THERE ARE TWO WORD-LENGTH EFFECTS IN VERBAL SHORT-TERM MEMORY:

Abstract— In the word-length effect (WLE), lists of shorter words are better recalled than lists of longer words This effect a fundamental to decay-based theories of verbal short-term memory, such as the phonological loop theory (Baddeley, 1986) The WLE has been attributed to the time taken to articulate words, not their structure, a critical point in the debate between decay and interference theories However, this article, we show that the traditional WLE comprises two opposed effects an advantage for words spoken more quickly (short words in terms of duration) and an advantage for words with more elements (long words in terms of complexity) We also report two interactions a disadvantage for a midlist change in duration and an advantage for a midlist change in complexity These results contradict simple decay- based theories and establish the importance of interference in short- term memory We discuss whether decay is also required     

ON WHAT THERE IS

Abstract: This paper programmatically outlines a case for “nominalism”. If brown and colored are so related logically that being colored is nothing over and above being brown, then whatever “exists”other than concreta is nothing over and above concreta. Possibilities of rain and “universals” like the shape, circularity (= the logical possibility of being so shaped), lack “existence” in another sense. (“There are things that don't exist” shows that ‘there are’ is used even more broadly than ‘there exist’.) The univocity of ‘exist’ is disproved by “A prime number between 6 and 10 exists” being analytic despite the invalidity of ontological arguments.     

THERE MUST BE BLOOD

It is argued that in the effective psychotherapy of patients suffering with severe trauma, there is always blood that is shed. This blood may be metaphorical but is often literal. In its absence, it is unlikely that anything of real value has occurred.     

BRUTE FACTS,THE NECESSITY OF IDENTITY,AND THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES

In ‘Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Della Rocca argues that any counterexample to the PII would involve ‘a brute fact of non‐identity [. . .] not grounded in any qualitative difference.’ I respond that Adams's so‐called Continuity Argument against the PII does not postulate qualitatively inexplicable brute facts of identity or non‐identity if understood in the context of Kripkean modality. One upshot is that if the PII is understood to quantify over modal as well as non‐modal properties, the qualitative explicability of numerical distinctness requires not the PII but a principle of the identity of necessary indiscernibles.     

IS THERE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY?

It is widely held that there is a legal right to privacy that plays such a central role in a number of important US Supreme Court decisions. There is however a great deal of dispute about whether there is a moral right to privacy and if there is, what grounds the right. Before this can be determined, we must be clear about the nature of privacy, something that is not clearly understood and that, as we shall see, is often confused with the right to privacy. I shall begin with a critical discussion of various views about the nature of privacy. I shall then present my own account, and show how it meets the objections that have been raised against other views. Lastly, I shall close with a discussion about whether privacy is a moral right.     

ARE INTENTIONS REASONS?

Abstract:   This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in tie-break situations.