Upward and Downward Counterfactual Thought After Loss: A Multiwave Controlled Longitudinal Study

Counterfactual thoughts, mental simulations about how a situation may have turned out differently (i.e., “if only …, then …”), can reduce mental health after stressful life-events. However, how specific counterfactual thought types relate to post-loss mental health problems is unclear. We hypothesized that self-referenced upward counterfactuals (i.e., “If only I had done …, then the current situation would be better”) may serve as cognitive avoidance, thereby perpetuating loss-related distress. Conversely, downward counterfactuals (i.e., “If … had happened, then the current situation could have been [even] worse”) may facilitate benefit finding, thereby reducing distress. In a longitudinal survey, self-referent, other-referent, and nonreferent upward counterfactuals, and nonreferent downward counterfactuals were assessed at baseline. Prolonged grief and depression symptoms were assessed at baseline, and 6- and 12-month follow-ups. Multiple regression analyses assessed associations between counterfactual thoughts and symptom levels in 65 recently bereaved people who generated counterfactual thoughts about the loss-event. Moderator analyses assessed the unicity of significant effects in the previous step, by comparing these effects in 59 people generating loss-related counterfactuals with those in 59 propensity-score matched participants generating counterfactuals about other negative life-events. Multivariate analyses showed that nonreferent upward counterfactuals were uniquely strongly positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms concurrently. Self-referent upward counterfactuals were uniquely positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms longitudinally. Moderator analyses confirmed that thinking about how one’s (in)actions could prevent a death uniquely exacerbated prolonged grief and depression severity. Prolonged grief treatment may be improved by targeting self-blame and guilt.     

Effect of Motivational Goals on the Causal Realism of Counterfactual Thoughts

Counterfactual thinking refers to mental comparisons of reality with imagined alternatives of it. The “functional view” of counterfactual thinking suggests that upward counterfactuals (which improve on reality) serve a preparative function and downward counterfactuals (which worsen reality) serve an affective function. This view presumes that people generate counterfactuals that focus on cause(s) that have actually produced the negative outcomes. The two experiments reported here demonstrate that people spontaneously manipulate the causal content of their counterfactuals, depending on their motivational goals. Specifically, it was found that when people aim to feel better about a poor decision they generate less realistic (upward) counterfactuals, experience less negative affect and tend to attribute the outcome to less controllable causes than when they aim to learn from their experience. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions (“The Recognition Thesis”) and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us (“The Valuers Like Us Thesis”)—but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife (“The Human Form Thesis”).     

Counterfactuals and Context-Sensitivity

It is commonly agreed that when evaluating the validity of an argument involving context-sensitive expressions, the context should be held fixed. In their 2008 essay “Counterfactuals and Context,” Brogaard and Salerno argue further that context should be held fixed when evaluating an argument involving counterfactuals for validity, since, as many will agree, counterfactuals are context-sensitive. In the present paper, it will however be argued that Brogaard and Salerno fail to distinguish between two different roles that context plays in determining the meaning of a given counterfactual. If they were fully aware of the distinction between these two roles played by context, they might propose a contextualist approach to counterfactuals, as has been developed by Ichikawa in his 2011 paper “Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.”     

Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as

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Moral principles as moral dispositions

What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena “falling within their scope,” support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary connections” between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or “lawlike” moral generalizations.     

Strategic behavior and counterfactuals

The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players' beliefs would eventually converge.I wish to thank Michael Bacharach, In-Koo Cho, William Harper, Aanund Hylland, Isaac Levi, Wolfgang Spohn, Tommy Tan and two anonymous referees for many useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from National Science Foundation grant SES 87-10209 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Elusive Counterfactuals

I offer a novel solution to the problem of counterfactual skepticism: the worry that all contingent counterfactuals without explicit probabilities in the consequent are false. I argue that a specific kind of contextualist semantics and pragmatics for would‐ and might‐counterfactuals can block both central routes to counterfactual skepticism. One, it can explain the clash between would‐ and might‐counterfactuals as in: (1) If you had dropped that vase, it would have broken. and (2) If you had dropped that vase, it might have safely quantum tunneled to China. Two, it can explain why counterfactuals like (1) can be true despite the fact that quantum tunneling worlds are among the most similar worlds. I further argue that this brand of contextualism accounts for the data better than other existing solutions to the problem.     

Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation

This article defends the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer. Against Bogen, I argue that counterfactual claims concerning what would happen under interventions are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world. I also argue, against both Machamer and Bogen, that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to capture the notions like causal relevance and causal mechanism. Contrary to what both authors suppose, counterfactuals are not “unscientific”—a substantial tradition within statistics and the causal modelling literature makes heavy use of them.     

Counterfactuals

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The influence of clause order,congruency, and probability on the processing of conditionals

Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., “if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow”) and q, if p (e.g., “I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill”). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low-probability statements relative to high-probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability.     

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On the Risks of Recycling Because of Guilt: An Examination of the Consequences of Introjection1

The present study sought to examine the influence of introjected beliefs on individuals’ vulnerability to counterattitudinal arguments. University students’ reasons for engaging in proenvironmental behaviors were assessed prior to their reading excerpts from a counterattitudinal article. The excerpts were written by a personally attractive or unattractive author and contained either weak or strong arguments against recycling. Our results show that individuals who were highly introjected about recycling (e.g., “I recycle because I would feel guilty if I didn't”) were influenced by the personal attractiveness of the source but not by the strength of the specific arguments. Specifically, a thought‐listing procedure revealed that introjection was associated with generating more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments about the anti‐recycling message when the author was personally attractive than when he was unattractive.     

Causal conditionals and counterfactuals

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Theory of mind finds its Piagetian perspective: why alternative naming comes with understanding belief

In the last of a series of experiments 48 3–5-year old children were tested on an alternative naming game with “synonyms,” e.g., if puppet calls the depicted item a “rabbit” the child has to call it a “bunny,” or the child has to judge puppet’s performance when roles are reversed. The game was also played with categories (rabbit–animal), name/colour (rabbit–black), colour/colour (black–white), and part/part (head–tail). The younger children (≤3.5 years) had severe problems with “synonyms” and categories (alternative names for the items, <10% correct), but not with names and colours, only colours, or only parts (>80% correct). Children’s increasing success with age on the alternative names tasks was closely paralleled (.53≤r≤.72) by their mastery of the false belief task in which they had to predict that a mistaken story character would look for a desired object in the wrong location. For explaining the synchrony between alternative naming and understanding false belief we draw on the Piagetian idea that children come to represent perspective at some point in their development. To apply this idea to the alternative naming game we draw on the philosophical discussion about sortals (terms that specify what sort of object something is) creating perspective differences.     

The effects of information processing complexity and interpersonal cue availability on strategic play in a mixed-motive game1

A 60-trial iterated PDG was played by 24 male undergraduates. Half were Abstract Information Processors, and half were Concrete Information Processors. In addition, half of the subject pairs played the game face-to-face, while in the other pairs the game was played in separate cubicles. Rather than allowing for free play, the subjects were given the illusion of playing against one another when in reality they all played against a simulation program. It was found that concrete subjects cooperated most in the presence of another player, and competed most when not facing him. This was apparently due to the tendency for the concrete players to be “caught” by the cooperative pull of the face-to-face condition. The abstract subjects tended to use information-seeking strategies in both conditions. When the information was irrelevant to the game (e.g., presence of a false “partner”) the abstract players did not maximize to the same degree as when the feedback was more meaningful.