The order task produces left-to-right serial-position effects, whereas the item task produces U-shaped serial-position effects. Because these differences suggest that subjects may be able to exert strategic control over the comparison process, two sets of experiments were designed to test whether or not subjects can change the relative weightings devoted to the respective serial positions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the probability that a mismatch occurred in the different positions was manipulated. In Experiments 3 and 4, the physical spacing between letters, as well as whether or not the spaces were filled with neutral noise characters, was varied. None of the manipulations had much influence on the serial-position effects. Thus, the distinct serial-position effects for the order and item tasks apparently are mandatory and not due to any voluntary comparison strategy.     

Separating bias and sensitivity in judgments of associative memory

Ratings of the degree of association between words are linearly related to normed associative strengths, but the intercept is high, and the slope is shallow (the judgments of associative memory [JAM] function). Two experiments included manipulations intended to decrease the intercept and increase the slope. Discrimination training on many pairs of words and constraining ratings to sum to a constant both reduced the intercept but failed to change the slope. The intercept of the JAM function appears to contain a bias component that can be manipulated independently of the slope, which reflects sensitivity to associative strengths.